Extra compensation received by a district judge for holding
court outside of his own district is no part of his official salary
or recoverable as such under the provisions of the retiring
act.
This was a petition by the late District Judge for the Eastern
District of New York for his retiring salary under Rev.Stat. § 714
at the rate of $6,800 per annum, which the petition avers was the
salary which was by law payable to him during the year previous to
his resignation. The petitioner acknowledges the payment of $5,000
and claims a residue of $1,800, to which he avers himself to be
justly entitled.
Upon hearing the case and upon the consent of parties, the Court
of Claims found the following facts:
"First. The petitioner, Charles L. Benedict, is a citizen of the
United States, of lawful age, and resides at Dongan Hills, Staten
Island, in the City of New York and State of New York."
"Second. In the month of April, 1865, the petitioner was duly
appointed by the President of the United States Judge of the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New
York."
"Third. The petitioner duly entered on the duties of his office,
and duly performed the same until the year 1897, during which, and
on or about the 20th of July, 1897, he resigned his office, having
then held his commission as judge of said court for more than ten
years, and having attained the age of seventy and upward."
"Fourth. Since the passage of the Act of February 7, 1873, the
petitioner has held, under the provisions of that act and the
Revised Statutes, to-wit, sections 613 and 658 of the Revised
Statutes, the six terms of the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York, referred
Page 176 U. S. 358
to in said statutes, in every year, and has received for holding
each of said terms the sum of $300, the same being paid to him by
the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York
pursuant to sections 613 and 597, Revised Statutes."
"Fifth. That the same was paid upon a voucher in substance as
follows:"
(Omitted.)
"The total amount thus paid annually to the plaintiff was
$1,800."
"Sixty. That such payments to the petitioner by the marshal were
from time to time allowed in the marshal's accounts and paid to him
out of the appropriations for defraying the expenses of the courts
of the United States."
"Seventh. During the year previous to the petitioner's
resignation, he received the said $1,800 for that year, in
accordance with the provisions of sections 613, 597, and 658,
Revised Statutes, as above set forth, and also the salary of $5,000
payable to him as provided by the Act of Congress of February 24,
1891, appropriation to pay the salaries of district judges of the
United States."
"Eighth. During the year since his resignation, petitioner has
only received as salary the sum of $5,000, which sum has been
received by him without prejudice to the claim which he makes in
this proceeding."
"Ninth. The petitioner presented to the auditor of the state and
other departments a bill for the amount of his salary claimed by
him herein to be remaining due and unpaid, and made claim on the
auditor for the payment of said bill, but the auditor refused to
audit or approve the said bill, and no part of the said $1,800 has
been paid to him."
The petition was dismissed (34 Ct.Cl. 388), and petitioner
appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 176 U. S. 359
By Rev.Stat. sec. 714,
"when any judge of any court of the United States resigns his
office after having held his commission as such at least ten years
and having attained the age of seventy years, he shall, during the
residue of his natural life, receive the same salary which was by
law payable to him at the time of his resignation."
In April, 1865, petitioner was appointed by the President Judge
of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of New York, and served as such until July 20, 1897, when he
resigned his office, having then held his commission for over
thirty years and attained the age of seventy years and upwards. The
salary of all district judges was fixed by the Act of February 24,
1891, 26 Stat. 783, c. 287, at the rate of $5,000 per annum. There
is no question made but that petitioner was entitled to this
amount, and that it has been paid him.
The controversy arises over the proper construction of the Act
of February 7, 1873, reproduced in Rev.Stat. §§ 658 and 613. By
section 658, it is enacted that
"the regular terms of the circuit court shall be held in each
year at the times and places following: . . . in the Southern
District of New York, at the City of New York, . . . exclusively
for the trial and disposal of criminal cases, and matters arising
and pending in said court, on the second Wednesday in January,
March, and May, on the third Wednesday in June, and on the second
Wednesday in October and December;"
and by section 613 it is provided that
"the terms of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New
York, appointed exclusively for the trial and disposal of criminal
business, may be held by the circuit judge of the Second Judicial
Court [circuit] and the District Judges for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York, or any one of said three judges, and
at every such term held by said judge of said eastern district, he
shall receive the sum of three hundred dollars, the same to be paid
in the manner now prescribed by law for the payment of the expenses
of another district judge while holding court in said
district."
The facts are that, after the passage of this Act of February 7,
1873, petitioner held each year the six terms of the District
Page 176 U. S. 360
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York
referred to in the statute, and received for holding each of said
terms the sum of $300, amounting in all to $1,800 per annum.
Petitioner now insists that this was a part of the salary which was
by law payable to him at the time of his resignation, within the
meaning of the retiring act, sec. 714, and should therefore be
added to the $5,000 per annum admitted to be due him.
The case in reality turns upon the meaning of the word "salary,"
as used in section 714. The word "salary" may be defined generally
as a fixed annual or periodical payment for services, depending
upon the time, and not upon the amount, of services rendered.
Thompson v. Phillips, 12 Ohio St. 617;
Landis v.
Lincoln County, 31 Or. 427;
Dane v. Smith, 54 Ala.
49;
State v. Murphy, 24 Fla. 33;
Castle v.Lawlor,
47 Conn. 345;
Commonwealth v. Butler, 99 Pa. 542. As
applied to district judges in general, and indeed to every district
judge except the judge of the Eastern District of New York, it
doubtless refers to the salary of $5,000 fixed by the Act of
February 24, 1891. Such salary is an annual stipend, payable in
sickness as well as in health, for duties much more onerous in some
districts than in others, and regardless of the fact whether such
duties are performed by the judge in person or by the judge of
another district called in to take his place. It is a compensation
which cannot be diminished during the continuance of the incumbent
in office and of which he cannot be deprived except by death,
resignation, or impeachment.
Wholly different considerations apply to the compensation
provided for by section 613. To entitle the Judge of the Eastern
District of New York to the $300 per term, provided for by that
section, it is necessary that the term be actually held by him,
when he is paid for his services in the manner provided by law for
the expenses of a district judge holding court in another district
than his own. He may hold but one term a year, for which he would
receive $300. He may hold three terms, for which he may receive
$900, or he may hold the entire six terms and receive $1,800. Such
compensation
Page 176 U. S. 361
is a variable quantity, dependent upon the number of terms held
by the judge. Upon the theory of the petitioner, if he had held but
one term during the year previous to his resignation, he would be
entitled to but $300 in addition to his regular salary of $5,000.
The fact that he was able to hold the entire number of six terms
for the twenty-four years preceding his resignation is a tribute to
his industry, faithfulness, and capacity, as well as to his good
health, but it does not affect the question in a legal point of
view. This compensation was not only for services actually
performed, but was subject to be diminished or taken away at the
will of Congress. It was something entirely distinct from the
salary paid to him as Judge of the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, but was in fact, as was held by the Court of
Claims, extra pay for extra work performed -- for particular, as
distinguished from continuous, services.
We are all of opinion that the judgment of that court was right,
and it is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA did not sit in this case.
