By the Act of Congress of February 8, 1887, c. 119, known as the
Indian General Allotment Act it was provided:
"That upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this
act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to
issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be
of the legal effect and declare that the United States does and
will hold the land thus allotted for the period of twenty-five
years in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom
such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of
his heirs according to the laws of the state or territory where
such land is located, and that, at the expiration of said period,
the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or
his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free
of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever:
Provided, That
the President of the United States may in any case in his
discretion extend the period. And if any conveyance shall be made
of the lands set apart and allotted, as herein provided, or any
contract made touching the same, before the expiration of the time
above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely
null and void."
Held:
(1) That neither the lands allotted nor the permanent
improvements thereon nor the personal property obtained from the
United States and used by the Indians on the allotted lands are
subject to state or local taxation during the period of the trust
provided by the above act of 1887.
(2) The United States has such an interest in the question as to
entitle it to maintain a suit to protect the Indians against local
or state taxation.
(3) This suit was properly brought in equity, and not at law,
the remedy at law not being as adequate and efficacious as was
necessary.
This suit was instituted under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States for the purpose of restraining the
collection of taxes alleged to be due the County of Roberts, South
Dakota, in respect of certain permanent improvements on, and
personal property used in the cultivation of lands in that county
occupied by members of the Sisseton band of Sioux Indians in the
State of South Dakota.
Page 188 U. S. 433
The case is here upon questions certified by the judges of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
According to the certificate, the bill alleged that Charles R.
Crawford, Adam Little Thunder, Solomon Two Stars, and Victor
Renville are Indians and members of the Sisseton band of Sioux
Indians in the State of South Dakota, wards of the United States
and under its guardianship and supervision, and residents of that
portion of the Sisseton agency situated in the County of Roberts;
that the said Indians are holding, and for several years last past
have held, allotted lands in that county and within the former
Sisseton Indian Reservation, which lands were allotted to those
Indians under the provisions of the agreement of December the 12th,
1889, as ratified by the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036,
and more particularly under section 5 of the General Allotment Act
of Congress approved February the 8th, 1887, 24 Stat. 389, and that
the lands so allotted by the United States are held in trust by the
United States under the provisions of the last-named act.
The bill then alleged that, during the year 1900, the duly
authorized officers of Roberts County listed certain improvements
on the allotted lands of Crawford, and returned the assessment
thereon at the sum of $630, such improvements consisting of a large
frame house and barn attached thereto (a fixture and permanent
improvement upon the allotted lands), and other improvements of a
permanent character attached to these lands; that the amount of
taxes extended on the tax roll of such improvement is for state and
county taxes for the year 1900 was the sum of $21.42; that for that
year, the officers of Roberts County listed, assessed, and returned
upon the tax rolls of the county certain personal property against
Crawford, consisting of horses, one cow, and two wagons at the
aggregate valuation of $129, upon which was assessed and levied a
tax of $4.90, and that said personal property was issued to the
allottee by the United States pursuant to the acts of Congress and
the treaties between the United States and the band of Indians to
which Crawford belongs, was branded "I.D." and was then and there
in the possession of the allottee, being kept and used by him upon
his allotment.
Page 188 U. S. 434
Similar allegations were made in reference to the other Indians
named in the bill, covering the years 1899 and 1900.
It was also alleged that the defendant was county treasurer and
collector of taxes for the county, and threatened to sell, and was
about to sell, the property just described as that of the Indians
named in the bill and assessed for the years above stated, and
would sell the same unless restrained, whereby the United States
would be subjected to and compelled to defend a multitude of
actions, suits, and proceedings which would greatly embarrass it;
that the assessments of said property and the amount of taxes so
assessed and returned upon the tax roll of the county are upon the
books of the county and of record in the office of the county
auditor and treasurer, and constitute a cloud upon the title of the
lands of the United States above referred to.
It was further alleged that the United States was without any
plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law, and could only have
relief in a court of equity, and that irreparable injury would be
inflicted upon it in case the enforcement, assessment, and
collection of such taxes were not enjoined.
The defendant demurred to the bill upon the following grounds:
that it did not disclose any equity nor entitle the United States
to the relief prayed; that the United States had no interest in the
subject matter of the suit; that the property assessed by Roberts
County was personal property, and the injunction would not lie to
restrain the collection of the tax, and that the United States had
an adequate remedy at law.
The demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the government
failing to amend, the bill was dismissed upon the merits.
Subsequently, the case was carried to the circuit court of
appeals.
Thereupon, that court made a certificate of certain questions in
respect to which it desired the instructions of this Court. These
questions will be referred to in the course of this opinion.
Page 188 U. S. 435
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
I.
Were the lands held by the allottees, Charles R. Crawford
and the other Indians named in the bill, subject to assessment and
taxation by the taxing authorities of Roberts County, South
Dakota?
This is the first of the questions certified by the judges of
the circuit court of appeals. It is not, in our opinion, difficult
of solution.
By the Act of Congress of February 8th, 1887, c. 119, referred
to in the certificate and known as the General Allotment Act,
provision was made for the allotment of lands in severalty to
Indians on the various reservations, and for extending the
protection of the laws of the United States and the territories
over the Indians. To that end, the President was authorized,
whenever in his opinion a reservation or any part thereof was
advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes, to cause it or
any part thereof to be surveyed or resurveyed if necessary, and to
allot the lands in the reservation in severalty to any Indian
located thereon, in certain quantities specified in the statute --
the allotments to be made by special agents appointed for that
purpose, and by the agents in charge of the special reservations on
which the allotments were made. 24 Stat. 388, 389-390, § 1.
What interest, if any, did the Indian allottee acquire in the
land allotted to him? That question is answered by the fifth
section of the allotment act, which provides:
"That upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this
act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to
issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be
of the legal effect, and declare, that the United States does and
will hold the land thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five
years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom
such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of
his heirs according to the laws of the state or territory where
Page 188 U. S. 436
such land is located, and that, at the expiration of said
period, the United States will convey the same by patent to said
Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust
and free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever:
Provided, That the President of the United States may in
any case, in his discretion, extend the period. And if any
conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and allotted, as
herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the
expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract
shall be absolutely null and void:
Provided, That the law
of descent and partition in force in the state or territory where
such lands are situate shall apply thereto after patents therefor
have been executed and delivered, except as herein otherwise
provided. . . ."
24 Stat. 389, § 5.
The word "patents," where it is first used in this section, was
not happily chosen to express the thought which it is clear, all
parts of the section being considered, Congress intended to
express. The "patents" here referred to (although that word has
various meanings) were, as the statute plainly imports, nothing
more than instruments or memoranda in writing, designed to show
that, for a period of twenty-five years, the United States would
hold the land allotted in trust for the sole use and benefit of the
allottee or, in case of his death, of his heirs, and subsequently,
at the expiration of that period, unless the time was extended by
the President, convey the fee, discharged of the trust and free of
all charge or encumbrance. In other words, the United States
retained the legal title, giving the Indian allottee a paper or
writing, improperly called a patent, showing that at a particular
time in the future, unless it was extended by the President, he
would be entitled to a regular patent conveying the fee. This
interpretation of the statute is in harmony with the explicit
declaration that any conveyance of the land, or any contract
touching the same, while the United States held the title in trust,
should be absolutely null and void. So that the United States
retained its hold on the land allotted for the period of
twenty-five years after the allotment, and as much longer as the
President, in his discretion, should determine.
The bill, as appears from the certificate of the judges,
shows
Page 188 U. S. 437
that the lands in question were allotted
"under provisions of the agreement of December 12, 1889, as
ratified by the Act of March 3, 1891, and more particularly under
Section V of the General Allotment Act approved February 8,
1887."
Upon inspection of that agreement, we find nothing that
indicates any different relation of the United States to the
allotted lands from that created or recognized by the act of 1887.
On the contrary, the agreement contemplates that patents shall
issue for the lands allotted under it "upon the same terms and
conditions and limitations as is provided in Section V of the Act
of Congress approved February 8, 1887." 2 6 Stat. 1035, 1036, Art.
IV.
If, as is undoubtedly the case, these lands were held by the
United States in execution of its plans relating to the Indians --
without any right in the Indians to make contracts in reference to
them or to do more than to occupy and cultivate them -- until a
regular patent conveying the fee was issued to the several
allottees, it would follow that there was no power in the State of
South Dakota, for state or municipal purposes, to assess and tax
the lands in question until at least the fee was conveyed to the
Indians. These Indians are yet wards of the nation, in a condition
of pupilage or dependency, and have not been discharged from that
condition. They occupy these lands with the consent and authority
of the United States, and the holding of them by the United States
under the act of 1887, and the agreement of 1889, ratified by the
act of 1891, is part of the national policy by which the Indians
are to be maintained as well as prepared for assuming the habits of
civilized life, and ultimately the privileges of citizenship. To
tax these lands is to tax an instrumentality employed by the United
States for the benefit and control of this dependent race, and to
accomplish beneficent objects with reference to a race of which
this Court has said that
"from their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the federal government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized
by the Executive and by Congress, and by this Court, whenever
the
Page 188 U. S. 438
question has arisen."
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.
S. 375,
118 U. S. 384.
So that, if they may be taxed, then the obligations which the
government has assumed in reference to these Indians may be
entirely defeated, for, by the act of 1887, the government has
agreed at a named time to convey the land to the allottee in fee,
discharged of the trust, "and free of all charge or encumbrance
whatsoever." To say that these lands may be assessed and taxed by
the County of Roberts under the authority of the state is to say
they may be sold for the taxes, and thus become so burdened that
the United States could not discharge its obligations to the
Indians without itself paying the taxes imposed from year to year,
and thereby keeping the lands free from encumbrances.
In
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.
S. 151,
117 U. S. 155,
the Court held that property of the United States was exempt by the
Constitution of the United States from taxation under the authority
of any state. Giving the outlines of the grounds of the judgment
delivered by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, the Court said:
"That Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are
supreme; they control the Constitutions and laws of the respective
states, and cannot be controlled by them. The people of a state
give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their
property at its discretion. But the means employed by the
government of the Union are not given by the people of a particular
state, but by the people of all the states, and, being given by all
for the benefit of all, should be subjected to that government only
which belongs to all. All subjects over which the sovereign power
of a state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it
does not extend are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from
taxation. The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which
exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission;
but does not extend to those means which are employed by Congress
to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people
of the United States. The attempt to use the taxing power of a
state on the means employed by the government of the Union, in
pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse, because it
is
Page 188 U. S. 439
the usurpation of a power which the people of a single state
cannot give. The power to tax involves the power to destroy; the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create,
and there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a
power to control the constitutional measures of another, which
other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control. The states have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the general government."
These principles were recognized and applied in
Wisconsin
Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U.
S. 496,
133 U. S. 504,
in which the Court said:
"The Constitution vests in Congress the power to 'dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States.' And this implies an
exclusion of all other authority over the property, which could
interfere with this right or obstruct its exercise."
It was therefore well said by the Attorney General of the United
States, in an opinion delivered in 1888,
"that the allotment lands provided for in the act of 1887 are
exempt from state or territorial taxation upon the ground above
stated, . . . namely, that the lands covered by the act are held by
the United States for the period of twenty-five years in trust for
the Indians, such trust being an agency for the exercise of a
federal power, and therefore outside the province of state or
territorial authority."
19 Op.Atty.Gen. 161, 169.
In support of these general views, reference may be made to the
following cases:
Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 467;
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316;
Osborn v.
Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738;
United States v.
Rogers, 4 How. 567;
New York
Indians, 5 Wall. 761;
Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 119 U. S. 1,
119 U. S. 27;
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.
S. 445,
174 U. S. 483;
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,
135 U. S. 641,
135 U. S. 653;
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.
S. 294;
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.
S. 553.
Another suggestion by the defendant deserves to be noticed.
Page 188 U. S. 440
It is that there is a "compact" between the United States and
the State of South Dakota which, if regarded, determines this case
for the state. Let us see what there is of substance in this
view.
By the Act of February 22, 1889, c. 180, providing, among other
things, for the division of the Territory of Dakota into two
states, it was declared that the conventions called to frame
Constitutions for them should provide, "by ordinances irrevocable
without the consent of the United States and the people of said
states," as follows:
"Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed states do
agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to
the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by
any Indian or Indian tribes, and that, until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States the same shall be
and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and
said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States; . . . that no taxes
shall be imposed by the states on lands or property therein
belonging to, or which may hereafter be purchased by, the United
States, or reserved for its use. But nothing herein, or in the
ordinances herein provided for, shall preclude the said states from
taxing as other lands are taxed any lands owned or held by any
Indian who has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from
the United States or from any person a title thereto by patent or
other grant, save and except such lands as have been or may be
granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from
taxation; but said ordinances shall provide that all such lands
shall be exempt from taxation by said states so long and to such
extent as such act of Congress may prescribe."
25 Stat. 677.
That provision was embodied in the Constitution of South Dakota
-- for the purpose, no doubt, of meeting the views of Congress
expressed in the Enabling Act of 1889 -- and was declared by that
instrument to be irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of the state expressed by
Page 188 U. S. 441
their legislative assembly, and this action of the United States
and of the state constitutes the "compact" referred to, and upon
which the appellee relies in support of the taxation in
question.
We pass by, as unnecessary to be considered, whether the above
provision in the act of Congress of 1889 had any legal efficacy in
itself, after the admission of South Dakota into the Union upon an
equal footing with the other states, for the same provision, in the
state constitution, deliberately adopted by the state, is, without
reference to the act of Congress, the law for its legislature and
people until abrogated by the state. Looking at that provision, we
find nothing in it sustaining the contention that the County of
Roberts has any authority to tax these lands. On the contrary, it
is declared in the state constitution that lands within the limits
of the state, owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribe, shall,
until the title has been extinguished by the United States, remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the
United States. And when the state comes to declare, in its
Constitution, what taxes it shall not be precluded from imposing,
the provision is that it shall not be precluded from taxing, as
other lands,
"any lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed his
tribal relation,
and has obtained from the United States,
or from any person, a title thereto
by patent or other
grant."
Art. XXII. The patent or grant here referred to is the final
patent or grant which invests the patentee or grantee with the
title in fee -- that is, with absolute ownership. No such patent or
grant has been issued to these Indians. So that the appellee cannot
sustain the taxation in question under the clause of the state
constitution to which he refers, and the right to tax these lands
must rest upon the general authority of the legislature to impose
taxes. But, as already said, no authority exists for the state to
tax lands which are held in trust by the United States for the
purpose of carrying out its policy in reference to these
Indians.
II.
Were the permanent improvements, such as houses and
other structures upon the lands held by allotment by Charles R.
Crawford and the other Indians named in the bill, subject
to
Page 188 U. S. 442
assessment and taxation by the taxing officers of Roberts
County as personal property in 1899 and 1900? This is the
second of the questions certified by the judges of the circuit
court of appeals.
Looking at the object to be accomplished by allotting Indian
lands in severalty, it is evident that Congress expected that the
lands so allotted would be improved and cultivated by the allottee.
But that object would be defeated if the improvements could be
assessed and sold for taxes. The improvements to which the question
refers were of a permanent kind. While the title to the land
remained in the United States, the permanent improvements could no
more be sold for local taxes than could the land to which they
belonged. Every reason that can be urged to show that the land was
not subject to local taxation applies to the assessment and
taxation of the permanent improvements.
It is true that the statutes of South Dakota, for the purposes
of taxation, classify "all improvements made by persons upon lands
held by them under the laws of the United States" as personal
property. But that classification cannot apply to permanent
improvements upon lands allotted to and occupied by Indians, the
title to which remains with the United States, the occupants still
being wards of the nation, and as such under its complete authority
and protection. The fact remains that the improvements here in
question are essentially a part of the lands, and their use by the
Indians is necessary to effectuate the policy of the United
States.
Counsel for the appellee suggests that the only interest of the
United States is to be able at the end of twenty-five years from
the date of allotment to convey the land free from any charge or
encumbrance; that, if a house upon Indian land were seized and sold
for taxes, that would not prevent the United States from conveying
the land free from any charge or encumbrance, and that, in such
case, the Indians could not claim any breach of contract on the
part of the United States. These suggestions entirely ignore the
relation existing between the United States and the Indians. It is
not a relation simply of contract, each party to which is capable
of guarding his own interests, but the
Page 188 U. S. 443
Indians are in a state of dependency and pupilage, entitled to
the care and protection of the government. When they shall be let
out of that state is for the United States to determine without
interference by the courts or by any state. The government would
not adequately discharge its duty to these people if it placed its
engagements with them upon the basis merely of contract, and failed
to exercise any power it possessed to protect them in the
possession of such improvements and personal property as were
necessary to the enjoyment of the land held in trust for them. In
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S.
1,
119 U. S. 28,
this Court said:
"The recognized relation between the parties to this controversy
therefore is that between a superior and an inferior, whereby the
latter is placed under the care and control of the former, and
which, while it authorizes the adoption on the part of the United
States of such policy as their own public interests may dictate,
recognizes, on the other hand, such an interpretation of their acts
and promises as justice and reason demand in all cases where power
is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and
protection. The parties are not on an equal footing, and that
inequality is to be made good by the superior justice which looks
only to the substance of the right, without regard to technical
rules framed under a system of municipal jurisprudence, formulating
the rights and obligations of private persons equally subject to
the same laws."
See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.
S. 373,
185 U. S.
396.
III.
Was the personal property, consisting of cattle,
horses, and other property of like character, which had been issued
to these Indians by the United States, and which they were using
upon their allotments, liable to assessments and taxation by the
officers of Roberts County in 1899 and 1900? This is the third
one of the certified questions.
The answer to this question is indicated by what has been said
in reference to the assessment and taxation of the land and the
permanent improvements thereon. The personal property in question
was purchased with the money of the government, and was furnished
to the Indians in order to maintain them on the land allotted
during the period of the trust estate, and to
Page 188 U. S. 444
induce them to adopt the habits of civilized life. It was in
fact the property of the United States, and was put into the hands
of the Indians to be used in execution of the purpose of the
government in reference to them. The assessment and taxation of the
personal property would necessarily have the effect to defeat that
purpose.
IV.
Has the United States such an interest in this
controversy or in its subjects as entitles it to maintain this
suit? This is the fourth one of the certified questions.
In view of the relation of the United States to the real and
personal property in question, as well as to these dependent
Indians still under national control, and in view of the injurious
effect of the assessment and taxation complained of upon the plans
of the government with reference to the Indians, it is clear that
the United States is entitled to maintain this suit. No argument to
establish that proposition is necessary.
V.
Has the United States a remedy at law so prompt and
efficacious that it is deprived of all relief in equity? This
is the last of the certified questions.
We do not perceive that the government has any remedy at law
that could be at all efficacious for the protection of its rights
in the property in question and for the attainment of its purposes
in reference to these Indians. If the personal property and the
structures on the land were sold for taxes and possession taken by
the purchaser, then the Indians could not be maintained on the
allotted lands, and the government, unless it abandoned its policy
to maintain these Indians on the allotted lands, would be compelled
to appropriate more money and apply it in the erection of other
necessary structures on the land and in the purchase of other stock
required for purposes of cultivation. And so on, every year. It is
manifest that no proceedings at law can be prompt and efficacious
for the protection of the rights of the government, and that
adequate relief can only be had in a court of equity, which, by a
comprehensive decree, can finally determine once for all the
question of the validity of the assessment and taxation in
question, and thus give security against any action upon the part
of the local authorities tending to interfere with the complete
control, not only of the Indians
Page 188 U. S. 445
by the government, but of the property supplied to them by the
government and in use on the allotted lands.
Railroad
Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444;
Coosaw Mining Co.
v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550,
144 U. S.
564-566.
Some observations may be made that are applicable to the whole
case. It is said that the state has conferred upon these Indians
the right of suffrage and other rights that ordinarily belong only
to citizens, and that they ought therefore to share the burdens of
government like other people who enjoy such rights. These are
considerations to be addressed to Congress. It is for the
legislative branch of the government to say when these Indians
shall cease to be dependent and assume the responsibilities
attaching to citizenship. That is a political question, which the
courts may not determine. We can only deal with the case as it
exists under the legislation of Congress.
We answer the fourth question in the affirmative, and the first,
second, third, and fifth questions in the negative. It will be so
certified to the circuit court of appeals.
Answers certified.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER took no part in the decision of this
case.