Appellants' suits to enjoin the Postmaster General from
interfering with their cable properties upon the ground that
requisition of these by the President, followed by assumption of
possession and control by the defendant, was in excess or abuse of
the power given by the Joint Resolution of July 16, 1918, c. 154,
40 Stat. 904, and not attended by adequate provision for
compensation, became moot when, by the President's authority, the
properties were restored to them, together with the revenues,
admittedly sufficient compensation, derived therefrom during
government operation. P.
250 U. S.
362.
Apprehension that the alleged wrongs may be repeated and that
the revenues may be claimed by the United States does not preserve
the justiciable quality of these cases.
Id.
The dismissal of the bills by the district court for want of
equity, upon a holding that compensation was adequately provided
for and that the other objections were nonjusticiable was such a
rejection of the appellants' asserted right as necessitates a
reversal with directions to dismiss without prejudice and without
costs.
Id. United States v. Hamburg-American Co.,
239 U. S. 466.
255 F. 99 reversed.
The cases are stated in the opinion.
Page 250 U. S. 361
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By virtue of the Joint Resolution of July 16, 1918, c. 154, 40
Stat. 904, considered in the
Dakota Central Telephone
case,
ante, p.
250 U. S. 163, the
President, by proclamation dated November 2, 1918, 40 Stat. 1872,
assumed control, possession, and supervision
"of each and every marine cable system and every part thereof
owned or controlled and operated by any company or companies
organized and existing under the laws of the United States, or any
state thereof."
As in the case of the telephone lines, the proclamation
conferred authority upon the Postmaster General to carry out its
provisions. In the name of the President, the Postmaster General
then took possession and assumed control of the cable lines owned
or under the control of the two companies which are appellants on
these records. The companies thereupon filed their bills in the
court below to enjoin the Postmaster General or his representatives
from interfering with their property because (1) under the
circumstances alleged, the President had no power to take
possession and control of the cable lines; (2) if he had such
power, he was not justified in exerting it under the conditions
stated, and (3) as the result of the failure to provide adequate
compensation, the taking of the cable lines was void for repugnancy
to the Constitution. These propositions were based upon elaborate
averments concerning the subject matter. On motion of the
defendant, the bills were dismissed for want of equity. The court
held that as, under the facts admitted, the first two propositions
raised no question of power, but only charged a wrongful exercise
of a discretion vested, they stated no ground for relief, as the
subject was not justiciable, and that, as to the third proposition,
there was no equity in the bill because the provision
Page 250 U. S. 362
made for compensation met the constitutional requirement.
By appeals, the cases were brought here, and were argued and
submitted in March last. While they were under advisement, the
United States directed attention to the fact that, by authority of
the President, all the cable lines with which the two corporations
were concerned, and to which the bills related, had been turned
over to and had been accepted by the corporations, and the
government hence had no longer any interest in the controversy. As
the result of submitting an inquiry to counsel as to whether the
cases had become moot, that result is admitted by the United
States, but in a measure is disputed by the appellants for the
following reasons: first, it is said that, as the taking over of
the lines by the President was wholly unwarranted and without any
public necessity whatever, there is ground to fear that they may
again be wrongfully taken unless these cases now proceed to a
decree condemning the original wrong, and second, that, although it
is true that, during the operation of the property while under the
control of the government, all the revenues derived from it were
separately kept and have been returned to the owners of the
property -- a result which financially is satisfactory to them --
nevertheless, unless there is a decree in this case, the owners can
feel no certitude that the revenues may not be claimed from them by
the United States in the future.
But we are of opinion that these anticipations of possible
danger afford no basis for the suggestion that the cases now
present any possible subject for judicial action, and hence it
results that they are wholly moot, and must be dismissed for that
reason. In giving effect, however, to that conclusion, we are of
opinion that the decree below, which in substance rejected the
rights asserted by the complainants, ought not to be allowed to
stand, but, on the contrary, following the well established
precedents (
United
Page 250 U. S. 363
States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Co., 239 U.
S. 466;
United States v. American-Asiatic Steamship
Co., 242 U. S. 537),
the decrees below should be reversed and the cases remanded to the
lower court with directions to set aside the decrees and to
substitute decrees dismissing the bills without prejudice and
without costs, because the controversy which they involve has
become moot and is no longer therefore a subject appropriate for
judicial action.
And it is so ordered.