The constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among
the states and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate
contracts between shipper and carrier of shipments in such commerce
in regard to liability for loss or damage to articles carried.
Until Congress has legislated upon that subject, the liability
of a carrier, although engaged in interstate commerce, for loss or
damage to property carried, may be regulated by law of the
state.
Since the decisions of this Court in
Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133, and
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes,
191 U. S. 477,
Congress has by § 20 of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat.
584, c. 3591, known as the Carmack Amendment, legislated directly
upon the carrier's liability for loss of and damage to interstate
shipments, and this legislation supersedes all regulations and
policies of a particular state upon the same subject.
Only the silence of Congress authorizes the exercise of the
police power of the state upon the subject of contracts with
carriers for interstate shipments, and when Congress exercises its
authority, the regulating power of the state is at an end.
In enacting the Carmack Amendment, it is evident that Congress
intended to adopt a uniform rule as to the liability imposed upon
interstate carriers by state regulations of bills of lading, and to
relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they
had theretofore been subject.
A proviso reserving certain rights of action will not be
construed as nullifying the statute itself and maintaining the
existing confusion which it was the purpose of Congress to put an
end to, and so
held that the proviso in the Carmack
Amendment related to remedies under existing federal law at the
time of this action, and not to any state law.
A rational interpretation will be given to a statute and a
proviso, and not one by which the statute will, through the
proviso, destroy itself.
A common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for his
own
Page 226 U. S. 492
negligence or that of his employees, but the rigor of this rule
may be modified by a fair, reasonable and just agreement with the
shipper which does not include exemption from such negligence, and
the right to receive compensation commensurate with the risk
involves the right to agree upon rates proportionate with the value
of the property transported.
An interstate carrier may, by a fair, open, and reasonable
agreement limit the amount recoverable by the shipper to an agreed
value made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more
rates proportioned to the amount of risk.
A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value to obtain a
lower rate does not conflict with any sound principle of public
policy, and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice
that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and
then recover a larger value in case of loss.
The provisions of the Carmack Amendment are not violated by a
plain provision in a bill of lading basing the charges on value of
article transported and charging higher rates for increasing
liability as value is declared, and so
held as to express
rates filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
This was an action in the Circuit Court of Kenton County,
Kentucky, against the express company, to recover the full market
value of a small package containing a diamond ring which was
delivered by the plaintiff below to the express company at its
office in Cincinnati, Ohio, consigned to J. W. Clendenning at
Augusta, Georgia. The package was never delivered.
The express company made defense by answer. The plaintiff
demurred to the answer as not containing a defense, which demurrer
was sustained. The company declined to further plead, whereupon the
circuit court gave judgment for the sum of $137.52, being the full
value of the ring and interest. A writ of error was sued out from
this Court to the Circuit Court of Kenton County, that being the
highest court of the state in which a decision could be had.
The answer and accompanying exhibit were in substance as
follows:
Page 226 U. S. 493
That the defendant was an express company engaged in interstate
commerce within the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 29,
1906; that, in obedience to that act, it had duly filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission schedules showing its rates and
charges from Cincinnati to Augusta, Georgia, which schedules showed
that its rates and charges, when the value of the property to be
carried was in excess of fifty dollars, were graduated reasonably,
according to the value, and that the lawful rate upon the package
of the plaintiff from Cincinnati to Augusta was twenty-five cents
if the value was fifty dollars or less, and was fifty-five cents if
its value was one hundred twenty-five dollars.
It is averred that the plaintiff knew that the charges upon the
package shipped were based upon the value of the shipment, and that
it (the defendant) required that the value should be declared by
the shipper, and that, if he did not disclose and declare the value
when he delivered the shipment to it at Cincinnati for
transportation to Augusta, the rate charged would be based upon a
valuation of fifty dollars. It is then alleged that the package so
delivered was sealed, and that defendant did not know the contents
or value, and that, if it had, it would not have received it for
carriage for less than the lawful published rate of fifty-five
cents. The receipt or bill of lading issued shows no value, but
contains a stipulation in these words:
"In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said
property, which is regulated by the value thereof, and is based
upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars unless a greater
value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said
property is not more than fifty dollars, unless a greater value is
stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable, in any
event, for more than the value so stated, nor for more than fifty
dollars if no value is stated herein. "
Page 226 U. S. 499
MR. JUSTICE LURTON, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The answer relies upon the Act of Congress of June 29, 1906,
being an act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as the
only regulation applicable to an interstate shipment, and avers
that the limitation of value, declared in its bill of lading, was
valid and obligatory under that act. This defense was denied. This
constitutes the federal question and gives this Court
jurisdiction.
Under the law of Kentucky, this contract, limiting the
plaintiff's recovery to the agreed or declared value, was invalid,
and the shipper was entitled to recover the actual value, "unless,"
as said in
Adams Express Company v. Walker, 119 Ky. 121,
and affirmed in
Southern Express Company v. Fox &
Logan, 131 Ky. 257, "sufficient facts are shown, independently
of the special contract, to avoid the contract for fraud, or to
create an estoppel at common law."
The question upon which the case must turn is whether the
operation and effect of the contract for an interstate shipment, as
shown by the receipt or bill of lading, is
Page 226 U. S. 500
governed by the local law of the state, or by the acts of
Congress regulating interstate commerce.
That the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign nations comprehends power to
regulate contracts between the shipper and the carrier of an
interstate shipment by defining the liability of the carrier for
loss, delay, injury, or damage to such property, needs neither
argument nor citation of authority.
But it is equally well settled that, until Congress has
legislated upon the subject, the liability of such a carrier,
exercising its calling within a particular state, although engaged
in the business of interstate commerce, for loss or damage to such
property, may be regulated by the law of the state. Such
regulations would fall within that large class of regulations which
it is competent for a state to make in the absence of legislation
by Congress, growing out of the territorial jurisdiction of the
state over such carriers, and its duty and power to safeguard the
general public against acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance
committed within its limits, although interstate commerce may be
indirectly affected:
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.
S. 465;
New York &c. Railroad v. New York,
165 U. S. 628;
Chicago, Milwaukee & St.P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133,
169 U. S. 137;
Richmond &c. Ry. v. Patterson Co., 169 U.
S. 311;
Cleveland &c. Ry. v. Illinois,
177 U. S. 514;
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477. In the
Solan case, cited above, it was
said of such state legislation:
"They are not, in themselves, regulations of interstate
commerce, although they control in some degree the conduct and the
liability of those engaged in such commerce. So long as Congress
has not legislated upon the particular subject, they are rather to
be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a
rightful exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the
relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within
its limits. "
Page 226 U. S. 501
In that case, the court upheld the validity of an Iowa statute
which made void every
"contract, receipt, rule, or regulation which shall exempt any
railway from liability as a common carrier, which would exist had
no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation been made or entered
into."
The contract there involved was for transportation of cattle
with a drover in charge, and the shipper had signed a contract
limiting the liability to himself or the drover to $500 for injury
to the person of the drover. Proof was offered that this limitation
was the consideration of a reduced rate of transportation.
In
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477,
191 U. S. 487,
191 U. S. 491,
there was involved a bill of lading in all essentials identical
with the one here concerned, whereby it was stipulated that, in
consideration of a reduced rate of freight, the shipper should
receive, in case of negligent loss, the agreed value declared in
the receipt. The shipment was made in New York, where the
stipulation was valid, to a point in Pennsylvania, where such a
limitation was invalid. The loss occurred in the latter state, and
the supreme court of the state upheld a judgment for the full
value, declaring the limitation invalid as forbidden by the public
policy of that state. That case came to this Court upon the
contention that the Pennsylvania court, in refusing to limit the
recovery to the valuation agreed upon, had denied to the railroad
company a right or privilege secured to it by the interstate
commerce law. But this Court, as to that, said:
"It may be assumed that, under the broad power conferred upon
Congress over interstate commerce, as defined in repeated decisions
of this Court, it would be lawful for that body to make provision
as to contracts for interstate carriage, permitting the carrier to
limit its liability to a particular sum in consideration of lower
freight rates for transportation. But, upon examination of the
terms
Page 226 U. S. 502
of the law relied upon, we fail to find any such provision
therein. The sections of the Interstate Commerce Law relied upon by
the learned counsel for plaintiff in error, 24 Stat. 379, 382, c.
104; 25 Stat. 855, c. 382, provide for equal facilities to shippers
for the interchange of traffic, for nondiscrimination in freight
rates, for keeping schedules of rates open to public inspection,
for posting the same in public places, with certain particulars as
to charges, rules, and regulations, for the publication of joint
tariff rates for continuous transportation over one or more lines,
to be made public when directed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, against advances in joint tariff rates except after ten
days' notice to the Commission; against reduction of joint tariff
rates except after three days' like notice, making it unlawful for
any party to a joint tariff to receive or demand a greater or less
compensation for the transportation of property between points as
to which a joint tariff is made different than is specified in the
schedule filed with the Commission, giving remedies for the
enforcement of the foregoing provisions, and providing penalties
for their violation, making it unlawful to prevent continuous
carriage, and providing that no break of bulk, stoppage, or
interruption by the carrier, unless made in good faith, for some
necessary purpose, without intention to evade the act, shall
prevent the carriage of freights from being treated as one
continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of
destination."
"While, under these provisions, it may be said that Congress has
made it obligatory to provide proper facilities for interstate
carriage of freight, and has prevented carriers from obstructing
continuous shipments on interstate lines, we look in vain for any
regulation of the matter here in controversy. There is no sanction
of agreements of this character limiting liability to stipulated
valuations, and, until Congress shall legislate upon it, is there
any
Page 226 U. S. 503
valid objection to the state's enforcing its own regulations
upon the subject, although it may to this extent indirectly affect
interstate commerce contracts of carriage?"
In view of the decisions of this Court in the two cases last
referred to, we shall assume that this case is governed by them,
unless the subsequent legislation of Congress is such as to
indicate a purpose to bring contracts for interstate shipments
under one uniform rule of law not subject to the varying policies
and legislation of particular states.
The original Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, was
extensively amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c.
3591. We may pass by many of the changes and amendments made by the
latter act as not decisive, and come at once to the far more
important amendment made in § 20 -- an amendment bearing directly
upon the carrier's liability or obligation under interstate
contracts of shipment, and generally referred to as the Carmack
Amendment. For convenience of reference, it is set out in the
margin.
*
Page 226 U. S. 504
This amendment came under consideration in
Atlantic Coast
Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, but
the opinion and judgment was confined to that provision of the act
which made the initial carrier liable for a loss upon the line of a
connecting carrier, the property having been received under a bill
of lading which confined the liability of the initial carrier to
loss occurring upon its own line.
The significant and dominating features of that amendment are
these:
First: it affirmatively requires the initial carrier to issue "a
receipt or bill of lading therefor," when it receives "property for
transportation from a point in one state to a point in
another."
Second: such initial carrier is made "liable to the lawful
holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property
caused by it."
Third: it is also made liable for any loss, damage, or injury to
such property caused by
"any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to
which such property may be delivered, or over whose line or lines
such property may pass."
Fourth: it affirmatively declares that "no contract, receipt,
rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or
transportation company from the liability hereby imposed."
Prior to that amendment, the rule of carriers' liability, for an
interstate shipment of property, as enforced in both federal and
state courts, was either that of the general common law, as
declared by this Court and enforced in the federal courts
throughout the United States,
Hart v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, 112 U. S. 331, or
that determined by the supposed public policy of a particular
state,
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477, or that prescribed by statute law of a
particular state,
Chicago &c. Railroad v. Solan,
169 U. S. 133.
Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability was
Page 226 U. S. 505
possible until Congress should deal with the subject. The
situation was well depicted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga.App. 675, 687, 63
S.E. 865, where that court said:
"Some states allow carriers to exempt themselves from all or a
part of the common law liability by rule, regulation, or contract;
others did not. The federal courts sitting in the various states
were following the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one
court when, under the same state of facts, he would be exempt from
liability in another. Hence, this branch of interstate commerce was
being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and judicial
holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in
a business that extended beyond the confines of his own state, or a
carrier whose lines were extensive, to know, without considerable
investigation and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little
certainty, what would be the carrier's actual responsibility as to
goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to another.
The congressional action has made an end to this diversity, for the
national law is paramount, and supersedes all state laws as to the
rights and liabilities and exemptions created by such transactions.
This was doubtless the purpose of the law, and this purpose will be
effectuated, and not impaired or destroyed, by the state courts'
obeying and enforcing the provisions of the federal statute where
applicable to the fact in such cases as shall come before
them."
That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies
of a particular state upon the same subject results from its
general character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the
carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue, and limits his
power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract. Almost
every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can
be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession
of
Page 226 U. S. 506
the subject, and supersede all state regulation with reference
to it. Only the silence of Congress authorized the exercise of the
police power of the state upon the subject of such contracts. But
when Congress acted in such a way as to manifest a purpose to
exercise its conceded authority, the regulating power of the state
ceased to exist.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington,
222 U. S. 370;
Southern Railway v. Reid, 222 U.
S. 424;
Mondou v. Railroad, 223 U. S.
1.
To hold that the liability therein declared may be increased or
diminished by local regulation or local views of public policy will
either make the provision less than supreme, or indicate that
Congress has not shown a purpose to take possession of the subject.
The first would be unthinkable, and the latter would be to revert
to the uncertainties and diversities of rulings which led to the
amendment. The duty to issue a bill of lading and the liability
thereby assumed are covered in full, and though there is no
reference to the effect upon state regulation, it is evident that
Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve such
contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been
theretofore subject.
What is the liability imposed upon the carrier? It is a
liability to any holder of the bill of lading which the primary
carrier is required to issue "for any loss, damage, or injury to
such property caused by it," or by any connecting carrier to whom
the goods are delivered. The suggestion that an absolute liability
exists for every loss, damage, or injury, from any and every cause
would be to make such a carrier an absolute insurer, and liable for
unavoidable loss or damage, though due to uncontrollable forces.
That this was the intent of Congress is not conceivable. To give
such emphasis to the words "any loss or damage" would be to ignore
the qualifying words "caused by it." The liability thus imposed is
limited to "any loss, injury, or damage caused by it or a
succeeding
Page 226 U. S. 507
carrier to whom the property may be delivered," and plainly
implies a liability for some default in its common law duty as a
common carrier.
But it has been argued that the nonexclusive character of this
regulation is manifested by the proviso of the section, and that
state legislation upon the same subject is not superseded, and that
the holder of any such bill of lading may resort to any right of
action against such a carrier, conferred by existing state law.
This view is untenable. It would result in the nullification of the
regulation of a national subject, and operate to maintain the
confusion of the diverse regulation which it was the purpose of
Congress to put an end to.
What this Court said of the § 22 of this Act of 1887 in the case
of
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Mills,
204 U. S. 426, is
applicable to this contention. It was claimed that that section
continued in force all rights and remedies under the common law or
other statutes. But this Court said of that contention what must be
said of the proviso in the § 20, that it was evidently only
intended to continue in existence such other rights or remedies for
the redress of some specific wrong or injury, whether given by the
Interstate Commerce Act, or by state statute, or common law, not
inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
provisions of this act. Again, it was said of the same clause, in
the same case, that it could not in reason be construed as
continuing in a shipper a common law right the existence of which
would be inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other
words, the act cannot be said to destroy itself.
To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of any such
bill of lading any right or remedy which he may have had under
existing federal law at the time of his action gives to it a more
rational interpretation than one which would preserve rights and
remedies under existing state laws, for the latter view would cause
the proviso to
Page 226 U. S. 508
destroy the act itself. One illustration would be a right to a
remedy against a succeeding carrier, in preference to proceeding
against the primary carrier, for a loss or damage incurred upon the
line of the former. The liability of such succeeding carrier in the
route would be that imposed by this statute, and for which the
first carrier might have been made liable.
We come now to the question of the validity of the provision in
the receipt or bill of lading limiting liability to the agreed
value of fifty dollars, as shown therein. This limiting clause is
in these words:
"In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said
property, which is regulated by the value thereof, and is based
upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars unless a greater
value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said
property is not more than fifty dollars, unless a greater value is
stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable, in any
event, for more than the value so stated, nor for more than fifty
dollars if no value is stated herein."
The answer states that the schedules which the express company
had filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission showed rates
based upon valuations, and that the lawful and established rate for
such a shipment as that made by the plaintiff from Cincinnati to
Augusta, having a value not in excess of fifty dollars, was
twenty-five cents, while for the same package, if its value had
been declared to be one hundred twenty-five dollars, the amount for
which the plaintiff sues as the actual value, the lawful charge,
according to the rate filed and published, would have been
fifty-five cents. It is further averred that the package was
sealed, and its contents and actual value unknown to the
defendant's agent.
That no inquiry was made as to the actual value is not vital to
the fairness of the agreement in this case. The receipt which was
accepted showed that the charge made
Page 226 U. S. 509
was based upon a valuation of fifty dollars unless a greater
value should be stated therein. The knowledge of the shipper that
the rate was based upon the value is to be presumed from the terms
of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed with the
Commission. That presumption is strengthened by the fact that
across the top of this bill of lading there was this statement in
bold type: "This company's charge is based upon the value of the
property, which must be declared by the shipper."
That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for
his own negligence or that of his servants is elementary.
York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois
Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107;
Railroad
Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357;
Bank of
Kentucky v. Adams Express Company, 93 U. S.
174;
Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad,
112 U. S. 331,
112 U. S. 338.
The rule of the common law did not limit his liability to loss and
damage due to his own negligence or that of his servants. That rule
went beyond this, and he was liable for any loss or damage which
resulted from human agency, or any cause not the Act of God or the
public enemy. But the rigor of this liability might be modified
through any fair, reasonable, and just agreement with the shipper
which did not include exemption against the negligence of the
carrier or his servants. The inherent right to receive a
compensation commensurate with the risk involved the right to
protect himself from fraud and imposition by reasonable rules and
regulations, and the right to agree upon a rate proportionate to
the value of the property transported.
It has therefore become an established rule of the common law,
as declared by this Court in many cases, that such a carrier may,
by a fair, open, just, and reasonable agreement, limit the amount
recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed
value, made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more
rates of
Page 226 U. S. 510
charges proportioned to the amount of the risk.
York Mfg.
Co. v. Railroad, 3 Wall. 107;
Railroad
v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357;
Hart v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, cited above;
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W.
Trans. Co., 117 U. S. 312,
117 U. S. 322;
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.
S. 397,
129 U. S. 442;
New York, L. E. & W. Ry. v. Estill, 147 U.
S. 591,
147 U. S. 619;
Primrose v. W. U. Tel. Co., 154 U. S.
1,
154 U. S. 15;
Chicago &c. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133,
169 U. S. 135;
Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Company, 170 U.
S. 272,
170 U. S. 278;
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477,
191 U. S.
485.
That such a carrier might fix his charges somewhat in proportion
to the value of the property is quite as reasonable and just as a
rate measured by the character of the shipment. The principle is
that the charge should bear some reasonable relation to the
responsibility, and that the care to be exercised shall be in some
degree measured by the bulk, weight, character, and value of the
property carried.
Neither is it conformable to plain principles of justice that a
shipper may understate the value of his property for the purpose of
reducing the rate, and then recover a larger value in case of loss.
Nor does a limitation based upon an agreed value for the purpose of
adjusting the rate conflict with any sound principle of public
policy. The reason for the legality of such agreements is well
stated in
Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad, cited above,
where it is said (p.
112 U. S.
340):
"The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from
liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It
exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed
on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negligence.
The compensation for carriage is based on that value. The shipper
is estopped from saying that the value is greater. The articles
have no greater value, for the purposes of the contract of
transportation, between the parties to that contract. The
Page 226 U. S. 511
carrier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is just
and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered into, and where
there is no deceit practiced on the shipper, should be upheld.
There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would
be unjust and unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest
principles of fair dealing and of the freedom of contracting, and
thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed
to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to
repudiate it in case of loss."
The statutory liability, aside from responsibility for the
default of a connecting carrier in the route, is not beyond the
liability imposed by the common law, as that body of law applicable
to carriers has been interpreted by this Court, as well as many
courts of the states.
Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N.Y. 170,
175;
Bernard v. Adams Express Company, 205 Mass. 254, 259.
The exemption forbidden is, as stated in the case last cited, "a
statutory declaration that a contract of exemption from liability
for negligence is against public policy and void." This is no more
than this Court, as well as other courts administering the same
general common law, have many times declared. In the same case,
just such a stipulation as that here involved was upheld, the court
saying:
"But such a contract as we are considering in this case is not
an exemption from liability for negligence in the management of
property within the meaning of the statute. It is a contract as to
what the property is in reference to its value. The purpose of it
is not to change the nature of the undertaking of the common
carrier, or limit his obligation in the care and management of that
which is entrusted to him. It is to describe and define the subject
matter of the contract, so far as the parties care to define it,
for the purpose of showing of what value that is which comes into
the carrier's possession, and for which he must account in the
performance of his duty
Page 226 U. S. 512
as a carrier. It is not in any proper sense a contract exempting
him from liability for the loss, damage, or injury to the property,
as the shipper describes it in stating its value for the purpose of
determining for what the carrier shall be accountable upon his
undertaking, and what price the shipper shall pay for the service
and for the risk of loss which the carrier assumes."
In
Greenwald v. Barrett, cited above, the same
conclusion was reached as to the nature of the liability imposed
and the purport of the exemption forbidden, the court, among other
things, saying:
"The language of the enactment does not disclose any intent to
abrogate the right of common carriers to regulate their charges for
carriage by the value of the goods, or to agree with the shipper
upon a valuation of the property carried. It has been the uniform
practice of transportation companies in this country to make their
charges dependent upon the value of the property carried, and the
propriety of this practice and the legality of contracts signed by
the shipper, agreeing upon a valuation of the property, were
distinctly upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Hart v. Penn. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331,
112 U. S.
341."
To the same effect are the cases of
Travis v. Wells, Fargo
Co., 79 N.J.L. 83;
Fielder v. Adams Express Co., 69
W.Va. 138;
Larsen v. Oregon Short Line,38 Utah 130.
See also Atkinson v. New York Transfer Co. 76 N.J.L. 608,
as to the general rule.
That a carrier rate may be graduated by value, and that a
stipulation limiting recovery to an agreed value, made to adjust
the rate, is recognized by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
see 13 I.C.C. 550.
We therefore reach the conclusion that the provision of the act
forbidding exemptions from liability imposed by the act is not
violated by the contract here in question.
Page 226 U. S. 513
The demurrer to the answer of the defendant below should have
been overruled. For this reason, the judgment is reversed, with
direction to overrule the demurrer, and for such further
proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion.
*
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to
a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such
property may be delivered, or over whose line or lines such
property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation
shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company from the liability hereby imposed:
Provided, That
nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or
bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under
existing law."
"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover
from the common carrier, railroad. or transportation company on
whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained
the amount of such loss, damage, or injury, as it may be required
to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any
receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof."