The jurisdiction of this Court to review a judgment of a state
court the effect of which is to deny a federal right cannot be
avoided by placing such judgment on nonfederal grounds which are
plainly untenable. P.
253 U. S.
22.
Certain allotments belonging to Indians in Oklahoma, which by
federal right were exempt from taxation, were assessed by county
officials, while suits, of which they had full knowledge and in one
of which they were defendants, were being litigated in behalf of
all such allottees, to maintain the exemption (
Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S.
Page 253 U. S. 18
665), and, in response to demands, accompanied by threats of
advertisement and sale which were carried out in other case, the
allottees paid the taxes to avoid such sales and the imposition of
heavy penalties, but did so under protest, denying the validity of
the taxation.
Held:
(1) That the payment were clearly made under compulsion, and
that no statutory authority was necessary to enable or require the
county to refund the money (p.
253 U. S.
23).
(2) The fact that part of the money, after collection, was paid
over by the county to the state and other municipalities, and the
absence of a state statute making the county liable for taxes so
paid, did not alter the county's obligation to restore the full
sums to the allottees. P.
253 U. S.
24.
The application of the state statute of limitations, not having
been discussed by the state court, is not dealt with here or
affected by the decision. P.
253 U. S. 25.
68 Okla. ___ reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding by and on behalf of Coleman J. Ward and
sixty-six other Indians to recover moneys alleged to have been
coercively collected from them by Love County, Oklahoma, as taxes
on their allotments which, under the laws and Constitution of the
United States, were nontaxable. The county commissioners disallowed
the claim, and the claimants appealed to the district court of the
county. There, the claimants' petition was challenged by a
demurrer, which was overruled,
Page 253 U. S. 19
and the county elected not to plead further. A judgment for the
claimants followed, and this was reversed by the supreme court.
Board of Commr's of Love County v. Ward, 173 P. 1050. The
case is here on writ of certiorari. 248 U.S. 556.
The claimants, who were members of the Choctaw Tribe and wards
of the United States, received their allotments out of the tribal
domain under a congressional enactment of 1898, which subjected the
right of alienation to certain restrictions and provided that "the
lands allotted shall be nontaxable while the title remains in the
original allottee, but not to exceed twenty-one years from date of
patent." C. 517, 30 Stat. 507. In the Act of 1906, enabling
Oklahoma to become a state, Congress made it plain that no
impairment of the rights of property pertaining to the Indians was
intended, c. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, and the state included in its
Constitution a provision exempting from taxation
"such property as may be exempt by reason of treaty
stipulations, existing between the Indians and the United States
government, or by federal laws, during the force and effect of such
treaties or federal laws."
Article 10, § 6. Afterwards Congress, by an Act of 1908, removed
the restrictions on alienation as to certain classes of allottees,
including the present claimants, and declared that all land from
which the restrictions were removed "shall be subject to taxation,
. . . as though it were the property of other persons than
allottees." C. 199, §§ 1, 4, 35 Stat. 312.
Following the last enactment, the officers of Love and other
counties began to tax the allotted lands from which restrictions on
alienation were removed, and this met with pronounced opposition on
the part of the Indian allottees, who insisted, as they had been
advised, that the tax exemption was a vested property right which
could not be abrogated or destroyed consistently with the
Constitution of the United States. Suits were begun in the state
courts to maintain the exemption and enjoin the
Page 253 U. S. 20
threatened taxation, one of the suits being prosecuted by some
8,000 allottees against the officers of Love and other counties.
The suits were resisted, and the state courts, being of opinion
that the exemption had been repealed by Congress, sustained the
power to tax.
English v. Richardson, 28 Okl. 408;
Gleason v. Wood, 28 Okl. 502;
Choate v. Trapp, 28
Okl. 517. The cases were then brought here, and this Court held
that the exemption was a vested property right which Congress could
not repeal consistently with the Fifth Amendment, that it was
binding on the taxing authorities in Oklahoma, and that the state
courts had erred in refusing to enjoin them from taxing the lands.
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665;
Gleason v. Wood, 224 U. S. 679;
English v. Richardson, 224 U. S. 680.
While those suits were pending, the officers of Love County,
with full knowledge of the suits, and being defendants in one,
proceeded with the taxation of the allotments, demanded of these
claimants that the taxes on their lands be paid to the county,
threatened to advertise and sell the lands unless the taxes were
paid, did advertise and sell other lands similarly situated, and
caused these claimants to believe that their lands would be sold if
the taxes were not paid. So, to prevent such a sale and to avoid
the imposition of a penalty of eighteen percent for which the local
statute provided, these claimants paid the taxes. They protested
and objected at the time that the taxes were invalid, and the
county officers knew that all the allottees were pressing the
objection in the pending suits.
As a conclusion from these facts, the claimants asserted that
the taxes were collected by Love County by coercive means, that
their collection was in violation of a right arising out of a law
of Congress and protected by the Constitution of the United States,
and that the county was accordingly bound to repay the moneys thus
collected. The total amount claimed is $7,833.35, aside from
interest.
Page 253 U. S. 21
Such, in substance, was the case presented by the petition,
which also described each tract that was taxed, named the allottee
from whom the taxes were collected, and stated the amount and date
of each payment.
In reversing the judgment which the district court had given for
the claimants, the supreme court held first, that the taxes were
not collected by coercive means, but were paid voluntarily, and
could not be recovered back, as there was no statutory authority
therefor, and secondly that there was no statute making the county
liable for taxes collected and then paid over to the state and
municipal bodies other than the county -- which, it was assumed,
was true of a portion of these taxes -- and that the petition did
not show how much of the taxes was retained by the county or how
much paid over to the state and other municipal bodies, and
therefore it could not be the basis of any judgment against the
county.
The county challenges our jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss
the writ of certiorari and by way of supporting the motion insists
that the supreme court put its judgment entirely on independent
nonfederal grounds which were broad enough to sustain the
judgment.
As these claimants had not disposed of their allotments and
twenty-one years had not elapsed since the date of the patents, it
is certain that the lands were nontaxable. This was settled in
Choate v. Trapp, supra, and the other cases decided with
it, and it also was settled in those cases that the exemption was a
vested property right arising out of a law of Congress and
protected by the Constitution of the United States. This being so,
the state and all its agencies and political subdivisions were
bound to give effect to the exemption. It operated as a direct
restraint on Love County, no matter what was said in local
statutes. The county did not respect it, but, on the contrary,
assessed the lands allotted to these claimants, placed them on the
county tax roll, and there charged them with taxes like
Page 253 U. S. 22
other property. If a portion of the taxes was to go to the state
and other municipal bodies after collection, which we assume was
the case, it still was the county that charged the taxes against
these lands and proceeded to collect them. Payment of all the taxes
was demanded by the county, and all were paid to it in the
circumstances already narrated.
We accept so much of the supreme court's decision as held that,
if the payment was voluntary, the moneys could not be recovered
back in the absence of a permissive statute, and that there was no
such statute. But we are unable to accept its decision in other
respects.
The right to the exemption was a federal right, and was
specially set up and claimed as such in the petition. Whether the
right was denied, or not given due recognition, by the supreme
court is a question as to which the claimants were entitled to
invoke our judgment, and this they have done in the appropriate
way. It therefore is within our province to inquire not only
whether the right was denied in express terms, but also whether it
was denied in substance and effect, as by putting forward
nonfederal grounds of decision that were without any fair or
substantial support.
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 248 U. S. 67;
Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93,
207 U. S. 99;
Vandalia R. Co. v. South Bend, 207 U.
S. 359,
207 U. S. 367;
Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.
S. 468;
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias,
225 U. S. 246,
225 U. S. 261;
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers' Mutual Canal
Co., 243 U. S. 157,
243 U. S. 164.
And see 66 U. S.
Skelly, 1 Black 436,
66 U. S. 443;
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657,
146 U. S.
683-684;
Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.
S. 135,
143 U. S. 180;
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442,
177 U. S. 447.
Of course, if nonfederal grounds, plainly untenable, may be thus
put forward successfully, our power to review easily may be
avoided.
Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. Co. v. Indiana,
194 U. S. 579,
194 U. S. 589.
With this qualification, it is true that a judgment of a state
court which is put on
Page 253 U. S. 23
independent nonfederal grounds broad enough to sustain it cannot
be reviewed by us. But the qualification is a material one, and
cannot be disregarded without neglecting or renouncing a
jurisdiction conferred by law and designed to protect and maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof.
The facts set forth in the petition, all of which were admitted
by the demurrer whereon the county elected to stand, make it plain,
as we think, that the finding or decision that the taxes were paid
voluntarily was without any fair or substantial support. The
claimants were Indians just emerging from a state of dependency and
wardship. Through the pending suits and otherwise, they were
objecting and protesting that the taxation of their lands was
forbidden by a law of Congress. But, notwithstanding this, the
county demanded that the taxes be paid, and, by threatening to sell
the lands of these claimants and actually selling other lands
similarly situated, made it appear to the claimants that they must
choose between paying the taxes and losing their lands. To prevent
a sale and to avoid the imposition of a penalty of eighteen
percent, they yielded to the county's demand and paid the taxes,
protesting and objecting at the time that the same were illegal.
The moneys thus collected were obtained by coercive means -- by
compulsion. The county and its officers reasonably could not have
regarded it otherwise, much less the Indian claimants.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor,
223 U. S. 280;
Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, supra, p.
223 U. S. 471;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra; Swift
Co. v. United States, 111 U. S. 22,
111 U. S. 29;
Robertson v. Frank Bros. Co., 132 U. S.
17,
132 U. S. 23;
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.
S. 320,
214 U. S. 329.
The county places some reliance on
Lamborn v. County
Commissioners, 97 U. S. 181, and
Railroad v. Commissioners, 98 U. S.
541; but those cases are quite distinguishable in their
facts, and some of the
Page 253 U. S. 24
general observations therein to which the county invites
attention must be taken as modified by the later cases just
cited.
As the payment was not voluntary, but made under compulsion, no
statutory authority was essential to enable or require the county
to refund the money. It is a well settled rule that "money got
through imposition" may be recovered back, and, as this Court has
said on several occasions,
"the obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural
and artificial, and if a county obtains the money or property of
others without authority, the law, independent of any statute, will
compel restitution or compensation."
Marsh v. Fulton
County, 10 Wall. 676,
77 U. S. 684;
City of Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U.
S. 294,
102 U. S.
298-299;
Chapman v. County of Douglas,
107 U. S. 348,
107 U. S. 355.
To say that the county could collect these unlawful taxes by
coercive means and not incur any obligation to pay them back is
nothing short of saying that it could take or appropriate the
property of these Indian allottees arbitrarily, and without due
process of law. Of course, this would be in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which binds the county as an agency of the
state.
If it be true, as the supreme court assumed, that a portion of
the taxes was paid over, after collection, to the state and other
municipal bodies, we regard it as certain that this did not alter
the county's liability to the claimants. The county had no right to
collect the money, and it took the same with notice that the rights
of all who were to share in the taxes were disputed by these
claimants and were being contested in the pending suits. In these
circumstances, it could not lessen its liability by paying over a
portion of the money to others whose rights it knew were disputed
and were no better than its own.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, supra, p.
223 U. S. 287.
In legal contemplation, it received the money for the use and
benefit of the claimants, and should respond to them
accordingly.
Page 253 U. S. 25
The county calls attention to the fact that in the demurrer to
the petition the statute of limitation (probably meaning § 1570,
Rev.Laws 1910) was relied on. This point was not discussed by the
supreme court, and we are not concerned with it beyond observing
that, when the case is remanded it will be open to that court to
deal with the point as to the whole claim or any item in it as any
valid local law in force when the claim was filed may require.
Motion to dismiss denied.
Judgment reversed.
