A petitioner in an application for a writ of prohibition to the
judges of a Court of Land Registration upon the ground that the
contemplated proceedings in said court denied to parties interested
due process of law, cannot maintain a writ of error from this Court
to the supreme court of the state without showing that he is
personally interested in the litigation, and has been, or is likely
to be, deprived of his property without due process of law.
The fact that other persons in whom he has no personal interest
and who do not appear in the case may suffer in that particular is
not sufficient.
This was a petition by Tyler to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for a writ of prohibition to be directed to the
judges of the Court of Registration to prohibit them from further
proceeding under what is known as the Torrens Act in the
registration of a certain parcel of land described in the
application, or in the determination of the boundary between such
parcel of land and land of petitioner.
The petition alleged, in substance, that David E. Gould and
George H. Jones, on December 22, 1898, applied to the court of land
registration to have certain land in the County of Middlesex
brought under the operation and provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed. The
land referred to was shown on a plan filed with the application.
The petitioner, who was the owner of an estate in fee simple in a
parcel of land adjoining part of the land described in the
application, insisted that the boundary line between his land and
the part aforesaid was not correctly shown on the plan filed with
the application, but encroached upon and included part of his land.
The petition prayed for a writ of prohibition, and alleged that the
Land Registration Act,
Page 179 U. S. 406
under which the proceedings were taken, violated the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, first, in making a decree
of confirmation conclusive upon persons having an interest in the
land, though they may have had no notice of the proceedings for
registration, and therefore would have the effect of depriving such
persons of their property without due process of law, and otherwise
than by the law of the land; second, that the act was also invalid
in giving judicial powers to the recorder and assistant recorders
therein mentioned, who were not judicial officers under the
Constitution of the commonwealth, and also gave them power to
deprive persons of their property without due process of law;
third, that the operation of the act in other respects depended for
the effect thereby intended upon the conclusiveness of the original
decree of registration, and the exercise of nonjudicial powers by
the recorder, etc.
Upon the petition and answer, which simply averred compliance
with the terms of the act, together with the rules of the land
court, etc., the case was reserved for a full bench upon the only
question raised at the hearing, namely, the constitutionality of
the act. The court decided the act to be constitutional, and
dismissed the petition. 175 Mass. 71. Hence this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The prime object of all litigation is to establish a right
asserted by the plaintiff or to sustain a defense set up by the
party pursued. Save in a few instances where, by statute or the
settled practice of the courts, the plaintiff is permitted to sue
for the benefit of another, he is bound to show an interest in the
suit personal to himself, and even in a proceeding which he
prosecutes for the benefit of the public, as, for example, in cases
of nuisance, he must generally aver an injury peculiar to himself,
as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens.
Page 179 U. S. 407
The very first general rule laid down by Chitty, Pleading, p. 1,
is that
"the action should be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been affected, against the party who committed or
caused the injury, or by or against his personal
representative."
An action on contract (p. 2) "must be brought in the name of the
party in whom the legal interest in such contract was vested," and
an action of tort (p. 68)
"in the name of the person whose legal right has been affected,
and who was legally interested in the property at the time the
injury thereto was committed."
As stated by another writer:
"No one can be a party to an action if he has no interest in it.
A plaintiff cannot properly sue for wrongs that do not affect him,
and, on the other hand, a person is not properly made a defendant
to a suit upon a cause of action in which he has no interest, and
as to which no relief is sought against him."
In familiar illustration of this rule, the plaintiff in an
action of ejectment must recover upon the strength of his own
title, and not upon the weakness of the defendant's who may even
show title in a third person to defeat the action.
Actions instituted in this Court by writ of error to a state
court are no exceptions to this rule. In order that the validity of
a state statute may be "drawn in question" under the second clause
of section 709, Rev.Stat., it must appear that the plaintiff in
error has a right to draw it in question by reason of an interest
in the litigation which has suffered, or may suffer, by the
decision of the state court in favor of the validity of the
statute. This principle has been announced in so many cases in this
Court that it may not be considered an open question.
In
Owings v.
Norwood, 5 Cranch 344, an action of ejectment,
defendant set up an outstanding title in one Scarth, a British
subject, who held a mortgage upon the premises. The decision of the
court being adverse to Owings, he sued out a writ of error from
this Court, contending that Scarth's title was protected by the
treaty with Great Britain. It was held that, as the defendant
claimed no right under the treaty himself, and that the right of
Scarth, if he had any, was not affected by the decision of the
case, the Court had no jurisdiction. "If," the Court said,
"he [the defendant] claims nothing under
Page 179 U. S. 408
a treaty, his title cannot be protected by the treaty. If Scarth
or his heirs had claimed, it would have been a case arising under a
treaty. But neither the title of Scarth nor of any person claiming
under him can be affected by the decision of this Court."
In
Henderson v.
Tennessee, 10 How. 311, a similar case, namely, an
action of ejectment, an outstanding title in a third person, was
set up by the defendant and alleged to have been derived under a
treaty. The Court held that an outstanding title in a third person
might be set up, and that the title set up in this case was claimed
under a treaty, "but," said the Court,
"to give jurisdiction to this Court, the party must claim the
right for himself, and not for a third person in whose title he has
no interest. . . . The heirs of Miller,"
who claimed under the treaty, "appear to have no interest in
this suit, nor can their rights be affected by the decision." Like
rulings were made under a similar state of facts in
Montgomery v.
Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129;
Hale v.
Gaines, 22 How. 144;
Verden v.
Coleman, 1 Black 472, and
Long v.
Converse, 91 U. S. 105.
In
Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 645, the
prior authorities are cited and the law treated as well settled
that,
"in order to give this Court jurisdiction to review a judgment
of a state court against a title or right set up or claimed under a
statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States,
that title or right must be one of the plaintiff in error, and not
of a third person only."
See also Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U.
S. 301.
It is true that, under the third clause of section 709, where a
title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under federal law,
such title, etc., must be "specially set up or claimed," and that
no such provision is made as to cases within the second clause,
involving the constitutionality of state statutes or authorities,
but it is nonetheless true that the authority of such statute must
"be drawn in question" by someone who has been affected by the
decision of a state court in favor of its validity, and that in
this particular the three clauses of the section are practically
identical.
As we had occasion to observe in
California v. San Pablo
& Tulare Railroad, 149 U. S. 308,
149 U. S.
314,
"the duty of this Court, as of every judicial tribunal, is
limited to determining rights of
Page 179 U. S. 409
persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the
particular case before it. When, in determining such rights, it
becomes necessary to give an opinion upon a question of law, that
opinion may have weight as a precedent for future decisions. But
the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases,
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or
counsel, whether in the case before the Court or in any other case,
can enlarge the power or affect the duty of the Court in this
regard."
See also Lord v.
Veazie, 8 How. 251;
Cleveland
v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 419;
Kimball v.
Kimball, 174 U. S. 158.
In the case under consideration, the plaintiff in error is the
owner of a lot adjoining the one which is sought to be registered,
and the only question in dispute between them relates to the
location of the boundary line. In his petition, he does not set
forth that he made himself a party to the proceedings before the
Court of Registration, and his name does not even appear in the
list of those who are required to be notified, or elsewhere in the
proceedings before the court.
In the assignment of error, he complains only of the
unconstitutionality of the statute in that it deprives persons of
property without due process of law. In his brief, his first
objection to the validity of the act is that the registration,
which deprives all persons except the registered owner of interest
in the land, is obtained as against residents and known persons
only by posting notices in a conspicuous place on the land and by
registered letters, and as against nonresidents and unknown persons
by publication in a newspaper, and that the rights of the parties
may be foreclosed without actual notice to them in either case, and
without actual knowledge of the proceedings. His second objection
to the validity of the act is that the registration of dealings
with the land after the original registration would in certain
cases have the effect of depriving the registered owners of their
property without due process of law.
His objections throughout assume that he has actual knowledge of
the proceedings, and may make himself a party to them
Page 179 U. S. 410
and litigate the only question -- namely, of boundaries --
before the Court of Registration. In other words, he is not
affected by the provisions of the act of which he complains, since
he has the requisite notice. Other persons, whether residents or
nonresidents, whose rights might be injuriously affected by the
decision might lawfully complain of the unconstitutionality of an
act which would deprive them of their property without notice, but
it is difficult to see how the petitioner would be affected by it.
Indeed, if the act were subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional, the proceedings against him would simply go for
naught. He would have lost nothing, since the action of the court
would simply be void, and his interest in the land would remain
unaffected by its action.
It is true that his competency to institute these proceedings
does not seem to have been questioned by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts. It may well have been thought that, to avoid the
necessity and expense of appearing before an unconstitutional court
and defending his rights there, he had sufficient interest to
attack the law which lay at the foundation of its proposed action;
but to give him a status in this Court, he is bound under his
petition to show either that he has been or is likely to be
deprived of his property without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and, as no such showing has been made, we
cannot assume to decide the general question whether the
commonwealth has established a court whose jurisdiction may, as to
some other person, amount to a deprivation of property. If that
court shall eventually uphold his contention with respect to the
boundary, he will have no ground for complaint. If he be
unsuccessful, he may, under the Registration Act, appeal to the
superior and ultimately to the supreme court, whence, if it be made
to appear that a right has been denied him under the Fourteenth
Amendment, he may have his writ of error from this Court.
Our conclusion is that the plaintiff in error has not the
requisite interest to draw in question the constitutionality of
this act, and that the writ of error must be
Dismissed.
Page 179 U. S. 411
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, dissenting:
In order to give this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment
of a state court on the ground that the validity of a statute of,
or an authority exercised under, any state, was drawn in question
for repugnancy to the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that its validity was sustained, it is enough that a definite
issue as to the validity of the statute is distinctly deducible
from the record, that the state court entertained the suit, and
that its judgment rested on the conclusion that the statute was
valid.
The inquiry is whether the validity of the statute or authority
has been drawn in question "in a suit" in the state court and a
"final judgment" has been rendered in favor of its validity. If so,
we have jurisdiction to review that judgment.
Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449;
Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Company v. Wheeling Bridge Company, 138 U.
S. 287;
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.,
147 U. S. 337;
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1.
Weston v. Charleston was an application to the state
court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the levy of a tax under
a city ordinance on the ground that it violated the Constitution,
and went to judgment in the highest court of South Carolina
sustaining the validity of the ordinance.
This Court held that the writ of error was properly issued, and
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said:
"The question, therefore, which was decided by the
constitutional court is the very question on which the revising
power of this tribunal is to be exercised, and the only inquiry is
whether it has been decided in a case described in the section
which authorizes the writ of error that has been awarded. Is a writ
of prohibition a suit?"
After answering this question in the affirmative, the Chief
Justice thus proceeded:
"We think also that it was a final judgment, in the sense in
which that term is used in the 25th section of the Judicial Act. If
it were applicable to those judgments and decrees only in
Page 179 U. S. 412
which the right was finally decided, and could never again be
litigated between the parties, the provisions of the section would
be confined within much narrower limits than the words import, or
than Congress could have intended."
"Judgments in actions of ejectment, and decrees in chancery
dismissing a bill without prejudice, however deeply they might
affect rights protected by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, would not be subject to the revision of this
Court. A prohibition might issue restraining a collector from
collecting duties, and this Court would not revise and correct the
judgment. The word 'final' must be understood, in the section under
consideration, as applying to all judgments and decrees which
determine the particular cause."
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company v. Wheeling Bridge
Company was a petition to condemn land, and it had been held
by the Supreme Court of West Virginia that the right to condemn was
to be determined before the amount of compensation to be made had
been ascertained. The judgment of the inferior court sustained the
proceedings to condemn and appointed commissioners, and the state
supreme court entertained an appeal from that judgment, and
affirmed it.
A writ of error from this Court was brought, and a motion to
dismiss it denied. Mr. Justice Field said:
"The judgment appears to have been considered by that court as
so far final as to justify an appeal from it, and if the Supreme
Court of a state holds a judgment of an inferior court of the state
to be final, we can hardly consider it in any other light, in
exercising our appellate jurisdiction."
In
Luxton v. Bridge Company, which was a proceeding to
condemn in a circuit court of the United States, we held that an
order appointing commissioners to assess damages was not a final
judgment. The case of the
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge
Company was cited and distinguished by Mr. Justice Gray, who
said:
"Jurisdiction of a writ of error to the Supreme Court of appeals
of West Virginia, affirming an order appointing commissioners under
a somewhat similar statute, was there entertained by this Court
solely because that order had been held
Page 179 U. S. 413
by the highest court of the state to be an adjudication of the
right to condemn the land, and to be a final judgment, on which a
writ of error would lie, and could therefore hardly be considered
in any other light by this Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the highest court of the
state upon a federal question.
138 U. S.
138 U.S. 287,
138 U. S. 290. To have held
otherwise might have wholly defeated the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
for if the highest court of the state held the order appointing
commissioners to be final and conclusive unless appealed from, and
the validity of the condemnation not to be open on a subsequent
appeal from the award of damages, it is difficult to see how this
Court could have reached the question of the validity of the
condemnation, except by writ of error to the order appointing
commissioners."
It is true that it appeared in these cases that the interests of
plaintiffs in error were directly affected, and it is held that
such is not the case here. But that ruling in effect involves
inquiry into the merits on a question of procedure, and it seems to
me inadmissible for this Court to deny, in a case like this, the
competency of a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the state
court, when that court has exercised it at his instance.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
prohibition was the appropriate remedy to avert the injury with
which petitioner alleged he was threatened, and that petitioner was
entitled to make the application for the writ, and thereupon passed
upon the question of the validity of the statute, and rendered a
final judgment sustaining its validity. The unconstitutionality of
the act was the sole ground on which the application for
prohibition rested, and the determination of that federal question
determined the cause.
We have, then, "a suit" and a "final judgment" sustaining the
validity of a state statute drawn in question for repugnancy to the
Constitution.
Every element requisite to the maintenance of our jurisdiction
exists, and I submit that we cannot decline to exercise it because
of any supposed error on the part of the state court in respect of
entertaining the suit.
Page 179 U. S. 414
To repeat: the state court ruled that the petition was
sufficient to raise the federal question, that petitioner was
competent to raise it, and that he was entitled to preventive
relief if his contention was well founded. And these rulings should
be accepted on the preliminary inquiry into our jurisdiction.
The objections of plaintiff in error to the proceedings of the
land court were not for want of jurisdiction over him personally,
but for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. In other
words, that there was a total want of power on the part of the
persons assuming to act as a court to proceed at all. Whether that
was so or not is the question which the state court decided, and
discussion of that question is discussion on the merits.
Plaintiff in error alleged that the integrity of his boundary
line was threatened by these proceedings. The fact that he had
actual knowledge of them did not validate them if the act was void.
And the answer to the question whether, if he were deprived of some
part of his real estate, or of the cost of litigation, such
deprivation would be deprivation without due process of law
determines the constitutionality of the statute by which that
result was effected.
In my opinion, the writ of error was providently issued, and I
am authorized to state that MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER
and MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS concur in that conclusion.