Neither the excellence nor the defects of a legislative scheme
may be permitted to determine the constitutionality of a state
statute; in this Court, the only question is whether the statute
transcends the limits of power defined by the federal
Constitution.
The legislature, provided it acts within constitutional
limitations, is the arbiter of the public policy of the state, and
it may by amendment enlarge the scope of a statute beyond the
limits set upon the previous statute by the courts.
While the court may, in the absence of legislation and in the
light of the common law, uphold or condemn contracts in the light
of what is conceived to be public policy, that determination must
yield to the legislative will when constitutionally expressed
thereafter.
A state has power to prohibit contracts limiting liability for
injuries made in advance of the injury received, and to provide
that the subsequent acceptance of benefits under such contracts
shall not constitute satisfaction of the claim for injuries
received after the contract. Such a statute does not impair the
liberty of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and so
held as to the Iowa statute relative to employees of
railway companies.
Freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right.
There is no absolute freedom to contract as one chooses. Liberty
implies the absence of arbitrary restraint -- not immunity from
reasonable regulations.
Where police legislation has a reasonable relation to an object
within governmental authority, the legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review.
The scope of judicial inquiry as to a statute is limited to the
question of power to enact, while the scope of legislative
consideration includes the matter of policy.
Where the legislature has power to establish a regulation, it
has also power to prohibit contracts in derogation of such
regulation.
Whether the relief scheme of a railroad company involving
contracts with its employees and contributions from both employees
and the
Page 219 U. S. 550
company, such as the one involved in this case, is a wise and
proper scheme which should be approved, or an unwise scheme which
should be disapproved by the public policy of the state, is under
the control of the legislative power of the state, and the statute
of Iowa prohibiting contracts between the railway companies and
their employees limiting the right to recover damages at common law
is within the police power of the state, has a reasonable relation
to the matter regulated, and is not unconstitutional under the due
process or equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A statute does not necessarily deny equal protection of the law
because limited to railway employees of a certain class.
The classification of the original statute having been sustained
by this Court, and there being no criticism of the amendment
thereto involved in this case that would not equally apply to the
original statute, the amendment will not be declared
unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law.
131 Ia. 340 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a law of the
Iowa, are stated in the opinion.
Page 219 U. S. 559
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Charles L. McGuire, the defendant in error, while acting as a
brakeman in the service of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Company, in Iowa, in the year 1900, received injuries
through negligence imputable to the company and recovered judgment
in the district court of that state for the sum of $2,000. By
stipulation, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway
Company
Page 219 U. S. 560
was joined in the judgment. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the State of Iowa, and the companies bring this writ of
error.
The question presented is with respect to the validity of § 2071
of the Code of Iowa, as amended in the year 1898, which was held to
preclude the railroad company from making the defense that recovery
was barred by the acceptance of benefits under a contract of
membership in its relief department.
The section in its original form was as follows:
"Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all
damages sustained by any person, including employees of such
corporation in consequence of the neglect of the agents or by any
mismanagement of the engineers or other employees thereof and in
consequence of the willful wrongs, whether of commission or
omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employees, when such
wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of
any railway on or about which they shall be employed, and no
contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or
binding."
The amendment of 1898 added the following provision:
"Nor shall any contract of insurance relief, benefit or
indemnity in case of injury or death entered into prior to the
injury between the person so injured and such corporation or any
other person or association acting for such corporation, nor shall
the acceptance of any such insurance relief, benefit or indemnity
by the person injured, his widow, heirs, or legal representatives,
after the injury, from such corporation, person, or association,
constitute any bar or defense to any cause of action brought under
the provisions of this section, but nothing contained herein shall
be construed to prevent or invalidate any settlement for damages
between the parties subsequent to injuries received."
The question arose upon demurrer to the defense in the
Page 219 U. S. 561
answer of the railroad company, which asserted the bar denied by
the statute. This defense in substance alleged that, in November
1900 and prior to his injury, the defendant in error had
voluntarily become a member of the relief department of the
railroad company, and thereupon had agreed that the acceptance of
benefits payable to him in accordance with the regulations of the
department should discharge the company from all liability for
damages; that, after he had sustained the injuries alleged in his
petition, he had received benefits from the relief fund of the
department amounting to $822, and that the payment and acceptance
of these benefits constituted, under the agreement, full
satisfaction of the claim in suit.
The facts with regard to the organization, purpose, and
management of the relief department, and the regulations governing
it, were fully averred. The department was organized in 1889, as a
part of the service of the railroad company, with the object of
creating a fund out of which definite amounts of money should be
paid to contributing employees in the event of disability from
sickness or accident, or, in case of death, for their proper burial
and the relief of their families. The various companies forming the
Burlington, system organized similar departments, and by agreement
these were associated in joint administration.
The regulations of the relief department provided that
membership in the department should be voluntary, and defined the
amount of contributions to be paid monthly, the members being
classified for this purpose according to their monthly wages. The
amount of benefits according to these classes was also specified.
The relief fund consisted of the contributions of members, income
from investments, interest paid by the railroad company on monthly
balances, and appropriations made by the company when necessary to
cover deficiencies. From the time of organization to December 31,
1900, there was paid
Page 219 U. S. 562
in benefits out of the fund so constituted the sum of
$2,671,510.54, of which $1,294,790.50 was paid by reason of
sickness, and $1,376,720.04 for injuries and death.
The railroad company had general charge of the relief
department, and guaranteed the fulfillment of its obligations. It
was responsible for the safekeeping of the moneys of the relief
fund, paid into the fund interest at the rate of four percentum per
annum on monthly balances, supplied without expense to the fund the
necessary facilities for the business of the department, and
defrayed from the moneys of the company the operating expenses. It
was alleged that, for these expenses, the company had paid to
December, 1900, $621,572.44. This sum did not include office rent
for the department or of medical examiners or various sundry
expenses, nor did it embrace the service of officers and of clerks
who were not wholly concerned with the work of the department, and
this service and incidental expenses were alleged to be worth
approximately $50,000 a year. In addition, during the period
mentioned, the railroad company paid to make up deficits in the
fund the sum of $42,532.94, for which it had no right to
reimbursement.
Among the regulations by which the members of the relief
department agreed to be bound was the following:
"64. In case of injury to a member, he may elect to accept the
benefits in pursuance of these regulations, or to prosecute such
claims as he may have at law against the company or any company
associated therewith in the administration of their relief
departments."
"The acceptance by the member of benefits for injury shall
operate as a release and satisfaction of all claims against the
company and all other companies associated therewith, as aforesaid,
for damages arising from or growing out of such injury, and
further, in the event of the death of a member, no part of the
death benefit or unpaid disability benefit shall be due or payable
unless and until
Page 219 U. S. 563
good and sufficient releases shall be delivered to the
superintendent of all claims against the relief department, as well
as against the company and all other companies associated
therewith, as aforesaid, arising from or growing out of the death
of the member, said releases having been duly executed by all who
might legally assert such claims, and further, if any suit shall be
brought against the company or any other company associated
therewith, as aforesaid, for damages arising from or growing out of
injury or death occurring to a member, the benefits otherwise
payable and all obligations of the relief department and of the
company, created by the membership of such member in the relief
fund, shall thereupon be forfeited without any declaration or other
act by the relief department or the company; but the superintendent
may, in his discretion, waive such forfeiture upon condition that
all pending suits shall first be dismissed."
"The payment by the company, or any company associated
therewith, as aforesaid, of any amount in compromise of a claim for
damages arising from or growing out of an injury to, or the death
of, a member, shall preclude any and all claims for benefits from
the relief fund, arising from or growing out of such injury or
death."
In support of the defense based upon this regulation, the
railroad company further asserted that the amended statute above
quoted did not deprive it of the right to plead the contract with
the defendant in error, and its satisfaction, as a discharge, for
the reason that the statute was repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (1) as an
unwarranted interference with liberty to make contracts and (2) as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The district court overruled the demurrer, but its judgment was
reversed by the supreme court of the state, which held the statute
to be valid, and, in consequence, that the demurrer should have
been sustained.
Page 219 U. S. 564
McGuire v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Ia. 340. This
ruling was adhered to when the question was again raised on the
appeal to that court from the final judgment. 138 Ia. 664. And to
review this decision as to the constitutionality of the statute,
the case has been brought here.
We pass without comment the criticisms which are made of certain
details of the relief plan, for neither the suggested excellence
nor the alleged defects of a particular scheme may be permitted to
determine the validity of the statute, which is general in its
application. The question with which we are concerned is not
whether the regulations set forth in the answer are just or unjust,
but whether the amended statute transcends the limits of power as
defined by the federal Constitution.
The first ground of attack is that the statute violates the
Fourteenth Amendment by reason of the restraint it lays upon
liberty of contract. This section of the Code of Iowa (§ 2071), as
originally enacted, imposed liability upon railroad corporations
for injuries to employees, although caused by the negligence or
mismanagement of fellow servants. And it was held by this Court
that it was clearly within the competency of the legislature to
prescribe this measure of responsibility.
Minneapolis & St.
Louis Railway Co. v. Herrick, 127 U.
S. 210, following
Missouri Railway Co. v.
Mackey, 127 U. S. 205. The
statute in its original form also provided that "no contract which
restricts such liability shall be legal or binding."
Subsequent to this enactment, the railroad company established
its relief department, and the question was raised in the state
court as to the legality of the provision then incorporated in the
contract of membership, by which, in case of suit for damages, the
payment of benefits was to be suspended until the suit should be
discontinued,
Page 219 U. S. 565
and the acceptance of benefits was to operate as a full
discharge. The two principal contentions against it were, first,
that it was against public policy, and second, that it was in
violation of the statute. Both were overruled, and with reference
to the statute, it was held that the contract of membership did not
fall within the prohibition for the reason that it did not restrict
liability, but put the employee to his election.
Donald v. C.,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., 93 Ia. 284;
Maine v. C., B. & Q.
Ry. Co., 109 Ia. 260. The legislature then amended the section
by providing expressly that a contract of this sort and the
acceptance of benefits should not defeat the enforcement of the
liability which the statute defined.
Manifestly, the decision that the existing statute was not broad
enough to embrace the inhibition did not prevent the legislature
from enlarging its scope so that it should be included. Nor was the
holding of the court final upon the point of public policy, so far
as the power of the legislature is concerned. The legislature,
provided it acts within its constitutional authority, is the
arbiter of the public policy of the state. While the court, unaided
by legislative declaration, and applying the principles of the
common law, may uphold or condemn contracts in the light of what is
conceived to be public policy, its determination as a rule for
future action must yield to the legislative will when expressed in
accordance with the organic law. If the legislature had the power
to incorporate a similar provision in the statute when it was
passed originally, it had the same power with regard to future
transactions to enact the amendment.
It may also be observed that the statute, as amended, does not
affect contracts of settlement or compromise, made after the
injury, and the question of the extent of the legislative power
with respect to such contracts is not presented. The amendment
provides:
"But nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or
invalidate
Page 219 U. S. 566
any settlement for damages between the parties subsequent to
injuries received."
As was said by the state court in construing the act (131 Ia.,
p. 377):
"The legislature does not in this act forbid or place any
obstacle in the way of such insurance, nor does it forbid or
prevent any settlement of the matter of damages with an injured
employee, fairly made after the injury is received. On the
contrary, the right to make such settlement is expressly provided
for in the amendment to Code, § 2071. The one thing which that
amendment was intended to prevent was the use of this insurance or
relief for which the employee has himself paid in whole or in part,
as a bar to the right which the statute has given him to recover
damages from the corporation."
It is urged, however, that the amendatory act prohibits the
making of a contract for settlement "by acts done after the
liability had become fixed." The acceptance of benefits is, of
course, an act done after the injury, but the legal consequences
sought to be attached to that act are derived from the provision in
the contract of membership. The stipulation which the statute
nullifies is one made in advance of the injury, that the subsequent
acceptance of benefits shall constitute full satisfaction of the
claim for damages. It is in this aspect that the question arises as
to the restriction of liberty of contract.
It has been held that the right to make contracts is embraced in
the conception of liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578;
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45;
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161. In
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, supra, the Court, in referring to
the Fourteenth Amendment, said (p.
208 U. S.
589):
"The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use
Page 219 U. S. 567
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others,
that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute,
right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to
contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw
from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which
consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the
power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
community.
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.
S. 89;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11.
"It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some
individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from
some contracts. It may deny to all the right to contract for the
purchase or sale of lottery tickets; to the minor the right to
assume any obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to
the common carrier the power to make any contract releasing himself
from negligence; and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any
employment from any contract in the course of that employment which
is against public policy. The possession of this power by
government in no manner conflicts with the proposition that,
generally speaking, every citizen has a right freely to contract
for the price of his labor, services, or property."
Frisbie v. United States, 157
U. S. 165,
157 U. S.
166.
The right to make contracts is subject to the exercise of the
powers granted to Congress for the suitable conduct of matters of
national concern; as, for example, the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and among the
Page 219 U. S. 568
several states.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U. S.
228-231;
Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U.S.
190 U. S.
174-176;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside
Mills, 219 U. S. 186;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, decided this
day,
ante, p.
219 U. S. 467.
It is subject also, in the field of state action, to the
essential authority of government to maintain peace and security
and to enact laws for the promotion of the health, safety, morals,
and welfare of those subject to its jurisdiction. This limitation
has had abundant illustration in a variety of circumstances. Thus,
in addition to upholding the power of the state to require
reasonable maximum charges for public service (
Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113;
C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.
155;
Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.
S. 307;
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
212 U. S. 19), and
to prescribe the hours of labor for those employed by the state or
its municipalities (
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.
S. 207), this Court has sustained the validity of state
legislation in prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors within the state (
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.
S. 623;
Crowley v. Christensen, supra); in
limiting employment in underground mines or workings, and in
smelters and other institutions for the reduction or refining of
ores or metals, to eight hours a day, except in cases of emergency
(
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366); in
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes without license (
Gundling v.
Chicago, 177 U. S. 183); in
requiring the redemption in cash of store orders or other evidences
of indebtedness issued in payment of wages (
Knoxville Iron Co.
v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13); in
prohibiting contracts for options to sell or buy grain or other
commodity at a future time (
Booth v. Illinois,
184 U. S. 425); in
prohibiting the employment of women in laundries more than ten
hours a day (
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.
S. 412), and in making it unlawful to contract to pay
miners employed at quantity rates upon the basis of screened coal,
instead of the weight
Page 219 U. S. 569
of the coal as originally produced in the mine (
McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S.
539).
The principle involved in these decisions is that where the
legislative action is arbitrary and has no reasonable relation to a
purpose which it is competent for government to effect, the
legislature transcends the limits of its power in interfering with
liberty of contract; but where there is reasonable relation to an
object within the governmental authority, the exercise of the
legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. The scope
of judicial inquiry in deciding the question of power is not to be
confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing
with the matter of policy. Whether the enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired result, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of
the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.
The principle was thus stated in
McLean v. Arkansas,
supra, pp.
211 U. S.
547-548:
"The legislature, being familiar with local conditions, is,
primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The mere
fact that a court may differ with the legislature in its views of
public policy, or that judges may hold views inconsistent with the
propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground for
judicial interference unless the act in question is unmistakably
and palpably in excess of legislative power [cases cited]. . . . If
there existed a condition of affairs concerning which the
legislature of the state, exercising its conceded right to enact
laws for the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of the
people, might pass the law, it must be sustained; if such action
was arbitrary interference with the right to contract or carry on
business, and having no just relation to the protection of the
public
Page 219 U. S. 570
within the scope of legislative power, the act must fail."
In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the
legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order
that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and
that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from
oppression. What differences, as to the extent of this power, may
exist with respect to particular employments and how far that which
may be authorized as to one department of activity may appear to be
arbitrary in another must be determined as cases are presented for
decision. But it is well established that, so far as its
regulations are valid, not being arbitrary or unrelated to a proper
purpose, the legislature undoubtedly may prevent them from being
nullified by prohibiting contracts which, by modification or
waiver, would alter or impair the obligation imposed. If the
legislature may require the use of safety devices, it may prohibit
agreements to dispense with them. If it may restrict employment in
mines and smelters to eight hours a day, it may make contracts for
longer service unlawful. In such case, the interference with the
right to contract is incidental to the main object of the
regulation, and if the power exists to accomplish the latter, the
interference is justified as an aid to its exercise. As was pointed
out in
Holden v. Hardy, supra, on page
169 U. S.
397:
"The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the
experience of legislators in many states has corroborated, that the
proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do not
stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a certain
extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much
labor as possible from their employees, while the latter are often
induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which
their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental
to their health or
Page 219 U. S. 571
strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and
the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such
cases, self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature
may properly interpose its authority. . . . But the fact that both
parties are of full age and competent to contract does not
necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere where the
parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health
demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against
himself."
"The state still retains an interest in his welfare, however
reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the
parts, and when the individual health, safety, and welfare are
sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer."
Here, there is no question as to the validity of the regulation
or as to the power of the state to impose the liability which the
statute prescribes. The statute relates to that phase of the
relation of master and servant which is presented by the case of
railroad corporations. It defined the liability of such
corporations for injuries resulting from negligence and
mismanagement in the use and operation of their railways. In the
cases within its purview, it extended the liability of the common
law by abolishing the fellow servant rule. Having authority to
establish this regulation, it is manifest that the legislature was
also entitled to insure its efficacy by prohibiting contracts in
derogation of its provisions. In the exercise of this power, the
legislature was not limited with respect either to the form of the
contract, or the nature of the consideration, or the absolute or
conditional character of the engagement. It was as competent to
prohibit contracts which, on a specified event, or in a given
contingency, should operate to relieve the corporation from the
statutory liability which would otherwise exist, as it was to deny
validity to agreements of absolute waiver.
The policy of the amendatory act was the same as that
Page 219 U. S. 572
of the original statute. Its provision that contracts of
insurance relief, benefit, or indemnity, and the acceptance of such
benefits, should not defeat recovery under the statute, was
incidental to the regulation it was intended to enforce. Assuming
the right of enforcement, the authority to enact this inhibition
cannot be denied. If the legislature had the power to prohibit
contracts limiting the liability imposed, it certainly could
include in the prohibition stipulations of that sort in contracts
of insurance relief, benefit or indemnity, as well as in other
agreements. But if the legislature could specifically provide that
no contract for insurance relief should limit the liability for
damages, upon what ground can it be said that it was beyond the
legislative authority to deny that effect to the payment of
benefits, or the acceptance of such payment, under the
contract?
The asserted distinction is sought to be based upon the fact
that, under the contract of membership, the employee has an
election after the injury. But this circumstance, however
appropriate it may be for legislative consideration, cannot be
regarded as defining a limitation of legislative power. The power
to prohibit contracts, in any case where it exists, necessarily
implies legislative control over the transaction, despite the
action of the parties. Whether this control may be exercised in a
particular case depends upon the relation of the transaction to the
execution of a policy which the state is competent to establish. It
does not aid the argument to describe the defense as one of accord
and satisfaction. The payment of benefits is the performance of the
promise to pay, contained in the contract of membership. If the
legislature may prohibit the acceptance of the promise as a
substitution for the statutory liability, it should also be able to
prevent the like substitution of its performance.
For the reasons we have stated, the considerations which
properly bear upon the wisdom of the legislation
Page 219 U. S. 573
need not be discussed. On the one hand, it is said that the
relief department is in the control of the corporation; that, by
reason of their exigency, the employees may readily be constrained
to become members; that the relief fund consists in larger part of
contributions made from wages; that the acceptance of benefits
takes place at a time when the employee is suffering from the
consequences of his injury, and, being seriously in need of aid, he
may easily be induced to accept payment from the fund in which, by
reason of his contributions, he feels that he is entitled to share,
and that such a plan, if were permitted, through the payment of
benefits, to result in a discharge of the liability for negligence,
would operate to transfer from the corporation to its employees a
burden which, in the interest of their protection and the safety of
the public, the corporation should be compelled to bear. On the
other hand, it is urged that the relief plan is a beneficent
scheme, avoiding the waste of litigation, securing prompt relief in
case of need due to sickness or injury, making equitable provision
for deserving cases, and hence tends in an important way to promote
the good of the service and the security of the employment. Even a
partial statement of these various considerations shows clearly
that they are of a character to invoke the judgment of the
legislature in deciding, within the limits of its power, upon the
policy of the state. And whether the policy declared by the statute
in question is approved or disapproved, it cannot be said that the
legislative power has been exceeded either in defining the
liability or in the means taken to prevent the legislative will
with respect to it from being thwarted.
The second ground upon which the statute as amended is assailed
is that it constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the
laws.
It is urged that the prohibition of the amendatory act applies
only to those employees of railroad corporations who were embraced
within the provision of the original
Page 219 U. S. 574
statute, and to the enforcement of the particular liabilities
which that statute defined. The limitation to a particular class of
employees of railroad corporations is based upon the decisions of
the state court that the benefits of the original statute were
confined to those who were engaged in the hazardous business of
operating railroads.
Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Ia. 52;
Malone v. Railway Co., 65 Ia. 417;
Akeson v. Railway
Co., 106 Ia. 54. It is said that all employees of the
plaintiffs in error may become members of the relief department,
and that the limited application of the amendment, as to the effect
of the acceptance of benefits under the membership contract, is an
invalid discrimination.
It was, however, entirely competent for the legislature, in
enacting the prohibition, for the purpose of securing the
enforcement of the liability it had defined, to limit it to those
cases in which the liability arose. As the purpose of the amendment
was to supplement the original statute, the classification was
properly the same. And with respect to subsequent transactions, the
amendment must be regarded as having the same validity as it would
have had if it had formed a part of the earlier enactment. No
criticism on the ground of discrimination can successfully be
addressed to the amendatory act which would not likewise impeach
the statute in its earlier form.
But the propriety of the classification of the original statute
was considered and upheld by this Court. And the validity of
legislation abrogating the fellow servant rule, both with respect
to the class of cases embraced in the statute and also where it is
abolished as to railway employees generally, has been sustained.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Herrick,
127 U. S. 210;
Missouri Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.
S. 205;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Melton, 218 U. S. 36;
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. Co. v. Turnipseed,
ante, p.
219 U. S. 35. In
view of the full discussion of this subject in the recent
decisions
Page 219 U. S. 575
above cited, nothing further need be said upon this point.
We find none of the objections which have been made to the
validity of the amendatory act to be well taken, and the judgment
is therefore
Affirmed.