The indeterminate sentence law of Michigan of 1903, as construed
and sustained according to its own constitution by the highest
court of that state, does not violate any provision of the federal
Constitution. It is of a character similar to the Illinois act
sustained by this Court in
Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U. S. 71.
When a subsequently enacted criminal law is more drastic than
the existing law which in terms is repealed thereby, the claim that
it is
ex post facto as to one imprisoned under the former
law and therefore void, and that, the earlier law being repealed,
he cannot be held thereunder has no force in this Court where the
state court has held that the later law does not repeal the earlier
law as to those sentenced thereunder. In such a case, this Court
follows the construction of the state court.
The Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the federal Constitution do
not limit the power of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution does not
limit the power of the state in dealing with crime committed within
its own borders or with the punishment thereof. But a state must
not deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and
impartial justice.
This Court follows the construction of an indeterminate sentence
law by the highest court of the state, to the effect that, where
the maximum term of imprisonment for a crime has been fixed by
statute, a maximum term fixed by the court of a shorter period is
simply void.
The granting of favors by a state to criminals in its prisons is
entirely a matter of policy to be determined by the legislature,
which may attach thereto such conditions as it sees fit, and where
it places the granting of such favors in the discretion of an
executive officer, it is not bound to give the convict applying
therefor a hearing.
The provision in the indeterminate law of Michigan of 1903,
excepting prisoners twice sentenced before from the privilege of
parole, extended in the discretion of the Executive to prisoners
after the expiration of
Page 208 U. S. 482
their minimum sentence, does not deprive convict of the excepted
class of their liberty without due process of law or deny to them
the equal protection of the laws.
This writ of error brings up a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Michigan denying the application of the plaintiff in error for a
writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his detention
in, and to obtain his discharge from, the state prison at
Jackson.
It appears from the record that, on the seventeenth of March,
1904, the plaintiff in error was proceeded against in the Circuit
Court for the County of Washtenaw, in the State of Michigan, on an
information filed by the prosecuting attorney for that county
charging the plaintiff in error with having committed the crime of
burglary on the fifteenth of March, 1904. Upon being arraigned upon
such information, he pleaded guilty and was, on the day mentioned,
sentenced under the indeterminate sentence act of the state to be
confined in the state prison at Jackson at hard labor for a period
not less than one year and not more than two years. Public Acts of
Michigan, 1903, No. 136. His term of imprisonment, counting the
maximum period for which he was sentenced, ended, as he asserts, on
March 17, 1906, even without any deduction for good behavior.
In his petition for the writ, plaintiff in error stated that, by
the record kept and retained by the warden of the Michigan state
prison at Jackson, it appeared, as plaintiff in error was advised,
that he had been twice before convicted of felony, and that he had
served four years in Kingston, Canada, and four years in Jackson,
Michigan, on account thereof, and that he was a resident of Canada,
and had never resided in the State of Michigan or in the United
States.
He made application at the end of the minimum term of his
sentence to the advisory board, provided for by § 4 of the above
act, for his discharge on parole, but he was notified that his
application could not be heard or considered for the reason
Page 208 U. S. 483
that it appeared that he had been twice before convicted of a
felony, and the act provides that no person who has been twice
previously convicted of a felony shall be eligible to parole.
After the expiration of the maximum term named in the sentence,
being still detained in prison under the claim that the law
provided a maximum term of imprisonment of five years in such a
case as his, which term had not elapsed, the plaintiff in error
applied to the Supreme Court of Michigan for a writ of habeas
corpus to obtain his discharge, and, upon the denial of the
application, brought the case here.
Page 208 U. S. 485
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An act providing for an indeterminate sentence was first passed
in Michigan in 1889, and was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of that state.
People v. Cummings, 88 Mich.
249. A constitutional amendment was subsequently adopted (1901)
which authorized the legislature to provide for an indeterminate
sentence law, as punishment for crime on conviction thereof. Art.
4, § 47, Constitution of Michigan, as amended. Under the authority
of this amendment, the legislature, in 1903, passed Act No. 136 of
the Public Acts of that year. This act was held to be valid.
In
re Campbell, 138 Mich. 597;
In re Duff, 141 Mich.
623. An act of a character very similar has been held to violate no
provision of the federal Constitution.
Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U. S. 71. While
the act in question here was in force, the crime of plaintiff in
error was committed, and on the seventeenth of March, 1904, he was
sentenced as already stated. The sentence fixed the maximum as well
as the minimum term of imprisonment, but the fixing of the maximum
term in the sentence has been held to be void, as not intended or
authorized by the law of 1903 in any case where the statute
providing for the punishment of a crime itself fixes the maximum
term of imprisonment at a certain number of years.
In re
Campbell and
In re Duff, supra.
In this case, where the maximum term for burglary is fixed by
the statute at five years, the sentence fixing that term at two
years was simply void, and the maximum term of imprisonment fixed
by the statute takes the place of the maximum term
Page 208 U. S. 486
fixed in the sentence.
In re Campbell and
In re
Duff, supra. Under this construction, the term of imprisonment
of the plaintiff in error has not yet expired.
He cannot, however, avail himself of the provisions of the
statute in relation to applying for and obtaining his discharge on
parole, after the expiration of the minimum term of the sentence,
because he has been convicted of two previous felonies.
In 1905 (Public Acts of Michigan, No. 184) the legislature
passed another act on the same subject and repealed the act of
1903. The plaintiff in error contends that the provisions of the
act of 1905 are more unfavorable to him than that of the act of
1903, and that it is invalid as to him because it is an
ex post
facto law, and, as the act of 1903 has been repealed, there is
no act in force by which he can be further imprisoned.
Without stopping to inquire whether the act of 1905 would be, in
his case, an
ex post facto law, it may be stated that the
Supreme Court of Michigan has held that the act of 1903 is not
repealed as to those who were sentenced under it, and that, as to
them, it is in full force, and the statute of 1905 has no
application.
In re Manaca, 146 Mich. 697. In such a case
as this, we follow that construction of the Constitution and laws
of the state which has been given them by the highest court
thereof. There is therefore no force in the contention made on the
part of the plaintiff in error that the act of 1905 applies in his
case and is
ex post facto.
It is also urged that the result of the holding of the state
court is that plaintiff in error is imprisoned under the
indeterminate sentence act of 1903 for the maximum period (five
years) provided by the general statute for the crime of which he
has been convicted, without any discretion on the part of the court
as to the term of his sentence, while he is also refused the right
to apply under the act for a discharge upon his parole after the
expiration of the
Page 208 U. S. 487
minimum term of the sentence, because, it is alleged, that as to
him there can be no minimum sentence, as he has been twice before
convicted of a felony, although he has had no opportunity of being
heard as to that allegation. He now urges that he is imprisoned in
violation of the sixth and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
federal Constitution.
The claim rests upon an entire misapprehension of the rights of
the plaintiff in error under these Amendments. The sixth and eighth
Amendments do not limit the powers of the states, as has many times
been decided.
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.
S. 131;
Eilenbecker v. District Court,
134 U. S. 31;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,
175 U. S. 174;
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581,
176 U. S. 586.
The plaintiff in error says that, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
he is imprisoned without due process of law, and is denied the
equal protection of the laws. The last-named amendment was not
intended to, and does not, limit the powers of a state in dealing
with crime committed within its own borders or with the punishment
thereof, although no state can deprive particular persons or
classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law.
In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436,
136 U. S. 448;
Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692. The
act in question provides for the granting of a favor to persons
convicted of crime who are confined in a state prison.
People
v. Cook, 147 Mich. 127, 132. It gives to a criminal so
confined, subsequent to the expiration of the minimum term of
imprisonment stated in the sentence, the privilege to make
application for parole to the warden or superintendent of the
prison where he is confined, and the warden is directed to send
such application to the governor. Upon its receipt, the governor
may order such investigation by the advisory board in the matter of
pardons as he may deem advisable and necessary, but the authority
to grant paroles, under such rules and regulations as the governor
may adopt, is conferred by the statute exclusively upon that
officer. He is not bound to grant a parole in any case, and § 4
provides "that no prisoner who has been twice previously convicted
of a felony shall be eligible to parole under the provisions of
this act." As the state is thus providing
Page 208 U. S. 488
for the granting of a favor to a convicted criminal confined
within one of its prisons, it may (unless under extraordinary
circumstances) attach such conditions to the application for or to
the granting of the favor as it may deem proper, or it may, in its
discretion, exclude such classes of persons from participation in
the favor as may to it seem fit. If the state choose to grant this
privilege to make application to the governor for a discharge upon
parole in the case of one class of criminals and deny it to others,
such, for instance, as those who have been twice convicted of a
felony, it is a question of state policy exclusively for the state
to decide, as is also the procedure to ascertain the fact, as well
as the kind or amount of evidence upon which to base its
determination. It is not bound to give the convict a hearing upon
the question of prior conviction, and a failure to give it violates
no provision of the federal Constitution. The application for
parole is, in any event, addressed exclusively to the discretion of
the governor. Even after the convict is at large by virtue of the
parole granted, he is still deemed to be serving out the sentence
imposed upon him, and he remains technically in the legal custody
and under the control of the governor,
"subject at any time to be taken back within the enclosure of
the prison from which he was permitted to go at large, for any
reason that shall be satisfactory to the governor, and at his sole
discretion, and full power to retake and return any such paroled
convict to the prison from which he was permitted to go at large is
hereby expressly conferred upon the governor."
Section 5, act of 1903,
supra.
We find nothing in the record which shows any violation of the
federal Constitution, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Michigan must therefore be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.
