Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of
Columbia in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the
Constitution.
The provision that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states according to their respective numbers, to be
ascertained by a census, was not intended to restrict the power of
imposing direct taxes to states only.
The power of Congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases whatsoever within the District of Columbia includes the power
of taxing it.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents to the consideration of the Court a single
question. It is this:
Page 18 U. S. 318
Has Congress a right to impose a direct tax on the District of
Columbia?
The counsel who maintains the negative has contended that
Congress must be considered in two distinct characters -- in one
character as legislating for the states; in the other, as a local
legislature for the District. In the latter character, it is
admitted, the power of levying direct taxes may be exercised; but,
it is contended for district purposes only, in like manner as the
legislature of a state may tax the people of a state for state
purposes.
Without inquiring at present into the soundness of this
distinction, its possible influence on the application in this
district of the first article of the Constitution and of several of
the amendments may not be altogether unworthy of consideration. It
will readily suggest itself to the gentlemen who press this
argument that those articles which, in general terms, restrain the
power of Congress may be applied to the laws enacted by that body
for the district if it be considered as governing the district in
its character as the national legislature, with less difficulty
than if it be considered a mere local legislature.
But we deem it unnecessary to pursue this investigation, because
we think the right of Congress to tax the District does not depend
solely on the grant of exclusive legislation.
The 8th section of the 1st article gives to Congress the "power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" for the
purposes thereinafter mentioned. This grant is general, without
limitation as to place. It consequently extends to all
Page 18 U. S. 319
places over which the government extends. If this could be
doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words which modify
the grant. These words are, "but all duties, imposts, and excises,
shall be uniform throughout the United States." It will not be
contended that the modification of the power extends to places to
which the power itself does not extend. The power then to lay and
collect duties, imposts, and excises may be exercised and must be
exercised throughout the United States. Does this term designate
the whole, or any particular portion of the American empire?
Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name
given to our great republic, which is composed of states and
territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the
Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or
Pennsylvania, and it is not less necessary, on the principles of
our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts,
duties, and excises should be observed in the one than in the
other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes, which
includes direct taxes, is obviously coextensive with the power to
lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, and since the latter
extends throughout the United States, it follows that the power to
impose direct taxes also extends throughout the United States.
The extent of the grant being ascertained, how far is it
abridged by any part of the Constitution?
The 20th section of the first article declares that
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included
Page 18 U. S. 320
within this Union according to their respective numbers."
The object of this regulation is, we think, to furnish a
standard by which taxes are to be apportioned, not to exempt from
their operation any part of our country. Had the intention been to
exempt from taxation those who were not represented in Congress,
that intention would have been expressed in direct terms. The power
having been expressly granted, the exception would have been
expressly made. But a limitation can scarcely be said to be
insinuated. The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be
imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be
apportioned to representatives, but that direct taxation, in its
application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.
Representation is not made the foundation of taxation. If, under
the enumeration of a representative for every 30,000 souls, one
state had been found to contain 59,000, and another 60,000, the
first would have been entitled to only one representative, and the
last to two. Their taxes, however, would not have been as one to
two, but as fifty-nine to sixty. This clause was obviously not
intended to create any exemption from taxation, or to make taxation
dependent on representation, but to furnish a standard for the
apportionment of each on the states.
The 4th paragraph of the 9th section of the same article will
next be considered. It is in these words: "No capitation or other
direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
Page 18 U. S. 321
The census referred to is in that clause of the Constitution
which has just been considered, which makes numbers the standard by
which both representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the states. The actual enumeration is to be made
"within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of
the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years,
in such manner as they shall by law direct."
As the direct and declared object of this census is to furnish a
standard by which "representatives, and direct taxes, may be
apportioned among the several states which may be included within
this Union," it will be admitted that the omission to extend it to
the District or the territories would not render it defective. The
census referred to is admitted to be a census exhibiting the
numbers of the respective states. It cannot, however, be admitted
that the argument which limits the application of the power of
direct taxation to the population contained in this census is a
just one. The language of the clause does not imply this
restriction. It is not that "no capitation or other direct tax
shall be laid, unless on those comprehended within the census
hereinbefore directed to be taken," but "unless in proportion to"
that census. Now this proportion may be applied to the District or
territories. If an enumeration be taken of the population in the
District and territories, on the same principles on which the
enumeration of the respective states is made, then the information
is acquired by which a direct tax may be imposed on the District
and territories "in proportion to the
Page 18 U. S. 322
census or enumeration" which the Constitution directs to be
taken.
The standard, then, by which direct taxes must be laid is
applicable to this District, and will enable Congress to apportion
on it its just and equal share of the burden with the same accuracy
as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion,
it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in
proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.
But the argument is presented in another form, in which its
refutation is more difficult. It is urged against this construction
that it would produce the necessity of extending direct taxation to
the District and territories, which would not only be inconvenient,
but contrary to the understanding and practice of the whole
government. If the power of imposing direct taxes be coextensive
with the United States, then it is contended that the restrictive
clause, if applicable to the District and territories, requires
that the tax should be extended to them, since to omit them would
be to violate the rule of proportion.
We think a satisfactory answer to this argument may be drawn
from a fair comparative view of the different clauses of the
Constitution which have been recited.
That the general grant of power to lay and collect taxes is made
in terms which comprehend the District and territories as well as
the states is, we think, incontrovertible. The subsequent clauses
are intended to regulate the exercise of this power, not to
withdraw from it any portion of the community.
Page 18 U. S. 323
The words in which those clauses are expressed import this
intention. In thus regulating its exercise, a rule is given in the
2d section of the first article for its application to the
respective states. That rule declares how direct taxes upon the
states shall be imposed. They shall be apportioned upon the several
states according to their numbers. If, then, a direct tax be laid
at all, it must be laid on every state, conformably to the rule
provided in the Constitution. Congress has clearly no power to
exempt any state from its due share of the burden. But this
regulation is expressly confined to the states, and creates no
necessity for extending the tax to the District or territories. The
words of the 9th section do not in terms require that the system of
direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the
territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall
be extended to all the states. They therefore may without violence
be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed,
without imposing the necessity of taxing them. It could scarcely
escape the members of the convention that the expense of executing
the law in a territory might exceed the amount of the tax. But be
this as it may, the doubt created by the words of the 9th section
relates to the obligation to apportion a direct tax on the
territories as well as the states, rather than to the power to do
so.
If, then, the language of the Constitution be construed to
comprehend the territories and District of Columbia as well as the
states, that language confers on Congress the power of taxing the
District
Page 18 U. S. 324
and territories as well as the states. If the general language
of the Constitution should be confined to the states, still the
16th paragraph of the 8th section gives to Congress the power of
exercising "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever within
this District."
On the extent of these terms according to the common
understanding of mankind there can be no difference of opinion; but
it is contended that they must be limited by that great principle
which was asserted in our Revolution that representation is
inseparable from taxation.
The difference between requiring a continent with an immense
population to submit to be taxed by a government having no common
interest with it, separated from it by a vast ocean, restrained by
no principle of apportionment, and associated with it by no common
feelings, and permitting the representatives of the American
people, under the restrictions of our Constitution, to tax a part
of the society which is either in a state of infancy advancing to
manhood, looking forward to complete equality so soon as that state
of manhood shall be attained, as is the case with the territories,
or which has voluntarily relinquished the right of representation
and has adopted the whole body of Congress for its legitimate
government, as is the case with the District, is too obvious not to
present itself to the minds of all. Although in theory it might be
more congenial to the spirit of our institutions to admit a
representative from the District, it may be doubted whether, in
fact, its interests would be rendered thereby
Page 18 U. S. 325
the more secure, and certainly the Constitution does not
consider their want of a representative in Congress as exempting it
from equal taxation.
If it were true that, according to the spirit of our
Constitution, the power of taxation must be limited by the right of
representation, whence is derived the right to lay and collect
duties, imposts, and excises, within this District? If the
principles of liberty and of our Constitution forbid the raising of
revenue from those who are not represented, do not these principles
forbid the raising it by duties, imposts, and excises, as well as
by a direct tax? If the principles of our Revolution give a rule
applicable to this case, we cannot have forgotten that neither the
stamp act nor the duty on tea were direct taxes.
Yet it is admitted that the Constitution not only allows but
enjoins the government to extend the ordinary revenue system to
this District.
If it be said that the principle of uniformity established in
the Constitution secures the District from oppression in the
imposition of indirect taxes, it is not less true that the
principle of apportionment, also established in the Constitution,
secures the District from any oppressive exercise of the power to
lay and collect direct taxes.
After giving this subject its serious attention, the Court is
unanimously of opinion that Congress possesses, under the
Constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the
District of Columbia in proportion to the census directed to be
taken by the Constitution, and that there is no error in the
judgment of the circuit court.
Judgment affirmed.