A state law not contrived in aid of the policies of Congress,
but to enforce a policy of the state differently conceived, cannot
be said to be in aid of interstate commerce.
When Congress has.taken the particular subject matter in hand,
coincidence of a state statute is as ineffective as opposition, and
a
Page 237 U. S. 598
state law on the same subject cannot he sustained as a help to
the federal statute because it goes farther than Congress has seen
fit to go.
A state statute which is a burden on interstate commerce is not
saved by calling it an exercise of police power.
Section 2573, Code of 112, of South Carolina, imposing a penalty
on carriers for failure to settle, or adjust, claims within forty
days is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and is
also in conflict with the provisions of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906 (Carmack
Amendment).
Atlantic Coast Line v. Mazursky, 216 U.
S. 122, distinguished, as that case was decided prior to
the enactment of the Carmack Amendment.
98 S.C. 63 reversed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the
commerce clause of the federal Constitution of certain provisions
of the South Carolina Civil Code of 1912 imposing penalties on
carriers for failure to pay claims within a specified period, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 237 U. S. 600
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action for $14.75, damage to furniture in transit
from High Point, North Carolina, to Varnville, South Carolina,
$4.60 overcharge, and $50 penalty under
Page 237 U. S. 601
a South Carolina statute, Civil Code 1912, § 2573, for a failure
to pay the claims within forty days. The defendant contended that
the law imposing the penalty was invalid under the Act to Regulate
Commerce, especially § 20, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906,
c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 593, known as the Carmack Amendment. The
lower courts gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
Atlantic Coast Line
v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, was
relied upon as still sustaining the law notwithstanding the
amendments of the federal act. 98 S.C. 63.
The defendant (plaintiff in error) received the goods from the
Southern Railway Company and delivered them in damaged condition.
Where the damage was done does not appear. But, by § 2572, in such
cases the initial, intermediate, or terminal carrier who fails
within forty days from notice to inform the notifying party when,
where, and by which carrier the property was damaged is made liable
for the amount of the claim and a penalty of $50, although it may
escape by proof that it used due diligence and was unable to trace
the property, etc. By § 2573, a similar liability is imposed on
carriers for failure to pay claims for freight overcharge or damage
to property while in the possession of such carriers, "within forty
days in case of shipments from without the state, after the filing
of such claim," etc. If the property never came into their
possession, they are remitted to § 2572. It seems to follow from
the decision in this case that the terminal carrier is held for a
loss anywhere along the line, and for the penalty, unless it proves
that the property never came into its possession, etc., or succeeds
in shifting the loss within the forty days allowed. Therefore the
assumption of this court in
Atlantic Coast Line v.
Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122,
216 U. S. 129,
that the statute only concerned property lost or damaged while in
the possession of a
Page 237 U. S. 602
carrier in South Carolina no longer is correct, perhaps because
of amendments in what now is § 2572.
It is true that, in the opinion of the supreme court, the
judgment is spoken of as being for damage done to a shipment "while
in defendant's possession in this state," and it is said that the
statute limits the liability to such damage. But, in view of the
record, this can mean no more than that there is a presumption that
the carrier that fails on notice to point out some other as
responsible is itself in fault. The defendant happened to be the
last carrier of the line, and in many states, including South
Carolina, a so-called presumption has been established at common
law that property starting in good condition remained so until the
latest moment when it could have been harmed. But, while this seems
to have made its first appearance in the guise of a true
presumption of fact, it became, if it was not always, a rule of
substantive law, a rule of convenience, calling on the last carrier
to explain.
Willett v. Southern Ry., 66 S.C. 477, 479;
Moore v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 173 Mass.
335, 337. The rule is stated as a rule of policy in South Carolina,
and the statute makes it still more clearly so, since, with the
limits that we have stated, it applies indifferently to any carrier
in the line, if within the state, according to the accident of the
plaintiff's demand. The case, then, we repeat, is that a carrier in
interstate commerce has been held liable for a loss not shown to
have happened while the goods were in its possession or within the
state, or to have been caused by it, if those facts are now in any
way material, on the strength of a rule of substantive law.
The claims dealt with in
Atlantic Coast Line Co. v.
Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, all
arose before June 29, 1906, the date of the Carmack Amendment. The
South Carolina law has been amended and enlarged in scope since
that decision, but it is less necessary to scrutinize those
changes
Page 237 U. S. 603
than to consider the modifications of the United States law. As
it now stands, that law requires the initial carrier to issue a
through bill of lading, and makes it liable for all damage anywhere
on the route. § 20. By § 1 as amended by the Act of June 18, 1910,
c. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 546, it is made the duty of carriers to
secure the safe transportation and delivery of property subject to
the act upon reasonable terms. As was said in
Missouri, Kans.
& Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U.
S. 412,
234 U. S. 420,
the result of many recent cases there cited, beginning with
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.
S. 491, and coming down through
Boston & Maine
R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, is
that
"the special regulations and policies of particular states upon
the subject of the carrier's liability for loss or damage to
interstate shipments, and the contracts of carriers with respect
thereto, have been superseded."
It is true that, in that case, the inclusion of the attorney's
fee not exceeding $20 in the costs upon judgments for certain small
claims was upheld, although incidentally including some claims
arising out of interstate commerce. But, apart from the effect
being only incidental, the ground relied upon was that the statute
did not "in any way enlarge the responsibility of the carrier" for
loss or "at all affect the ground of recovery, or the measure of
recovery" (pp.
234 U. S.
420-422). The South Carolina act, on the other hand,
extends the liability to losses on other roads in other
jurisdictions, and increases it by a fine difficult to escape. It
overlaps the federal act in respect of the subjects, the grounds,
and the extent of liability for loss. We leave on one side the
remote analogies put forward in the decision of the state court,
as, in our opinion, the cases and principle to which we have
referred are sufficient and direct. We should add that the item for
overcharges also falls under the act of Congress, § 2, as it now
stands, since that section makes the receiving of greater
compensation than is received from others for similar services an
unjust and unlawful discrimination.
Page 237 U. S. 604
The penalty, the only matter that we are considering, was
exacted for a failure to pay both claims, within forty days,
irrespective of the question whether adequate investigation had
been possible, as required by the Interstate Commerce Commission's
rulings, Nos. 462, 236, and 68.
It is suggested that the act is in aid of interstate commerce.
The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress,
but to enforce a state policy differently conceived, and the fine
of $50 is enough to constitute a burden.
Southern Ry. v.
Reid, 222 U. S. 424,
222 U. S. 443.
But that is immaterial. When Congress has taken the particular
subject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as
opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it
attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator
Co., 226 U. S. 426,
226 U. S. 435;
Southern Railway v. Indiana Railroad Commission,
236 U. S. 439,
236 U. S.
446-447. The legislation is not saved by calling it an
exercise of the police power, or by the proviso in the Carmack
Amendment saving the rights of holders of bills of lading under
existing law.
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.
S. 491,
226 U. S.
506-507.
Judgment reversed.