The general rule as to vessels plying between the ports of
different states and engaged in the coastwise trade is that the
domicil of the owner is the situs of the vessel for the purposes of
taxation, wholly irrespective of the place of enrollment, subject
to the exception that, where a vessel engaged in interstate
commerce has acquired an actual situs in a state other than that
which is the domicil of the owner, it may there be taxed because
within the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities.
Vessels owned by a corporation domiciled in Illinois and which,
although enrolled in a Kentucky port, are not engaged in commerce
wholly in the state, but are engaged in interstate commerce, and
which have acquired a permanent situs for taxation and are taxed in
another state, are not subject to taxation by the Kentucky, nor is
their situs for taxation therein on account of their being enrolled
at a port of that state.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, by Frank A. Lucas, revenue agent,
commenced an action in the County Court of McCracken County to
recover from the Ayer & Lord Tie Company alleged omitted state,
county, and municipal taxes for the years 1899, 1900, and 1901,
claimed to be assessable upon two steamboats and certain barges,
and, for the year 1901, upon one other steamboat, all the property
of the company.
In the statement of the plaintiff, the right to recover in
respect of the steamboats was based solely upon the assertion that,
on the dates when it was alleged the boats became subject to the
taxes in question, they were
"enrolled, in accordance with the laws of the United States
governing navigation at the port of Paducah, in the County of
McCracken and State of Kentucky; that, as required by the said laws
of the United
Page 202 U. S. 410
States governing navigation, the words of 'Paducah, Kentucky'
were painted on the stern of said steamboats; that said boats, when
not in use, are kept at Paducah, Kentucky, and that the said port
of Paducah is, and was, on each of said days, the home port of said
steamboats."
The right to recover in respect of the barges was based upon the
allegation that
"each and all of said boats are now, and were, on each of the
above days mentioned, used by the defendant for the purpose of
towing ties, loaded on barges; that the defendant was, on each of
the days aforesaid, the owner, seised of, and in possession of,
certain barges, used in connection with said steamboats for the
purpose of transporting railroad ties."
The tie company answered as follows: that it was an Illinois
corporation, chartered in 1893 and empowered "to transact business
with steamboats engaged in interstate commerce;" that,
"ever since its incorporation, it has been engaged in business
as owner of towboats, plying on the Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee,
and Cumberland Rivers and their tributaries; that the business in
which towboats had been engaged is that of interstate commerce and
of transporting railroad ties in its own barges from different
points of said rivers to the port of Brookport in the State of
Illinois; that their said towboats, in pursuit of their business,
occasionally touch at the point of Paducah, Kentucky, but never to
discharge their cargo, but simply for the purpose of buying stores,
employing seamen, and for other like purposes; that they and said
barges are in the State of Kentucky but temporarily, and most of
their business is transportations from ports and places in Alabama,
Mississippi, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Illinois, and Tennessee
to said Port of Brookport, in the State of Illinois; St. Louis, in
the State of Missouri; Duval's Bluff, in the State of Arkansas --
at which ports said towboats discharge and deliver their respective
cargo of ties, and said boats and barges, owned and controlled by
Ayer & Lord Tie Company, were engaged in the business aforesaid
during and prior to years
Page 202 U. S. 411
1899, 1900, and 1901, and, since owned by the said defendant
company, have never been engaged in any other business but as
aforesaid, nor has said company, since its incorporation, been
engaged in any other business than as aforesaid; that their said
vessels were and are regularly licensed and enrolled by the United
States under and in pursuance to the acts of Congress."
It is further averred that, although the tie company had offices
in various cities of Illinois situated on the Ohio River, as also
offices in the Cities of Paducah and Fulton in the State of
Kentucky, and Duval's Bluff, in the State of Arkansas, it had such
offices in Kentucky for convenience, and its principal office was
averred to be in the State of Illinois, of which state it was a
citizen.
It was denied that the home port of its vessels was in the port
of Paducah, Kentucky, and it was averred that such vessels were
enrolled in Kentucky for convenience, and that, when they were so
enrolled, the general manager of its transportation department and
of the steamboats of the tie company was a resident of the State of
Kentucky.
It was further specifically averred that, during the year for
which the State of Kentucky was seeking to assess the property in
question for taxation,
"all of said property was assessed [listed?] by the defendant in
the State of Illinois for taxation, and has been taxed, and
defendant has paid taxes under the State of Illinois, to said state
and City of Chicago on all of said property, and denies the right
of the State of Kentucky to subject same property to taxation."
Claiming the right under the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States to trade at the ports of the different states
without molestation by the State of Kentucky, the company averred
that the imposition and the collection of taxes in question would
operate an unlawful interference with the right of the company to
trade or engage in interstate commerce as it had heretofore been
accustomed to do.
A demurrer was filed to the answer on the ground that it
Page 202 U. S. 412
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. The
county court overruled the demurrer, and, plaintiff declining to
plead further, the court dismissed "the plaintiff's statement and
action." The case was then taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of
McCracken County. As part of the record from the county court, the
defendant filed in the circuit court a petition and bond for
removal of the cause to a federal court upon the ground of
diversity of citizenship. On the trial of the case, before action
taken on a demurrer which had been refiled to the answer, the court
overruled and dismissed the petition for removal, and the defendant
excepted. The demurrer to the answer was overruled, and, the
plaintiff declining to plead further, a judgment of dismissal was
entered. The cause was then appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky. That court held that the demurrer should have been
sustained, and the judgment in favor of the company was reversed.
25 Ky. 1068. A petition for rehearing was denied for reasons stated
in an opinion. 25 Ky. 2061.
After the mandate of the Court of Appeals was filed in the
circuit court, that court, upon the pleadings, and the mandate and
opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered a judgment sustaining the
demurrer, and, the defendant declining to plead further, the
allegations of plaintiff's statement were taken for confessed, and
it was adjudged that the property therein described was liable for
taxation at the values stated in the judgment, and the defendant
was adjudged to pay the taxes due upon such assessable values for
the years in controversy, with the statutory penalty. In compliance
with the request of the defendant, the court separately stated its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are as follows:
"
Separation of Findings of Facts from Conclusions of
Law"
"That the defendant was, at the time specified in the pleadings,
the sole owner of the following-described property, named in the
petition, to-wit: Steamers
Russel Lord, Pavonia,
Inverness,
Page 202 U. S. 413
and barges; that the same were of the value as follows, as set
out in the statement:
Russel Lord, $13,000;
Pavonia, $10,000;
Inverness, $2,500; barges,
$10,000; that the defendant had enrolled said steamboats at
Paducah, Kentucky, with the name 'Paducah' painted on the stern of
said vessels; that the defendant was a corporation legally
incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois."
"As a matter of law, the court adjudges that the port of
Paducah, Kentucky, was at the times mentioned in the statement the
home port of said vessels and barges belonging to defendant and
named in the statement, and that all of said vessels were liable to
assessment and valuation at the times stated in the statement, in
McCracken County, Kentucky, for purposes of state, county, and city
taxes for the years, respectively,
Russel Lord and
Pavonia, 1899, 1900, and 1901;
Inverness, 1901;
barges, 1899, 1900, and 1901. The defendant excepts to each of the
above findings of facts, and also to all of the conclusions of
law."
A motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial having
been made and overruled, the cause was again appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky. That court affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court upon the authority of its previous opinion, and the
case was then brought to this Court.
Page 202 U. S. 418
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
As, in the argument, counsel for plaintiff in error has not
discussed the alleged error in overruling the motion to remove, we
treat that question as waived, and pass to the merits.
Notwithstanding, by the demurrer to the answer, it was conceded
that the tie company was the owner of the alleged taxable property,
that it was an Illinois corporation, and that its main office was
in Chicago, that it had paid taxes in Illinois upon such property,
that the property was employed in interstate commerce between ports
of different states, including the State of Illinois, that its
steamboats were enrolled at Paducah, Kentucky, for convenience,
Kentucky being the place of residence of one of its managing
officers, and that its boats touched Paducah only temporarily,
never receiving or discharging cargo at that port, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky held that the property in question was subject
to the taxing power of the State of Kentucky. The existence of
power in the state to tax the property in question was rested
solely upon the proposition that, as the steamboats were enrolled
at Paducah, and the name "Paducah" was painted upon their sterns,
it was to be conclusively presumed that the home port of the
vessels was at Paducah, and that such home port was the situs of
the property for taxation. The barges were brought within the
principle announced because they were treated as mere accessories
of the steamboats. While, in the opinion, the steamboats were
regarded as operated under a registry, the fact is they were
engaged in the coastwise trade under an enrollment and license. But
this is immaterial, since vessels, in order to be enrolled, must
possess the qualifications and fulfill the requirements necessary
for registration.
To comprehend the question a chronological statement of the
legislation of Congress as to the registration or enrollment of
vessels, etc., is necessary.
Page 202 U. S. 419
By section 3 of an Act approved December 31, 1792, 1 Stat. 288,
c. 1, it was provided as follows:
"SEC. 3.
And be it further enacted that every ship or
vessel hereafter to be registered (except as is hereinafter
provided) shall be registered by the collector of the district in
which shall be comprehended the port to which such ship or vessel
shall belong at the time of her registry, which port shall be
deemed to be that at or nearest to which the owner, if there be but
one, or, if more than one, the husband or acting and managing owner
of such ship or vessel, usually resides. And the name of the said
ship or vessel, and of the port to which she shall so belong, shall
be painted on her stern, on a black ground, in white letters of not
less than three inches in length. And if any ship or vessel of the
United States shall be found without having her name and the name
of the port to which she belongs painted in manner aforesaid, the
owner or owners shall forfeit fifty dollars, one-half to the person
giving the information thereof, the other half to the use of the
United States."
On June 23, 1874, 18 Stat. 252, c. 467, the foregoing provision
was amended so to allow the name of the vessel to be painted upon
her stern in yellow or gold letters. In the Revised Statutes, the
requirement in question was separated into two sections (sections
4141, 4178), reading as follows:
"SEC. 4141. Every vessel, except as is hereinafter provided,
shall be registered by the collector of that collection district
which includes the port to which such vessel shall belong at the
time of her registry, which port shall be deemed to be that at or
nearest to which the owner, if there be but one, or, if more than
one, the husband or acting and managing owner of such vessel,
usually resides."
"SEC. 4178. The name of every registered vessel, and of the port
to which she shall belong, shall be painted on her stern, on a
black ground, in white letters of not less than three inches in
length. If any vessel of the United States shall be
Page 202 U. S. 420
found without having her name and the name of the port to which
she belongs so painted, the owner or owners shall be liable to a
penalty of fifty dollars, recoverable one-half to the person giving
the information thereof, the other half to the use of the United
States."
By section 2 of the Act of February 18, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, c. 8,
"for enrolling and licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the
coasting trade," etc., the same requirements were made essential
for enrollment as for registering, and, by section 11, licensed
vessels were specifically obliged to have the name and port painted
on the stern. As incorporated into the Revised Statutes the latter
provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 4334. Every licensed vessel shall have her name and the
port to which she belongs painted on her stern in the manner
prescribed for registered vessels, and if any licensed vessel be
found without such painting, the owner thereof shall be liable to a
penalty of twenty dollars."
By section 21 of an Act approved June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 58, c.
121, it was provided as follows:
"SEC. 21. That the word 'port,' as used in sections forty-one
hundred and seventy-eight and forty-three hundred and thirty-four
of the Revised Statutes, in reference to painting the name and port
of every registered or licensed vessel on the stern of such vessel,
shall be construed to mean either the port where the vessel is
registered or enrolled or the place in the same district where the
vessel was built or where one or more of the owners reside."
Again, by Acts approved February 21, 1891, c. 250, section 1, 26
Stat. 765, and January 20, 1897, c. 67, section 1, 29 Stat. 491,
section 4178, Rev.Stat., was amended so that it now reads as
follows:
"SEC. 4178. The name of every documented vessel of the United
States shall be marked upon each bow and upon the stern, and the
home port shall also be marked upon the stern. These names shall be
painted or gilded, or consist of cut or carved or cast roman
letters in light color on a dark ground,
Page 202 U. S. 421
or in a dark color on a light ground, secured in place, and to
be distinctly visible. The smallest letters used shall not be less
in size than four inches. If any such vessel shall be found without
these names being so marked, the owner or owners shall be liable to
a penalty of ten dollars for each name omitted:
Provided,
however, That the names on each bow may be marked within the
year eighteen hundred and ninety-seven."
Was the ruling below justified by these statutes? We think
not.
The general rule has long been settled as to vessels plying
between the ports of different states, engaged in the coastwise
trade, that the domicil of the owner is the situs of a vessel for
the purpose of taxation, wholly irrespective of the place of
enrollment, subject, however, to the exception that where a vessel
engaged in interstate commerce has acquired an actual situs in a
state other than the place of the domicil of the owner, it may
there be taxed because within the jurisdiction of the taxing
authority.
In
Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S.
Co., 17 How. 596, vessels were registered in New
York, where the owner resided. The vessels were employed in
commerce on the Pacific Ocean between San Francisco and Panama, and
the question was whether the vessels were subject to taxation in
California. It was decided that they were not, as they had not
become incorporated into the property of California so as to have
an actual situs in that state, and it was declared that the vessels
were properly taxable at the domicil of their owner.
In
St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry
Co., 11 Wall. 423, the boats of the company, an
Illinois corporation, were enrolled at St. Louis, and plied between
that city and the City of East St. Louis, in the State of Illinois.
The company had an office in St. Louis, where its president and
other principal officers lived, and where the ordinary business
meetings of the directors were held and the corporate seal was
kept. A tax was paid upon the boats in Illinois, the residence of
the owner. The City of St. Louis
Page 202 U. S. 422
taxed the ferry boats as personal property "within the city." It
was, however, held that the boats did not so abide within the city
as to become incorporated with and form part of its personal
property, citing
Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co. supra. In
the course of the opinion, the Court said (italics mine):
"The boats were enrolled at the City of St. Louis, but that
throws no light upon the subject of our inquiry. The act of 1789,
section 2, 1 Stat. 55, c. 11, and the act of 1792, section 3, 1
Stat. 288, c. 1, require every vessel to be registered in the
district to which she belongs, and the fourth section of the former
act, and the third section of the latter, declare that her home
port shall be that at or near which her owner resides.
The
solution of the question where her home port is, when it arises,
depends wholly upon the locality of her owner's residence, and not
upon the place of her enrollment. 3 Kent. Com. 133, 170;
Hill v. The Golden Gate, Newberry 308;
The
Superior, Newberry 181;
Jordan v. Young, 38 Me.
276."
In
Morgan v.
Parham, 16 Wall. 471, a vessel originally
registered in New York had been engaged for years in the coastwise
trade between Mobile and New Orleans, and was enrolled at Mobile.
It was decided that the boat could not be taxed in Alabama.
In
Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S.
273, vessels engaged in commerce between ports of
different states were held taxable at the domicil of the owner.
Quite recently, in
Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia,
198 U. S. 299, the
foregoing authorities were approvingly cited and were in effect
reaffirmed. In that case, the vessels were enrolled in New York,
the domicil of the owner, but, although engaged in interstate
commerce, the vessels were navigated wholly within the limits of
the State of Virginia, it was held that they came within the
exception to the general rule which we have previously stated, and
were properly taxable in Virginia.
Page 202 U. S. 423
As, in the case at bar, the owner of the vessels was domiciled
in Illinois, and the vessels were not employed exclusively in
commerce between points in the State of Kentucky, but were engaged
in traffic between that state and the ports of other states,
including Illinois, it seems obvious that, as a question of fact,
they had no permanent situs in the State of Kentucky within the
rule announced in the
Old Dominion Steamship case. The
right, then, of the State of Kentucky to tax the vessels must
solely depend upon the fact that they were enrolled at the port of
Paducah in that state. But, if enrollment at that place was within
the statutes, it is wholly immaterial, since the previous decisions
to which we have referred decisively establish that enrollment is
irrelevant to the question of taxation, because the power of
taxation of vessels depends either upon the actual domicil of the
owner or the permanent situs of the property within the taxing
jurisdiction. The court below, however, did not apparently decline
to apply the previous decisions of this Court, but treated them as
inapposite under the assumption that they were rendered before the
act of 1884, and that the necessary effect of that statute was to
change the general law so as to cause vessels to be subject to
taxation within a state where they were enrolled, although that
state was neither the residence of the owner nor the place of the
actual situs of the property. As the ruling below was made before
the decision of this Court in the
Old Dominion Steamship
Company case, rendered since the act of 1884, we might well
leave the demonstration of the error into which the court fell to
result from the decision of that case, since the ruling below is
wholly inconsistent with that decision. This clearly follows since,
in the
Old Dominion Steamship case, the right of the State
of Virginia to tax was based upon the permanent situs of the
vessels in Virginia, although they were enrolled in another state.
But, in view of the general importance of the subject, we shall
briefly point out the mistaken construction given by the court
below to the act of 1884.
After referring to the act of 1884 and quoting the
provisions
Page 202 U. S. 424
of the Rev.Stat. section 4178, as now existing, the court below
said:
"Appellee had a right to cause its boats to be registered at
Paducah, although that was not the place nearest to the port where
it resided, and it fully complied with the law regulating the
subject by painting the words 'of Paducah, Kentucky,' on the stern
thereof, and, by the amendment of 1884, Paducah became the home
port of the vessels so registered and marked."
"
* * * *"
"The steamboats involved in this litigation are separated from
the residence of their owner by a long distance . . . ; in fact,
they can never visit the port at which their owner resides; they
are, so far as their actual situs is concerned, permanently
confined to the rivers over which they float; if their home port
had to be Chicago, because that is the residence of their owner, as
under the law prior to 1884, then they would have a home port from
which they could derive no advantage or protection, because they
could never reach it. It was to obviate this hardship, with others,
that the act of 1884 was passed by Congress, permitting their
owners to select for them a home port in the field of their
operations, which is for them a home port in fact as well as in law
and name. Property such as that under consideration ought logically
to be taxed at its own home port; there it can be seen and properly
valued for assessment by the fiscal officers, whereas, at the
residence of its owner (Chicago), the officers, of necessity, must
rely on the statements of the latter for both its existence [of the
property] and its value. At its home port, it enjoys the protection
of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is located, and both
justice and reason would seem to require that property thus
permanently located, both in legal contemplation and in fact,
within a jurisdiction foreign to that of its owner, should
contribute its fair share to the support of that government whose
protection it enjoys."
It is at once apparent that this line of reasoning, whilst
it
Page 202 U. S. 425
asserts the principle of actual situs and expounds the act of
1884 as making that the exclusive rule to test the power to tax, at
once causes the act to destroy the very principle which it was
assumed the act upheld. This is the inevitable consequence of the
conclusion reached by the court below that the act of 1884 endowed
the owner of a vessel with the power, simply by the painting a name
of a place upon his vessel, to make such place the situs for
taxation, although it might be neither the actual situs of the
property nor the residence of the owner.
The act in question was an elaborate one, containing thirty
sections relating to the American merchant marine, and was entitled
"An Act to Remove Certain Burdens on the American Merchant Marine,
and Encourage the American Foreign Carrying Trade, and for Other
Purposes." 23 Stat. 53, c. 121. The only provision contained in
that act which had any reference to the subject under
consideration, and which was relied upon in the court below, was
section 21, which we have previously quoted, and which we again
copy:
"SEC 21. That the word 'port,' as used in sections forty-one
hundred and seventy-eight and forty-three hundred and thirty-four
of the Revised Statutes, in reference to painting the name and port
of every registered or licensed vessel on the stern of such vessel,
shall be construed to mean either the port where the vessel is
registered or enrolled or the place in the same district where the
vessel was built or where one or more of the owners reside."
Clearly this section does not essentially change the prior
general law respecting enrollment, as it simply enlarges the power
of an owner in regard to painting on the stern of his vessel the
name of the place from which he may desire to hail her. The prior
provisions as to enrollment clearly exacted that the owner, as an
incident to enrollment, should mark upon his vessel the name of the
place of enrollment -- in other words, compelled the owner to hail
his vessel from the place of enrollment, although he might be
domiciled elsewhere. Now,
Page 202 U. S. 426
as the settled rule at the time of the passage of this act was
that enrollment, and consequent marking of the stern of the vessel
with the name of the place of enrollment, was not the criterion by
which to determine the power of taxation, it is impossible to
conceive that Congress intended, by merely conferring a privilege
to select the name of a place other than the port of enrollment to
be marked upon a vessel, to overthrow the settled rules in regard
to taxation of such property which existed at the time of the
passage of the act of 1884. To give to the statute the construction
adopted by the court below would be simply to hold that its purpose
was to endow the owner with the faculty of arbitrarily selecting a
place for the taxation of his vessel in defiance of the law of
domicil, and in disregard of the principle of actual situs, since,
by the statute, the owner was given the right to paint either the
name of the place where the vessel was built, where enrolled, or
where one of the owners resided. And this demonstrates the
misconception of the construction given to the act of 1884 by the
court below, since the court declared that the whole effect of the
act was to endow the owner of vessels with the power to select, by
marking on the stern, a place "in the field of operations," which
should be the place of taxation. But no such limitation as the
field of operations can be implied from the language of the
statute, and therefore, if the construction adopted were upheld,
the unlimited right of the owner to arbitrarily frustrate the
taxing laws of the state where he was rightfully subject to
taxation would result.
Undoubtedly, as we have said, the general statutes as to
enrollment in force prior to 1884 required that the name of the
port to be painted upon the vessel should be the port of
enrollment, although such place might not be the domicil of the
owner. In practice, however, that rule was not always observed,
because the owners of vessels desired to hail them from the place
of the residence of the owner.
The Albany, 4 Dill. 439.
And the history of the adoption of the provision now known as
section 21 of the act of 1884 referred to leaves
Page 202 U. S. 427
no room for doubt that Congress simply intended to legalize such
practice. The provision had its origin in an amendment unanimously
reported by the committee on commerce of the Senate on May 1, 1884,
to a bill then pending in the Senate. The chairman of the
committee, in reporting the proposed amendment, said (15 Cong.Rec.
p. 3650):
"Mr. Frye. The next amendment I am authorized to offer is a
section in reference to the painting of the name of the ship on the
stern. Not very important that must appear to Senators. Many of our
shipowners in the State of Maine think more of that than they do of
the rest of this bill. This man who owns a ship looks upon her as
his wife or his children; he loves his ship; and, under the law as
it stands today, he is required to paint on the stern the name, it
may be that of his wife or of his daughter, and the port to which
she belongs. For seventy-five years, the port to which she belonged
was construed to be the place where she was owned, and if a man
built a ship in Surry, and she was owned there, he painted in the
stern the 'May Ann, from Surry, Maine.' In 1875, a sharp Treasury
official discovered that it was a violation of the law. He reported
to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary issued an order
that all those ships must bear the name of the port of entry,
regardless of where they were built or owned. They are building
vessels, home vessels, owned at home, owned in families, in many
instances by the blacksmith, the carpenter, the captain, and the
mate. Their vessels they wish to name after one of the family and
the home, the place where she is owned and built, and yet, under
the construction of the Treasury Department, she may be the 'Julia
Ann,' from Machias, her port of entry, but actually built and owned
a hundred miles from there. Take Bath and Richmond, on the Kennebec
River -- Bath, the greatest ship-building city in the United States
today of wooden ships; her rival, Richmond, is fifteen miles above.
The men who build their ships in Richmond regard it as about as
serious a wrong as can be imposed upon them by law to compel
them
Page 202 U. S. 428
to put a ship built there and owned there under the name of
bath, her port of entry, and Bath would fully reciprocate under
like circumstances. I take it that no Senator will object to that
provision."
"Mr. Hale. Just there let me ask my colleague, was not the
reason for the ruling of the Secretary of the Treasury that the
technical view was taken of the word 'port,' and it was concluded
there could be nothing but the port of entry, thereby taking away
this privilege from the men who built the ship?"
"Mr. Frye. I so understand it."
And, without debate, the amendment was adopted, and
subsequently, with other amendments, was incorporated as part of
the bill which came from the House of Representatives, relating to
the same general subject as the bill which was under consideration
in the Senate. 15 Cong.Rec. pp. 3869, 3973, 5440.
The suggestion that, because the vessels were enrolled at
Paducah, the owner was estopped from disputing that they had a
situs for taxation there is but to contend that the place of
enrollment was
per se controlling, in disregard of the
repeated rulings of this Court to the contrary.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
