1. Article V of the Constitution implies that amendments
submitted thereunder must be ratified, if at all, within some
reasonable time after their proposal. Pp.
256 U. S. 371,
256 U. S.
374.
2. Under this Article, Congress, in proposing an amendment, may
fix a reasonable time for ratification. P.
256 U. S.
375.
3. The period of seven years, fixed by Congress in the
resolution proposing the Eighteenth Amendment was reasonable. P.
256 U. S.
376.
4. The Eighteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution on
January 16, 1919, when, as the Court notices judicially, its
ratification in the state legislatures was consummated, not on
January 29, 1919, when the ratification was proclaimed by the
Secretary of State. P.
256 U. S.
376.
5. As this Amendment, by its own terms, was to go into effect
one year after being ratified, §§ 3 and 26, Title II, of the
National Prohibition Act, which, by § 21, Title III, were to be in
force from and after the effective date of the Amendment, were in
force on January 16, 1920. P.
256 U. S.
376.
262 F. 563 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 256 U. S. 370
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Ex parte Dillon, 262 F. 563. The petitioner
was in custody under § 26 of Title II of the National Prohibition
Act, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, on a charge of transporting intoxicating
liquor in violation of § 3 of that title, and by his petition
sought to be discharged on several grounds, all but two of which
were abandoned after the decision in
National Prohibition
Cases, 253 U. S. 350. The
remaining grounds are, first, that the Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, to enforce which Title II of the act was adopted, is
invalid, because the congressional
Page 256 U. S. 371
resolution, 40 Stat. 1050, proposing the amendment declared that
it should be inoperative unless ratified within seven years; and,
secondly, that, in any event, the provisions of the act which the
petitioner was charged with violating, and under which he was
arrested, had not gone into effect at the time of the asserted
violation nor at the time of the arrest.
The power to amend the Constitution and the mode of exerting it
are dealt with in Article V, which reads:
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in
either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of
this Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three
fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by the Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be
made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth
section of the first article, and that no state, without its
consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate."
It will be seen that this article says nothing about the time
within which ratification may be had -- neither that it shall be
unlimited nor that it shall be fixed by Congress. What then is the
reasonable inference or implication? Is it that ratification may be
had at any time, as within a few years, a century, or even a longer
period, or that it must be had within some reasonable period which
Congress is left free to define? Neither the debates in the federal
convention which framed the Constitution nor those in the state
conventions which ratified it shed any light on the question.
The proposal for the Eighteenth Amendment is the
Page 256 U. S. 372
first in which a definite period for ratification was fixed.
[
Footnote 1] Theretofore,
twenty-one amendments had been proposed by Congress and seventeen
of these had been ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of
the states, some within a single year after their proposal and all
within four years. Each of the remaining four had been ratified in
some of the states, but not in a sufficient number. [
Footnote 2] Eighty years after the partial
ratification of one, an effort was made to complete its
ratification, and the legislature of Ohio passed a joint resolution
to that end, [
Footnote 3] after
which the effort was abandoned. Two, after ratification in one less
than the required number of states had lain dormant for a century.
[
Footnote 4] The other,
proposed March 2, 1861, declared:
"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will
authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere,
within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said state.
[
Footnote 5]"
Its principal purpose was to protect slavery, and, at the time
of its proposal and partial ratification, it was a subject of
absorbing interest, but after the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment, it was generally forgotten. Whether an amendment
Page 256 U. S. 373
proposed without fixing any time for ratification, and which,
after favorable action in less than the required number of states,
had lain dormant for many years, could be resurrected and its
ratification completed had been mooted on several occasions, but
was still an open question.
These were the circumstances in the light of which Congress, in
proposing the Eighteenth Amendment, fixed seven years as the period
for ratification. Whether this could be done was questioned at the
time and debated at length, but the prevailing view in both houses
was that some limitation was intended, and that seven years was a
reasonable period. [
Footnote
6]
That the Constitution contains no express provision on the
subject is not, in itself, controlling, for, with the Constitution
as with a statute or other written instrument, what is reasonably
implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed. [
Footnote 7] An examination of Article V
discloses that it is intended to invest Congress with a wide range
of power in proposing amendments. Passing a provision long since
expired, [
Footnote 8] it
subjects this power to only two restrictions: one, that the
proposal shall have the approval of two-thirds of both houses, and
the other excluding any amendment which will deprive any state,
without
Page 256 U. S. 374
its consent, of its equal suffrage in the Senate. [
Footnote 9] A further mode of proposal -- as
yet never invoked -- is provided, which is that, on the application
of two-thirds of the states, Congress shall call a convention for
the purpose. When proposed in either mode, amendments, to be
effective, must be ratified by the legislatures or by conventions
in three-fourths of the states, "as the one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Congress." Thus, the people of
the United States, by whom the Constitution was ordained and
established, have made it a condition to amending that instrument
that the amendment be submitted to representative assemblies in the
several states and be ratified in three-fourths of them. The plain
meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have the sanction
of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power,
acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that ratification
by these assemblies in three-fourths of the states shall be taken
as a decisive expression of the people's will and be binding on
all. [
Footnote 10]
We do not find anything in the article which suggests that an
amendment, once proposed, is to be open to ratification for all
time, or that ratification in some of the states may be separated
from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find
that which strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and
ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding
steps
Page 256 U. S. 375
in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are
not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only when there
is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be
proposed, the reasonable implication being that, when proposed,
they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the
people, and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the
states, there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently
contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the
people in all sections at relatively the same period, which, of
course, ratification scattered through a long series of years would
not do. These considerations and the general purport and spirit of
the article lead to the conclusion expressed by Judge Jameson
[
Footnote 11]
"that an alteration of the Constitution proposed today has
relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if
not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to
exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted
upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress."
That this is the better conclusion becomes even more manifest
when what is comprehended in the other view is considered; for,
according to it, four amendments proposed long ago-two in 1789, one
in 1810 and one in 1861 -- are still pending and in a situation
where their ratification in some of the states many years since by
representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be
effectively supplemented in enough more states to make
three-fourths by representatives of the present or some future
generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and, in
our opinion, it is quite untenable. We conclude that the fair
inference or implication from Article V is that the ratification
must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.
Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable
Page 256 U. S. 376
limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification we
entertain no doubt. As a rule, the Constitution speaks in general
terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail
as the public interests and changing conditions may require,
[
Footnote 12] and Article V
is no exception to the rule. Whether a definite period for
ratification shall be fixed, so that all may know what it is and
speculation on what is a reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our
opinion, a matter of detail which Congress may determine as an
incident of its power to designate the mode of ratification. It is
not questioned that seven years, the period fixed in this instance,
was reasonable if power existed to fix a definite time; nor could
it well be questioned considering the periods within which prior
amendments were ratified.
The provisions of the act which the petitioner was charged with
violating and under which he was arrested (Title II, §§ 3, 26) were
by the terms of the act (Title III, § 21) to be in force from and
after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment should go into effect,
and the latter, by its own terms, was to go into effect one year
after being ratified. Its ratification, of which we take judicial
notice, was consummated January 16, 1919. [
Footnote 13] That the Secretary of State did not
proclaim its ratification until January 29, 1919, [
Footnote 14] is not material, for the date
of its consummation, and not that on which it is proclaimed,
controls. It follows that the provisions of the act with which the
petitioner is concerned went into effect January
Page 256 U. S. 377
16, 1920. His alleged offense and his arrest were on the
following day, so his claim that those provisions had not gone into
effect at the time is not well grounded.
Final order affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Some consideration had been given to the subject before, but
without any definite action. Cong.Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2771;
40th Cong.3d Sess. 912, 1040, 1309-1314.
[
Footnote 2]
Watson on the Constitution, vol. 2, pp. 1676-1679; House Doc.
54th Cong.2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, p. 300.
[
Footnote 3]
House Doc. 54th Cong.2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, p. 317 (No. 243);
Ohio Senate Journal, 1873, pp. 590, 666, 667, 678; Ohio House
Journal, 1873, pp. 848, 849. A committee charged with the
preliminary consideration of the joint resolution reported that
they were divided in opinion on the question of the validity of a
ratification after so great a lapse of time.
[
Footnote 4]
House Doc. 54th Cong.2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, pp. 300, 320 (No.
295), 329 (No. 399).
[
Footnote 5]
12 Stat. 251; House Doc. 54th Cong.2d Sess. No. 353, pt. 2, pp.
195-197, 363 (No. 931), 369 (No. 1025).
[
Footnote 6]
Cong.Rec. 65th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 5648-5651, 5652-5653,
5658-5661; 2d Sess. pp. 423-425, 428, 436, 443, 444, 445-446, 463,
469, 477-478.
[
Footnote 7]
United States v.
Babbit, 1 Black 55,
66 U. S. 61;
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651,
110 U. S. 658;
McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651,
168 U. S. 672;
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.
S. 437,
199 U. S. 451;
Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9,
231 U. S. 24;
The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216.
[
Footnote 8]
Article V, as before shown, contained a provision that
"no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and
fourth clauses in the ninth § of the first article."
One of the clauses named covered the migration and importation
of slaves, and the other deals with direct taxes.
[
Footnote 9]
When the federal convention adopted Article V, a motion to
include another restriction forbidding any amendment whereby a
state, without its consent, would "be affected in its internal
police" was decisively voted down. The vote was: Yeas 3 --
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware; nays 8 -- New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia. Elliott's Debates, vol. 5, pp. 551,
552.
[
Footnote 10]
See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304,
14 U. S.
324-325;
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S.
402-404;
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
19 U. S.
413-414;
Dodge v.
Woolsey, 18 How. 331,
59 U. S.
347-348;
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.
S. 221; Story on the Constitution (5th ed.) §§ 362, 363,
463-465.
[
Footnote 11]
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed., § 585.
[
Footnote 12]
Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304,
14 U. S. 326;
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S.
407.
[
Footnote 13]
Sen.Doc. No. 169, 66th Cong.2d Sess.; Ark.Gen. Acts 1919, p.
512; Ark.House Journal, 1919, p. 10; Ark.Sen. Journal, 1919, p. 16;
Wyo.Sen. Journal, 1919, pp. 26, 27; Wyo.House Journal, 1919, pp.
27, 28; Mo.Sen. Journal, 1919, pp. 17, 18; Mo.House Journal, 1919,
p. 40.
[
Footnote 14]
40 Stat. 1941.