The Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 145, c. 2939, regulating the
hours of labor of railway employees engaged in interstate commerce
and requiring carriers to make reports in regard thereto, is not
unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress because it applies
to railroads and employees engaged in intrastate business.
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463, distinguished.
By virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of persons
and property in interstate transportation and may restrict the
hours of labor of employees connected with such transportation.
The length of time employed has a direct relation to efficiency
of employees, and the imposition of reasonable restrictions in
regard thereto is not an unconstitutional interference with the
liberty of contract.
C., B. & Q. R. Co. v.McGuire,
219 U. S. 549.
The power of Congress to make regulations in regard to agencies
for interstate commerce is not defeated by the fact that the
agencies regulated are also connected with intrastate commerce.
An exception in a statute of cases of emergency does not render
a statute void for uncertainty where Congress has appropriately
described the exceptional cases intended to be covered.
Under § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, the Interstate
Commerce Commission has power to require carriers to make reports
regarding the hours of labor of such employees as are subject to
the Act of March 4, 1907, and the requirement of such reports does
not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
A corporation cannot plead a privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; nor can an officer of
a corporation plead that the immunity guaranteed by that amendment
relieves him personally from making records from the books and
papers of the corporation.
Wilson v. United States, ante,
p.
221 U. S. 361.
Page 221 U. S. 613
The facts, which involve the validity of an order made by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the construction of the
Employe's Act (hours of service) of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415,
c. 2939, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity to annul an order made by the
Interstate Commerce Commission on March 3, 1908, and for
injunction. The order required the carriers within the provisions
of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1907, Chapter 2939, 34 Stat.
1415, to make monthly reports, under oath, showing the instances
where employees subject to that act had been on duty for a longer
period than that allowed. The statute, entitled "An Act to Promote
the Safety of Employees and Travelers upon Railroads by Limiting
the Hours of Service of Employees Thereon," is set forth in the
margin.
*
Page 221 U. S. 614
By stipulation, there were introduced into record additional
instructions issued by the Commission under date of August 15,
1908. These prescribed new forms, and also a separate form of oath
for use in case there had been no excessive service, and it was
further directed that reports of hours of service of the employees
described should be made by the secretary or similar officer of the
carrier.
It was agreed that a number of like suits brought by other
carriers should abide the final disposition of this cause, and that
meanwhile the reports should not be required.
The bill alleged that the purpose of the Commission in
Page 221 U. S. 615
making the order was to secure from carriers evidence of
infractions of the law in order that suits might be brought to
recover penalties; that, even if this were not the purpose, the
result of the requirement would be the same because of the
provision that the Commission should lodge with the proper district
attorneys information of the violations coming to its knowledge,
and that this compulsory disclosure, both as to the corporation
itself and as to the officers concerned in such violations, was
repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States. It was also alleged
Page 221 U. S. 616
that the Commission was without authority to make the order
either under the provisions of the act or otherwise.
A demurrer for want of equity was sustained, and the complainant
appeals.
First. Although the question was not specifically
raised by the bill, it is now contended that the statute is
unconstitutional in its entirety, and therefore no action of the
Commission can be based upon it. It is said that it goes beyond the
power which Congress may exercise in the regulation of interstate
commerce; that, while addressed to common carriers engaged in
interstate transportation by railroad to any extent whatever, its
prohibitions and penalties are not limited to interstate commerce,
but apply to intrastate railroads and to employees engaged in local
business.
The prohibitions of the act are found in § 2. This provides that
it shall be "unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or
agents, subject to this Act, to require or permit any employee
subject to this Act to be or remain on duty" for a longer period
than that prescribed. The carriers and employees subject to the act
are defined in § 1 as follows:
"That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common
carrier or carriers, their officers, agents, and employees, engaged
in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the
District of Columbia or any territory of the United States, or from
one state or territory of the United States or the District of
Columbia to any other state or territory of the United States or
the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to
an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States
through a foreign country to any other place in the United States.
The term 'railroad,' as used in this Act, shall include all bridges
and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and
also all the road in use by any common carrier operating a
railroad,
Page 221 U. S. 617
whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease,
and the term 'employees,' as used in this Act, shall be held to
mean persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement of
any train."
No difficulty arises in the construction of this language. The
first sentence states the application to carriers and employees who
are "engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by
railroad" in the District of Columbia or the territories, or in
interstate or foreign commerce. The definition in the second
sentence, of what the terms "railroad" and "employees" shall
include, qualify these words as previously used, but do not remove
the limitation as to the nature of the transportation in which the
employees must be engaged in order to come within the provisions of
the statute. If the definition in the last part of the sentence of
the words used in the first part be read in connection with the
latter, the meaning of the whole becomes obvious. The section in
effect thus provides:
"This act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers, their
officers, agents, and employees (meaning by 'employees' persons
actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train),
engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad
(meaning by 'railroad' to include all bridges and ferries used or
operated in connection with any railroad) in the District of
Columbia or any territory . . . or from one state . . . to any
other state,"
etc. In short, the employees to which the act refers, embracing
the persons described in the last sentence of the section, are
those engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by
railroad in the district, territorial, interstate, or foreign
commerce defined, and the railroad, including bridges and ferries,
is the railroad by means of which the defined commerce is
conducted.
The statute therefore, in its scope, is materially different
from the Act of June 11, 1906, chapter 3073, 34
Page 221 U. S. 618
Stat. 232, which was before this Court in the
Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463.
There, while the carriers described were those engaged in the
commerce subject to the regulating power of Congress, it appeared
that if a carrier was so engaged, the act governed its relation to
every employee, although the employment of the latter might have
nothing whatever to do with interstate commerce. In the present
statute, the limiting words govern the employees as well as the
carriers.
But the argument undoubtedly involves the consideration that the
interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so
interwoven that it is utterly impracticable for them to divide
their employees in such manner that the duties of those who are
engaged in connection with interstate commerce shall be confined to
that commerce exclusively. And thus, many employees who have to do
with the movement of trains in interstate transportation are, by
virtue of practical necessity, also employed in intrastate
transportation.
This consideration, however, lends no support to the contention
that the statute is invalid. For there cannot be denied to Congress
the effective exercise of its constitutional authority. By virtue
of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, Congress
may enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and property
that are transported in that commerce, and of those who are
employed in transporting them.
Johnson v. Southern Pacific
Company, 196 U. S. 1;
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 177,
208 U. S. 178;
St. Louis I. M. & S. Railway Company v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company v. United
States, decided May 15, 1911,
220 U.
S. 559. The fundamental question here is whether a
restriction upon the hours of labor of employees who are connected
with the movement of trains in interstate transportation is
comprehended within this sphere of authorized legislation. This
question admits of but one
Page 221 U. S. 619
answer. The length of hours of service has direct relation to
the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection to life
and property necessarily depends. This has been repeatedly
emphasized in official reports of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and is a matter so plain as to require no elaboration.
In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employees and
travelers, Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws
relating to mechanical appliances, but it was also competent to
consider, and to endeavor to reduce, the dangers incident to the
strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of engineers,
conductors, train dispatchers, telegraphers, and other persons
embraced within the class defined by the act. And in imposing
restrictions having reasonable relation to this end, there is no
interference with liberty of contract as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company
v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549.
If, then, it be assumed, as it must be, that, in the furtherance
of its purpose, Congress can limit the hours of labor of employees
engaged in interstate transportation, it follows that this power
cannot be defeated either by prolonging the period of service
through other requirements of the carriers or by the commanding of
duties relating to interstate and intrastate operations.
Second. It is also urged that the statute is void for
uncertainty. This objection is based on the wording of the first
proviso in § 2 of the act, which is as follows:
"
Provided, that no operator, train dispatcher . . .
shall be required or permitted to be or remain on duty for a longer
period than nine hours in any twenty-four-hour period in all
towers, offices, places, and stations continuously operated night
and day, nor for a longer period than thirteen hours in all towers,
offices, places, and stations operated only during the daytime,
except in case of emergency, when the employees named in this
Page 221 U. S. 620
proviso may be permitted to be and remain on duty for four
additional hours in a twenty-four-hour period, on not exceeding
three days in any week."
It is said that the words "except in case of emergency" make the
application of the act so uncertain as to destroy its validity. But
this argument in substance denies to the legislature the power to
use a generic description, and, if pressed to its logical
conclusion, would practically nullify the legislative authority by
making it essential that legislation should define, without the use
of generic terms, all the specific instances to be brought within
it. In a legal sense there is no uncertainty. Congress, by an
appropriate description of an exceptional class, has established a
standard with respect to which cases that arise must be
adjudged.
Nor does the contention gather strength from the broad scope of
the proviso in § 3, for if the latter, in limiting the effect of
the entire act, could be said to include everything that may be
embraced within the term "emergency," as used in § 2, this would be
merely a duplication which would not invalidate the act.
Third. Finding that the objections to the validity of
the statute are not well taken, we are brought to the question
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has authority to require
the reports called for by its order.
Section 4 of the act provides:
"SEC. 4. It shall be the duty of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to execute and enforce the provisions of this Act, and
all powers granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission are hereby
extended to it in the execution of this Act."
The Commission, then, may call to its aid the enforcement of the
act "all powers granted" to it. And although there might have been
doubt as to the adequacy of the authority of the Commission, under
the law as it formerly
Page 221 U. S. 621
stood, to require these reports, there can be none now, in view
of the amendment of § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce by the Act
of June 18, 1910, c., 36 Stat. 556. As so amended, this section
contains the following provision:
"The commission shall also have authority by general or special
orders to require said carriers, or any of them, to file monthly
reports of earnings and expenses, and to file periodicals or
special, or both periodical and special, reports concerning any
matters about which the commission is authorized or required by
this or any other law to inquire or to keep itself informed, or
which it is required to enforce, and such periodical or special
reports shall be under oath whenever the commission so
requires."
This clearly embraces the power which the Commission here
asserts, and it is certainly now entitled to promulgate an order
requiring reports to be made. It follows that as, under the
stipulation of record here, the requirement of the Commission is to
operate wholly in the future, and it has been suspended awaiting
the final determination of this cause, the question of the
authority of the Commission at the time the order was made has
become a moot one. Were there no other question before us, the
appeal would accordingly be dismissed, and to justify a reversal of
the judgment and the sustaining of the complainant's bill, other
grounds must appear.
Nor can it be said, so far as the scope of the requirement of
the order is concerned, that it goes beyond the authority which has
been conferred upon the Commission. The order relates to the
employees who are "subject to said act." The bill alleges that, in
the original forms prescribed, the carrier was required to show the
employees who were
"either on duty for a period of time in excess of that
contemplated by the act, or who had not been off duty after any
period of service, for the length of time prescribed by the act,
and in the case of every such employee,
Page 221 U. S. 622
the carrier was required to state the cause of, and the facts,
if any, explanatory of, the excess service thus rendered by the
employee."
By the amended instructions set forth in the stipulation, it
appears that,
"in case no employee has been employed in excess of the time
named in said act, and in case no employee has gone on duty with
less then the statutory period off duty,"
a separate form of oath to that effect will be accepted in lieu
of the forms which are to be used in detailing excess service. And,
as already noted, the reports are to be made by the secretary or
similar officer.
To enable the Commission properly to perform its duty to enforce
the law, it is necessary that it should have full information as to
the hours of service exacted of the employees who are subject to
the provisions of the statute, and the requirements to which we
have referred are appropriate for that purpose, and are
comprehended within the power of the Commission.
Fourth. There is the final objection that to compel the
disclosure by these reports of violations of the law is contrary to
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States.
The order of the Commission is suitably specific and reasonable,
and there is not the faintest semblance of an unreasonable search
and seizure. The Fourth Amendment has no application.
Nor can the corporation plead a privilege against
self-crimination under the Fifth Amendment.
Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U. S. 74,
201 U. S. 75;
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212
U. S. 348,
212 U. S. 349;
Wilson v. United States, decided May 15, 1911,
ante, p.
221 U. S. 361.
With respect to its officers, it would be sufficient to say that
the privilege guaranteed to them by this amendment is a personal
one, which cannot be asserted on their behalf by the corporation.
But the transactions to which the required reports relate are
corporate transactions, subject to the regulating power
Page 221 U. S. 623
of Congress. And, with regard to the keeping of suitable records
of corporate administration, and the making of reports of corporate
action, where these are ordered by the Commission under the
authority of Congress, the officers of the corporation, by virtue
of the assumption of their duties as such, are bound by the
corporate obligation, and cannot claim a personal privilege in
hostility to the requirement.
Wilson v. United States,
supra.
The decree of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.
*
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the
provisions of this Act shall apply to any common carrier or
carriers, their officers, agents, and employees, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the
District of Columbia or any territory of the United States, or from
one state or territory of the United States or the District of
Columbia to any other state or territory of the United States or
the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to
an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States
through a foreign country to any other place in the United States.
The term 'railroad,' as used in this Act, shall include all bridges
and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and
also all the road in use by any common carrier operating a
railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or
lease, and the term 'employees,' as used in this Act, shall be held
to mean persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement
of any train."
"SEC. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its
officers or agents, subject to this Act, to require or permit any
employee subject to this Act to be or remain on duty for a longer
period than sixteen consecutive hours, and whenever any such
employee of such common carrier shall have been continuously on
duty for sixteen hours, he shall be relieved and not required or
permitted again to go on duty, until he has had at least ten
consecutive hours off duty, and no such employee who has been on
duty sixteen hours in the aggregate in any twenty-four-hour period
shall be required or permitted to continue or again go on duty
without having had at least eight consecutive hours off duty:
Provided, that no operator, train dispatcher, or other
employee who, by the use of the telegraph or telephone, dispatches,
reports, transmits, receives, or delivers orders pertaining to or
affecting train movements, shall be required or permitted to be or
remain on duty for a longer period than nine hours in any
twenty-four-hour period in all towers, offices, places, and
stations continuously operated night and day, nor for a longer
period than thirteen hours in all towers, offices, places, and
stations operated only during the daytime, except in case of
emergency, when the employees named in this proviso may be
permitted to be and remain on duty for four additional hours in a
twenty-four-hour period on not exceeding three days in any week:
Provided further, the Interstate Commerce Commission may,
after full hearing in a particular case, and for good cause shown,
extend the period within which a common carrier shall comply with
the provisions of this proviso as to such case."
"SEC. 3. That any such common carrier, or any officer or agent
thereof, requiring or permitting any employee to go, be, or remain
on duty in violation of the second section hereof, shall be liable
to a penalty of not to exceed five hundred dollars for each and
every violation, to be recovered in a suit or suits to be brought
by the United States district attorney in the district court of the
United States having jurisdiction in the locality where such
violation shall have been committed, and it shall be the duty of
such district attorney to bring such suits upon satisfactory
information being lodged with him; but no such suit shall be
brought after the expiration of one year from the date of such
violation, and it shall also be the duty of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to lodge with the proper district attorneys information
of any such violations as may come to its knowledge. In all
prosecutions under this Act, the common carrier shall be deemed to
have had knowledge of all acts of all its officers and agents:
Provided, that the provisions of this Act shall not apply
in any case of casualty or unavoidable accident or the act of God;
nor where the delay was the result of a cause not known to the
carrier or its officer or agent in charge of such employee at the
time said employee left a terminal, and which could not have been
foreseen:
Provided further, that the provisions of this
Act shall not apply to the crews of wrecking or relief trains."
"SEC. 4. It shall be the duty of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to execute and enforce the provisions of this Act, and
all powers granted to the interstate Commerce Commission are hereby
extended to it in the execution of this Act."
"SEC. 5. That this Act shall take effect and be in force one
year after its passage."