The following provisions in the first section of the Act of the
Legislature of Indiana approved by the Governor of that state on
the 4th day of March, 1893,
viz.:
"That every railroad or other corporation, except municipal,
operating in this state, shall be liable for damages for personal
injury suffered by any employee while in its service, the employee
so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, in the
following cases:
First. When such injury is suffered by
reason of any defect in the condition of ways, works, plant, tools
and machinery connected with, or in use in the business of such
corporation, when such defect was the result of negligence on the
part of the corporation or some person entrusted by it with the
duty of keeping such way, works, plant, tools or machinery in
proper condition.
Second. Where such injury resulted from
the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, to
whose order or direction the injured employee at the time of the
injury was bound to conform, and did conform.
Third. Where
such injury resulted from the act or omission of any person done or
made in obedience to any rule, regulation or bylaw of such
corporation, or in obedience to the particular instructions given
by any person delegated with the authority of the corporation in
that behalf.
Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the
negligence of any person in the service of such corporation who has
charge of any signal, telegraph office, switchyard, shop,
roundhouse, locomotive engine or train upon a railway, or where
such injury was caused by the negligence of any person, coemployee
or fellow servant engaged in the same common service in any of the
several departments of the service of any such corporation, the
said person, co-employee or fellow servant at the time acting in
the place and performing the duty of the corporation in that
behalf, and the person so injured obeying or conforming to the
order of some superior at the time of such injury, having the
authority to direct; that nothing herein shall be construed to
abridge the liability of the corporation under existing laws,"
as they are construed and applied by the supreme court of that
state, are not invalid and do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
This case comes to this Court on the following certificate of
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit
Page 175 U. S. 349
"In this case, duly argued and submitted to this court, there
arises a question of law concerning which this court desires the
instruction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The action
was brought by the plaintiff in error to recover damages for an
injury suffered while in the employment of the defendant in error,
caused by a negligent act of a fellow servant, for which the
defendant in error is alleged to be responsible by force of an Act
of the Legislature of Indiana approved by the governor of the state
March 4, 1893. The first section of the act reads as follows:"
" 1. That every railroad or other corporation, except municipal,
operating in this state, shall be liable in damages for personal
injury suffered by any employee while in its service, the employee
so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, in the
following cases:"
" First. When such injury is suffered by reason of any defect in
the condition of ways, works, plant, tools, and machinery connected
with or in use in the business of such corporation, when such
defect was the result of negligence on the part of the corporation
or some person entrusted by it with the duty of keeping such way,
works, plant, tools, or machinery in proper condition."
" Second. Where such injury resulted from the negligence of any
person in the service of such corporation, to whose order or
direction the injured employee at the time of the injury was bound
to conform and did conform."
" Third. Where such injury resulted from the act or omission of
any person done or made in obedience to any rule, regulation, or
bylaw of such corporation, or in obedience to the particular
instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of
the corporation in that behalf."
" Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any
person in the service of such corporation who has charge of any
signal, telegraph office, switchyard, shop, roundhouse, locomotive
engine, or train upon on a railway, or where such injury was caused
by the negligence of any person, co-employee, or fellow servant
engaged in the same common service in any of the several
departments of the
Page 175 U. S. 350
service of any such corporation, the said person, co-employee,
or fellow servant at the time acting in the place, and performing
the duty, of the corporation in that behalf, and the person so
injured, obeying or conforming to the order of some superior at the
time of such injury having the authority to direct; but nothing
herein shall be construed to abridge the liability of the
corporation under existing laws."
"For the entire act, reference is made to Session Laws of 1893,
page 294, Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, Revision of 1894,
paragraphs 7083 to 7087, inclusive."
"The Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company is a corporation
of the State of Illinois owning and operating a railroad extending
from Peoria, Illinois, into and through the State of Indiana. It is
contended that the statute referred to is invalid because
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States. If it be invalid, the declaration shows no cause
of action, and the errors alleged to have been committed at the
trial become immaterial. The opinion of this Court is that material
error was committed at the trial for which the judgment below
should be reversed if the statute mentioned is valid, and that if
the statute mentioned is invalid, the judgment should be affirmed.
The question whether that statute is valid or violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States the
court hereby orders certified and submitted to the Supreme Court of
the United States for its proper decision."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The contention is that the act referred to is in conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment because it denies the equal protection of
the laws to the corporations to which it is applicable.
Page 175 U. S. 351
In
Pittsburgh &c. Railroad Company v. Montgomery,
152 Ind. 1, the statute in question was held valid as to railroad
companies, and it was also held that objection to its validity
could not be made by such companies, on the ground that it embraced
all corporations except municipal, and that there were some
corporations whose business would not bring them within the reason
of the classification. In announcing the latter conclusion, the
court ruled in effect that the act was capable of severance; that
its relation to relation to railroad corporations was not
essentially and inseparably connected in substance with its
relation to other corporations, and that therefore whether it was
constitutional or not as to other corporations, it might be
sustained as to railroad corporations.
In
Leep v. Railway Company, 58 Ark. 407, and St. Louis,
I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 37 L.R. A. 504, 40 S.W.
705, an act of Arkansas of March 25, 1889, was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that state so far as
affecting natural persons, and sustained in respect of
corporations, and in
St. Louis, Iron Mountain &c. Railway
v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404,
that view of the act was accepted by this Court because that court
had so decided.
Considering this statute as applying to railroad corporations
only, we think it cannot be regarded as in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Mackey,
127 U. S. 205;
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Herrick,
127 U. S. 210;
Chicago, Kansas &c. Railroad v. Pontius, 157 U.
S. 209;
Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 F. 693;
Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.
S. 557.
In
Missouri Railway v. Mackey, the validity of a
statute of Kansas of 1874 providing that
"every railroad company organized or doing business in this
state shall be liable for all damages done to any employee of such
company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any
mismanagement of its engineers or other employees to any person
sustaining such damage"
was involved, and it was held that it did not deny to railroad
companies the equal protection of the laws. Mr. Justice Field
said:
"The hazardous character of the business of operating a railway
would seem to call for
Page 175 U. S. 352
special legislation with respect to railroad corporations,
having for its object the protection of their employees, as well as
the safety of the public. The business of other corporations is not
subject to similar dangers to their employees, and no objections
therefore can be made to the legislation on the ground of its
making an unjust discrimination. It meets a particular necessity,
and railroad corporations are, without distinction, made subject to
the same liabilities. As said by the court below, it is simply a
question of legislative discretion whether the same liability shall
be applied to carriers by canal and stage coaches and to persons
and corporations using steam in manufactories."
In
Minneapolis &c. Railway v. Herrick, the same
conclusion was reached in respect of a law of the State of Iowa
that
"every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all
damages sustained by any person, including employees of such
corporation, in consequence of the neglect of agents, or by any
mismanagement of the engineers or other employees of the
corporation, and in consequence of the willful wrongs, whether of
commission or omission, of such agents, engineers, or other
employees, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the
use and operation of any railway on or about which they shall be
employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be
legal or binding."
In
Chicago &c. Railroad v. Pontius, a bridge
carpenter employed by a railroad company, who was injured through
the negligence of employees of the company while assisting in
loading timber, taken from the false work used in constructing a
bridge, on a car for transportation to another point on the
company's road, was held to be an employee of the company within
the meaning of statute of Kansas, and the validity of that act was
again affirmed.
In
Peirce v. Van Dusen, a similar statute of the State
of Ohio applying to railroad companies was upheld by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN
delivering the opinion of the Court.
In
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, in which an act of the
State of Missouri in respect of policies of insurance
Page 175 U. S. 353
against loss or damage by fire was drawn in question, the
objection that the statute discriminated between fire insurance
companies and companies engaged in other kinds of insurance was
overruled, and it was said that the power of the state to
distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation
necessarily had a wide range of discretion; that it was sufficient
to satisfy the demands of the Constitution if the classification
were practical and not palpably arbitrary, and that the
classification of the Missouri statute was not objectionable in
view of the differences between fire insurance and other insurance.
Railroad Company v. Mackey and
Railroad Company v.
Beckwith were cited and approved.
And see Magoun v. Ill.
Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283;
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.
S. 339;
Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad v.
Matthews, 174 U. S. 96.
By reason of the particular phraseology of the act under
consideration, it is earnestly contended that the decisions
sustaining the validity of the statutes of Kansas, Iowa, and Ohio
are not in point, and that this statute of Indiana classified
railroad companies arbitrarily by name, and not with regard to the
nature of the business in which they were engaged, but the supreme
court of the state in the case cited has held otherwise as to the
proper interpretation of the act, and has treated it as practically
the same as the statutes of the states referred to. Indeed, the
Iowa statute is quoted from, and the case of
Beckwith, as
well as that of
Mackey, relied on as decisive in the
premises.
As remarked in
Missouri, Kansas &c. Railway v.
McCann, 174 U. S. 580,
174 U. S. 586,
the contention calls on this Court to disregard the interpretation
given to a state statute by the court of last resort of the state,
and, by an adverse construction, to decide that the state law is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. "But the
elementary rule is that this Court accepts the interpretation of a
statute of a state affixed to it by the court of last resort
thereof."
This being an action brought by Tullis to recover damages for an
injury suffered while in the employment of the railroad company,
caused by the negligent act of a fellow servant,
Page 175 U. S. 354
for which the company was alleged to be responsible by force of
the act, we answer the question propounded that
The statute as construed and applied by the Supreme Court of
Indiana is not invalid, and does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Certificate
accordingly.
