Where the federal questions raised by the bill are not merely
colorable, but are raised in good faith and not in a fraudulent
attempt to give jurisdiction to the circuit court, that court has
jurisdiction, and can decide the case on local or state questions
only, and it will not lose its jurisdiction of the case by omitting
to decide the federal questions or deciding them adversely to the
party claiming their benefit. Where the bill not only alleges that
the statute creating the commission, but also the order of the
commission sought to be enjoined, deprives complainant of its
property without due process of law, and also violate other
provisions of the Constitution, the circuit court obtains
Page 213 U. S. 176
jurisdiction without reference to the particular violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Barney v. City of New York,
190 U. S. 430,
distinguished.
The rule of this Court is not to decide constitutional questions
if the case can be decided without doing so, and when, as in this
case, it can dispose of the case by construction of the statute and
on the lack of authority given by such statute to make the order
complained of, it will do so, rather than on the constitutional
questions involved.
Jurisdiction so extensive as to place in the hands of a
commission power to make general maximum rates for all commodities
between all points in the state is not to be implied, but must be
given in language admitting no other reasonable construction, and
this power cannot be found in the Kentucky Railroad Commission
Act.
Notwithstanding the highest court of the state has not yet
construed the statute involved, this Court must, in a case of which
it has jurisdiction, construe it.
The fact that the legislature of a state gives to a railroad
commission no power to raise rates, but only power to reduce rates
found to be exorbitant after hearing on specific complaint, is an
argument against construing the statute so as to give the
commission power to fix maximum rates on all commodities.
Where a railroad commission, after a hearing on specific
complaint as to a rate on a particular commodity, makes a general
rate tariff for maximum rates on all commodities which is beyond
its statutory power, the whole tariff falls, and the rate on the
tariff on the particular commodity will not be separately
sustained.
The Kentucky Railroad Commission having, after a hearing on
complaints that the rates on lumber were too high, attempted to
impose a general maximum intrastate tariff schedule, and the
statute creating the commission not giving it authority to make
such a schedule, this Court, without deciding whether either the
statute or the order deprives the railroad companies of their
property without due process of law, holds that the entire schedule
of rates including those on lumber must fall as being beyond the
jurisdiction of the commission to establish in that manner.
The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, hereinafter
called the company, filed its bill July 25, 1906, in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky to
enjoin the enforcement of a certain order made by the Railroad
Commission of Kentucky (hereafter called the commission), providing
what are termed maximum rates on
Page 213 U. S. 177
the transportation of all commodities upon the railroad of the
company to and from all points within the state. In its bill, the
company contended that the order as to rates of transportation was
void because it was, upon several stated grounds, in violation of
certain named provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
among them being the claim that the rate were so low as to be
confiscatory. It was also contended that the statute was an
interference, in its results, with interstate commerce. The company
also contended (among other objections not of a federal nature)
that the commission had no power to make the order in question
under a correct and proper construction of the state statute of
March 10, 1900, under which the commission assumed to exercise the
power to fix the rates provided for in its order.
The circuit court decided that such act, hereinafter fully set
forth and called the "McChord act," and also the order of the
Railroad Commission of Kentucky, complained of, irrespective of any
claim that such order was confiscatory, violated the provisions of
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, prohibiting any state from depriving any person of property
without due process of law, and from denying to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, and that the
order of the commission, so far as it was applicable to the
company, was therefore null and void, and the special commissioner
who had been appointed to take evidence in the case as to the
character of the rates, and other matters, was directed to so
report. (The court decided the case upon the authority of
Louisville &c. R. Co. v. McChord, 103 F. 216, reversed
on other grounds in
183 U. S. 183 U.S.
483.)
A final decree having been made pursuant to the decision of the
court, the commission appealed directly to this Court from such
decree. The proceedings which led up to the decree from which the
commission has appealed, without the court passing upon the
allegation of the confiscatory nature of the rates, were by means
of a stipulation made in order to facilitate matters
Page 213 U. S. 178
by reason of which the court decided, as matter of law, the
order and act were both invalid, and it perpetually enjoined the
enforcement of the order as to rates as well as the procuring of
indictments against the officers of the company or the company
itself.
The appellants disputed the jurisdiction of the circuit court
upon grounds which are particularly stated in the opinion herein,
and they took issue on many of the material allegations contained
in the bill of complaint.
The facts upon which the questions in this case arise are as
follows: the company was duly incorporated under an Act of the
General Assembly of the State of Kentucky approved March 5, 1850.
It has a large mileage, amounting to over 1,200 miles within the
state, and it operates its road within the state in connection with
other portions of its road in other states, having altogether in
Kentucky and such other states a mileage of over 4,000 miles. It
claims to have a contract right to fix rates as provided in its
charter, and it contends that the order of the commission violates
that right as well as other rights protected by the federal
Constitution.
The state adopted a new constitution on the twenty-eighth day of
September, 1891, by § 209 of which the present railroad commission
of the state was established.
It is asserted by the company, though such assertion is denied,
that up to March 10, 1900, the commission or its predecessors had
not been empowered by constitutional or statutory provision to
regulate or fix the rate of compensation which a railroad company
might charge for the service of transporting freight or passengers
over its lines in the state. On the above-mentioned date, the
general assembly enacted what is generally called the "McChord
act," which is set forth in full in the margin.
*
Page 213 U. S. 179
The act has not been construed by the Court of Appeals, the
highest court of the State of Kentucky, upon the question
Page 213 U. S. 180
hereinafter discussed, nor has it been held valid as to all of
its provisions, with regard to the constitution of the state or of
the United States, by any court, state or federal.
After its passage, and in December, 1904, and January and
February, 1905, one Guenther, a citizen of Owensboro, Kentucky,
made complaints to the commission in which he complained generally
(but without specifying any in particular) that the rates charged
by the company, and also by the Illinois Central Railway, and the
Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railway Company, on
interstate freight to and from Owensboro, as compared with the
rates on like freight to and from Evansville, Indiana, and on
intrastate freight to and from points in Kentucky to and
from Owensboro, were unjust and unreasonable. A petition in regard
to interstate rates was subsequently filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, where it is still pending and undetermined. As
to regulating the local rates complained of, the commission then
made no finding.
Afterwards, Guenther prepared an amended complaint, which was
filed with the commission some time early in September, 1905, in
which this company and all the other railroad companies operating
lines in the State of Kentucky were made
Page 213 U. S. 181
defendants, and wherein it was alleged, in substance (and again
without any details), that all local freights from and to all local
points in the State of Kentucky, as fixed and charged by the
defendant railroad companies on all classes of freight, were
excessive, discriminatory, and extortionate, and he prayed the
commission to revise and adjust the rates not only in and out of
Owensboro, but to revise and adjust the rates between all local
points from and to every local point throughout the State of
Kentucky.
Subsequently, on the fourteenth of September, 1905, three lumber
companies of Louisville, Kentucky, tendered their petition to be
made parties to the Guenther proceedings then pending, and they
adopted the general language of his complaint with respect to all
local rates in the state, and they added complaints in regard to
the rates on logs, lumber, and cross-ties.
On the third of October, 1905, the State of Kentucky, through
certain attorneys, filed a petition to intervene on the part of the
state in the Guenther proceedings and sought to make the state a
party complainant against all the railroad companies as defendants
operating lines in the state. The petition was opposed by the
company on the ground that the state had no standing in the
proceedings, and certainly none by the attorneys named, but it was
granted, and the state intervened as prayed for, and was made a
party complainant so that it might prosecute the proceedings
against the company and all the other carriers made defendants
therein. The proceedings against the various railroad companies
within the state were subsequently consolidated before the
commission.
Before answering the complaints of Guenther, the lumber
companies, and the State of Kentucky against the defendant company
and the other railroad companies in that state, the company, in
this case, duly objected to the proceedings before the commission
on various grounds, among them, that the complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
company, and on the ground that the complaints were not
sufficiently definite and specific, and that the complaints
Page 213 U. S. 182
should show specifically what rates are claimed to be
exorbitant, excessive, or extortionate, or what commodity or which
communities the rates of the company discriminate against.
An objection was also duly and in season made that the
commission had no power to fix a general maximum rate or rates for
all commodities from and to all points within the state, but that
specific complaint should be made as to the particular rates
complained of. The commission ruled that the entire subject of
railroad rates was before it, and decided to proceed with its
investigation of such rates on all railroads and between all places
and on all classes of commodities within the State of Kentucky.
By virtue of the complaints above adverted to, the proceedings
against substantially all the railroad companies of the state were
then continued, and the commission heard and decided the question
of rates relating to this company, and some, but not all, of the
other roads in the state.
The commission subsequently, and on July 20, 1906, promulgated
its order making schedules for "Maximum Rates on Freight," and it
applied one schedule, called "Kentucky Railroad Commission's
Standard Tariff, No. 1," to this company and four other companies
within the state, although, in the case of one of the four (the
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company), no notice of such tariff
was ever served upon it. Another schedule, called "Kentucky
Railroad Commission's Standard Tariff, No. 2," applied to the
Illinois Central Railroad Company alone, and the commission left
several railroad companies untouched by either of such schedules,
or by any schedule, although they were defendants in this
proceeding. In its opinion, the commission stated as follows:
"The several complaints, which, for convenience, have been
consolidated and heard together in this investigation, raise for
the first time in Kentucky the question of the reasonableness of
all rates, for the transportation of all commodities, upon all
railroads, to and from all points within the state. "
Page 213 U. S. 190
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellants deny the jurisdiction of the circuit court in
this case. There is no diverse citizenship in the case of this
particular company, and the jurisdiction must depend upon the
presence of a federal question. The bill filed by the company
herein attacked the validity of the Act of the Legislature of
Kentucky of March 10, 1900 (above set forth in full), on several
grounds, as in violation of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was
also averred that the act was a violation of § 4, Article IV, of
the federal Constitution in that it constituted an abandonment by
the State of Kentucky of a republican
Page 213 U. S. 191
form of government insofar as it vested legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of an absolute and arbitrary nature over
railroad carriers in one body or tribunal, styled the railroad
commission. The company also contended that the act was in
violation of the federal Constitution on account of the enormous
fines and penalties provided in the act as a punishment for a
violation of any of its provisions; also that the enforcement of
the act would operate to deprive the company of its property
without due process of law, and would deny to it the equal
protection of the laws in violation of § 1 of Article XIV of the
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Other grounds
of alleged invalidity of the act in question as in violation of the
federal Constitution are set up in the bill. The bill also
contained the averment that the order of the Railroad Commission of
Kentucky in making a general schedule of maximum rates for the
railroads mentioned in its order was invalid as unauthorized by the
statute. This is, of course, a local or state question.
The federal questions as to the invalidity of the state statute
because, as alleged, it was in violation of the federal
Constitution gave the circuit court jurisdiction, and, having
properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all the
question in the case even though it decided the federal questions
adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to
decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state
questions only.
This Court has the same right, and can, if it deem it proper,
decide the local questions only, and omit to decide the federal
questions, or decide them adversely to the party claiming their
benefit.
Horner v. United States, 143 U.
S. 570,
143 U. S. 576;
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.
S. 112,
164 U. S. 154;
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Austin, 168 U.
S. 685,
168 U. S. 694;
Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283,
196 U. S. 295;
Williamson v. United States, 207 U.
S. 425;
People's Savings Bank v. Layman, 134 F.
635;
Michigan Railroad Tax Cases, 138 F. 223. Of course,
the federal question must not be merely colorable or
Page 213 U. S. 192
fraudulently set up for the mere purpose of endeavoring to give
the court jurisdiction.
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Austin, 168 U. S. 685,
168 U. S. 695;
Michigan Railroad Tax Cases, 138 F. 223,
supra.
The character of some of the federal question raised is such as
to show that they are not merely colorable, and have not been
fraudulently raised for the purpose of attempting to give
jurisdiction to a federal court.
The appellants, however, contend that the jurisdiction of the
circuit court did not attach under the Fourteenth Amendment,
because of the allegations contained in the bill of the company, in
which was contained an averment that the defendants below (the
appellants here) had not been vested with the power by either the
Constitution of the State of Kentucky or by any act of its
legislature, or by any law, to make and enter the order of July 20,
1906, complained of in the company's bill. The argument of the
appellants is that, in order to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
the action complained of must be under the authority of the state,
and where the allegation of the bill was that
"no power or authority had been vested in or conferred upon the
appellants by the Act of March 10, 1900, or by any law, to make or
fix the rates complained of,"
such allegation swept away the foundation for the claim of
federal jurisdiction, inasmuch as, in such case, the action of the
railroad commission was not the action of the state, and the
principle decided in
Barney v. New York, 193 U.
S. 430,
193 U. S. 437,
was applicable.
If the averment as to the invalidity of the order of the
commission were the only ground upon which a federal question was
founded, and if the bill alleged that the order was invalid because
it was not authorized by the state, either by statute or in any
other way, the objection might be good; but the bill sets up
several federal questions. Some of them are directed to the
invalidity of the statute itself, on the ground that it violates
various named provisions of the federal Constitution in addition to
and other than the Fourteenth Amendment, while some of the other
federal questions are founded upon the
Page 213 U. S. 193
terms of the order made by the commission, under what is claimed
by the commission to be the authority of the statute. The bill also
sets up several local questions arising from the terms of the
order, and which the company claims are unauthorized by the
statute. The various questions are entirely separate from each
other. Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the
circuit court obtained jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the
federal questions set up in the bill, without reference to the
particular violation set up in regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Where a case in this Court can be decided without reference to
questions arising under the federal Constitution, that course is
usually pursued, and is not departed from without important
reasons. In this case, we think it much better to decide it with
regard to the question of a local nature, involving the
construction of the state statute and the authority therein given
to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to
unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing
in the record.
The commission has assumed the power under this statute of
making what are termed general maximum rates for the transportation
of all commodities, upon all railroads, to and from all points
within the state, and this company is included in the general order
made by the commission. This is an enormous power. Jurisdiction so
extensive and comprehensive as must exist in a commission in the
making of rates by one general tariff upon all classes of
commodities upon all the railroads throughout the state is not to
be implied. The proper establishment of reasonable rates upon all
commodities carried by railroads, and relating to each and all of
them within the state, depends upon so many facts, which may be
very different in regard to each road, that it is plain the work
ought not to be attempted without a profound and painstaking
investigation, which could not be intelligently or with
discrimination accomplished by wholesale. It may be matter of
surprise to find such power granted to any commission, although it
would seem
Page 213 U. S. 194
that it has in some cases been attempted.
Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Railway Co., 167 U.
S. 479,
167 U. S. 495.
In any event, the jurisdiction of the commission to establish all
rates at one time, and in regard to all commodities, on all
railroads in the state, on a general and comprehensive complaint to
the commission that all rates are too high, or upon like
information of the commission itself, must be conferred in plain
language. The commission, as an extraordinary tribunal of the
state, must have the power herein exercised conferred by a statute
in language free from doubt. The power is not to be taken by
implication; it must be given by language which admits of no other
reasonable construction.
In this case, we are without the benefit of a construction of
the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we must
proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject.
Nevertheless, we are compelled to the belief that the statute does
not grant to the commission any such great and extensive power as
it has assumed to exercise in making the order in question.
The first section of the statute provides for a complaint's
being made to the commission accusing the railroad company of
charging or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates over
its lines of railroad in that state, or, if the commission receive
information or have reason to believe that such rate or rates are
being charged, it is its duty in either case to hear and determine
the matter as speedily as possible. The commission is to give the
company complained of not less than ten days' notice, and the
notice must contain a statement of the nature of the complaint or
matter to be investigated, and if the commission, after
investigation of the complaint or on its own information,
determines that the company has been guilty of extortion, the
commission is, in that case, authorized to make and fix
"a just and reasonable rate, toll, or compensation, which said
railroad company or corporation shall charge, collect, or receive
for like service thereafter rendered."
The whole section, it seems to us, proceeds upon the assumption
that complaint
Page 213 U. S. 195
shall be made of some particular rate or rates' being charged,
or if, without formal complaint, the commission receives
information or has reason to believe that such rate or rates are
being charged, then the investigation is to go on in relation to
those particular rates. We cannot for one moment believe that,
under such language as is contained in the section, the commission
is clothed with jurisdiction, either upon complaint or upon its own
information, to enter upon a general investigation of every rate
upon every class of commodities carried by all the roads of the
state from or to all points therein, and make a general tariff of
rates throughout the state such as has been made in this case. No
such power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati &c. Railway
Co., 167 U. S. 479,
supra. As the express power was not given in so many words
to the commission, this Court held that it could not be
implied.
The so-called complaints, in this case above mentioned, are, as
we construe the statute, entirely too general to raise any
objection to a specific rate. Guenther, in his petition, in
substance, alleged
"that all local freight rates to and from all local points in
the State of Kentucky, as fixed and charged by all railroads, on
all classes of freight, are excessive, discriminatory, and
extortionate."
The lumber companies, which were permitted to intervene, made
substantially the same complaint (with an addition as to lumber,
ties, and logs), and the attorneys appearing in behalf of the State
of Kentucky joined in the general complaint of Guenther. If
complaint were necessary to enable the commission to make rates,
the allegations in the complaint of Guenther were mere sweeping
generalities, and were in no sense whatever a fair or honest
compliance with the statute. The commission itself, in order to
act, must have had some information or had some reasons to believe
that certain rates were extortionate, and it could not, under this
statute, enter upon a general attack upon all the rates of all the
companies throughout the state, and make an order such as this in
question. Such action is, in our judgment, founded upon a total
Page 213 U. S. 196
misconstruction of the statute, and an assumption on the part of
the commission of a right and power to do that which the statute
itself gives it no authority whatever to do.
And again, the section provides that, if the commission should
determine that the company had been guilty of extortion, it must,
instead of the extortionate rate, make and fix a reasonable and
just rate, which the company may charge for its service thereafter
rendered. This language is not apt by which to confer power to
establish a schedule of rates applicable in all cases, to all
commodities, and on all roads, and, on the contrary, it strengthens
the view that no such general jurisdiction to establish rates in
all cases for all roads throughout the state by a general tariff
was in the contemplation of the framers of the statute.
It may also be stated that, if the statute was really intended
to give the commission power to make a general schedule of rates,
we should expect to find, almost necessarily, a right to increase
as well as to reduce those rates in some instances, in order to
produce an equality, where, otherwise, great inequalities might
exist as a result of the putting the general schedule of reductions
in force. Here is a case where the schedule of rates was reduced
from twenty to twenty-five percent upon an average. Some of the
rates not touched might require increase in order to make the whole
schedule fair and reasonable, and yet the commission could not make
the increase over the amount theretofore collected by the company.
This seems to us to be a very strong argument in favor of the view
that the legislature never intended to, and did not in fact give
such a power to establish general maximum rates, but confined it to
one or two or a few specified rates, which might be reduced upon
complaint, and where there might be a real investigation of all the
problems involved in the propriety of the reduction in a few
distinct and separate cases. A sufficient investigation of the
whole series of rates on all the roads in the state by one
commission is almost an impossibility, and an attempt to do so
would prove a failure, and would, in all probability, result in
gross injustice
Page 213 U. S. 197
to the roads. The statute, it will be remembered, gives no power
to the commission to fix rates unless it has already determined
that the rates complained of, or which it has investigated upon its
own information, are extortionate after hearing the parties, and
then it fixes the rates at a just and reasonable amount. If no
extortion is found in any particular rate, there can be no fixing
of rates in that particular. And yet that particular rate might
require increase in order to make the whole schedule just, fair,
and reasonable. A general power to fix rates under such limitations
cannot be supposed to have been within the intent of the
legislature. The difference between the fixing of one rate or a
few, upon specific complaint or information, and the adoption of a
general scheme of rates, applicable in all cases to all the roads,
is vast and important. In the one case, it can be fairly
accomplished, while, in the other, the chances of injustice and
great inequalities are infinite and almost certain to occur.
We do not say that, under this statute, as we construe it, there
must be a separate proceeding or complaint for each separate rate.
A complaint, or a proceeding on information by the commission
itself, in regard to any road, may include more than the rate on
one commodity or more than one rate, but there must be some
specific complaint or information in regard to each rate to be
investigated, and there can be, under this statute, no such
wholesale complaint, which, by its looseness and its generalities,
can be made applicable to every rate in operation on a railroad, or
upon several or all of the railroads of the state. If the
legislature intended to give such a universal and all-prevailing
power, it is not too much to say that the language used in giving
it should be so plain as not to permit of doubt as to the
legislative intent.
The appellants contend that, in any event, the order made by the
commission December 7, 1905, regarding rates on lumber, logs, and
cross-ties, to and from all points in the state, ought to stand as
reasonable and proper. The complaint made by the lumber dealers in
their petition to intervene in the Guenther
Page 213 U. S. 198
proceeding adopted the language of that petition as to all
rates, upon all commodities, upon all roads throughout the state,
and then added a specific complaint as to the logs, etc. While the
whole proceeding as to all rates was pending before the commission,
it took up, as part of it, the question of the reasonableness of
all the rates on lumber to and from all points in the state. This
proceeding is therefore but a part of the whole proceeding,
involving an investigation as to every rate on all commodities on
every road throughout the state, and we do not think it a case
where a particular rate on a specific commodity, applicable all
through the state, upon all roads, should be separated from the
general order, when the specific order was made after the general
complaint was filed, and is itself a general order, and was made by
the commission in the exercise of an assumed power claimed to be
given by the statute, which claim we hold was totally unfounded. We
therefore think that, in this particular case, the order as to
lumber rates must fall with the rest of the assumed jurisdiction of
the commission.
There is nothing in our decision in
McChord v. L. & N.
R. Co., 183 U. S. 483,
which affects the question discussed in this opinion.
We are of opinion that, under the statute, the commission had no
authority to make a general tariff of rates, and the final decree
of the Circuit Court is, for that reason,
Affirmed.
*
"An Act to Prevent Railroad Companies or Corporations Owning and
Operating a Line or Lines of Railroad, and Its Officers, Agents,
and Employees, from Charging, Collecting, or Receiving Extortionate
Freight or Passenger Rates in This Commonwealth, and to Further
Increase and Define the Duties and Powers of the railroad
commission in Reference Thereto, and Prescribing the Manner of
Enforcing the Provisions of This Act, and Penalties for the
Violation of its Provisions."
"SEC. 1. When complaint shall be made to the railroad commission
accusing any railroad company or corporation of charging,
collecting, or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates
over its line or lines of railroad in this commonwealth, or when
said commission shall receive information, or have reason to
believe, that such rate or rates are being charged, collected, or
received, it shall be the duty of said commission to hear and
determine the matter as speedily as possible. They shall give the
company or corporation complained of not less than ten days'
notice, by letter mailed to an officer or employee of said company
or corporation, stating the time and place of the hearing of same,
also the nature of the complaint or matter to be investigated, and
shall hear such statements, argument, or evidence offered by the
parties as the commission may deem relevant, and, should the
commission determine that the company or corporation is or has been
guilty of extortion, said commission shall make and fix a just and
reasonable rate, toll, or compensation, which said railroad company
or corporation may charge, collect, or receive for like services
thereafter rendered. The rate, toll, or compensation so fixed by
the commission shall be entered and be an order on the record book
of their office and signed by the commission, and a copy thereof
mailed to an officer, agent, or employee of the railroad company or
corporation affected thereby, and shall be in full force and effect
at the expiration of ten days thereafter, and may be revoked or
modified by an order likewise entered of record. And should said
railroad company or corporation, or any officer, agent, or employee
thereof, charge, collect, or receive a greater or higher rate,
toll, or compensation for like services thereafter rendered than
that made and fixed by said commission as herein provided, said
company or corporation, and said officer, agent, or employee shall
each be deemed guilty of extortion, and, upon conviction, shall be
fined for the first offense in any sum not less than $500, nor more
than $1,000, and, upon a second conviction, in any sum not less
than $1,000 nor more than $2,000, and, for a third and succeeding
conviction, in any sum not less than $2,000 nor more than
$5,000."
"SEC. 2. The circuit court of any county into or through which
the line or lines of road carrying such passenger or freight owned
or operated by said railroad, and the Franklin Circuit Court, shall
have jurisdiction of the offense against the railroad company or
corporation offending, and the circuit court of the county where
such offense may be committed by said officer, agent, or employee
shall have jurisdiction in all prosecution against said officer,
agent, or employee."
"SEC. 3. Prosecutions under this act shall be by
indictment."
"SEC. 4. All prosecutions under this act shall be commenced
within two years after the offense shall have been committed."
"SEC. 5. In making said investigation, said commission may, when
deemed necessary, take the depositions of witnesses before an
examiner or notary public, whose fee shall be paid by the state,
and, upon the certificate of the chairman of the commission,
approved by the governor, the auditor shall draw his warrant upon
the treasury for its payment."
"Approved March 10, 1900."
