Subject to the requirement of due process of law, the states are
under no restriction as to their methods of procedure in the
administration of public justice.
Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78,
211 U. S.
111.
Due process of law implies a tribunal both impartial and
mentally competent to afford a hearing, but due process is not
denied when a competent state court refuses to set aside a verdict
because the sanity of one of the jurors which has been questioned
is established, after an inquiry in accordance with the established
procedure of the state, only by a preponderance of evidence.
In this case,
held that one convicted by a jury and
sentenced to death was not denied due process of law because, after
the verdict, one of the jurors became insane and the court, after
an inquiry had in accordance with the established procedure of the
state, found by a preponderance of evidence that the juror was of
sufficient mental capacity during the trial to act a such, and
therefore refused to set the verdict aside.
The practice of the Massachusetts courts in this case was not
inconsistent with the rules of the common law in regard to
determining the mental capacity of jurors.
207 Mass. 259 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the question of whether one convicted
in a state court by a jury, a member of which was possibly insane
at the time, was denied due process of law, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 225 U. S. 172
MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of murder in
the first degree and sentenced to death, and the judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court
Page 225 U. S. 173
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The case is brought here
upon a single question -- namely, that the plaintiff in error has
been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
because he was tried by a jury which included one Willis A. White,
concerning whose sanity it is said there existed reasonable
doubt.
The jury had been selected in the usual way, and White had been
accepted without knowledge by the state or the defendant of any
question concerning his mental fitness. It was impaneled on April
20, 1909. On May 4, it was charged, and on the same day returned a
verdict. On May 10, a motion for a new trial was made based upon
the suggestion by counsel for the prisoner that the juror White,
during the hearing and at the time the verdict was agreed upon, was
insane and incompetent to participate as a juror. The motion was
heard by two of the trial justices of the superior court, and much
oral evidence bearing upon the sanity of the juror was introduced,
all of which has been preserved by a bill of exceptions. At the
conclusion of the evidence, the prisoner presented no less than
seventy-two requests for rulings and findings, made part of the
record. The court found and ruled as follows:
"We find by a fair preponderance of all the evidence as a fact
that the juror Willis A. White was of sufficient mental capacity,
during the entire trial of Chester S. Jordan until after the
verdict was returned, to intelligently consider the evidence,
appreciate the arguments of counsel, the rulings of law, the charge
of the court, and to arrive at a rational conclusion, and therefore
we deny the motion."
"Having found the above fact, we deem it unnecessary to consider
the requests for rulings."
The numerous requests for rulings and special findings all
relate to the burden of proof and the rules for the weighing of
evidence upon the issues presented.
The Supreme Judicial Court, after a consideration of
Page 225 U. S. 174
the evidence upon which this finding was based, ruled that it
could not be said that there was not evidence warranting the
conclusion of the trial judges.
We shall assume that both the trial court and the Supreme
Judicial Court have sustained the verdict of the jury because they
were of opinion that it was not essential that the sanity of the
juror under the circumstances of this case should be established by
more than a fair preponderance of the evidence. The insistence is
that thereby the constitutional guaranty of due process of law,
found in the Fourteenth Amendment, has been violated.
That the procedure in this case was in conformity with the
Constitution and law of Massachusetts is determined by the judgment
and opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court.
Subject to the requirement of due process of law, the states are
under no restriction as to their method of procedure in the
administration of public justice. That the court had jurisdiction
and that there was a full hearing upon the issue made by the
suggestion of the insanity of the juror is not questioned.
"Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be
universally prescribed in all systems of law, . . . this Court has,
up to this time, sustained all state laws, statutory or judicially
declared, regulating procedure, evidence, and methods of trial, and
held them to be consistent with due process of law."
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78,
211 U. S.
111.
In
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138, it
is said:
"Without attempting to define exactly in what due process of law
consists, it is sufficient to say that, if the supreme court of a
state has acted in consonance with the constitutional laws of a
state and its own procedure, it could only be in very exceptional
circumstances that this Court would feel justified in saying that
there had been a failure of due legal process. We might ourselves
have pursued a different course in this case, but that is not
Page 225 U. S. 175
the test. The plaintiff in error must have been deprived of one
of those fundamental rights, the observance of which is
indispensable to the liberty of the citizen, to justify our
interference."
In
Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, it
appeared that a deaf person was tried and convicted of murder. It
was claimed that he had been denied due process of law because he
had not heard a word of the evidence, and that the evidence should
have been repeated to him through an ear trumpet, although it was
not clear that he could have been made to understand by that means.
After saying that the state court had jurisdiction of the person
and of the subject matter, this Court said:
"The appellant was not deprived of his liberty without due
process of law by the manner in which he was tried, so as to
violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution. That Amendment, it has been said by this Court, 'did
not radically change the whole theory of the relations of the state
and federal governments to each other and of both governments to
the people.'
In re Kemmler, 136 U. S.
436,
136 U. S. 448;
Brown v.
New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,
175 U. S.
175."
"We are unable to see how jurisdiction was lost in this case by
the manner of trial. The accused was
compos mentis. No
claim to the contrary is made. He knew he was being tried on
account of the killing of the deceased. He had counsel, and
understood the fact that he was on trial on the indictment
mentioned, but he did not hear the evidence. He made no objection,
asked for nothing, and permitted his counsel to take his own
course. We see no loss of jurisdiction in all this, and no absence
of due process of law. It is to be regretted that the testimony was
not read or repeated to him. But that omission did not affect the
jurisdiction of the court."
In
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Schmidt,
177 U. S. 230,
177 U. S. 236,
it was said:
Page 225 U. S. 176
"It is no longer open to contention that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or
regulate practice therein. All its requirements are complied with,
provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to have been due
process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice, and
adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend.
Iowa
Central Railway v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389;
Wilson v.
North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586."
Due process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally
competent to afford a hearing. But to say that due process is
denied when a competent state court refuses to set aside the
verdict of a jury because the sanity of one of its members was
established by only a preponderance of evidence would be to enforce
an exaction unknown to the precedents of the past, and an
interference with the discretion and power of the state not
justified by the demands of justice, nor recognized by any
definition of due process.
In criminal cases, due process of law is not denied by a state
law which dispenses with a grand jury indictment and permits
prosecution upon information, nor by a law which dispenses with the
necessity of a jury of twelve, or unanimity in the verdict. Indeed,
the requirement of due process does not deprive a state of the
power to dispense with jury trial altogether.
Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516;
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
When the essential elements of a court having jurisdiction in which
an opportunity for a hearing is afforded are present, the power of
a state over its methods of procedure is substantially unrestricted
by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Touching the power of the states over their procedure for the
administration of their police power, Mr. Justice Moody, in
Twining v. New Jersey, cited above, said:
Page 225 U. S. 177
"The power of their people ought not to be fettered, their sense
of responsibility lessened, and their capacity for sober and
restrained self-government weakened by forced construction of the
federal Constitution. If the people of New Jersey are not content
with the law as declared in repeated decisions of their courts, the
remedy is in their own hands."
The proceeding here in question was in absolute conformity to
the Massachusetts law of criminal procedure, and no fundamental
principle of justice was violated by a determination of the mental
capacity of the juror by a preponderance of the evidence. Neither
is there any established rule of the common law inconsistent with
the practice adopted in this case. There are many decisions in
accord with the Massachusetts view of the law, among them being:
State v. Scott, 8 N.C. 24;
Burik v. Dundee Woolen
Co., 66 N.J.L. 420;
State v. Howard, 118 Mo. 127;
Surles v. State, 89 Ga. 167.
In
Hogshead v. State, 6 Humph. 59, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the trial court erred in not granting a new
trial when it appeared "probable" that a juror was insane. But, in
Tennessee, the denial of a new trial is assignable as error and
reversible upon writ of error.
Our conclusion is that the plaintiff in error has not been
denied due process of law, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY took no part in the hearing or consideration
of this case.