The Supreme Court of Ohio, after refusing to review a judgment
of the Ohio Court of Appeals by certiorari, dismissed a writ of
error to the judgment for want of jurisdiction.
Held that,
under Jud.Code § 237, the writ of this Court ran properly to the
court of appeals.
Stratton v. Stratton, 239 U. S.
55.
In a controversy in the courts of Ohio over the right of one
corporation to condemn land of another,
held that the
existence of the petitioning corporation, its right to condemn, its
inability to agree as to compensation to be paid for the property,
and the necessity for the appropriation were matters depending
purely on the local law.
It not appearing otherwise whether the judgment of the Ohio
Court of Appals was based on provisions of local law or upon a
question which was raised under the federal Constitution,
semble that the action of the supreme court of the state
in dismissing a writ of error to the judgment for want of
jurisdiction, upon the express ground that no question under the
state or federal constitutions was involved in the judgment, would
warrant this Court in concluding that the judgment had a nonfederal
basis only.
Where the judgment of a state court may rest upon either a
federal or a nonfederal ground, and the basis actually adopted does
not appear by the state court's opinion or otherwise, this Court
has no jurisdiction to review.
Dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 244 U. S. 301
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court:
The Cuyahoga River Power Company, plaintiff in error, was
chartered under the laws of Ohio to build and maintain a system of
dams, canals, and locks in the Big Cuyahoga river for the
generation of electricity for light, heat, and other purposes. The
corporation was granted authority to acquire by condemnation or
purchase property necessary for the conduct of its business. In
July, 1911, the Power Company commenced this action against the
Northern Realty Company, one of the defendants in error, to condemn
a large tract of land owned by it adjacent to the river. After the
suit was brought, this land was sold by the defendant company and
was ultimately acquired by the Northern Ohio Traction & Light
Company, chartered by the state to operate an interurban electric
railway, and upon the land thus bought by it after the commencement
of the suit that company, for its charter purposes, built and was
operating two large power plants.
Upon its own motion, the Traction Company was made a party to
the pending suit for expropriation. In conformity with the Ohio
statutes regulating the procedure in eminent domain, four
preliminary questions were required to be passed upon by the court
without a jury, and, if decided in favor of the plaintiff, a jury
was then required to determine the question of compensation. The
four preliminary questions were these: (a) the existence of the
petitioning corporation, (b) its right to make the appropriation,
(c) its inability to agree as to the compensation to be paid for
the property, and (d) the necessity for the appropriation. The
defendants not only relied upon these four preliminary
propositions, but also resisted the taking on the ground that a
condemnation of the land under the petition of the Power Company
would be inconsistent
Page 244 U. S. 302
with and destructive of the public use to which the land had
been applied by the Traction Company. The court did not come to a
jury trial on the question of compensation because, after hearing
evidence on the preliminary issues, on motion of the defendants, it
entered an order dismissing the petition, no reason for such
decision having been expressed.
The case was taken to the court of appeals, it being assigned as
error that the trial court had erred in its rulings on the four
preliminary questions, and it was further alleged that the refusal
of the court to order the condemnation of the land upon the theory
that it was not subject to be condemned because, after the suit had
been brought, it had been acquired by the Traction Company and by
it dedicated to a public use, constituted an impairment of the
contract rights of the plaintiff and a taking of its property
without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the
United States. Following a judgment of affirmance without a written
opinion, the Power Company applied to the supreme court of the
state to direct the court of appeals to certify the record for
review, which was denied, and a writ of error which was prosecuted
to the court of appeals from the supreme court was dismissed for
want of jurisdiction for the stated ground that the case did not
"involve any question arising under the Constitution of the United
States or the State of Ohio." Because of the asserted denial of the
alleged federal rights referred to the case is here, the writ of
error being directed to the court of appeals.
Our jurisdiction to review is challenged by a motion to dismiss,
based upon two grounds which we consider separately.
1. It is contended that as, under § 237 of the Judicial Code, we
have jurisdiction to review only final judgments of the highest
court of the state in which a decision could be had, the writ of
error should have been prosecuted to
Page 244 U. S. 303
the Supreme Court of Ohio. In view, however, of the denial by
that court of the application to direct the court of appeals to
certify the record for review, and its order dismissing the writ of
error for want of jurisdiction, the contention is without merit.
Stratton v. Stratton, 239 U. S. 55;
Valley Steamship Company v. Wattawa, 241 U.S. 642;
Second National Bank v. First National Bank, 242 U.
S. 600.
2. It is contended that, conceding the existence of federal
questions in the case, nevertheless, as there were independent
state grounds broad enough to sustain the judgment, there is no
jurisdiction. We think the contention is sound. Despite some
suggestion to the contrary, it is certain that the four preliminary
propositions concerned purely local law, and, if decided adversely
to the plaintiff, were broad enough to sustain the judgment
irrespective of the merits of the federal question which, it is
insisted, was involved in the particular defense made by the
Traction Company concerning the public character of the use to
which it had applied the property and the consequent want of
authority to take it for the benefit of the Power Company, which
was submitted to the court along with the preliminary questions.
Leaving aside any inference sustaining the view that the supreme
court treated the preliminary questions as having been adversely
decided and the constitutional questions as having been eliminated
when it refused to order up the record for review, that conclusion
is sustained by its express declaration, made in refusing the writ
of error, that there was no question under the state or federal
Constitution involved -- a conclusion which, if it had not been in
so many words declared, would by necessary implication have
resulted from the dismissal of the writ of error for want of
jurisdiction, since, under the Constitution and laws of Ohio, if a
question under the Constitution of the United States or the state
constitution had existed, the duty to take jurisdiction would have
been obvious.
Page 244 U. S. 304
But assuming that we are not controlled by the statement of the
Supreme Court of Ohio on this subject, and must determine it upon
our own conception as to what was done by the court whose judgment
is under review, the result would be the same. We so conclude
because, looked at from the point of view of the action of the
trial court and of the court of appeals, the case presents the
single question of what principle is to be applied where, from an
absence of an opinion expressed by the court below, it is
impossible to say whether its judgment was rested upon state
questions adequate to sustain it independent of the federal
questions, or upon such federal questions, both being in the case.
But the rule which controls such a situation has long prevailed,
and was clearly expressed in
Allen v. Arguimbau,
198 U. S. 149,
198 U. S.
154-155, where a writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Florida was dismissed, as follows:
"The supreme court of Florida gave no opinion, and therefore we
are left to conjecture as to the grounds on which the pleas were
held to be bad; but if the judgment rested on two grounds, one
involving a federal question and the other not, or if it does not
appear on which of two grounds the judgment was based, and the
ground independent of a federal question is sufficient, in itself,
to sustain it, this Court will not take jurisdiction.
Dibble v.
Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U. S. 63;
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257;
Johnson v. Risk,
137 U. S.
300;"
Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36;
Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE Day and MR. JUSTICE Clarke took no part in the
consideration and decision of this case.