Under the tenth section of the Patent Act of 21 February 1793,
ch. 11, upon granting a rule by the judge of the district court
upon the patentee, to show cause why process should not issue to
repeal the patent, the patent is not repealed
de facto by
making the rule absolute, but the process to be awarded is in the
nature of a
scire facias at common law to the patentee to
show cause why the patent should not repealed, with costs of suit,
and upon the return of such process, duly served, the judge is to
proceed to stay the cause upon the pleadings filed by the parties
and the issue joined thereon. If the issue be an issue of fact, the
trial thereof is to be by a jury; if an issue of law, by the court,
as in other cases.
In such a case, a record is to be made of the proceedings
antecedent to the rule to show cause why process should not issue
to repeal the patent, and upon which the rule is founded.
MR. JUSTICE Story delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Judge of the Southern District of New York, under
the 10th section of the Patent Act of 21 February, 1793, chapter
11, granted a rule upon Charles Wood and Gilbert
Page 22 U. S. 604
Brundage, at the instance and complaint of Jethro Wood, to show
cause why process should not issue against them to repeal a patent
granted to them for a certain invention in due form of law, and
upon hearing the parties, no sufficient cause being, in his
judgment, shown to the contrary, he, on 2 July, 1823, passed an
order that the said rule be made absolute and that the said patent
be repealed, and that process issue to repeal the said patent and
for the costs of the complainant. The patentees, by their counsel,
moved the court to direct a record to be made of the whole
proceedings, and that process in the nature of a
scire
facias, should be issued, to try the validity of the patent.
The court denied the motion upon the ground that these were summary
proceedings and that the patent was repealed
de facto, by
making the rule absolute, and that the process to be issued was not
in the nature of a
scire facias to try the validity of the
patent, but merely process repealing the patent.
A motion was made on a former day of this term in behalf of the
patentees for a rule upon the district judge to show cause why a
mandamus should not issue from this Court directing him to make a
record of the proceedings in the cause and to issue a
scire
facias for the purpose of trying the validity of the patent.
The rule having been granted and due service had, the case has
since been argued by counsel for and against the rule, and the
opinion of this Court is now to be delivered.
Two objections have been urged at the bar
Page 22 U. S. 605
against the making this rule absolute. The first is that these
proceedings, being summary, are not properly matters of record. The
second that this is not a case in which, by law, a
scire
facias or process in the nature of a
scire facias can
be awarded to try the validity of the patent.
Both of these objections are founded upon the provisions of the
10th section of the patent act, and must be decided by a careful
examination of those provisions. The words are
"That upon oath or affirmation being made before the judge of
the district court where the patentee, his executors, &c.,
reside, that any patent, which shall be issued in pursuance of this
act was obtained surreptitiously or upon false suggestion and
motion made to the said court within three years after issuing the
said patent, but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful for the
judge of the said district court, if the matter alleged shall
appear to him to be sufficient, to grant a rule that the patentee
or his executor, &c., show cause why process should not issue
against him, to repeal such patent, and if sufficient cause shall
not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, and
thereupon the judge shall order process to be issued against such
patentee or his executors, &c., with costs of suit. And in case
no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall
appear that the patentee was not the true inventor or discoverer,
judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of the said
patent. And if the party at whose complaint the process issued
shall have judgment given against him, he shall pay all
Page 22 U. S. 606
such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the
suit, to be taxed by the court and recovered in due course of
law."
Upon the slightest inspection of this section it will be at once
perceived that however summary the proceedings may be, they are of
vast importance to the parties and involve the whole right and
interest of the patentee. The jurisdiction given to the court is
not general and unlimited, but is confined to cases where the
patent was obtained surreptitiously or upon false suggestions,
where the patentee resides within the district, and where the
application is made within three years after the issuing of the
patent. It is therefore certainly necessary that all these facts
which are indispensable to found the jurisdiction should be stated
in the motion and accompanying affidavits, and without them the
court cannot be justified in awarding the rule. It follows of
course that in any record that is to be made of the proceedings,
they constitute the preliminary part, and ought not to be omitted.
In the present case, they have been wholly omitted, and the record
is in this respect incomplete and inaccurate.
But it is said that, technically speaking, these proceedings are
not matters of record. They are certainly proceedings of a court of
record, for such are all the courts of the United States in virtue
of their organization, both upon principles of the common law and
the express intendment of Congress. In general, the interlocutory
proceedings in suits are not entered of record, as they are deemed
merely collateral incidents. But where
Page 22 U. S. 607
a special jurisdiction is given to a court, as in the present
instance, it appears to us that in conformity to the course of
decisions in this Court upon the subject of jurisdiction, all the
preliminary proceedings required to found that jurisdiction should
appear of record, as they constitute an essential part of the case.
In general, motions and rules made in the course of suits over
which the court has an acknowledged jurisdiction are not entered of
record. But where a rule is the sole foundation of the suit and the
first step in its progress, that rule can only be granted under
special circumstances prescribed by law; it is not sufficient to
show that the rule itself was granted, but it must also appear by
the proceedings that it was rightfully granted.
But the more material question is whether the proceedings, so
far as the rights of the patentees are concerned, terminated with
the rule being made absolute, so that
ipso facto the
patent was repealed, and the process to be issued was only process
to enforce or declare the repeal, or whether the process was in the
nature of a
scire facias at common law to repeal the
patent if, upon a future trial, the same should be found
invalid.
This question must be decided by the terms of the section in
controversy; but in the interpretation of those terms if their
meaning is somewhat equivocal, that construction ought certainly to
be adopted which, not departing from the sense, is most congenial
to our institutions and is most convenient in the administration of
public justice.
Page 22 U. S. 608
The securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their
inventions was deemed of so much importance as a means of promoting
the progress of science and the useful arts that the Constitution
has expressly delegated to Congress the power to secure such rights
to them for a limited period. The inventor has, during this period,
a property in his inventions -- a property which is often of very
great value and of which the law intended to give him the absolute
enjoyment and possession. In suits at common law where the value in
controversy exceeds $20, the Constitution has secured to the
citizens a trial by jury. In causes of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, they have the security of a regular and settled
course of proceedings, where the rules of evidence and the
principles of decision are well established. And in all these cases
there is the further benefit conferred by our laws of revising the
judgments of the inferior courts by the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction. It is not lightly to be presumed, therefore, that
Congress, in a class of cases placed peculiarly within its
patronage and protection, involving some of the dearest and most
valuable rights which society acknowledges and the Constitution
itself means to favor, would institute a new and summary process
which should finally adjudge upon those rights without a trial by
jury, without a right of appeal, and without any of those guards
with which in equity suits it has fenced round the general
administration of justice. The patent acts have given to the
patentee a right to sue at common law for damages for any violation
of his invention,
Page 22 U. S. 609
and have given him a further right to claim the interference of
a court of equity by way of injunction to protect the enjoyment of
his patent. It would be somewhat surprising if, after such anxious
legislation, there should exist in the act a clause which in a
summary manner enables any person to repeal his patent, and thus
sweep away his exclusive property without interposing any guards by
way of appeal, or any regular proceedings by which the validity of
titles in ordinary cases is examined and contested.
With these considerations in view, let the 10th section of the
act be examined. Its object is to provide some means to repeal
patents which have been obtained surreptitiously or upon false
suggestions -- the very cases for which a
scire facias
issues at the common law. As the patents are not enrolled in the
records of any court, but among the rolls of the Department of
State, it was necessary to give some directions as to the correct
time and manner of instituting proceedings to repeal them. It
accordingly directs that the district judge may, upon proper
evidence, under oath and motion made to the court, in his
discretion,
"grant a rule that the patentee, &c., show cause why process
should not issue against him to repeal such patent, and if
sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall
be made absolute, and thereupon the judge shall order process to be
issued against such patentee, &c., with costs of suit."
It is obvious from the language of this clause that the rule is
a rule not to repeal the patent if it is made absolute, but a
Page 22 U. S. 610
rule for process to issue to repeal the patent. It is not then
the rule, but the process contemplated by the act, that repeals the
patent. It is not a mere form, but it is of the essence of the
proceedings, without which the rule has no efficacy. Is the process
to be issued a process which,
per se, repeals the patent,
or are the words "to repeal such patent" to be construed as merely
descriptive of the nature of the process and of the effect of it if
judgment shall be finally pronounced in support of it? In other
words, is it a process in the nature of an execution, or a judicial
process in the nature of a
scire facias, calling for
further proceedings? If the words of the section had stopped at the
clause already referred to, it would perhaps have been difficult to
find a sufficient explanation of the legislative will to have led
the court to the conclusion that judicial process in the nature of
a
scire facias was certainly intended; there would have
been some reason for hesitation; but even then an interpretation
against such process would not have been without serious
embarrassments. It could not be arrived at without leaving much of
questionable reasoning behind. But the section does not stop here.
It goes on to make further provisions which if the process
absolutely repealed the patent, could have no operation and no
intelligible meaning. On the other hand, if the process was to be
in the nature of a
scire facias, all the words are
sensible and operative, and describe the proper progress and
proceedings upon such a writ. The clause is in these words:
"And in case no sufficient
Page 22 U. S. 611
cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear that
the patentee was not the true inventor or discoverer, judgment
shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of the patent."
These words follow after the clause awarding the process, and of
course suppose the process already issued. The party is supposed to
be called upon to show cause, which is precisely what a
scire
facias requires in its official mandate, and if no sufficient
cause is shown to the contrary or if it shall appear that the
patentee was not the true inventor or discoverer, then the patent
is to be repealed. If the process is merely to repeal the patent,
and not to institute a trial, how can the party show cause?; how
can it judicially appear that the patentee is not the inventor?
These provisions are intelligible in a
scire facias, for
that authorizes subsequent inquiry into the law and the facts. But
further, "judgment" is to be rendered. Now it is not necessary to
lay any particular stress on this word as a known juridical phrase
expressive of the final decision of the court, but if the making
the rule absolute repealed the patent, and the process is merely an
execution, how could any subsequent judgment be rendered in the
case? It would be contrary to all analogy, to all rules of judicial
interpretation to suppose that judgment is to succeed, and not to
precede, the writ of execution. The clause goes on,
"and if the party at whose complaint the process issued shall
have judgment against him, he shall pay all such costs as the
defendant shall be put to in defending the suit, to be taxed
Page 22 U. S. 612
by the court and recovered in due course of law."
The language is here still more distinct and persuasive. It
imports in a clear manner that some proceedings were to be had
after the process issued by which the case might be further
investigated, and if upon such investigation judgment should be
against the complainant, the patentee should recover his costs. The
language is that the party at whose complaint the process issued,
not the rule issued, shall have judgment against him. Upon what,
the rule? Certainly not, but upon the process issued. He shall pay
the costs to which the defendant is put in defending the suit. What
suit is here intended? We think it is clear that it means the suit
upon the process -- that is, upon the
scire facias, for
the proceedings upon the rule are not, in a technical or in any
accurate sense, a suit. The costs of defending the suit are to be
paid. But how can any costs arise from a defense upon a process
which is final and absolute? It appears to the court that to give
the construction contended for by the counsel against the rule
would be to reject the plain and obvious purport of the whole of
the last clauses of the section and make them a perfect nullity. In
the other view, they have entire effect, and are as reasonable and
just in themselves as they are promotive of the security of vested
rights and property.
Nor does the occurrence of the words "costs of suit" in the
preceding part of the section, where it is said that "the process
shall be issued, &c., with costs of suit," in the slightest
degree impugn
Page 22 U. S. 613
this interpretation. The true meaning of these words in this
connection is not that costs of suit already incurred shall be paid
and collected, but that the process shall be to show cause why the
patent shall not be repealed and costs of suit given to the
complainant. In this view it fortifies the construction already
asserted by the court. That this is the true exposition of the
words is made apparent by examining the 5th section of the Patent
Act of 1790, ch. 34, which is exactly similar in terms to the 10th
section of the present act except that it omits in this place the
words "costs of suit." These words therefore were not intended to
change and cannot be admitted to change the natural meaning of the
other parts of the section. And if the other words used in this
connection are descriptive of the nature of the process, these
words are merely explanatory of the legislative intent that the
costs of the suit should follow upon the final judgment in favor of
the complainant. Without this provision, as the other clause giving
costs applies to the patentee only, the complainant, although he
should prevail in the suit, would not be entitled to any costs.
This was a real defect in the first act, and is cured by the
insertion of the words under consideration.
Nor are there any public mischiefs which will result from the
view which the Court takes of this section. On the contrary, it
will subserve the purposes of general justice. If a patent has been
fraudulently obtained or upon false suggestions, it may be repealed
within three years if a jury,
Page 22 U. S. 614
upon a trial, shall be satisfied of the fact. If such a repeal
be not had, still the public has a perfect security. It may violate
the patent with impunity, and if sued for the violation, any person
may show the same facts in his defense, and it will constitute a
complete bar to the suit by the express provisions of the 6th
section of the patent act. Here also the trial will be ordinarily
by a jury, and if the verdict is found upon such facts in favor of
the defendant, the law expressly declares that "judgment shall be
rendered for the defendant, with costs, and the patent shall be
declared void." Many patents, under this section, have already in
such suits been adjudged void, so that the danger of extensive
imposition or injury is wholly chimerical. On the other hand, if by
any accident or mistake the patentee should neglect to appear to
oppose the rule upon the argument on the other side, he may be
remediless. But upon the exposition of the statute adopted by the
court he will still be entitled to appear to the
scire
facias and have a more deliberate opportunity to defend his
rights.
Upon the whole it is the opinion of the Court that the rule
ought to be made absolute and that a peremptory mandamus issue to
the judge of the district court directing him to enter upon record
the proceedings in this cause antecedent to the granting of the
rule and upon which it was founded; that he award a process in the
nature of a
scire facias to the patentees to show cause
why the patent should not be repealed, with costs of suit; that
upon such process' being returned,
Page 22 U. S. 615
duly executed, he proceed to try the same cause upon the
pleadings filed by the parties and the issue joined thereon, and
that if the issue so joined be an issue of fact, then the trial
thereof to be by a jury; if an issue of law, then by the court, as
in other cases.
Mandamus accordingly.
JUDGMENT. Upon the hearing of this cause upon the rule to show
cause heretofore awarded by this Court and on consideration of the
arguments of counsel for and against making the same rule absolute,
it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED by the Court that the same rule be and
hereby is made absolute. And it is further ORDERED by the Court
that a peremptory mandamus issue to the District Judge of the
Southern District of New York commanding him to enter upon record
the proceedings in this cause antecedent to the granting by him of
the rule to show cause why process should not issue, to repeal the
patent in the proceedings mentioned and upon which the said rule
was founded; that the said judge do award a process in the nature
of a
scire facias to the patentees to show cause why the
said patent should not be repealed, with costs of suit; that upon
the return of such process as duly served, the said judge do
proceed to try the cause upon the pleadings filed by the parties
and the issue joined thereon; and that if the issue be an issue of
fact, the trial thereof be by a jury; if an issue of law then by
the court, as in other cases.