Prior to the amendment of June 18, 1910, § 4 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce lodged in the carrier the right to exercise a
primary judgment, subject to administrative control and ultimate
judicial review, concerning the necessity and propriety of making a
lower rate for the longer than the shorter haul, thus giving the
carrier power to exert its judgment as to things of a public
nature; but the amendment withdrew that right of primary judgment
and lodged it in the Interstate Commerce Commission, to be
exercised on request and after due investigation and consideration
of the public interests concerned and in view of the preference and
discrimination clauses of §§ 2 and 3 of the act.
The long- and short-haul provisions of § 4 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce as amended by the Act of June 18, 1910, are not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as a delegation
of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission beyond the
competency of Congress.
If a statute is constitutional, this Court must be governed by
it and its plain meaning; with the wisdom of Congress in adopting
the statute this Court has nothing to do.
In
Louis. Nash. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.
S. 503, this Court decided that a general enforcement of
the long- and short-haul clause of the Act to Regulate Commerce
would not be repugnant to the Constitution, and will not now
reconsider and overrule that decision.
The Commerce Court had jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
involved in these cases and which refused the request of carriers
to put in force rates requested by them.
Under § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the Act
of June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
make an order, such as that involved in these cases, permitting
a
Page 234 U. S. 477
lower rate for the longer haul but only on terms stated in the
order, establishing zones for the intermediate points and relative
percentages upon which proportionate rates should be based.
191 F. 856 reversed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the long- and
short-haul provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended by
the Act of June 18, 1910, and the validity of an order made in
pursuance thereof by the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated
in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We shall seek to confine our statement to matters which are
essential to the decision of the case. The provisions of § 4 of the
Act to Regulate Commerce, dealing with what is known as the long-
and short-haul clause, the power of
Page 234 U. S. 478
carriers because of dissimilarity of circumstances and
conditions to deviate from the exactions of such clause, and the
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission in relation to such
subjects, were materially amended by the Act of June 18, 1910, c.
309, 36 Stat. 547. Following the form prescribed by the Commission
after the amendment in question, the seventeen carriers who are
appellees on this record made to the Interstate Commerce Commission
their "application for relief from provisions of fourth section of
Amended Commerce Act in connection with the following tariffs." The
tariffs annexed to the applications covered the whole territory
from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast and the Gulf of
Mexico, including all interior points, and embracing practically
the entire country, and the petition asked the Interstate Commerce
Commission for authority to continue all rates shown on the tariffs
from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast, and from the
Pacific coast to the Atlantic seaboard, and to and from interior
points lower than rates concurrently in effect from and to
intermediate points. It was stated in the petition:
"This application is based upon the desire of the interested
carriers to continue the present method of making rates lower at
the more distant points than at the intermediate points, such lower
rates being necessary by reason of competition of various water
carriers and of carriers partly by water and partly by rail
operating from Pacific coast ports to Atlantic seaboard ports;
competition of various water carriers operating to foreign
countries from Pacific coast ports, and competition of the products
of foreign countries with the products of the Pacific coast;
competition of the products of Pacific coast territory with the
products of other sections of the country; competition of Canadian
rail carriers not subject to the interstate commerce act;
competition of the products of Canada moving by Canadian carriers
with the products of the United States; rates established via
Page 234 U. S. 479
the shorter or more direct routes, but applied also via the
longer or more circuitous routes."
After full hearing, the Commission refused to grant
unqualifiedly the prayer of the petition, but entered an order
permitting, in some respects, a charge of a lower rate for the
longer haul to the Pacific coast than was asked for intermediate
points provided a proportionate relation was maintained between the
lower rate for the longer haul to the Pacific coast and the higher
rate to the intermediate points, the proportion to be upon the
basis of percentages which were fixed. For the purposes of the
order in question, the Commission in substance adopted a division
of the entire territory into separate zones, which division had
been resorted to by the carriers for the purposes of the
establishment of the rates in relation to which the petition was
filed. Refusing to comply with this order the carriers commenced
proceedings in the Commerce Court praying a decree enjoining the
enforcement of the fourth section as amended on the ground of its
repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, and of the
order as being, in any event, violative of the amended section as
properly construed. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The
defendants moved to dismiss, and, on the overruling of the motions,
appealed from the interlocutory order, the case being No. 136.
Subsequently, upon the election of the defendants to plead no
further, a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal
being No. 162.
It suffices at this moment to say that all the contentions which
the assignments of error involve and every argument advanced to
refute such contentions, including every argument urged to uphold,
on the one hand, or to overthrow, on the other, the action of the
Commission, as well as every reason relied upon to challenge the
action of the court or to sustain its judgment, are all reducible
to the following propositions:
(a) The absolute want of power of the court below to
Page 234 U. S. 480
deal with the subject involved in the complaint because
controversies concerning the fourth section of the Act to Regulate
Commerce of the nature here presented were, by an express statutory
provision, excluded from the cognizance of the court below. (b)
That, even if this be not the case, the action of the Commission
which was complained of was purely negative, and therefore not
within the cognizance of the court, because not inherently
justiciable. (c) That, correctly interpreting the fourth section,
the order made by the Commission was absolutely void because wholly
beyond the scope of any power conferred by the fourth section as
amended. (d) That even if, in some respects, the order of the
Commission was within the reach of its statutory power, there was
intermingled in the order such an exertion of authority not
delegated as to cause the whole order to be void. (e) That the
order of the Commission was void even if the fourth section be
interpreted as conferring the authority which the Commission
exerted, since, under that assumption, the fourth section as
amended was repugnant to the Constitution.
All the propositions, even including the jurisdictional ones,
are concerned with and depend upon the construction of the fourth
section as amended, and we proceed to consider and pass upon that
subject and every other question in the case under four separate
headings: 1, the meaning of the statute; 2, its constitutionality;
3, the jurisdiction of the court; 4, the validity of the order in
the light of the statute as interpreted.
1.
The meaning of the statute.
We reproduce the section as originally adopted and as amended,
bracketing the words omitted by the amendment and printing in
italics those which were added by the amendment, thus at a glance
enabling the section to be read as it was before and as it now
stands after amendment.
"SEC. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
Page 234 U. S. 481
subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive any
greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of
passengers, or of like kind of property, [under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions,] for a shorter than for a
longer distance over the same line
or route in the same
direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance,
or to charge any greater compensation as a through route than
the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions
of this Act; but this shall not be construed as authorizing
any common carrier within the terms of this Act to charge [and]
or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a
longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the
Interstate Commerce Commission [appointed under the
provisions of this Act], such common carrier may in special cases,
after investigation [by the Commission], be authorized
by the
Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter
distances for the transportation of passengers or property, and the
Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such
designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of
this section [of this Act];
Provided, further, That no rates or
charges lawfully existing at the time of the passage of this
amendatory Act shall be required to be changed by reason of the
provisions of this section prior to the expiration of six months
after the passage of this Act, nor in any case where application
shall have been filed before the Commission, in accordance with the
provisions of this section, until a determination of such
application by the Commission."
"
Whenever a carrier by railroad shall in competition with a
water route or routes reduce the rates on the carriage of any
species of freight to or from competitive points, it shall not be
permitted to increase such rates unless after hearing by the
Interstate Commerce Commission it shall be found that such proposed
increase rests upon changed conditions other than the elimination
of water competition. "
Page 234 U. S. 482
Before considering the amended text, we state briefly some of
the more important requirements of the section before amendment and
the underlying conceptions of private right, of public duty and
policy which it embodied, because to do so will go a long way to
remove any doubt as to the amended text, and will moreover serve to
demonstrate the intent of the legislative mind in enacting the
amendment.
Almost immediately after the adoption of the Act to Regulate
Commerce in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in
considering the meaning of the law and the scope of the duties
imposed on the Commission in enforcing it, reached the conclusion
that the words "under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions" of the fourth section dominated the long- and
short-haul clause and empowered carriers to primarily determine the
existence of the required dissimilarity of circumstances and
conditions, and consequently to exact in the event of such
difference a lesser charge for the longer than was exacted for the
shorter haul, and that competition which materially affected the
rate of carriage to a particular point was a dissimilar
circumstance and condition within the meaning of the act. We say
"primarily" because, of course, it was further recognized that the
authority existing in carriers to the end just stated was subject
to the supervision and control of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in the exertion of the powers conferred upon it by the
statute, and especially in view of the authority stated in the
fourth section. In considering the act comprehensively, it was
pointed out that the generic provisions against preference and
discrimination expressed in the second and third sections of the
act were all-embracing, and were therefore operative upon the
fourth section as well as upon all other provisions of the act. But
it was pointed out that where, within the purview of the fourth
section, it had lawfully resulted that
Page 234 U. S. 483
the lesser rate was charged for a longer than was exacted for a
shorter haul, such exaction, being authorized, could not be a
preference or discrimination and therefore illegal. In re
Louisville & N. R. Co., 1 I.C.C. Rep. 31, 1 I.C.C. 278. These
comprehensive views announced at the inception as a matter of
administrative construction were subsequently sustained by many
decisions of this Court, and to the leading of such cases we refer
in the margin. [
Footnote 1] We
observe, moreover, that, in addition, it came to be settled that,
where competitive conditions authorized carriers to lower their
rates to a particular place, the right to meet the competition by
lowering rates to such place was not confined to shipments made
from the point of origin of the competition, but empowered all
carriers, in the interest of freedom of commerce and to afford
enlarged opportunity to shippers, to accept, if they chose to do
so, shipments to such competitive points at lower rates than their
general tariff rates -- a right which came aptly to be described as
"market competition" because the practice served to enlarge markets
and develop the freedom of traffic and intercourse. It is to be
observed, however, that the right thus conceded was not absolute,
because its exercise was only permitted provided the rates were not
so lowered as to be nonremunerative, and thereby cast an
unnecessary burden upon other shippers.
East Tenn. &c. R.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S.
1. As the statute as thus construed imposed no
obligation to carry to the competitive point at a rate which was
less than a reasonable one, it is obvious that the statute regarded
the rights of private ownership, and sought to impose no duty
conflicting therewith. It is also equally clear that, in permitting
the carrier
Page 234 U. S. 484
to judge primarily of the competitive conditions, and to meet
them at election, the statute lodged in the carrier the right to
exercise a primary judgment concerning a matter of public concern
broader than the mere question of the duty of a carrier to carry
for a reasonable rate, on the one hand, and of the right of the
shipper, on the other, to compel carriage at such rate, since the
power of primary judgment which the statute conferred concerned in
a broad sense the general public interest with reference to both
persons and places -- considerations all of which therefore, in
their ultimate aspects, came within the competency of legislative
regulation. It was apparent that the power thus conferred was
primary, not absolute, since its exertion by the carrier was made
by the statute the subject both of administrative control and
ultimate judicial review. And the establishment of such control, in
and of itself, serves to make manifest the public nature of the
attributes conferred upon the carrier by the original fourth
section. Indeed, that insofar as the statute empowered the carrier
to judge as to the dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions
for the purpose of relief from the long- and short-haul clause, it
but gave the carrier the power to exert a judgment as to things
public, was long since pointed out by this Court.
Texas &
Pac. Railway v. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U.
S. 197,
162 U. S.
218.
With the light afforded by the statements just made, we come to
consider the amendment. It is certain that the fundamental change
which it makes is the omission of the substantially similar
circumstances and conditions clause, thereby leaving the long- and
short-haul clause in a sense unqualified except insofar as the
section gives the right to the carrier to apply to the Commission
for authority "to charge less for longer than for shorter distances
for the transportation of persons or property," and gives the
Commission authority from time to time "to prescribe the extent to
which such designated common carrier may
Page 234 U. S. 485
be relieved from the operation of this section." From the
failure to insert any word in the amendment tending to exclude the
operation of competition as adequate under proper circumstances to
justify the awarding of relief from the long- and short-haul
clause, and there being nothing which minimizes or changes the
application of the preference and discrimination clauses of the
second and third sections, it follows that, in substance, the
amendment intrinsically states no new rule or principle, but simply
shifts the powers conferred by the section as it originally stood
-- that is, it takes from the carriers the deposit of public power
previously lodged in them and vests it in the Commission as a
primary, instead of a reviewing, function. In other words, the
elements of judgment, or, so to speak, the system of law by which
judgment is to be controlled, remains unchanged, but a different
tribunal is created for the enforcement of the existing law. This
being true, as we think it plainly is, the situation under the
amendment is this: power in the carrier primarily to meet
competitive conditions in any point of view by charging a lesser
rate for a longer than for a shorter haul has ceased to exist,
because to do so, in the absence of some authority, would not only
be inimical to the provision of the fourth section, but would be in
conflict with the preference and discrimination clauses of the
second and third sections. But, while the public power, so to
speak, previously lodged in the carrier, is thus withdrawn and
reposed in the Commission, the right of carriers to seek and obtain
under authorized circumstances the sanction of the Commission to
charge a lower rate for a longer than for a shorter haul because of
competition or for other adequate reasons is expressly preserved,
and, if not, is, in any event, by necessary implication, granted.
And, as a correlative, the authority of the Commission to grant on
request the right sought is made by the statute to depend upon the
facts established and the judgment of that body, in the exercise of
a sound
Page 234 U. S. 486
legal discretion, as to whether the request should be granted
compatibly with a due consideration of the private and public
interests concerned, and in view of the preference and
discrimination clauses of the second and third sections.
2.
The alleged repugnancy of the section as amended to the
Constitution.
But if the amendment has this meaning, it is insisted that it is
repugnant to the Constitution for various reasons which,
superficially considered, seem to be distinct, but which really are
all so interwoven that we consider and dispose of them as one. The
argument is that the statute, as correctly construed, is but a
delegation to the Commission of legislative power which Congress
was incompetent to make. But the contention is without merit.
Marshall Field Co. v. Clark, 143 U.
S. 649;
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.
S. 470;
Union Bridge Co. v. United States,
204 U. S. 364;
United States v. Heinszen, 206 U.
S. 370;
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, 210 U. S. 281;
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.
S. 177. We do not stop to review these cases, because
the mere statement of the contention, in the light of its
environment, suffices to destroy it. How can it otherwise be, since
the argument, as applied to the case before us, is this: that the
authority in question was validly delegated so long as it was
lodged in carriers, but ceased to be susceptible of delegation the
instant it was taken from the carriers for the purpose of being
lodged in a public administrative body? Indeed, when it is
considered that, in last analysis, the argument is advanced to
sustain the right of carriers to exert the public power which it is
insisted is not susceptible of delegation, it is apparent that the
contention is self-contradictory, since it reduces itself to an
effort to sustain the right to delegate a power by contending that
the power is not capable of being delegated. In addition, however,
before passing from the proposition, we observe that, when rightly
appreciated, the contention but challenges every decided case since
the
Page 234 U. S. 487
passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887, involving the
rightfulness of the exertion by a carrier of the power to meet
competition as a means of being relieved from the long- and
short-haul clause of the fourth section before its amendment. While
what we have already said answers it, because of its importance, we
notice another contention. As the power of carriers to meet
competition, and the relation of that right to noncompetitive
places, may concern the fortunes of numberless individuals and the
progress and development of many communities, it is said, to permit
authority to be exerted concerning the subject without definite
rules for its exercise will be to destroy the rights of persons and
communities. This danger, the argument proceeds, is not obviated by
declaring that the provisions of the second and third sections as
to undue preference and discrimination apply to the fourth section,
since, without a definition of what constitutes undue preference
and discrimination, no definite rule of law is established, but
whim, caprice, or favor will, in the nature of things, control the
power exerted. And it is argued that this view is not here urged as
the mere result of conjecture, since, in the report of the
Commission in this case, it was declared in unequivocal terms as
the basis of the order entered that the statute vested in the
Commission a wide and undefined discretion by virtue of which it
became its duty to see to it that communities and individuals
obtained fair opportunities, that discord was allayed, and
commercial justice everywhere given full play. Let it be conceded
that the language relied upon would have the far-reaching
significance attributed to it if separated from its context, we
think when it is read in connection with the report of which it but
forms a part, and moreover, when it is elucidated by the action
taken by the Commission, there is no substantial ground for holding
that, by the language referred to, it was entitled to declare that
the fourth section as amended conferred the uncontrolled
Page 234 U. S. 488
exuberance of vague and destructive powers which it is now
insisted was intended to be claimed. In any event, however, we must
be governed by the statute and its plain meaning. After all has
been said, the provisions as to undue preference and
discrimination, while involving, of course, a certain latitude of
judgment and discretion, are no more undefined or uncertain in the
section as amended than they have been from the beginning, and
therefore the argument comes once more to the complaint that,
because public powers have been transferred from the carriers to
the Commission, the wrongs suggested will arise. Accurately testing
this final result of the argument, it is clear that it exclusively
rests upon convictions concerning the impolicy of having taken from
carriers, intimately and practically acquainted as they are with
the complex factors entering into ratemaking, and moreover impelled
to equality of treatment as they must be by the law of
self-interest operating upon them as a necessary result of the
economic forces to which they are subjected, and having lodged the
power in an official administrative body which, in the nature of
things, must act, however conscientiously, from conceptions based
upon a more theoretical and less practical point of view. But this
does not involve a grievance based upon the construction or
application of the fourth section as amended, but upon the wisdom
of the legislative judgment which was brought into play in adopting
the amendment -- a subject with which we have nothing in the world
to do. It is said in the argument on behalf of one of the carriers
that, as in substance and effect the duty is imposed upon the
Commission in a proper case to refuse an application, therefore the
law is void because, in such a contingency, the statute would
amount to an imperative enforcement of the long- and short-haul
clause and would be repugnant to the Constitution. It is conceded
in the argument that it has been directly decided by this Court
that a general enforcement
Page 234 U. S. 489
of the long- and short-haul clause would not be repugnant to the
Constitution (
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky,
183 U. S. 503),
but we are asked to reconsider and overrule the case, and thus
correct the error which was manifested in deciding it. But we are
not in the remotest degree inclined to enter into this inquiry, not
only because of the reasons which were stated in the case itself,
but also because of those already expounded in this opinion, and
for an additional reason, which is that the contention, by
necessary implication, assails the numerous cases which, from the
enactment of the Act to Regulate Commerce down to the present time,
have involved the adequacy of the conditions advanced by carriers
for justifying their departure from the long- and short-haul
clause. We say this because the controversies which the many cases
referred to considered and decided by a necessary postulate
involved an assertion of the validity of the legislative power to
apply and enforce the long- and short-haul clause. How can it be
otherwise, since, if this were not the case, all the issues
presented in the numerous cases would have been merely but moot,
affording therefore no basis for judicial action, since they would
have had back of them no sanction of lawful power whatever.
3.
The jurisdiction of the court.
The argument on this subject is two-fold: (a) that as, by the
act creating the Commerce Court, that court was endowed only with
the jurisdiction "now possessed by circuit courts of the United
States and the judges thereof," and provided that
"nothing contained in this act shall be construed as enlarging
the jurisdiction now possessed by the circuit courts of the United
States or the judges thereof, that is hereby transferred to and
vested in the Commerce Court,"
and as new powers were created by the subsequent amendment of
the fourth section, therefore the Commerce Court had no
jurisdiction. But we pass any extended discussion of
Page 234 U. S. 490
the proposition because it is completely disposed of by the
construction which we have given to the amended section, since that
construction makes it clear that the effect of the amended fourth
section was not to create new powers theretofore nonexisting, but
simply to redistribute the powers already existing and which were
then subject to review. The argument affords another manifestation
of the tendency to which we have already directed attention in this
case to seek to maintain and aggrandize a power by insisting upon
propositions which, if they were accepted, would raise the gravest
question as to the constitutional validity of the asserted power --
a question which we need not at all consider in view of the want of
foundation for the exercise of the power claimed in the light of
the plain meaning of the act to the contrary which we have already
pointed out.
(b) The second contention as to jurisdiction yet further affords
an illustration of the same mental attitude, since it rests upon
the assumption that the order of the Commission refusing to grant
the request of the carrier made under the fourth section was purely
negative, and hence was not subject to judicial inquiry. The
contention therefore presupposes that the power which, from the
beginning, has been the subject of judicial review, by the mere
fact of its transfer to the Commission was made arbitrary. Besides,
the proposition disregards the fact that the right to petition the
Commission conferred by the statute is positive, and while the
refusal to grant it may be in one sense negative, in another and
broader view it is affirmative, since it refuses that which the
statute in affirmative terms declares shall be granted if only the
conditions which the statute provides are found to exist. It is, of
course, true, as pointed out in
Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Illinois Central Railroad, 215 U.
S. 452,
215 U. S. 470,
and since repeatedly applied, that findings of fact made by the
Commission within the scope of its administrative
Page 234 U. S. 491
duties must be accepted in case of judicial review, but that
doctrine, as was also pointed out, does not relieve the courts in a
proper case from determining whether the Constitution has been
violated or whether statutory powers conferred have been
transcended, or have been exercised in such an arbitrary way as to
amount to the exertion of authority not given -- doctrines which
but express the elementary principle that an investiture of a
public body with discretion does not imply the right to abuse, but,
on the contrary, carries which it as a necessary incident the
command that the limits of a sound discretion be not transcended;
which, by necessary implication, carries with it the existence of
judicial power to correct wrongs done by such excess. And, without
pausing to particularly notice it, we observe in passing that what
has just been said is adequate to meet the contention that, as
violations of the fourth section were made criminal, no power
existed to enjoin an order of the Commission made under that,
section because the consequence would be to enjoin criminal
prosecution. The right which, as we have seen, the act gives to
test the validity of orders rendered under the fourth section is
not to be destroyed by a reference to a provision of that section.
The two must be harmoniously enforced.
4.
The validity of the order in the light of the statute as
interpreted.
The order is in the margin. [
Footnote 2] The main insistence is
Page 234 U. S. 492
that there was no power after recognizing the existence of
competition and the right to charge a lesser rate to the
competitive point than to intermediate points to do more than fix a
reasonable rate to the intermediate points -- that is to say that,
under the power transferred to it by the section as amended, the
Commission was limited to
Page 234 U. S. 493
ascertaining the existence of competition, and to authorizing
the carrier to meet it, without any authority to do more than
exercise its general powers concerning the reasonableness of rates
at all points. But this proposition is directly in conflict with
the statute as we have construed it and with the plain purpose and
intent manifested by its enactment. To uphold the proposition, it
would be necessary to say that the powers which were essential to
the vivification and beneficial realization of the authority
transferred had evaporated in the process of transfer, and hence
that the power perished as the result of the act by which it was
conferred. As the prime
Page 234 U. S. 494
object of the transfer was to vest the Commission, within the
scope of the discretion imposed and subject, in the nature of
things, to the limitations arising from the character of the duty
exacted and flowing from the other provisions of the act, with
authority to consider competitive conditions and their relation to
persons and places, necessarily there went with the power the right
to do that by which alone it could be exerted, and therefore a
consideration of the one and the other, and the establishment of
the basis by percentages, was within the power granted. As will be
seen by the order, and as we have already said, for the purpose of
the percentages established zones of influence were adopted, and
the percentages fixed as to such zones varied or fluctuated upon
the basis of the influence of the competition in the designated
areas. As we have pointed out, though somewhat modified, the zones
as thus selected by the Commission were in substance the same as
those previously fixed by the carriers as the basis of the
ratemaking which was included in the tariffs which were under
investigation, and therefore we may put that subject out of view.
Indeed, except as to questions of power, there is no contention in
the argument as to the inequality of the zones or percentages, or
as to any undue preference or discrimination resulting from the
action taken. But, be this as it may, in view of the findings of
the Commission as to the system of rates prevailing in the tariffs
which were before it, of the inequalities and burdens engendered by
such system, of the possible aggrandizement unnaturally beyond the
limits produced by competition in favor of the competitive points
and against other points by the tariff in question -- facts which
we accept, and which indeed are unchallenged -- we see no ground
for saying that the order was not sustained by the facts upon which
it was based, or that it exceeded the powers which the statute
conferred, or transcended the limits of the sound legal discretion
which it lodged in
Page 234 U. S. 495
the Commission when acting upon the subject before it.
It results that the Commerce Court, in enjoining the order of
the Commission, was wrong, and its decree to that end must
therefore by reversed, and the case be remanded to the proper
district court, with directions to dismiss the bill for want of
equity.
Reversed.
*Docket title of these cases: No. 136, United States of America,
Interstate Commerce Commission
et al. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Company
et al., No. 162, United
States of America, Interstate Commerce Commission
et al.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company
et
al.
[
Footnote 1]
Interstate Com. Com. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co., 145 U. S. 263;
Cin., N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Com. Com.,
162 U. S. 184;
Texas & Pac. Railway v. Interstate Com. Com.,
162 U. S. 197;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U.
S. 648;
East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Interstate Com.
Com., 181 U. S. 1.
[
Footnote 2]
"
FOURTH SECTION ORDER NO. 124."
"In the matter of the applications Nos. 205, 342, 343, 344, 349,
350, and 352, on behalf of the Transcontinental Freight Bureau, by
R. H. Countiss, agent, for relief from the provisions of the fourth
section of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended June 18, 1910,
with respect to rates made from eastern points of shipment which
are higher to intermediate points than to Pacific coast
terminals."
"
COMMODITY RATES"
"These applications, as above numbered, on behalf of the
Transcontinental Freight Bureau, ask for authority to continue
rates from eastern points of shipment which are higher to
intermediate points in Canada and in the States of Arizona, New
Mexico, Idaho, California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington, and other states east thereof, than to Pacific coast
terminals."
"Full investigation of the matters and things involved in these
petitions, insofar as they concern westbound commodity rates,
having been had,"
"
It is ordered, That, for the purposes of the
disposition of these applications, the United States shall be
divided into five zones, as described in the following manner:"
(The transcontinental group hereinafter described are as
specified in R. H. Countiss, agent's transcontinental Tariff I.C.C.
No. 929.)
"Zone No. 1 comprises all that portion of the United States
lying west of a line called Line No. 1, which extends in a general
southerly direction from a point immediately east of Grand Portage,
Minnesota; thence southwesterly, along the northwestern shore of
Lake Superior, to a point immediately east of Superior, Wisconsin;
thence southerly, along the eastern boundary of Transcontinental
Group F, to the intersection of the Arkansas and Oklahoma state
line; thence along the west side of the Kansas City Southern
Railway to the Gulf of Mexico."
"Zone No. 2 embraces all territory in the United States lying
east of Line No. 1 and west of a line called Line No. 2, which
begins at the international boundary between the United States and
Canada, immediately west of Cockburn Island in Lake Huron; passes
westerly through the Straits of Mackinaw; southerly through Lake
Michigan to its southern boundary; follows the west boundary of
Transcontinental Group C to Paducah, Kentucky; thence follows the
east side of the Illinois Central Railroad to the southern boundary
of Transcontinental Group C; thence follows the east boundary of
Group C. to the Gulf of Mexico."
"Zone No. 3 embraces all territory in the United States lying
east of Line No. 2 and north of the south boundary of
Transcontinental Group C, and on and west of Line No. 3, which is
the Buffalo Pittsburg line from Buffalo, New York, to Wheeling,
West Virginia, marking the western boundary of Trunk Line Freight
Association territory; thence follows the Ohio River to Huntington,
West Virginia."
"Zone No. 4 embraces all territory in the United States east of
Line No. 3 and north of the south boundary of Transcontinental
Group C."
"Zone No. 5 embraces all territory south and east of
Transcontinental Group C."
"
It is further ordered, (1) That those portions of the
above-numbered applications that request authority to maintain
higher commodity rates from points in Zone No. 1 to intermediate
points than to Pacific coast terminals be, and the same are hereby,
denied, effective November 15, 1911; (2) that petitioners herein
be, and they are hereby, authorized to establish and maintain,
effective November 15, 1911, commodity rates from all points in
zones numbered 2, 3, and 4, as above defined, to points
intermediate to Pacific coast terminals, that are higher to
intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals; provided, that
the rates to intermediate points from points in zones numbered 2,
3, and 4 shall not exceed the rates on the same commodities from
the same points of origin to the Pacific coast terminals by more
than 7 percent from points in Zone No. 2, 15 percent from points in
Zone No. 3, and 25 percent from points in Zone No. 4."
"The commission does not hereby approve any rates that may be
established under this authority, all such rates being subject to
complaint, investigation, and correction if they conflict with any
other provisions of the act."
"By the Commission:"
"[Seal.] JUDSON C. CLEMENTS"
"
Chairman"