1. That section of the Revised Statutes of Missouri declaring
that, in all suits upon policies of life insurance, it shall be no
defense that the insured committed suicide, applies not only to
cases where the insured takes his own life voluntarily and in full
possession of his mental faculties, but to all cases of
self-destruction by the insured, whether sane or insane, unless he
contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the
policy.
Page 187 U. S. 198
The fact that this Court has held that a clause avoiding a
policy in case the insured should die by his own hand applied only
where the insured intentionally took his own life while sane, does
not estop the court from giving a different construction to a
statute embodying an important question of public policy.
2. While, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
it must be held that the above statute was repealed by the act of
1887, authorizing the incorporation of insurance companies on the
assessment plan, as to policies thereafter issued, this statute of
1887 was prospective in its operation, and with respect to policies
issued anterior to the date of that act, the rights of the parties
are to be determined by the suicide statute.
It was further held that a law passed in 1897, specially
applying the suicide statute to insurance companies doing business
upon the assessment plan, was constitutional, and applied to this
policy, inasmuch as the insured did not die until 1898.
3. The promise of the company to pay the plaintiff the sum of
$3,000 and all the money paid on the policy in assessments, was not
impaired by subsequent amendments to the constitution, inasmuch as
these amendments operated only upon policies thereafter issued.
This was a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the
circuit court of appeals affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court
for the Western District of Missouri, overruling the defense of
suicide to an action upon a policy of life insurance, and awarding
plaintiff judgment for the amount of the policy and assessments
thereon.
An agreed statement of facts shows defendant to be an Illinois
corporation, organized "for the purpose of furnishing life
indemnity or pecuniary benefits to widows," etc., and that, on
October 19, 1885, it issued to John P. Jarman, plaintiff's husband,
and a citizen of Missouri, a policy of insurance or certificate of
membership, subject to the constitution and bylaws of the company
and certain conditions in the policy, one of which provided for its
avoidance in case of self-destruction, "whether voluntary or
involuntary, sane or insane." The seventh stipulation was that
"John P. Jarman, while insane to such an extent as to be
incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of his act,
took his own life, and came to his death on the 12th day of
September, 1898, by a gunshot wound, inflicted by himself. It is
not contended, however, by plaintiff that such self-destruction was
the result of accident."
The further material facts are set forth in the opinion.
Page 187 U. S. 199
Defendant having refused to pay the amount of the policy on
account of the suicide of the insured, Rosa B. Jarman, his widow
and beneficiary, brought an action January 19, 1899, in the Circuit
Court of Grundy County to recover the amount of the policy, $5,000,
and assessments, which action was subsequently removed to the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of
Missouri upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. The case was
submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and
resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of
$6,006.30, which was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.
Whereupon petitioner sued out a writ of certiorari from this
Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case turns principally upon the applicability to the policy
in question of sec. 5982 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of
1879, afterwards Rev.Stat. 1889, sec. 5855 (hereinafter termed the
suicide statute), which was in force in 1885, when this policy was
written. The section is as follows:
"In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter
issued by any company doing business in this state, it shall be no
defense that the insured committed suicide unless it shall be shown
to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause that the
insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application
for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary
shall be void."
1. The first defense in order of time is that Jarman did not
commit suicide within the meaning of this act, since the stipulated
fact was that he shot himself while insane to such an extent as to
be incapable of understanding the nature or consequences
Page 187 U. S. 200
of his act. The position of the company in this connection is
that the enactment above quoted, that "it shall be no defense that
the insured committed suicide," relates only to cases where the
insured takes his own life voluntarily, while sane, and in full
possession of his mental faculties, and hence, the provision of the
policy that, "in case of the self-destruction of the holder of this
policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, . . .
this policy shall become null and void" applies, and exonerates the
company from all liability beyond that provided in the policy,
"that in the case of the suicide of the holder of this policy,
then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees such
an amount of his policy as the member shall have paid to this
company on the policy in assessments on the same without
interest."
This contention is founded upon the ruling of this Court in
Life Insurance Co. v.
Terry, 15 Wall. 580, and cognate cases, to the
effect that a similar provision avoiding a policy in case the
insured should "die by his own hand" applied only where the insured
intentionally takes his own life while in possession of his
ordinary reasoning faculties, and does not apply when he is unable
to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences
and effects of the act he is about to commit, or when he is
impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power
to resist.
But we are of opinion that the word "suicide" is not used in
this statute in its technical and legal sense of self-destruction
by a sane person, but according to its popular meaning of death by
one's own hand, irrespective of the mental condition of the person
committing the act. The result of the construction urged by the
defendant would be that, if a perfectly sane man voluntarily and
from anger, pride, or jealousy, or a mere desire to escape from the
ills of life, puts an end to his life and thereby becomes guilty of
the crime of self-murder and of a fraud upon the insurance company,
the company would still be responsible unless it could be shown
that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his
application for the policy; while, if he committed the same act
while insane, and therefore irresponsible, the statute would not
apply, and the company would not
Page 187 U. S. 201
be liable under the terms of the policy, which provided that it
should become void "in case of the self-destruction of the holder .
. . whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane." In the one
case, as we held in
Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
169 U. S. 139 --
that is, of self-destruction by a sane man -- not only would the
policy be void, whether there were a provision to that effect or
not, but even a contract that it should be valid under such
circumstances was thought to be against public policy and
subversive of sound morality (p.
169 U. S.
154), while in the other case of a suicide by an insane
person, the insured is guilty of no wrong to the company if he be
incapable of understanding the moral consequences of his own act,
and there is no reason in law or morals why the company should not
pay. It is impossible to suppose that the legislature could have
contemplated such a contingency, and a construction that would lead
to this result should be deemed inadmissible unless the language of
the statute were too plain to be misunderstood.
The statute was manifestly intended to apply to all cases of
self-destruction or suicide, unless the same were contemplated at
the time application was made for the policy, and the fact that we
may have given a different construction to the same words when used
in a policy of insurance does not militate against this theory. The
same words may require a different construction when used in
different documents, as for instance in a contract, and a statute,
and identity of words is not decisive of identity of meaning where
they are used in different connections and for different purposes.
In a contract, the technical rights of the parties only are
involved; in a statute, an important question of public policy. If
this statute were read alone and disembarrassed by the construction
given to these words in policies of insurance, not a doubt would
arise as to its application to all cases of self-destruction, and
when we examine the theory of the defendant, and find that it leads
to the conclusion that the company would be liable if the insured
had committed a fraud upon it, and would not be liable if he had
taken his life, though guilty of no fraud, the theory must be
rejected without hesitation. The construction we have given to the
words "committed suicide" in this act is fortified by
Page 187 U. S. 202
reference to sec. 6570, Rev.Stat. Missouri 1889, referring to
the construction of statutes, which provides that
"words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or ordinary
and usual, sense, but technical words and phrases, having a
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood
according to their technical import."
Undoubtedly the word "suicide" in its usual sense includes all
cases of self-destruction.
2. We are next brought to the consideration of the applicability
of the suicide statute, sec. 5982, to policies of this company
issued at this time. This act, upon its face, applies to all
insurance companies "doing business in this state," and to all
policies issued by such companies after the date of the act. It
undoubtedly governs the rights of the parties in this case except
so far as the same may have been modified by an act, passed in
1887, authorizing the incorporation of insurance companies on the
assessment plan. Section 10 of this act, Laws 1887, pp. 199, 204,
is now known as sec. 5869 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of
1889, and provides that corporations "doing business under this
article" shall make certain annual statements, which, as well as
other requirements, are also made applicable to foreign companies,
with the following proviso:
"
Provided always That nothing herein contained shall
subject any corporation
doing business under this article
to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance
laws of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth."
It appears that the defendant in this case, which is a citizen
of Illinois, elected to take advantage of this law, and on June 18,
1888, received from the insurance department of the state authority
to do business thereunder upon the assessment plan. As to policies
issued upon the assessment plan subsequent to this date and prior
to 1897, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the suicide
statute above quoted does not apply.
Haynie v. Knights Templars
&c. Co., 139 Mo. 416. To the same effect are
Hanford
v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, 122 Mo. 50;
Jacobs
v. Omaha Life Association, 142 Mo. 49, and
Aloe v. Mutual
Reserve Life Association, 147 Mo. 561. It is true the
authority of these cases was somewhat shaken by the recent case of
Aloe v. Fidelity Mutual Life Association, 164 Mo. 675,
which
Page 187 U. S. 203
did not involve the repeal of the suicide statute, but of
another statute, providing that no misrepresentation should be
deemed material unless the matter misrepresented should have
contributed to the death of the insured. The case, however, turned,
as did the cases above cited, upon the scope of the proviso of sec.
5869, and a persuasive opinion was delivered by Judge Valliant in
favor of the theory that the proviso was intended to relate only to
the organization of the corporations, and the extent to which they
should be subject to the supervision of the department of insurance
and under the superintendent's control. This opinion was delivered
in the first department of the supreme court, and, there being a
dissent, the cause was transferred to the court in banc, wherein a
majority of the court apparently differed from the views expressed
by Judge Valliant, and reaffirmed the cases above cited. These
cases, including the
Haynie case, must therefore be
regarded as representing the views of the supreme court that the
suicide statute was actually repealed by the act of 1887 as to
policies thereafter issued, and that view is, of course, binding
upon this Court.
But we are of the opinion that this statute was intended to be
prospective in its operation, and that the rights of the defendant
as an assessment company under the act of 1887 began in June, 1888,
with its certificate of authority to do business under that act,
and with respect to policies anterior to that date, the rights of
the parties are to be determined by the suicide statute, sec. 5855,
Rev.Stat. 1889. It must be borne in mind that the repealing act of
1887, now known as Rev.Stat. 1889, sec. 5869, was not passed as an
independent statute, but as section 10 of a new statute of fourteen
sections, entitled
"An Act to Provide for the Incorporation and Regulation of
Associations, Societies, or Companies, Doing a Life or Casualty
Insurance Business on the Assessment Plan."
The prior sections define what shall be deemed a contract of
insurance upon the assessment plan, how the corporations are
formed, what the policies should specify, giving general details
with regard to the management of the business, and then providing,
in section 10, for annual statements made by "every corporation
doing business under this act," with the provision that
"nothing herein contained
Page 187 U. S. 204
shall subject any corporation doing business under this act to
any provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of
this state, except as distinctly herein set forth."
This whole act, slightly amended in language, was carried into
the Revised Statutes of 1889 as chapter 89, article III. It seems
to us quite clear that the declaration of the proviso that
corporations "doing business under this act" shall not be subject
to the general insurance laws of the state applies only to
corporations which took out a certificate of authority from the
insurance department to do business on the assessment plan, and to
policies thereafter issued by such companies, notwithstanding the
fact that such companies may have issued policies under the general
insurance laws of the state prior to the act of 1887. The words
"doing business" evidently refer to issuing policies, and not to
paying them. A man does business when he contracts obligations; he
ceases to do business when he discharges them.
This is not only the natural construction of the act, but to
hold that the proviso applies to policies antecedently issued might
open it to the imputation of impairing the obligation of contracts
previously entered into between these companies and their insured,
since these policies amounted to a special agreement on the part of
the companies that they would be liable in case of suicide -- an
agreement upon which the insured and his beneficiary were entitled
to rely. The provision of the suicide statute that it shall be no
defense that the insured committed suicide, and that any
stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void, must be
considered as imposing a condition upon every policy thereafter
issued, notwithstanding any stipulation in the policy to the
contrary. It must be treated as an independent and binding
obligation, and as overriding and nullifying any stipulation of the
parties. As Mr. Justice Gray observed in
Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Clements, 140 U.
S. 226: "The statute . . . is mandatory, and controls
the nature and terms of the contract into which the company may
induce the assured to enter."
But we do not find it necessary to express an opinion whether,
if the act of 1887 were plainly applicable upon its face to
antecedent policies, it would be objectionable as impairing the
obligation
Page 187 U. S. 205
of contracts entered into between the insurance company and
insured, inasmuch as we are clearly of opinion that it should not
be held to apply to such unless its language imperatively demand
it.
City Railway Co. v. Citizens' R. Co., 166 U.
S. 557,
166 U. S.
565.
Were the act of 1887 more ambiguous than it is as to its
application to past transactions, we should still be disposed to
apply the cardinal rule of construction that, where the language of
an act will bear two interpretations equally obvious, that one
which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution is to be preferred. Endlich, Interpretation of
Statutes, sec. 178. This rule was applied by this Court in
Granada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.
S. 261;
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.
S. 252,
116 U. S. 269,
and
Hooper v. California, 155 U.
S. 648,
155 U. S.
657.
We do not wish to be understood, however, as expressing an
opinion upon the constitutionality of the act of 1887 if it were
applied to prior policies, but simply as holding that, in view of
the language of the act, and the doubtfulness of its
constitutionality as applied to prior policies, it should only be
given effect in cases of policies thereafter issued.
But there is another argument in this connection which ought not
to be overlooked, and which is, in our opinion, decisive that the
suicide statute is applicable to this policy. In 1897, a law was
passed by the Legislature of Missouri, specially applying the
suicide statute to insurance companies doing business upon the
assessment plan. This was done by an amendment to sec. 5869, which
will hereafter be considered. Two objections to the applicability
of this statute are deserving of consideration. First, that it is
in conflict with art. IV, sec. 28, of the Constitution of Missouri,
declaring "that no bill . . . shall contain more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title;" and also art. IV,
sec. 25, that "no law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill
shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to
change its original purpose."
The act was entitled
"An Act to Repeal Section 5869 of Art. 3, Chap. 89, of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, entitled 'Insurance Companies
on the Assessment Plan,' and to Enact a New Section in Lieu
Thereof, and Designated
Page 187 U. S. 206
as Section 5869"
of the same chapter,
"Relating to statement of Affairs of Assessment Insurance
Companies and Misrepresentations Made in Securing a Policy of
Insurance and Defense Thereon, for Such Misrepresentations,"
and as first introduced contained the section as herein printed
in the margin.
* Subsequently the
bill was amended by inserting between the word "sections" and the
figures "5912" the figures "5855" (the suicide statute). This was
not strictly germane to the other secs. cited, which related to the
purposes set forth in the title to the act, and it is argued that
the legislature exceeded its constitutional powers in inserting
these figures.
In the absence of an express adjudication of the supreme court
of the state upon this question, we are forced to rely upon other
decisions concerning the construction given to this provision of
the state constitution. In
State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, it
was held that the object of this provision was to prevent
logrolling, and surprise and fraud on members, and in
State ex
Rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 276, it is said that
"these and other cases show that this section of the
Constitution is to be reasonably and liberally construed and
applied, due regard being had to its object and purpose. It was
designed to prevent the insertion of disconnected matters in the
same bill. The section asserts only two propositions. The first is
that no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the second is
that this single subject must be clearly expressed in the title. If
all
Page 187 U. S. 207
the provisions of the bill have a natural relation and
connection, then the subject is single, and this, too, though the
bill contains many provisions. As to the second proposition --
namely, that the single subject must be clearly expressed in the
title, it is sufficient to say that the legislature may select its
own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that
the title fairly embraces the subject matter covered by the act;
mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title."
And in
State v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112, 118, it is
said:
"A mere reference to the section to be amended, without other
description of the subject matter of the amendatory law, is under
the rulings of this court a sufficient title to an act which deals
exclusively with the subject of the section amended."
It was also said in
State Dickason v. County Court, 128
Mo. 440:
"The practice of legislation by reference to sections of the
authorized version of the statutes (without other description of
the subject of the amending act) has been followed quite generally
in this state on the faith of early rulings of the supreme court
approving such methods of lawmaking. So much has been done, and so
many rights have been acquired, on the basis of those rulings, that
we hold that the question of their correctness ought not to be
reopened at this day. We adhere to them and follow them as an
expression of the settled law of Missouri."
As the new act was simply an amendment of sec. 5869, these two
last cases would seem to be decisive of the opinion of the supreme
court upon the statute in question, upon which its decision is, of
course, obligatory upon this Court.
Section 5869 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 deals with four
questions relating to the law of insurance by companies doing
business on the assessment plan. First, providing for an annual
statement; second, a visitation and examination into the affairs of
the corporation; third, a general statement that foreign companies
are subject to certain provisions; and, fourth, a recital as to
what, among the general insurance laws of the state, shall be
applicable to these companies.
While, as already stated, the supreme court has not decided as
to the constitutional power of the legislature to incorporate the
suicide statute into this amended sec. 5869, the decisions
Page 187 U. S. 208
above cited, that a mere reference to the section amended is
sufficient to sustain the validity of the law, would seem to cover
the case, and for this reason the suicide statute, though not
strictly germane to the other sections mentioned, is germane to the
business of insurance on the assessment plan. Bearing in mind that
the suicide statute was originally repealed, as to these policies,
by sec. 5869, as enacted in 1887, it would seem that an amendment
introduced into the same sections restoring its application to
these same policies would not be unconstitutional.
A second objection to the application of this statute is that,
if the petitioner be right in his contention that, by the repeal of
the suicide statute, the contract between the assured and the
company relieving the latter from liability in case of suicide,
became effective, the legislature could not thereafter, by
reenacting the statute or attempting to subject assessment
companies to its provisions, impair the contract subsisting between
the assured and this petitioner.
The answer to this argument is not difficult. No new contract
was made, and no new rights were vested, between the act of 1887,
repealing the suicide statute, and the act of 1897 restoring it.
All that the latter act purported to do was to reinstate the
parties in their original rights prior to the act of 1887, which
rights had not been affected by anything done during the ten years
between the two acts. Upon defendant's theory, if the act of 1887
had been in existence but a single day the same result would have
followed.
Our conclusion, then, is that the court below was correct in
holding that the suicide statute, as originally applied to this
policy, had not been repealed at the death of Jarman in 1898, when
the cause of action arose.
3. It is also assigned as error in this case that the court
permitted a recovery, not only of the amount of the policy, but of
all the money paid by assured in assessments upon such policy.
The promise of the company was to pay the plaintiff
"the sum of $5,000, and
all the money paid on the policy in
assessments, subject to the limitation as to the amount of
such payment
Page 187 U. S. 209
as is provided in sec. 1 of art. VII of the constitution on the
back of this policy, which section reads as follows:"
"SEC. 1. Upon due notice and satisfactory proof of the death of
a member of this company, the board of directors shall within sixty
(60) days pay the widow, children, or heirs of the deceased member
(and in the order named unless otherwise ordered by the member
during his lifetime or in his will), the amount set forth in the
deceased member's policy of membership:
Provided, that a
policy of membership for $5,000 shall be good for all the money in
the death fund arising from one assessment; provided, it shall not
exceed $5,000 and
all the money paid on the policy in
assessments, and a certificate for $4,000 shall be good for
four-fifths of all the money in the death fund arising from one
assessment, provided it shall not exceed $4,000 and all the money
paid on the policy in assessments, and so on in the same proportion
as to all certificates."
The assessments paid upon the policy amounted to $811.83, and
the right of the plaintiff to recover this amount in addition to
the principal sum of $5,000 would be beyond question, were it not
for certain changes thereafter made in the constitution, which it
is insisted were binding upon the plaintiff under the following
clause, found in the application of Jarman for membership:
"I further agree, if accepted, to abide by the constitution,
rules, and regulations of the company, as they now are, or may be
constitutionally changed hereafter."
The application further stated that the application was made a
part of the policy by reference thereto.
In virtue of the privilege thus given to amend its constitution,
the company, on January 8, 1889, amended art. IV, sec. 3, of the
constitution so as to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Policies of membership may be issued upon a basis of
benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, and all the money paid in
assessments upon the policy
for the first five years."
The proviso of art. VII, sec. 1, was also amended at the same
time to correspond with the above amendment and to read as
follows:
"
Provided, That a policy of membership for $5,000 shall
be good for all the money in the death fund arising from one
Page 187 U. S. 210
assessment; provided, that it shall not exceed $5,000 and all
the money paid on the policy in assessments
for the first five
years."
On February 20, 1894, this section was again amended by striking
out the proviso altogether.
It seems that these sections thus changed from an agreement to
repay all assessments upon policies to an agreement to pay all
assessments for the first five years, was found, or deemed to be,
too liberal, and in January, 1898, the company made an important
additional amendment by striking out entirely the proviso for the
repayment of assessments, under which it now claims to be relieved
altogether from paying more than the principal sum of the policy.
The article as finally amended reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Policies of membership may be issued upon a basis of
benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, but no member shall hold
more than one policy at the same time, except one additional policy
on the term plan,"
etc.
In view of the fact that both of these amendments imply a
prospective operation upon policies which
may be issued,
it would seem to be unnecessary to consider the question discussed
with much detail in briefs of counsel, whether the amendments were
intended to operate upon policies already issued. In our opinion it
is clear that they were not, and conceding the proposition that
Jarman had agreed to abide by the constitution, rules, and
regulations of the company, as they then were or might be
constitutionally changed thereafter, this agreement could have no
operation upon changes which, upon their face, indicated that they
applied only to policies thereafter to be issued. To cover this
case, he should have promised to abide by amendments thereafter
made, though they were intended to apply only to future
policies.
The judgment of the court below awarding the plaintiff the full
amount agreed upon in the policy, without damages, is
accordingly
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the decision of this
case.
*
"SEC. 5869. Every corporation doing business under this article
shall annually, on or before the first day of February, return to
the superintendent of the insurance department, in such manner and
form as he shall prescribe, a statement of its affairs, for the
year ending on the preceding 31st day of December, and the said
superintendent, in person or by deputy, shall have the power of
visitation of and examination into the affairs of such corporation,
which are conferred upon him in the case of life insurance
companies by the laws of this state, and all such foreign companies
are hereby declared to be subject to, and required to conform to,
the provisions of secs. 5912, and 5849, and 5850 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri of 1889, and governed and controlled by all
the provisions in said sec. contained:
Provided always,
That nothing herein contained shall subject any corporation doing
business under this article to any other provisions or requirements
of the general insurance laws of this state, except as distinctly
herein set forth and provided."