Under the Act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, known
as the Swamp Land Act, the legal title to land passes only on
delivery of a patent, and as the record in this case discloses no
patent, there was no passing of the legal title from the United
States, whatever equitable rights may have vested. Until the legal
title to land passes from the government, inquiry as to all
equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the Land
Department.
Although cases may arise in which a party is justified in coming
into the
Page 173 U. S. 474
courts of the District of Columbia to assert his rights as
against a proceeding in the Land Department, or when that
department refuses to act at all, yet as a general rule, power is
vested in the department to determine all questions of equitable
right and title, upon proper notice to the parties interested, and
the courts should be resorted to only when the legal title has
passed from the government.
On May 10, 1898, the appellant, as plaintiff, filed in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia his bill setting forth,
besides certain jurisdictional matters, the Swampland Act of
September 28, 1850; the extension of that act to all the states by
the Act of March 12, 1860; a selection of lands thereunder by the
State of Oregon (evidenced by what is called "List No. 5"), and an
approval on September 16, 1882, of that selection by the Secretary
of the Interior; a purchase in 1880 from the state by H. C. Owen of
certain of those selected lands, and subsequent conveyances thereof
to plaintiff. Then, after showing the appointment of Hon. William
F. Vilas as Secretary of the Interior, the bill proceeds:
"That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, on the 27th day of
December, A.D. 1888, the said Secretary of the Interior, then the
said William F. Vilas, made and entered an order annulling,
cancelling, and revoking the said List Number 5, and the approval
thereof, and annulling and revoking the said judgment and
determination so made by his said predecessor in said office, the
aid Henry M. Teller, whereby his said predecessor had adjudged and
determined that the lands aforesaid were swamp and overflowed
lands, within the meaning of the acts aforesaid, and made and
entered an order purporting to adjudge and determine that certain
of the lands described in said List Number 5, including the lands
hereinbefore described, were not swamp and overflowed lands within
the meaning of the acts aforesaid."
"That thereafter, as plaintiff is informed and believes, divers
proceedings were taken before the said Secretary of the Interior
and in the General Land Office of the United States by the State of
Oregon, and by the grantors of this plaintiff, to set aside and
have held for naught the orders and rulings so made
Page 173 U. S. 475
by the said William F. Vilas as such Secretary of the Interior,
which proceedings came to an end within one year last past."
"That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, since the said
proceedings last aforesaid came to an end, the defendant, as such
Secretary of the Interior, is proceeding to put in force and to
carry out the orders and rulings so as aforesaid made by the said
William F. Vilas as such Secretary of the Interior, and to hold the
lands hereinbefore described to be public lands of the United
States, and subject to entry under the laws of the United States,
and threatens and intends to receive and permit the officers of the
Land Department of the United States to receive applications for
and allow entries of the lands aforesaid as public lands of the
United States."
After alleging the invalidity of these proceedings, the bill
goes on to aver that the proceedings thus initiated by Secretary
Vilas throws a cloud upon appellant's title,
"and is likely to cause many persons to attempt to settle upon
the said lands, and to enter the same in the Land Department of the
United States as public lands of the United States subject to such
entry, and that plaintiff will be unable to remove such persons
from said lands, or to quiet his title thereto as against them,
without a multiplicity of suits, and that therefore this plaintiff
is entitled in this Court to an order enjoining and restraining the
defendant, as such Secretary of the Interior, and his subordinate
officers of the Land Department of the United States, from in any
way carrying said last-mentioned orders and rulings into effect,
and from permitting any entries upon said lands, or holding the
same open to entry, and from in any way interfering with or
embarrassing the plaintiff in his title and ownership of the lands
aforesaid."
Upon these facts, plaintiff prayed a decree cancelling the order
of December 27, 1888, restraining the officers of the Land
Department from carrying it into effect, and forbidding the
defendant and his subordinates from holding the lands to be public
lands of the United States, or subject to entry under the general
land laws. To this bill a demurrer was filed, which was sustained,
and the bill dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals
of the District, and, upon an affirmance
Page 173 U. S. 476
of the decree by that court, brought the decision here for
review.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Swamp-Land Act, the legal title passes only on
delivery of the patent. So the statute in terms declares. The
second section provides that the Secretary of the Interior
shall,
"at the request of said governor [the governor of the state],
cause a patent to be issued to the state therefor, and on that
patent, the fee simple to said lands shall vest in the said
state."
9 Stat. 519;
Rogers Locomotive Works v. American Emigrant
Company, 164 U. S. 559,
164 U. S. 574;
Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.
S. 589,
168 U. S.
592.
In this case, the record discloses no patent, and therefore no
passing of the legal title. Whatever equitable rights or title may
have vested in the state, the legal title remained in the United
States.
Until the legal title to public land passes from the government,
inquiry as to all equitable rights comes within the cognizance of
the Land Department. In
United States v. Schurz,
102 U. S. 378,
102 U. S. 396,
which was an application for a mandamus to compel the delivery of a
patent, it was said:
"Congress has also enacted a system of laws by which rights to
these lands may be acquired and the title of the government
conveyed to the citizen. This Court has, with a strong hand, upheld
the doctrine that so long as the legal title to these lands
remained in the United States and the proceedings for acquiring it
were as yet
in fieri, the courts would not interfere to
control the exercise of the power thus vested in that tribunal. To
that doctrine we still adhere."
While a delivery of the patent was ordered, yet that was so
Page 173 U. S. 477
ordered because it appeared that the patent had been duly
executed, countersigned, and recorded in the proper land records of
the Land Department, and transmitted to the local land office for
delivery, and it was held that the mere manual delivery was not
necessary to pass the title, but that the execution and record of
the patent were sufficient. And yet from that conclusion Chief
Justice Waite and Mr. Justice Swayne dissented. The dissent
announced by the Chief Justice only emphasizes the proposition laid
down in the opinion, as heretofore quoted, that so long as the
legal title remains in the government, all questions of right
should be solved by appeal to the Land Department, and not to the
courts.
See, in support of this general proposition,
Michigan Land & Lumber Lumber Co. v. Rust, supra
(which, like the present case, arose under the Swamp-Land Act), and
cases cited in the opinion. Indeed, it may be observed that the
argument in behalf of appellant was avowedly made to secure a
modification of that opinion. We might well have disposed of this
case by a simple reference to that decision; but, in view of the
earnest challenge by counsel for appellant of the views therein
expressed, we have reexamined the question in the light of that
argument and the authorities cited. And after such reexamination,
we see no reason to change, but, on the contrary, we reaffirm, the
decision in
Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust. As a
general rule, no mere matter of administration in the various
executive departments of the government can, pending such
administration, be taken away from such departments and carried
into the courts. Those departments must be permitted to proceed to
the final accomplishment of all matters pending before them, and
only after that disposition may the courts be invoked to inquire
whether the outcome is in accord with the laws of the United
States. When the legal title to these lands shall have been vested
in the State of Oregon or in some individual claiming a right
superior to that of the state, then is inquiry permissible in the
courts, and that inquiry will appropriately be had in the courts of
Oregon, state or federal.
We do not mean to say that cases may not arise in which a party
is justified in coming into the courts of the District to
Page 173 U. S. 478
assert his rights as against a proceeding in the Land
Department, or when the department refuses to act at all.
United States v. Schurz, supra, and
Noble v. Union
River Logging Railroad Co., 147 U. S. 165, are
illustrative of these exceptional cases.
Neither do we affirm that the administrative right of the
departments in reference to proceedings before them justifies
action without notice to the parties interested, any more than the
power of a court to determine legal and equitable rights permits
action without notice to parties interested.
"The power of supervision and correction is not an unlimited or
an arbitrary power. It can be exerted only when the entry was made
upon false testimony, or without authority of law. It cannot be
exercised so as to deprive any person of land lawfully entered and
paid for. By such entry and payment the purchaser secures a vested
interest in the property, and a right to a patent therefor, and can
no more be deprived of it by order of the commissioner than he can
deprived by such order of any other lawfully acquired property. Any
attempted deprivation in that way of such interest will be
corrected whenever the matter is presented so that the judiciary
can act upon it."
Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S. 456,
128 U. S.
461,
"The government holds the legal title in trust for him, and he
may not be dispossessed of his equitable rights without due process
of law. Due process in such case implies notice and a hearing. But
this does not require that the hearing must be in the courts, or
forbid an inquiry and determination in the Land Department."
Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372,
157 U. S.
383.
But what we do affirm and reiterate is that power is vested in
the departments to determine all questions of equitable right or
title, upon proper notice to the parties interested, and that the
courts must, as a general rule, be resorted to only when the legal
title has passed from the government. When it has so passed, the
litigation will proceed, as it generally ought to proceed, in the
locality where the property is situate, and not here, where the
administrative functions of the government are carried on.
In the case before us, there is nothing to show that proper
Page 173 U. S. 479
notice was not given, that all parties in interest were not
fully heard, or that the adjudication of the administrative
department of the government was not justified by the facts as
presented. The naked proposition upon which the plaintiff relies is
that, upon the creation of an equitable right or title in the
state, the power of the Land Department to inquire into the
validity of that right or title ceases. That proposition cannot be
sustained. Whatever rights, equitable or otherwise, may have passed
to the state by the approval of list No. 5 by Secretary Teller, can
be determined, and should be determined, in the courts of Oregon,
state or federal, after the legal title has passed from the
government. The decree of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, sustained by the opinion of the Court of Appeals of the
District, was right, and is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA takes no part in the decision of this
case.
