Where the United States grants a right of way by statute to a
railroad company which files a map of definite location, and the
road is constructed, the land forming the right of way is taken out
of the category of public land subject to preemption and sale, and
the land department is without authority to convey rights therein.
Homesteaders filing entries thereafter can acquire no interest in
land within the right of way on the ground that the grants to them
were of full legal subdivisions the descriptions whereof include
part of the right of way.
Although a right of way granted by the United States through
public domain within a state may be amenable to the police power of
that state, an individual cannot for private purposes acquire by
adverse possession under a statute of limitations of that state any
portion of a right of way granted by the United States to a
railroad company in the manner and under the conditions as the
right of way was granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company.
This controversy concerns the validity of an asserted title, by
adverse possession, to a portion of the right of way in Wadena
County, Minnesota, granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, its successors and assigns, by the second section of the
Act of Congress approved July 2, 1864. 13 Stat. 365. The plaintiff
in error, the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of
the State of Wisconsin, acquired the railroad and property of the
former named company on or about August 31, 1896, by purchase at a
sale under foreclosure of certain mortgages.
By the first section of the act of 1864, the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company was created a corporation, and was empowered to
construct and maintain a continuous railroad and telegraph line
from a point on Lake Superior to some point on Puget Sound. In the
second section of the act, it was provided, among other things, as
follows:
Page 190 U. S. 268
"And be it further enacted, That the right of way through the
public lands be and the same is hereby granted to said Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, for the
construction of a railroad and telegraph, as proposed, and the
right, power, and authority is hereby given to said corporation to
take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road,
material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the
construction thereof. Said way is granted to said railroad to the
extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad,
where it may pass through the public domain, including all
necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine
shops, switches, side tracks, turntables, and water stations, and
the right of way shall be exempt from taxation within the
territories of the United States. . . ."
Section 3 created a large land grant to secure the construction
and continuous maintenance of the road. Construction was to be
supervised by commissioners appointed by the President. (Sec. 4.)
Section 5 provided how the road must be built, and that the company
should not charge the government higher rates than individuals. The
right of eminent domain was conferred by section 7. In section 8
conditions of the grant in respect to the commencement and
completion of the construction of the road were enumerated. Section
9 reserved the right to Congress to complete the road. Section 10
secured to all the people of the United States the right to
subscribe for its stock. Section 11 made it a post road subject to
the use of the United States for government service, and subject to
such regulations as Congress might impose respecting charges for
government transportation. The remaining provisions of the act
dealt with the mode of acceptance of the grant, the powers and
duties of the board of directors and other officers of the company,
the payments of cash assessments, and other subjects. We need only
further particularly refer, however, to section 18, wherein it was
provided that the railroad company, previous to commencing the
construction of its road, should obtain the consent of the
legislature of any state through which any portion of its line
might pass. Such consent was duly given by the State of
Minnesota.
Page 190 U. S. 269
The company signified its acceptance in writing, as provided in
the act. In November, 1871, the line of road was definitely
located, and a duly approved map was filed showing said definite
location. This line crossed the northwest quarter of section 24,
township 134 north, of range 35 west, of the fifth principal
meridian, Minnesota. At that time, as well as prior thereto, said
quarter section was public land, to which the United States had
full title, and the same was not reserved or otherwise
appropriated, nor had any entries or filings or applications to
make entry or filing thereon been made. During the years 1870 and
1871, the railroad was duly constructed through the section
referred to, and the portion of the road thus constructed was
thereafter duly accepted by the President.
In December, 1878, and February, 1882, homestead entries were
initiated on said northwest quarter of section 24, and on November
30, 1885, and July 24, 1889, patents which purported to convey the
whole of each forty-acre subdivision were issued to Abner Townsend
and George H. Brown, respectively. Subsequently, in 1886 and 1888,
the title to said northwest quarter was conveyed to the defendant
in error Minerva Townsend. During the occupancy of the
homesteaders, they cultivated up to the line of the ordinary and
snow fences of the railroad, situated respectively fifty and one
hundred feet from the center of the track, and such occupancy
continued a sufficient length of time to constitute a title by
adverse possession under the limitation statutes of Minnesota.
Demand was made by the railroad company for possession of that
portion of the quarter section which was within the granted right
of way, and, upon noncompliance, an action of ejectment was brought
in a court of the State of Minnesota to recover possession of the
disputed ground. The case was tried by the court without a jury.
Lengthy findings of fact were made, and, as a conclusion of law,
the court found that the railroad company was entitled to the
possession of the premises described, and entered judgment
accordingly.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the judgment
of the trial court. 84 Minn. 152. The cause was then brought to
this Court.
Page 190 U. S. 270
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the outset, we premise that, as the grant of the right of
way, the filing of the map of definite location, and the
construction of the railroad within the quarter section in question
preceded the filing of the homestead entries on such section, the
land forming the right of way therein was taken out of the category
of public lands subject to preemption and sale, and the Land
Department was therefore without authority to convey rights
therein. It follows that the homesteaders acquired no interest in
the land within the right of way because of the fact that the grant
to them was of the full legal subdivisions.
Conceding the adverse possession and its efficacy under the
state law as against the railroad right of way to be as found by
the state court, the sole question which arises, then, for decision
is whether, in view of the provisions of the act of Congress to
which we have referred, an asserted title by adverse possession can
be made efficacious as respects the property in controversy. And
depending, as this question does, upon the nature and effect of the
acts of Congress, its solution necessarily involves a federal
question.
In determining whether an individual, for private purposes, may,
by adverse possession, under a state statute of limitations,
acquire title to a portion of the right of way granted by the
United States for the use of this railroad, we must be guided by
the doctrine enunciated in
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.
S. 661,
137 U. S. 669,
and approvingly referred to in
Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U. S. 1,
152 U. S. 44,
viz.:
"The courts of the United States will construe the grants of the
general government without reference to the rules of construction
adopted by the states for their grants; but whatever incidents or
rights attach to the ownership
Page 190 U. S. 271
of property conveyed by the government will be determined by the
states, subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the
efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of the property by
the grantee."
Following the decisions of this Court construing grants of
rights of way similar in tenor to the grant now being considered,
New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. , 172 U.
S. 171,
172 U. S. 181;
St. Joseph & Denver City R. Co. v. Baldwin,
103 U. S. 426, it
must be held that the fee passed by the grant made in section 2 of
the Act of July 2, 1864. But, although there was a present grant,
it was yet subject to conditions expressly stated in the act, and
also (to quote the language of the
Baldwin case) "to those
necessarily implied, such as that the road shall be . . . used for
the purposes designed." Manifestly the land forming the right of
way was not granted with the intent that it might be absolutely
disposed of at the volition of the company. On the contrary, the
grant was explicitly stated to be for a designated purpose -- one
which negated the existence of the power to voluntarily alienate
the right of way or any portion thereof. The substantial
consideration inducing the grant was the perpetual use of the land
for the legitimate purposes of the railroad, just as though the
land had been conveyed in terms to have and to hold the same so
long as it was used for the railroad right of way. In effect, the
grant was of a limited fee, made on an implied condition of
reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the
land for the purpose for which it was granted. This being the
nature of the title to the land granted for the special purpose
named, it is evident that to give such efficacy to a statute of
limitations of a state as would operate to confer a permanent right
of possession to any portion thereof upon an individual for his
private use would be to allow that to be done by indirection which
could not be done directly; for, as said in
Grand Trunk
Railroad v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454,
91 U. S. 468,
"a railroad company . . . is not at liberty to alienate any part of
it so as to interfere with the full exercise of the franchises
granted." Nor can it be rightfully contended that the portion of
the right of way appropriated was not necessary for the execution
of the powers conferred
Page 190 U. S. 272
by Congress, for, as said in
Northern Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Smith, 171 U. S. 261,
171 U. S. 275,
speaking of the very grant under consideration:
"By granting a right of way four hundred feet in width, Congress
must understood to have conclusively determined that a strip of
that width was necessary for a public work of such importance."
Neither courts nor juries, therefore, nor the general public may
be permitted to conjecture that a portion of such right of way is
no longer needed for the use of the railroad and title to it has
vested in whomsoever chooses to occupy the same. The whole of the
granted right of way must be presumed to be necessary for the
purposes of the railroad, as against a claim by an individual of an
exclusive right of possession for private purposes.
To repeat, the right of way was given in order that the
obligations to the United States, assumed in the acceptance of the
act, might be performed. Congress having plainly manifested its
intention that the title to, and possession of, the right of way
should continue in the original grantee, its successors and assigns
so long as the railroad was maintained, the possession by
individuals of portions of the right of way cannot be treated,
without overthrowing the act of Congress, as forming the basis of
an adverse possession which may ripen into a title good as against
the railroad company.
Of course, nothing that has been said in anywise imports that a
right of way granted through the the public domain within a state
is not amenable to the police power of the state. Congress must
have assumed when making this grant, for instance, that in the
natural order of events, as settlements were made along the line of
the railroad, crossings of the right of way would become necessary,
and that other limitations in favor of the general public upon an
exclusive right of occupancy by the railroad of its right of way
might be justly imposed. But such limitations are in no sense
analogous to claim of adverse ownership for private use.
As our construction of the act of Congress determines the
question presented for decision, it becomes unnecessary to review
the cases which have been called to our attention supporting, on
the one hand, or denying, on the other, the broad contention
Page 190 U. S. 273
that title by adverse possession, under state statutes of
limitation, may be acquired by individuals to land within the right
of way of a railroad. None of the cases adverted to as holding the
affirmative of the proposition even suggest that the rule would be
applicable where its enforcement would conflict with the powers and
duties imposed by law on a railroad corporation in a given case. As
here we find that the nature of the duties imposed by Congress upon
the railroad company and the character of the title conferred by
Congress in giving the right of way through the public domain are
inconsistent with the power in an individual to acquire, for
private purposes, by limitation, a portion of the right of way
granted by Congress, the cases in question are inapposite.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota must be
Reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BROWN dissent.
