A judgment in a suit to quiet title to real property in New
Mexico is not binding on a person or corporation or trustee having
an interest in the premises who could be definitely located and
served with process and who were not joined by name. The court did
not acquire jurisdiction over them.
The statute of New Mexico which, in 1894, permitted unknown
claimant to be joined a defendant as such and to be served by
publication did not relate to parties who could be definitely
located and joined or who were confirmees of the grant including
the property under the Act of June 21, 1860.
In affirming a judgment, an appellate court is not confined to
the ground on which the court below based the judgment.
The full faith and credit clause and statute enacted thereunder
do not apply to judgments rendered by a court having no
jurisdiction
Page 232 U. S. 605
of the parties or subject matter or of the
res in
proceeding
in rem. Thompson v. Thompson,
226 U. S. 551,
distinguished.
A town in New Mexico and its inhabitants are substantial
entities in fact, and in this case have been recognized by Congress
a having rights to be authenticated by a patent. When a town is a
patentee it represents not only individual, but collective,
interests.
Maese v. Herman, 183 U.
S. 572.
Proceedings against some of the inhabitants of a town
held in this case not to bind the other inhabitants
individually, or collectively as a town, on the ground of
privity.
16 N.M. 692 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of statutes of New
Mexico in regard to serving process in real estate action on
unknown defendants and the effect of a judgment based on service by
publication, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Action for mandamus brought by appellants in the District Court
of the County of San Miguel, then in the Territory of New Mexico,
against appellees as trustees of The town of Las Vegas, to require
them to execute a deed or deeds to the property described in the
petition. The appellees filed an answer to the petition and also a
counterclaim. Those papers set out the history of the Las Vegas
grant, preceding and subsequent to its confirmation by the act of
Congress hereinafter referred to and the final patent to the town.
Motions to strike them out were overruled, and demurrers to them
were also overruled. An answer having been filed to the
counterclaim by appellants, portions of which were struck out by
the court
Page 232 U. S. 606
on motion of appellees, after hearing, judgment was rendered
dismissing the petition. The judgment was affirmed by the supreme
court of the territory.
The petition alleges appellants to be the owners in fee simple
and holders of a perfect title to the land described therein, and
that it lies within the boundaries of "the Las Vegas grant." That
they acquired the title thereto between October 4, 1888, and the
July 1, 1894, by purchase from the then owners and occupants of the
several portions comprising the tract, and obtained deeds of
conveyance therefor, and afterwards instituted proceedings in the
District Court of San Miguel County against certain named persons
"and all of the unknown claimants of interests in the lands and
premises" adverse to appellants, to quiet their title to the lands,
and that, on September 15, 1894, a decree was duly entered in the
cause confirming and establishing in them an estate in fee simple
absolute against any and all and every adverse claim of all persons
whomsoever, and quieting and setting at rest the title to the land
against appellees. A copy of the decree is attached to the
petition.
The petition also alleges that the Las Vegas grant was confirmed
by act of Congress on June 21, 1860, to the Town of Las Vegas, and
became thereby segregated from the public domain and the property
of the grantee and its privies.
That Jefferson Reynolds, Eugenio Romero, Charles Ilfeld, Elisha
v. Long, Isidor v. Gallegos, Felix Esquibel, and F. H. Pierce are
the trustees of the town, duly appointed by the District Court of
San Miguel County under and by virtue of an act of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of New Mexico, entitled, "An Act to
Provide for the Management of the Las Vegas Grant, and for Other
Purposes," approved March 12, 1903, and that it was made the duty
of the board of trustees to make, execute, and deliver deeds of
conveyance to all persons who held a
Page 232 U. S. 607
title to any lands of the grant, which became or was perfect or
entitled them to the possession thereof at the time of the
acquisition of New Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or
at any time subsequent thereto.
That appellants made application to the board of trustees to
execute and deliver a deed to them of the tract of land described,
the title to which had become perfected by the decree hereinbefore
specified, but the board declined to recognize the title of
appellants and to issue the deed of conveyance asked for.
Mandamus, directed to the board, was prayed.
The ground of appellants' petition therefore is that they
possess a perfect title established by the suit and decree referred
to which entitled them to a deed from the trustees under the Act of
the Legislative Assembly of March 12, 1903. Laws of New Mexico,
1903, p. 72. That act becomes a factor for consideration. By it the
District Court of San Miguel County is vested with jurisdiction to
manage, control, and administer the land grant. In the exercise of
such jurisdiction, power is conferred to appoint a board of
trustees from among the residents upon the grant. Provision is made
for their organization, and the court is empowered to exercise the
same control over their acts as courts of equity exercise over
receivers. And it is provided that
"this act shall not interfere with or prejudice any vested
rights in and to any of the lands embraced within the bounds of
said Las Vegas grant, or preclude a judicial examination or
adjustment thereof, and it is hereby made the duty of said board of
trustees to make, execute, and deliver deeds of conveyance to any
and all persons who hold a title to any such lands, which became or
was perfect or entitled them to the possession thereof at the time
of the acquisition of New Mexico, under the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo or at any other time subsequent thereto."
By § 9, the board has power, under the direction of the
Page 232 U. S. 608
court, to lease, sell, or mortgage any part or parts of the
grants, the proceeds to be used "for such purpose as said board and
court may deem to be for the best interests of the community for
the benefit of which such grant was made."
It will be seen, therefore, that the statute makes it the duty
of the trustees, it may be under the direction of the court, to
execute and deliver deeds of conveyance to anyone having the kind
of title described -- that is, which had become or was perfect, or
entitled such person to land which he claimed at the time of the
acquisition of New Mexico, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
or at any other time subsequent thereto. Appellants rely upon such
title, as we have seen, as established by the suit to quiet title
and the decree rendered therein. A consideration of this suit and
decree therefore becomes necessary.
The suit was brought in the District Court of San Miguel County,
Territory of New Mexico, by appellants against certain named
defendants and "all unknown claimants of interests in the premises
and lands" which were described. The complaint alleged that
appellants were owners in fee simple and the occupants and
possessors of the land, that it lay within the exterior boundaries
of a grant of land made by the Mexican government to certain named
parties in the year 1835 "for the use and benefit of the
inhabitants and settlers of the Town of Las Vegas;" that the grant
was known in the archives of the Surveyor General of New Mexico as
private land claim number 20, and, as such, on June 21, 1860, duly
confirmed by act of Congress of the United States to the Town of
Las Vegas, and thereby became segregated from the public domain.
That the land described in the complaint as belonging to appellants
was taken possession of by them and their grantors under and by
virtue of the terms and provisions of the said Las Vegas grant, and
the laws of the Territory of New Mexico applicable thereto, more
than
Page 232 U. S. 609
ten years prior to the commencement of the suit, and that they
and their grantors from whom they claim title and from whom they
have deeds of conveyance have been in the actual, exclusive, open,
and uninterrupted adverse possession under claim of title, and have
therefore a good and indefeasible title in fee simple to the land,
and are entitled to occupy and hold possession thereof.
It was alleged that certain persons, naming them, made some
claim adverse to the complainants in the suit (appellants here),
but what the nature and extent of their claim was complainants were
unable to state. And it was alleged that there were certain unknown
successors of the Fairview Town Company who made some claim of
interest in and title to the land, but the nature and extent of the
claim were unknown.
Then the following was alleged:
"That your orators are credibly informed and believe that
certain unknown persons designated in this bill as 'unknown
claimants of interests in the premises adverse to your orators'
also make some claim of interest and title in and to the said tract
of land adverse to the estate of your orators, but what the nature
and extent of the said claim of said unknown persons in and to said
tract of land is, is likewise to your orators unknown."
It was finally alleged that all of the claims and pretenses of
the defendants in the suit, known and unknown, adverse to the
estate of complainants were of no avail against their title, and
constituted a cloud upon it. It was prayed that the title of
complainants be established against all of the defendants, and that
it be forever quieted and set at rest, and process was prayed.
An affidavit for publication of process was filed in which it
was recited, among other things,
"that the place of residence is unknown and the whereabouts
cannot be discovered of any and all of the defendants designated as
unknown claimants of interest in the premises and lands
Page 232 U. S. 610
described in the bill of complaint, who claim adversely to the
complainants, George E. Priest, Melvin W. Quick, and Charles M.
Benjamin."
Publication was made. There was no appearance on the part of any
of the defendants, and the bill of complaint was ordered to be
taken as confessed, and it was decreed that all of the defendants
were brought before the court by proper process, and that the court
had jurisdiction of them, whether known or unknown, and
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit; that the land lay
within the exterior boundaries of the Las Vegas grant, as
described, was confirmed by Congress as alleged, and that, in
consequence of the grant and confirmation, the land was segregated
from the public domain and became and was the private property of
the grantees and their privies. That the complainants in the suit
and their grantors from whom they claimed and from whom they had
deeds of conveyance were in the adverse possession of the land as
alleged, and that, as a consequence thereof, complainants were
entitled to the relief for which they prayed. And it was decreed
that the right, title, and interest of complainants was an estate
in fee simple absolute, and that the same be established in them,
and that the defendants be barred and estopped from having or
claiming or asserting any right, title, or interest whatsoever
adverse to the complainants or any of them, and that their title to
the land, and each and every part thereof, be forever quieted and
set at rest.
It will be observed that the title set up by appellants in the
suit to quiet title, and sustained by the decree, depended upon
adverse possession -- in other words, upon the statute of
limitations -- and the trial court in the case at bar considered
that aspect of the case and decree only, and found that the statute
did not begin to run until after the passage of the Act of 1903 and
the appointment of the board of trustees, and that possession of
appellants
Page 232 U. S. 611
and their predecessors in title for a period of ten years prior
to the act and the appointment of the trustees could not ripen any
title against appellees.
The court therefore adjudged that the decree in favor of
appellants of September 15, 1894, quieting title in them, was not
binding upon appellees, and the petition herein was dismissed.
The supreme court, however, considered this position untenable,
saying that, if
"the court had jurisdiction, as against defendants, to render
the decree of 1894, all the findings upon which that decree
proceeds are likewise conclusive against it, and it avails nothing
to inquire, as did the trial court, into whether such findings were
as a matter of fact properly made."
And the court said: "The whole question, therefore, is whether
the proceedings of 1894 bind the present defendants," the board of
trustees of the Town of Las Vegas.
The court answered the question in the negative, basing the
answer on the provisions of the laws of the territory. Sections
4010 and 4011 of the Complied Laws of 1897 [
Footnote 1] of the territory, the court said, provide
for an action to quiet title to real property, and permit the
complainant to make parties, "by their names as near as can be
ascertained," those who claim an interest adverse to him, the
unknown heirs of any deceased person who made claim in his
lifetime,
"and all unknown persons who may claim any interest or title
adverse to plaintiff, . . . unknown heirs by the style of unknown
heirs of such deceased person, and said unknown persons who may
claim any interest or title adverse to plaintiff by the name and
style of unknown claimants of interests in the premises adverse to
the plaintiff, and the service of process on, and notice of said
suit against, defendants, shall be made in the same manner as now
provided by law in other civil
Page 232 U. S. 612
suits."
Service by publication, the court said, is provided by § 2964,
[
Footnote 2] and may be ordered
upon a sworn pleading or affidavit
"showing that the defendant, or any one or more of them in said
cause, resides or has gone out of the territory, has concealed
himself within it, has avoided service of process on him, or is in
any other manner so situated that process cannot be served upon him
or them, or that his or their names, or place of residence, is
unknown, or that his or their whereabouts cannot be
discovered,"
p. 696.
The provisions of these sections, appellants contended, were
pursued by them in their suit to quiet title, and, after citing
them, as we have said, and the allegations of the bill of complaint
therein, the court considered the effect of the decree therein upon
the board of trustees of the Town of Las Vegas, appellees herein,
and said:
"The board was not
eo nomine a party, nor indeed was it
in existence in 1894. Any effect of the decree upon it must
therefore result from its holding under some party to the cause.
That it is not holding under any of the individuals named is
conceded. That it is not affected by the futile provisions of the
decree quieting title against 'any person whatsoever' is evident.
The only remaining alternative is that it is bound because of the
fact that 'all the unknown claimants of interests in the premises
adverse to complainants' [are named in the complaint] were cited in
the publication, and were decreed against in the court's
disposition of the case, and that this was a binding adjudication
against the defendant under § 4011, above quoted. But in 1894, were
the owners of the Las Vegas grant, whom defendant now represents,
unknown owners? The complainants certainly knew the exact status of
the matter, for their complaint, as we have seen, in terms alleged
that the premises were a part of the Las Vegas grant 'on June 21,
1860, duly confirmed by act of Congress of the United States to the
Town of Las Vegas.' "
Page 232 U. S. 613
"The complainants thus knew that the Town of Las Vegas was the
confirmee of the grant, and that, if complainants' title had, by
adverse possession, been wrested from anyone, it was from such
confirmee. Knowing this, we are of opinion that it was their duty
to have made the Town of Las Vegas a party, and that the term
'unknown owners' could not be utilized to divest title from what
the Act of Congress, no less than plaintiffs' conceded knowledge,
told them was the true ownership of the property."
The court commented upon the abuse which may be made of statute
providing for constructive service, and the necessity to so
construe them as "to hold that, where the real owner may be brought
into court by name, his property may not be taken by an
advertisement against unknown owners," and that where,
"as in this case, the locus of the title is definitely declared
of record, and such is confessedly known to the complainant, it is
but an exaction of good faith that the holder of such title should
be summoned by name in order that he may appear and defend. To
exact less is to open the doors wide to insidious attacks upon
property rights, and indeed to ignore the statute which in terms
provides (Comp.Laws, § 4011) that persons claiming interests 'may
be made parties defendant by their names, as near as the same can
be ascertained.'"
P. 698.
To the contention that the designation of ownership of the Las
Vegas grant as "unknown claimants" was justified because the Town
of Las Vegas, as used in the Act of confirmation, was a mere
aggregation of people without corporate organization, and that the
suit became one practically against the individuals residing on the
grant, and that, as to these, the designation of unknown owners was
necessary and proper, the court said it was not impressed, nor by
the other contention that there was no officer upon whom process
could have been served, and replied to the first contention, as it
said it was replied in
Page 232 U. S. 614
Maese v. Herman, 183 U. S. 572,
that
"the town and its inhabitants were certainly substantial
entities in fact, and were recognized by Congress as having rights,
and directed such rights to be authenticated by a patent of the
United States."
To the second contention the obvious answer was that, under §
2964,
supra, then in force, service by publication could
have been made, "since in that event, the defendant
was so
situated that process could not otherwise be served upon
it.'"
We have quoted thus at length from the opinion of the supreme
court because necessarily the contention of appellants that the
town was properly impleaded and properly served under the
designation of "unknown claimants of interests" depends upon the
local statutes, to the construction of which by the supreme court
we have repeatedly decided we refer. In this case, the deference is
the more justified, if indeed it is not compelled, by the
subsequent construction of the statutes in the same way by the
supreme court of the state in
Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch
Co., 134 P. 228, in which case § 3181 of the Compiled Laws of
New Mexico was considered. By that section, it is provided that, in
suits for partition, all persons interested in the premises
"whose names are unknown may be made parties to such partition
by the name and description of unknown owners or proprietors of the
premises, or as unknown heirs of any person who may have been
interested in the same."
Persons who were in actual possession had not been made parties
by name, and the question was whether they were made parties under
the designation of "unknown owners." The question was determined in
the negative, the court holding
"that it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for
the making of parties by the name of unknown owners, and for the
service of process upon them by publication, when they in fact were
in the open and notorious adverse possession of a part of the
Page 232 U. S. 615
premises."
The court further said that the complainants in the suit had the
means, and it was their duty, to ascertain the names of all persons
actually holding adverse possession, and that it was not the
intention of the legislature to allow the rights of claimants to
land in such circumstances
"to be foreclosed of their rights by a proceeding in which they
are not named, and in which the only service obtained upon them was
by publication."
The court cited the decision in the case at bar in support of
its conclusion, saying, after noting certain differences which
strengthened that decision:
"In principle, we can see no difference between the two cases.
In that case, the court was construing the statutes of the
territory in regard to proceedings to quiet title, which are in
substance and effect the same as the partition statute in regard to
proceedings against unknown owners, and held that such statutes
must be strictly construed, and that the decree in that case was
unavailing as against the Town of Las Vegas."
Other cases were cited, among them being
American Land Co.
v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 48. It
is not necessary to review them, as the construction of the court
of the local statute is that it requires the parties defendant in
an action to quiet title to be designated "by their names, as near
as they can be ascertained," and permits parties defendant to be
designated as "unknown claimants" only when their names cannot be
ascertained. In other words, requires them to be unknown in fact,
not merely in designation. Any other conclusion would make the
statute not a facility for removing clouds from titles, but for
putting clouds upon them, and the accommodation of the law of its
process to an exceptional condition could be perverted, and rights
divested by a semblance of notice of adverse claims to them.
It is contended, however, that the distinction which the supreme
court of the territory made between the findings of the trial court
in the proceedings of 1894, as to
Page 232 U. S. 616
jurisdiction, and findings as to other matters in issue, is
without foundation, and that "the question of the jurisdiction of
the defendants through service by publication having been
adjudicated in the decree of 1894" is conclusive, "and not subject
to attack in this collateral proceeding, whether as a matter of
fact it was in issue or not." To sustain the contention,
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 552,
is cited. The case was concerned with the faith and credit to be
given to a decree of divorce rendered upon service by publication.
The publication was attacked because based on an affidavit made on
information and belief, and it was hence contended that the court
had not acquired jurisdiction. The contention was held untenable,
the Court saying that, if the affidavit could be regarded as
defective, it was not in the omission to state a material fact, but
in the degree of proof, and that therefore the resulting judgment
could not be said to be void on its face. The principle was
declared, however, to be established that the full faith and credit
clause and the statute enacted thereunder do not apply to judgments
rendered by a court having no jurisdiction of the parties or
subject matter, or of the
res in proceedings
in
rem.
The case at bar is therefore clearly distinct from that case.
The Town of Las Vegas, at the time of the institution of the suit
to quiet title and of the publication of process, was, whether
regarded as an entity separate from its inhabitants or
collectively, as composed of them, either not intended to be made a
party under the designation "unknown claimants of interest" or the
designation was untrue.
But it is further contended that service by publication was not
an issue in this case, the pleadings and the decision of the trial
court being based upon the view "that the status of the town was
such that no rights by limitation could be adjudicated against it
because of the impossibility of serving it with legal process," and
that, the supreme court having found against appellants on that
Page 232 U. S. 617
contention, there was nothing left but to reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to grant
the writ prayed for. The supreme court could not, it was further
contended, go outside of the record, and of its own motion raise
the issue as to the sufficiency of the service upon the defendants,
that issue being in express language excluded by appellees from the
court's consideration. The answer is immediate. We know of no rule
which precludes an appellate court deciding a case for other
reasons than those expressed by the trial court, and the contention
that the sufficiency of the service was withdrawn from the
consideration of the court by appellees is not justified. It is
based upon the averment of the town that neither at the time of the
confirmation of the grant nor at any time subsequent thereto did it
have a representative upon whom legal process could have been
served, until the ninth of December, 1902, when the board of
trustees was appointed.
The supreme court dealt with the fact, and, as we have seen,
ascribed a different effect to it than that ascribed by the trial
court. The supreme court said, there being no officer of the town
upon whom process could have been served, service by publication
could have been made, "since, in that event the defendant
was
so situated that process could not otherwise be served upon it.'"
But the court was of the view, as we have seen, that such fact did
not authorize the town to be made defendant under the name of
"unknown claimants," or cited as such by publication, and, the town
having been so named, the decree of 1894 was not binding upon
it.
The next contention of appellants is that the inhabitants of the
town and appellees are privies in estate, and are bound by the
decree quieting title. In other words, that there was such identity
of interest between the defendants in the suit to quiet title and
the present appellees, the board of trustees, that the latter is
bound by the decree.
Page 232 U. S. 618
The argument is that the town was the mere representative of the
inhabitants, and that the nonappointment of someone to represent
it
"cannot operate to suspend either the institution or prosecution
of legal proceedings against the trust estate, or to discharge
either the trust estate or the beneficiaries from the effect of the
judgment rendered, when the latter have been made parties and
served with legal process."
In other words, if we understand the contention, it is that the
proceedings of 1894, being against some of the inhabitants of the
town, bind all of the other inhabitants, considered as an entity or
collectively. We need not pause to consider the soundness of the
contention. If justified at all, it would seem to make necessary
the present petition. It puts out of view, besides, the effect of
the confirmation to the town. We said, in
Maese v. Herman,
supra:
"The town and its inhabitants were certainly substantial
entities in fact, and were recognized by Congress as having rights,
and directed such rights to be authenticated by a patent of the
United States."
The town was the confirmee, and represented, it may be,
individual interests, but collective interests as well. It was
because of the grant to the town that the Act of March 12, 1903,
supra, was enacted, giving the District Court of San
Miguel County, "jurisdiction to manage, control, and administer"
the grant. It was in the execution of this jurisdiction that the
appellees, trustees of the town, were appointed and given the power
to make conveyances to individuals if they had the character of
title described.
But the town also had rights, and, as we have seen, by § 9 of
the Act of March 12, 1903, the trustees were given power "to lease,
sell, or mortgage any part or parts of the grant."
See, as
to rights which towns had under the Mexican law,
United
States v. Pico,, 5 Wall. 536;
Townsend
v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326;
United States v. Santa
Fe, 165 U. S. 675.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Identic reenactment of §§1, 2, c. 6, Act of April 2, 1884.
[
Footnote 2]
Based on § 1, c. 16, Act of January 2, 1879.