The rule laid down in
Heyburn's Case,
2 Dall. 409, that neither the legislative nor the executive branch
of the Government of the United State can assign to the judicial
branch any duties other than those that are properly judicial, to
be performed in a judicial manner, applied, and
held, that
it is beyond the power of Congress to provide for a suit of this
nature to be brought in the Court of
Page 219 U. S. 347
Claims with an appeal to this Court to test the
constitutionality of prior acts of Congress, such a suit not being
a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution.
From its earliest history, this Court has consistently declined
to exercise ay powers other than those which are strictly judicial
in their nature.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the exercise of
judicial power is limited to cases and controversies.
A case or controversy, in order that the judicial power of the
United States may be exercised thereon, implies the existence of
present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted
to the court for adjudication.
Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 431.
This court has no veto power on legislation enacted by Congress,
and its right to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional can
only be exercised when a proper case between opposing parties is
submitted for determination.
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137.
The determination by the Court of Claims, and on appeal by this
Court, of the constitutional validity of an act of Congress in a
suit brought by authority of a subsequent act of Congress clothing
such courts with jurisdiction for the avowed purpose of settling
such question with provision for payment of expenses of the suit in
certain contingencies out of funds in the Treasury of the United
States, is not within the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution upon this Court; such a suit is not a case or
controversy to which the judicial power extends, nor would such a
judgment conclude private parties in actual litigation.
That part of the Act of March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015,
1028, which requires of this Court action in its nature not
judicial within the meaning of the Constitution exceeds the
limitation of legislative authority, and is unconstitutional, and
the suits brought thereunder are dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
This court cannot be required to decide cases over which it has
not jurisdiction because other cases are pending involving the same
point of law; to do so would require it to give opinions in the
nature of advice concerning legislative action.
An act of Congress, conferring jurisdiction on the Court of
Claims and on this Court on appeal, testing the constitutionality
of prior acts of Congress will not be sustained as to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims alone if it cannot be also
sustained as to this Court.
44 Court of Claims 137 reversed with directions to dismiss the
suit.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality and
construction
Page 219 U. S. 348
of certain acts of Congress relating to the distribution and
allotment of lands and funds of the Cherokee Indians, are stated in
the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases arise under an act of Congress undertaking to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims, and upon this Court, on
appeal, to determine the validity of certain acts of Congress
hereinafter referred to.
Case No. 330 was brought by David Muskrat and J. Henry Dick, in
their own behalf, and in behalf of others in a like situation, to
determine the constitutional validity of the Act of Congress of
April 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137, as amended by the Act of June 21,
1906, c. 3504, 34 Stat. 325
et seq., and to have the same
declared invalid in so far as the same undertook to increase the
number of persons entitled to share in the final distribution of
lands and funds of the Cherokees beyond those enrolled on September
1, 1902, in accordance with the Act of Congress passed July 1,
1902, c. 1375, 32 Stat. 716-720-721. The
Page 219 U. S. 349
acts subsequent to that of July 1, 1902, have the effect to
increase the number of persons entitled to participate in the
division of the Cherokee lands and funds by permitting the
enrollment of children who were minors, living on March 4, 1906,
whose parents had theretofore been enrolled as members of the
Cherokee tribe, or had applications pending for that purpose.
Case No. 331 was brought by Brown and Gritts on their own behalf
and on behalf of other Cherokee citizens having a like interest in
the property allotted under the act of July 1, 1902, c. 1368, 32
Stat. 710. Under this act, Brown and Gritts received allotments.
The subsequent Act of March 11, 1904, c. 505, 33 Stat. 65,,
empowered the Secretary of the Interior to grant rights of way for
pipelines over lands allotted to Indians under certain regulations.
Another act, that of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137,
purported to extend to a period of twenty-five years the time
within which full-blooded Indians of the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole tribes were forbidden to alienate,
sell, dispose of, or encumber certain of their lands.
The object of the petition of Brown and Gritts was to have the
subsequent legislation of 1904 and 1906 declared to be
unconstitutional and void, and to have the lands allotted to them
under the original Act of July 1, 1902, adjudged to be theirs free
from restraints upon the rights to sell and convey the same. From
this statement, it is apparent that the purpose of the proceedings
instituted in the Court of Claims, and now appealed to this Court,
is to restrain the enforcement of such legislation subsequent to
the act of July 1, 1902, upon the ground that the same is
unconstitutional and void. The Court of Claims sustained the
validity of the acts and dismissed the petitions. 44 Ct.Cl. 137,
283.
These proceedings were begun under the supposed authority of an
Act of Congress passed March 1, 1907 (a part
Page 219 U. S. 350
of the Indian appropriation bill), c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028.
As that legislation is important in this connection, so much of the
act as authorized the beginning of these suits is here inserted in
full:
"That William Brown and Levi B. Gritts, on their own behalf and
on behalf of all other Cherokee citizens, having like interests in
the property allotted under the act of July first, nineteen hundred
and two, entitled, 'An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands of
the Cherokee Nation, for the Disposition of Town Sites Therein, and
for Other Purposes,' and David Muskrat and J. Henry Dick, on their
own behalf, and on behalf of all Cherokee citizens enrolled as such
for allotment as of September first, nineteen hundred and two, be,
and they are hereby, authorized and empowered to institute their
suits in the Court of Claims to determine the validity of any acts
of Congress passed since the said act of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, in so far as said acts, or any of them, attempt to
increase or extend the restrictions upon alienation, encumbrance,
or the right to lease the allotments of lands of Cherokee citizens,
or to increase the number of persons entitled to share in the final
distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees beyond those
enrolled for allotment as of September first, nineteen hundred and
two, and provided for in the said act of July first, nineteen
hundred and two."
"And jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims,
with the right of appeal, by either party, to the Supreme Court of
the United States, to hear, determine, and adjudicate each of said
suits."
"The suits brought hereunder shall be brought on or before
September first, nineteen hundred and seven, against the United
States as a party defendant, and, for the speedy disposition of the
questions involved, preference shall be given to the same by said
courts, and by the Attorney General, who is hereby charged with the
defense of said suits. "
Page 219 U. S. 351
"Upon the rendition of final judgment by the Court of Claims or
the Supreme Court of the United States, denying the validity of any
portion of the said acts authorized to be brought into question, in
either or both of said cases, the Court of Claims shall determine
the amount to be paid the attorneys employed by the above-named
parties in the prosecution thereof for services and expenses, and
shall render judgment therefor, which shall be paid out of the
funds in the United States Treasury belonging to the beneficiaries,
under the said act of July first, nineteen hundred and two."
This act is the authority for the maintenance of these two
suits.
The first question in these cases, as in others, involves the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceeding, and that
depends upon whether the jurisdiction conferred is within the power
of Congress, having in view the limitations of the judicial power,
as established by the Constitution of the United States.
Section 1 of article 3 of the Constitution provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from
time to time, ordain and establish."
Section 2 of the same article provides:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be
a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a
state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different
states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under
grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. "
Page 219 U. S. 352
It will serve to elucidate the nature and extent of the judicial
power thus conferred by the Constitution to note certain instances
in which this Court has had occasion to examine and define the
same. As early as 1792, an act of Congress, March 23, 1792, c. 11,
1 Stat. 243, was brought to the attention of this Court which
undertook to provide for the settlement of claims of widows and
orphans barred by the limitations theretofore established
regulating claims to invalid pensions. The act was not construed by
this Court, but came under consideration before the then Chief
Justice and another Justice of this Court and the district judge,
and their conclusions are given in the margin of the report of
Hayburn's Case,
2 Dall. 409. The act undertook to devolve upon the Circuit Court of
the United States the duty of examining proofs, of determining what
amount of the monthly pay would be equivalent to the disability
ascertained, and to certify the same to the Secretary of War, who
was to place the names of the applicants on the pension list of the
United States in conformity thereto unless he had cause to suspect
imposition or mistake, in which event he might withhold the name of
the applicant and report the same to Congress.
In the note to the report of the case in 2 Dall., it appeared
that Chief Justice Jay, Mr. Justice Cushing, and District Judge
Duane unanimously agreed:
"That by the Constitution of the United States, the government
thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches,
and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose,
encroachments on either."
"That neither the legislative nor the executive branches can
constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as are
properly judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner."
"That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are
not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to
contemplate them as such; inasmuch as
Page 219 U. S. 353
it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to
those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the
Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature,
whereas, by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any
other executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to
sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this
Court."
A further history of the case -- and of another brought under
the same act, but unreported -- will be found in
United
States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, in which the
opinion of the court was by the Chief Justice, and the note by him
on page
54 U. S. 52 was
inserted by order of the Court. Concluding that note, it was
said:
"In the early days of the Government, the right of Congress to
give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases not
enumerated in the Constitution was maintained by many jurists, and
seems to have been entertained by the learned judges who decided
Todd's Case. But discussion and more mature examination has settled
the question otherwise, and it has long been the established
doctrine, and we believe now assented to by all who have examined
the subject, that the original jurisdiction of this Court is
confined to the cases specified in the Constitution, and that
Congress cannot enlarge it. In all other cases, its power must be
appellate."
In the
Ferreira case, this Court determined the effect
of proceedings under an act of Congress authorizing the district
judge of the United States for the Northern District of Florida to
receive and adjudicate claims for losses for which this Government
was responsible under the treaty of 1819 between the United States
and Spain, decisions in favor of claimants, together with evidence
given in connection therewith, to be reported to the Secretary of
the Treasury, who, being satisfied that the same were just and
equitable and within the treaty, was to pay the amount thereof. It
was held that an award of the district
Page 219 U. S. 354
judge under that act was not the judgment of a court, and did
not afford a basis of appeal to this Court.
In 1793, by direction of the President, Secretary of State
Jefferson addressed to the Justices of the Supreme Court a
communication soliciting their views upon the question whether
their advice to the Executive would be available in the solution of
important questions of the construction of treaties, laws of
nations and laws of the land, which the Secretary said were often
presented under circumstances which "do not give a cognizance of
them to the tribunals of the country." The answer to the question
was postponed until the subsequent sitting of the Supreme Count,
when Chief Justice Jay and his associates answered to President
Washington that, in consideration of the lines of separation drawn
by the Constitution between the three departments of Government,
and being judges of a court of last resort, afforded strong
arguments against the propriety of extrajudicially deciding the
questions alluded to, and expressing the view that the power given
by the Constitution to the President, of calling on heads of
departments for opinions, "seems to have been purposely, as well as
expressly, united to the executive departments." Correspondence
& Public Papers of John Jay, vol. 3, p. 486.
The subject underwent a complete examination in the case of
Gordon v. United States, reported in an appendix to 117
U.S.Appx. 697, in which the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney,
prepared by him and placed in the hands of the clerk, is published
in full. It is said to have been his last judicial utterance, and
the whole subject of the nature and extent of the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution is treated with great learning and
fullness. In that case, an act of Congress was held invalid which
undertook to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims, and
thence by appeal to this Court, the judgment, however, not to be
paid until an appropriation had been estimated therefor
Page 219 U. S. 355
by the Secretary of the Treasury; and, as was said by the Chief
Justice, the result was that neither court could enforce its
judgment by any process, and whether it was to be paid or not
depended on the future action of the Secretary of the Treasury and
of Congress. "The Supreme Court," says the Chief Justice,
"does not owe its existence or its powers to the legislative
department of the Government. It is created by the Constitution,
and represents one of the three great divisions of power in the
Government of the United States, to each of which the Constitution
has assigned its appropriate duties and powers, and made each
independent of the other in performing its appropriate functions.
The power conferred on this Court is exclusively judicial, and it
cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other."
Concluding his discussion of the subject, the Chief Justice
said, after treating of the powers of the different branches of the
government, and laying emphasis upon the independence of the
judicial power as established under our Constitution:
"These cardinal principles of free government had not only been
long established in England, but also in the United States from the
time of their earliest colonization, and guided the American people
in framing and adopting the present Constitution. And it is the
duty of this Court to maintain it unimpaired as far as it may have
the power. And while it executes firmly all the judicial powers
intrusted to it, the Court will carefully abstain from exercising
any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which
is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution."
At the last term of the court, in the case of
Baltimore
& O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
215 U. S. 216,
this Court declined to take jurisdiction of a case which undertook
to extend its appellate power to the consideration of a case in
which there was no judgment in the court below. In that case,
former cases were reviewed
Page 219 U. S. 356
by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, who spoke for the Court, and the
requirement that this Court adhere strictly to the jurisdiction,
original and appellate, conferred upon it by the Constitution, was
emphasized and enforced. It is therefore apparent that, from its
earliest history, this Court has consistently declined to exercise
any powers other than those which are strictly judicial in their
nature.
It therefore becomes necessary to inquire what is meant by the
judicial power thus conferred by the Constitution upon this Court,
and, with the aid of appropriate legislation, upon the inferior
courts of the United States. "Judicial power," says Mr. Justice
Miller, in his work on the Constitution, "is the power of a court
to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between
persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision."
Miller on the Constitution 314.
As we have already seen, by the express terms of the
Constitution, the exercise of the judicial power is limited to
"cases" and "controversies." Beyond this it does not extend, and
unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning
of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere
conferred.
What, then, does the Constitution mean in conferring this
judicial power with the right to determine "cases" and
"controversies." A "case" was defined by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
as early as the leading case of
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, to be a suit instituted
according to the regular course of judicial procedure. And what
more, if anything, is meant in the use of the term "controversy?"
That question was dealt with by Mr. Justice Field, at the circuit,
in the case of
In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed.
241, 255. Of these terms, that learned justice said:
"The judicial article of the Constitution mentions cases and
controversies. The term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all
from 'cases,' is so in that it is less comprehensive
Page 219 U. S. 357
than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 431,
2 U. S. 432. By cases and
controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before
the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are
established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.
Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial
power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The
term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties,
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication."
The power being thus limited to require an application of the
judicial power to cases and controversies, is the act which
undertook to authorize the present suits to determine the
constitutional validity of certain legislation within the
constitutional authority of the court? This inquiry in the case
before us includes the broader question, when may this Court, in
the exercise of the judicial power, pass upon the constitutional
validity of an act of Congress? That question has been settled from
the early history of the court, the leading case on the subject
being
Marbury v. Madison, supra.
In that case, Chief Justice Marshall, who spoke for the Court,
was careful to point out that the right to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional could only be exercised when a proper
case between opposing parties was submitted for judicial
determination; that there was no general veto power in the Court
upon the legislation of Congress; and that the authority to declare
an act unconstitutional sprang from the requirement that the Court,
in administering the law and pronouncing judgment between the
parties to a case, and choosing between the requirements of the
fundamental law established by the people and embodied in the
Constitution and an act of the agents
Page 219 U. S. 358
of the people, acting under authority of the Constitution,
should enforce the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. The
Chief Justice demonstrated, in a manner which has been regarded as
settling the question, that with the choice thus given between a
constitutional requirement and a conflicting statutory enactment,
the plain duty of the Court was to follow and enforce the
Constitution as the supreme law established by the people. And the
Court recognized, in
Marbury v. Madison and subsequent
cases, that the exercise of this great power could only be invoked
in cases which came regularly before the courts for determination,
for, said the Chief Justice, in
Osborn
v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 819, speaking of
the third article of the Constitution, conferring judicial
power:
"This clause enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them
shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject
is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the Constitution
declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States."
Again, in the case of
Cohen v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, Chief Justice Marshall,
amplifying and reasserting the doctrine of
Marbury v.
Madison, recognized the limitations upon the right of this
Court to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, and granting
that there might be instances of its violation which could not be
brought within the jurisdiction of the courts, and referring to a
grant by a state of a patent of nobility as a case of that class,
and conceding that the Court would have no power to annul such a
grant, said:
"This may be very true, but by no means justifies the inference
drawn from it. The article does not extend the
Page 219 U. S. 359
judicial power to every violation of the Constitution which may
possibly take place, but to 'a case in law or equity' in which a
right under such law is asserted in a court of justice. If the
question cannot be brought into a court, then there is no case in
law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of the
article. But if, in any controversy depending in a court, the cause
should depend on the validity of such a law, that would be a case
arising under the Constitution, to which the judicial power of the
United States would extend. The same observation applies to the
other instances with which the counsel who opened the cause has
illustrated this argument. Although they show that there may be
violations of the Constitution of which the courts can take no
cognizance, they do not show that an interpretation more
restrictive than the words themselves import ought to be given to
this article. They do not show that there can be 'a case in law or
equity' arising under the Constitution to which the judicial power
does not extend."
See also, in this connection,
Chicago & G.T. R.
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339. On
page
143 U. S. 345
of the opinion in that case, the result of the previous decisions
of this Court was summarized in these apposite words by Mr. Justice
Brewer, who spoke for the court:
"Whenever, in pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic
assertion of rights by one individual against another, there is
presented a question involving the validity of any act of any
legislature, state or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests
on the competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must,
in the exercise of its solemn duties, determine whether the act be
constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the
ultimate and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. It never was
the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
Page 219 U. S. 360
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."
Applying the principles thus long settled by the decisions of
this Court to the act of Congress undertaking to confer
jurisdiction in this case, we find that William Brown and Levi B.
Gritts, on their own behalf and on behalf of all other Cherokee
citizens having like interest in the property allotted under the
act of July 1, 1902, and David Muskrat and J. Henry Dick, for
themselves and representatives of all Cherokee citizens enrolled as
such for allotment as of September 1, 1902, are authorized and
empowered to institute suits in the Court of Claims to determine
the validity of acts of Congress passed since the act of July 1,
1902, insofar as the same attempt to increase or extend the
restrictions upon alienation, encumbrance, or the right to lease
the allotments of lands of Cherokee citizens, or to increase the
number of persons entitled to share in the final distribution of
lands and funds of the Cherokees beyond those enrolled for
allotment as of September 1, 1902, and provided for in the said act
of July 1, 1902.
The jurisdiction was given for that purpose first to the Court
of Claims, and then, upon appeal, to this Court. That is, the
object and purpose of the suit is wholly comprised in the
determination of the constitutional validity of certain acts of
Congress; and furthermore, in the last paragraph of the section,
should a judgment be rendered in the Court of Claims or this Court,
denying the constitutional validity of such acts, then the amount
of compensation to be paid to attorneys employed for the purpose of
testing the constitutionality of the law is to be paid out of funds
in the Treasury of the United States belonging to the
beneficiaries, the act having previously provided that the United
States should be made a party, and the Attorney General be charged
with the defense of the suits.
Page 219 U. S. 361
It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor less in
this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial
determination, final in this Court, of the constitutional validity
of an act of Congress. Is such a determination within the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution, as the same has been
interpreted and defined in the authoritative decisions to which we
have referred? We think it is not. That judicial power, as we have
seen, is the right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction. The right to declare a law unconstitutional arises
because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the other of such
parties in determining their rights is in conflict with the
fundamental law. The exercise of this, the most important and
delicate duty of this Court, is not given to it as a body with
revisory power over the action of Congress, but because the rights
of the litigants in justiciable controversies require the court to
choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be
enacted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the
power delegated to the legislative branch of the government. This
attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of the act
of Congress is not presented in a "case" or "controversy," to
which, under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial
power alone extends. It is true the United States is made a
defendant to this action, but it has no interest adverse to the
claimants. The object is not to assert a property right as against
the government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs
because of action upon its part. The whole purpose of the law is to
determine the constitutional validity of this class of legislation,
in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right
necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a
proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity, and
concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the
doubtful character
Page 219 U. S. 362
of the legislation in question. Such judgment will not conclude
private parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the
question of the constitutionality of such legislation. In a legal
sense, the judgment could not be executed, and amounts in fact to
no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the acts
in question. Confining the jurisdiction of this Court within the
limitations conferred by the Constitution, which the Court has
hitherto been careful to observe, and whose boundaries it has
refused to transcend, we think the Congress, in the Act of March 1,
1907, exceeded the limitations of legislative authority so far as
it required of this Court action not judicial in its nature within
the meaning of the Constitution.
Nor can it make any difference that the petitioners had brought
suits in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to enjoin
the Secretary of the Interior from carrying into effect the
legislation subsequent to the Act of July 1, 1902, which suits were
pending when the jurisdictional act here involved was passed. The
latter act must depend upon its own terms and be judged by the
authority which it undertakes to confer. If such actions as are
here attempted, to determine the validity of legislation, are
sustained, the result will be that this Court, instead of keeping
within the limits of judicial power and deciding cases or
controversies arising between opposing parties, as the Constitution
intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature
of advice concerning legislative action -- a function never
conferred upon it by the Constitution, and against the exercise of
which this Court has steadily set its face from the beginning.
The questions involved in this proceeding as to the validity of
the legislation may arise in suits between individuals, and when
they do and are properly brought before this Court for
consideration they, of course, must be determined in the exercise
of its judicial functions. For
Page 219 U. S. 363
the reasons we have stated, we are constrained to hold that
these actions present no justiciable controversy within the
authority of the Court, acting within the limitations of the
Constitution under which it was created. As Congress, in passing
this act, as a part of the plan involved, evidently intended to
provide a review of the judgment of the Court of Claims in this
Court, as the constitutionality of important legislation is
concerned, we think the act cannot be held to intend to confer
jurisdiction on that Court separately considered.
Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540,
184 U. S. 565;
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463.
The judgments will be reversed, and the cases remanded to
the Court of Claims with directions to dismiss the petitions for
want of jurisdiction.