There is no presumption in a criminal case that the accused is
of good character.
A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a
disguise for another principle, means that common experience shows
the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the
truth.
The district court in a criminal trial is not bound by the rules
of evidence as they stood in 1789.
Rosen v. United States,
ante, 245 U. S. 467.
240 F. 320 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
The petitioner was tried for introducing whiskey from without
the state into that part of Oklahoma that formerly was within the
Indian Territory. He was convicted and sentenced to fine and
imprisonment. Material error at the trial is alleged because the
court refused to instruct the jury that the defendant was presumed
to be a person of good character, and that the supposed presumption
should be considered as evidence in favor of the accused, with some
further amplifications not necessary to be repeated. The court did
instruct the jury that the defendant
Page 245 U. S. 560
was presumed to be innocent of the charge until his guilt was
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the presumption
followed him throughout the trial until so overcome. The circuit
court of appeals sustained the court below. 240 F. 320. This
judgment was in accordance with a carefully reasoned earlier
decision in the same circuit,
Price v. United States, 218
F. 149, with an acute statement in
United States v. Smith,
217 F. 839, and with numerous state cases and textbooks. But, as
other Circuit courts of Appeal had taken a different view,
Mullen v. United States, 106 F. 892;
Garst v. United
States, 180 F. 339, 344-345, also taken by other cases and
textbooks, it becomes necessary for this Court to settle the
doubt.
Obviously the character of the defendant was a matter of fact,
which, if investigated, might turn out either way. It is not
established as matter of law that all persons indicted are men of
good character. If it were a fact regarded as necessarily material
to the main issues, it would be itself issuable, and the government
would be entitled to put in evidence whether the prisoner did so or
not. As the government cannot put in evidence except to answer
evidence introduced by the defense, the natural inference is that
the prisoner is allowed to try to prove a good character for what
it may be worth, but that the choice whether to raise that issue
rests with him. The rule that, if he prefers not to go into the
matter, the government cannot argue from it would be meaningless if
there were a presumption in his favor that could not be attacked.
For the failure to put on witnesses, instead of suggesting
unfavorable comment, would only show the astuteness of the
prisoner's counsel. The meaning must be that character is not an
issue in the case unless the prisoner chooses to make it one;
otherwise he would be foolish to open the
Page 245 U. S. 561
door to contradiction by going into evidence when, without it,
good character would be incontrovertibly presumed.
Addison v.
People, 193 Ill. 405, 419.
Our reasoning is confirmed by the fact that the right to
introduce evidence of good character seems formerly to have been
regarded as a favor to prisoners, McNally, Evidence, 320, which
sufficiently implies that good character was not presumed. In
reason, it should not be. A presumption upon a matter of fact, when
it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that
common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that
courts may notice the truth. Whatever the scope of the presumption
that a man is innocent of the specific crime charged, it cannot be
said that, by common experience, the character of most people
indicted by a grand jury is good.
It is argued that the court was bound by the rules of evidence
as they stood in 1789. That those rules would not be conclusive is
sufficiently shown by
Rosen v. United States, ante,
245 U. S. 467. But
it is safe to believe that the supposed presumption is of later
date, of American origin, and comes from overlooking the
distinction between this and the presumption of innocence and from
other causes not necessary to detail.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissents.