Section 1553 of the Code of Iowa, which provides that
"if any express company, railway company, or any agent or person
in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or
any person in the employ of any common carrier, or if any other
person shall transport or convey between points, or from one place
to another within this state, for any other person or persons or
corporation, any intoxicating liquors, without having first been
furnished with a certificate from and under the seal of the county
auditor of the county to which said liquor is to be transported or
is consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be
conveyed from place to place, certifying that the consignee or
person to whom said liquor is to be transported, conveyed or
delivered is authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in such
county, such company, corporation or person so offending, and each
of them, and any agent of said company, corporation or person so
offending, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of
one hundred dollars for each offense and pay costs of prosecution,
and the costs shall include a reasonable attorney fee to be
assessed by the court, which shall be paid into the county fund,
and stand committed to the county jail until such fine and costs of
prosecution are paid,"
cannot be held to apply to a box of spirituous liquors, shipped
by rail from a point in Illinois to a citizen of Iowa at his
residence in that state while in transit from its point of shipment
to its delivery to the consignee, without causing the Iowa Law to
be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Moving such goods in the station from the platform on which they
are put on arrival to the freight warehouse is a part of the
interstate commerce transportation.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company was, in
1891, a common carrier, incorporated under the law of
Page 170 U. S. 413
Illinois, and operated among others, a line of railway from
Dallas, Illinois, to Burlington, Iowa and beyond said point. The
Burlington & Western Railway Company was at the same date, a
common carrier, incorporated under the law of Iowa, and operated a
line of railway from Burlington, Iowa, to Oskaloosa, in that state,
with stations at intervening points, one of which was Brighton, in
Washington County. Both of these corporations had a depot at
Burlington, which they jointly used. The two carriers had at the
time stated, and for years previous thereto, between themselves,
joint freight tariffs, by which transportation under a single
through waybill was given to merchandise from any station on either
of the lines to any station on the line of the other.
In August, 1891, the Dallas Transportation Company delivered to
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad at Dallas, Illinois,
a wooden box, stated to contain groceries, consigned to William
Horn, Brighton, Iowa. It had been the habit of the agent of the
Dallas Company before this date to ship intoxicating liquors over
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. The box in question was
receipted for as through freight, and was billed through in
accordance with the custom above stated, was taken to Burlington,
Iowa, there delivered to the Burlington & Western Company, by
who it was carried to Brighton. On its arrival there, the package
was placed by the trainmen on the station platform, and shortly
afterwards the plaintiff in error, who was the station agent of the
Burlington & Western, in the discharge of his duties, opened
the door of the freight house, and moved the box into a freight
warehouse, which was about six feet from the platform. In about an
hour thereafter, the box was seized by a constable under a search
warrant, on the ground that it contained intoxicating liquors,
which proved to be the truth, and subsequently the liquor was
condemned, and ordered to be destroyed, and the order was executed.
At the time of the seizure, the freight charge due to the railways
was unpaid. It was admitted that there was nothing on the package
to notify the receiving railway of its contents, unless such
knowledge can be imputed from the nature of the previous dealings
of the Dallas Company
Page 170 U. S. 414
with the railway. There was, however, testimony showing that the
railroad agent who moved the box from the freight platform to the
warehouse had reason to know or suspect that it contained liquor,
since it was proven that, before the arrival of the box at
Brighton, a mail carrier called at the station, and asked for a
package consigned to William Horn, stating that one was expected
from Dallas, and that it would contain intoxicating liquor.
The plaintiff in error was proceeded against by information
before a justice of the peace, charging him with the unlawful
transportation of intoxicating liquors conveyed from Burlington to
Brighton, Iowa. This prosecution was under the provisions of the
statutes of the State of Iowa to which we shall hereafter refer. He
was convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100. An appeal from
this sentence was taken to the district court, where it was
affirmed, in which court, among other defenses, it was alleged that
the package in question was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
State of Iowa because, at the time of its removal from the platform
to the freight warehouse, it was in course of interstate commerce
transportation. The district court having affirmed the conviction,
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa,
where the judgment below was also affirmed.
State v.
Rhodes, 90 Ia. 496. To this judgment of affirmance this writ
of error is prosecuted.
The sole question presented for consideration is whether the
statute of the State of Iowa can be held to apply to the box in
question while it was in transit from its point of shipment,
Dallas, Illinois, to its delivery to the consignee at the point to
which it was consigned -- that is to say, whether the law of the
State of Iowa can be made to apply to a shipment from the State of
Illinois, before the arrival and delivery of the merchandise,
without causing the Iowa law to be repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States.
In
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 1888,
125 U. S. 465,
this Court was called upon to determine the validity of a statute
of the State of Iowa which it was asserted was repugnant to the
third clause of Section 8 of Article I of the
Page 170 U. S. 415
Constitution of the United States because its provisions
amounted to a regulation of interstate commerce. The facts upon
which the controversy then presented arose were briefly as follows:
kegs of beer were offered in the State of Illinois to a common
carrier operating a line of railway in the states of Illinois and
Iowa. The beer was consigned to a point in Iowa, and the carrier
refused to receive it on the ground that the statute of Iowa made
it unlawful to bring intoxicating liquors within the limits of that
state except when accompanied with a specified certificate, which
the Iowa law provided should be granted under particular and
exceptional conditions. The one by whom the beer was tendered to
the carrier in the State of Illinois thereupon sued the railroad
company for the damages claimed to have arisen from its refusal to
receive and carry the merchandise. The railway company defended on
the ground that it was justified in its refusal because of the
provision of the Iowa statute. This, on the other hand, was
asserted not to be an adequate defense, because it was claimed that
the Iowa statute was wholly void, as it constituted a regulation of
interstate commerce. The sole issue arising therefrom was whether
the Iowa law protected the refusing carrier, and thus involved
determining whether the statute of the state was repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States. After great consideration, it
was held that the law of the State of Iowa, insofar as it affected
interstate commerce, was repugnant to the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution, and was void. It was decided that the
transportation of merchandise from one state into and across
another was interstate commerce, and was protected from the
operation of state laws from the moment of shipment while in
transit and up to the ending of the journey by the delivery of the
goods to the consignee at the place to which they were consigned.
The Court, in the course of its opinion, adverted to the question
whether goods so shipped continued to be protected by the
interstate commerce clause after their delivery to the consignee,
and up to and including their sale in the original package by the
one to whom they had been delivered, but did not decide the
question, as it was
Page 170 U. S. 416
not essential to do so. Referring to the subject, however, the
Court said (pp.
125 U. S. 499,
500):
"It might be very convenient and useful in the execution of the
policy of prohibition within the state to extend the powers of the
state beyond its territorial limits. But such extraterritorial
powers cannot be assumed upon such an implication. On the contrary,
the nature of the case contradicts their existence, for, if they
belong to one state, they belong to all, and cannot be exercised
severally and independently. The attempt would necessarily produce
that conflict and confusion which it was the very purpose of the
Constitution by its delegations of national power to prevent."
"It is easier to think that the right of importation from
abroad, and of transportation from one state to another includes,
by necessary implication, the right of the importer to sell
unbroken packages at the place where the transit terminates, for
the very purpose and motive of that branch of commerce which
consists in transportation is that other and consequent act of
commerce which consists in the sale and exchange of the commodities
transported. Such, indeed, was the point decided in the case of
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, as to foreign commerce,
with the express statement, in the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall, that the conclusion would be the same in a case of
commerce among the states. But it is not necessary now to express
any opinion upon the point, because that question does not arise in
the present case. The precise line which divides the transaction,
so far as it belongs to foreign or interstate commerce, from the
internal and domestic commerce of the state we are not now called
upon to delineate. It is enough to say that the power to regulate
or forbid the sale of a commodity after it has been brought into
the state does not carry with it the right and power to prevent its
introduction by transportation from another state."
Subsequently, in
Leisy v. Hardin, (1890)
135 U.
S. 100, the question which was thus reserved in the
Bowman case arose for adjudication, and it was held that
the right to sell the imported merchandise in the original package
free from interference
Page 170 U. S. 417
of state laws was protected by the Constitution of the United
States, as up to such sale, the goods brought into the state were
not commingled with the mass of property in the state. Summing up
its conclusions, the Court said (p.
135 U. S.
124):
"The plaintiffs in error are citizens of Illinois, are not
pharmacists, and have no permit, but import into Iowa beer which
they sell in original packages, as described. Under our decision in
Bowman v. Chicago &c. Railway Co., supra, they had the
right to import this beer into that state, and, in the view which
we have expressed, they had the right to sell it, by which act
alone, it would become mingled in the common mass of property
within the state. Up to that point of time, we hold that, in the
absence of congressional permission to do so, the state had no
power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in prohibition
of importation and sale by the foreign or nonresident
importer."
The statute of the State of Iowa under which the prosecution now
before us was instituted is as follows:
"If any express company, railway company, or any agent or person
in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or
any person in the employ of any common carrier, or if any other
person shall transport or convey between points, or from one place
to another within this state, for any other person or persons or
corporation, any intoxicating liquors, without having first been
furnished with a certificate from and under the seal of the county
auditor of the county to which said liquor is to be transported or
is consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be
conveyed from place to place, certifying that the consignee or
person to whom said liquor is to be transported, conveyed, or
delivered is authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in such
county, such company, corporation, or person so offending, and each
of them, and any agent of said company, corporation, or person so
offending, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of
one hundred dollars for each offense, and pay costs of prosecution,
and the cost shall include a reasonable attorney fee to be assessed
by the court, which shall be paid into the county fund, and stand
committed to the county jail
Page 170 U. S. 418
until such fine and costs of prosecution are paid. The offense
herein defined shall be held to be complete, and shall be held to
have been committed in any County of the state through or to which
said intoxicating liquors are transported or in which the same is
unloaded for transportation, or in which said liquors are conveyed
from place to place or delivered. It shall be the duty of the
several county auditors of the state to issue the certificate
herein contemplated to any person having such permit, and the
certificate so issued shall be truly dated when issued, and shall
specify the date at which the permit expires, as shown by the
county records. Provided, however, that the defendant may show as a
defense hereunder by preponderance of evidence that the character
and circumstances of the shipment and its contents were unknown to
him."
(Iowa Code, section 1535, paragraph 2410, McClain's Annotated
Code of Iowa.)
This statute is identical with the one which was held to be
unconstitutional in the
Bowman case, except that the
latter contained the words "knowingly bring within this state,"
these words having been stricken out by an amendment adopted after
the decision in the
Bowman case. In other words, the
statute which was under review in the
Bowman case
provided,
"If any express company, railway company or any agent or person
in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or
if any other person shall knowingly bring within this state, or
transport or convey between points or from one place to another
within the state,"
while the statute now before us provides exactly the same thing,
except that the words "knowingly bring within this state" are
omitted. It is hence manifest that the present statute, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Iowa, has exactly the
significance it would have did it contain the words found in the
act reviewed in the
Bowman case. It follows that the law
before us now, as interpreted below, is the exact equivalent of the
statute which has once before been declared by this Court to be
repugnant to the Constitution. This result in reason is inevitable,
since the court below held that the words, as found in the present
law, were not confined to transportation
Page 170 U. S. 419
of commodities originating within the state, but related to
shipments made from another state. This ruling hence subjects
shipments made from another state to the control of the statute at
once on the arrival of the merchandise within the territorial
limits of the state, and before the completion of the interstate
shipment, as completely as if the words "bring within this state"
were yet in the statute. As it was held in the
Bowman case
that the power to ship from one state into another embraced of
necessity the right to have the goods carried to the place of
destination, and be delivered at that point to the consignee, it
follows that an interpretation of the present law which gives the
state the right to stop the goods shipped into the state at the
state line, and before their arrival at destination, is directly
within the rule announced in the
Bowman case.
The fundamental right which the decision in the
Bowman
case held to be protected from the operation of state laws by the
Constitution of the United States was the continuity of shipment of
goods coming from one state into another from the point of
transmission to the point of consignment, and the accomplishment
there of the delivery covered by the contract. This protection of
the Constitution of the United States is plainly denied by the
statute now under review, as its provisions are interpreted by the
court below. The power which it was held in the
Bowman
case the state did not possess was that of stopping interstate
shipments at the state line by breaking their continuity, and
intercepting their course from the point of origin to the point of
consummation. The right of a state to exert these very powers is
plainly upheld by the decision rendered below. It follows that if
the ruling in the
Bowman case is applicable to the
question here presented, it is decisive of this controversy, and
must lead to a reversal of the judgment below rendered. The claim
is, however -- and it was upon this ground that the court below
rested its judgment -- that under and by virtue of the provisions
of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313, the
ruling in the
Bowman case is no longer apposite, as the
effect of the act of Congress in question was to confer upon the
State of Iowa
Page 170 U. S. 420
the power to subject to its statutory regulations merchandise
shipped from another state the moment it reached the line of the
State of Iowa, and before the consummation of the contract of
shipment by arrival at its destination and delivery there to the
consignee. And it is to this question that the discussion at bar
has mainly related, and upon which a decision of the cause really
depends.
It is not gainsaid that the effect of the act of Congress was to
deprive the receiver of goods shipped from another state of all
power to sell the same in the State of Iowa in violation of its
laws, but, while it is thus conceded that the act of Congress has
allowed the Iowa law to attach to the property when brought into
the state before sale, when it otherwise would not have done so
until after sale, on the other hand, it is contended that the act
of Congress in no way provides that the laws of Iowa should apply
before the consummation by delivery of the interstate commerce
transaction. To otherwise construe the act of Congress, it is
claimed, would cause it to give to the statutes of Iowa
extraterritorial operation, and would render the act of Congress
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. It has been
settled that the effect of the act of Congress is to allow the
statutes of the several states to operate upon packages of imported
liquor before sale.
Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.
S. 545.
Did the act of Congress referred to operate to attach the
legislation of the State of Iowa to the goods in question the
moment they reached the state line, and before the completion of
the act of transportation, by arriving at the point of consignment
and the delivery there to the consignee? is then the pivotal
question. The act of Congress is as follows:
"That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or
liquids transported into any state or territory or remaining
therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein shall, upon
arrival in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such state or territory, enacted in the
exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same
manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such
state or territory, and shall not be exempt
Page 170 U. S. 421
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise."
The words, "shall upon arrival in such state or territory be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or
territory," in one sense might be held to mean arrival at the state
line. But to so interpret them would necessitate isolating these
words from the entire context of the act, and would compel a
construction destructive of other provisions contained therein. But
this would violate the fundamental rule requiring that a law be
construed as a whole, and not by distorting or magnifying a
particular word found in it. It is clearly contemplated that the
word "arrival" signified that the goods should actually come into
the state, since it is provided that "all fermented, distilled or
other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into a state or
territory," and this is further accentuated by the other provision,
"or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage
therein."
This language makes it impossible in reason to hold that the law
intended that the word "arrival" should mean at the state line,
since it presupposes the coming of the goods into the state for
"use, consumption, sale, or storage." The fair inference from the
enumeration of these conditions, which are all-embracing, is that
the time when they could arise was made the test by which to
determine the period when the operation of the state law should
attach to goods brought into the state. But to uphold the meaning
of the word "arrival," which is necessary to support the state law,
as construed below, forces the conclusion that the act of Congress
in question authorized state laws to forbid the bringing into the
state at all. This follows from the fact that, if arrival means
crossing the line, then the act of crossing into the state would be
a violation of the state law, and hence, necessarily, the operation
of the law is to forbid crossing the line, and to compel remaining
beyond the same. Thus, if the construction of the word "arrival" be
that which is claimed for it, it must be held that the state
statute attached and operated beyond the state line confessedly
before the time when it was intended by the act of Congress it
should take effect.
Page 170 U. S. 422
But the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal
distinction furnish no safe guide for construing the act of
Congress. On the contrary, it should be interpreted and enforced by
the light of the fundamental rule of carrying out its purpose and
object, of affording the remedy which it was intended to create,
and of defeating the wrong which it was its purpose to frustrate.
Undoubtedly the purpose of the act was to enable the laws of the
several states to control the character of merchandise therein
enumerated at an earlier date than would have been otherwise the
case, but it is equally unquestionable that the act of Congress
manifests no purpose to confer upon the states the power to give
their statutes an extraterritorial operation so as to subject
persons and property beyond their borders to the restraints of
their laws. If the act of Congress be construed as reaching the
contract for interstate shipment made in another state, the
necessary effect must be to give to the laws of the several states
extraterritorial operation, for, as held in the
Bowman
case, the inevitable consequence of allowing a state law to forbid
interstate shipments of merchandise would be to destroy the right
to contract beyond the limits of the state for such shipments. If
the construction claimed be upheld, it would be in the power of
each state to compel every interstate commerce train to stop before
crossing its borders, and discharge its freight, lest by crossing
the line it might carry within the state merchandise of the
character named covered by the inhibitions of a state statute. The
force of this view is well illustrated by the conclusions of the
court below, where it is said:
"Was the defendant, in the removal of the liquor, engaged in
transporting or conveying it within the meaning of our statute? The
language of the statute is broad enough to cover the act of
defendant in removing the liquor from the platform to the freight
room of the depot. He was one of the instruments necessary to
complete the act of transportation. If it be not so, then clearly
he is within the terms of the act, as he conveyed 'the liquor from
one point to another within this state.' His guilt is not to be
determined by the distance
Page 170 U. S. 423
he conveyed the package, but his conveying it any distance was a
violation of the law. With the propriety of legislation making such
an act a crime, and with the severity of the punishment attached to
doing the act, we having nothing to do."
If it had been the intention of the act of Congress to provide
for the stoppage at the state line of every interstate commerce
contract relating to the merchandise named in the act, such purpose
would have been easy of expression. The fact that such power was
not conveyed, and that, on the contrary, the language of the
statute relates to the receipt of the goods "into any state or
territory for use, consumption, sale or storage therein," negatives
the correctness of the interpretation holding that the receipt into
any state or territory for the purposes named could never take
place. Light is thrown upon the purpose and spirit of the act by
another consideration. The
Bowman case was decided in
1888, the opinion in
Leisy v. Hardin was announced in
April, 1890, and the act under consideration was approved August 8,
1890. Considering these dates, it is reasonable to infer that the
provisions of the act were intended by Congress to cause the
legislative authority of the respective states to attach to
intoxicating liquors coming into the states by an interstate
shipment only after the consummation of the shipment, but before
the sale of the merchandise -- that is, that the one receiving
merchandise of the character named should, while retaining the full
right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free from
the restrictions as to sale created by state legislation, a right
which the decision in
Leisy v. Hardin had just previously
declared to exist.
This view gives meaning and effect to the language of the act
providing that such merchandise "shall not be exempt therefrom"
(legislative power of the state) by reason of being introduced
therein in "original packages or otherwise." These words have no
place or meaning in the act if its purpose was to attach the power
of the state to the goods before the termination of the interstate
commerce shipment. The words "original packages" had, at the time
of the passage of the act, by the decisions of this Court, acquired
with reference
Page 170 U. S. 424
to the construction of the Constitution a technical meaning,
signifying that the merchandise in such packages was entitled to be
sold within a state by the receiver thereof, although state laws
might forbid the sale of merchandise of like character not in such
packages.
While it is true that the right to sell free from state
interference interstate commerce merchandise was held in
Leisy
v. Hardin to be an essential incident to interstate commerce,
it was yet but an incident, as the contract of sale within a state
in its nature was usually subject to the control of the legislative
authority of the state. On the other hand, the right to contract
for the transportation of merchandise from one state into or across
another involved interstate commerce in its fundamental aspect, and
imported in its very essence a relation which necessarily must be
governed by laws apart from the laws of the several states, since
it embraced a contract which must come under the laws of more than
one state. The purpose of Congress to submit the incidental power
to sell to the dominion of state authority should not, without the
clearest implication, be held to imply the purpose of subjecting to
state laws a contract which, in its very object and nature, was not
susceptible of such regulation even if the constitutional right to
do so existed, as to which no opinion is expressed. And this view
is cogently illustrated by the opinion in the
Bowman case,
where it was said (pp.
125 U. S.
486-487):
"Has the law of Iowa any extraterritorial force which does not
belong to the law of the State of Illinois? If the law of Iowa
forbids the delivery, and the law of Illinois requires the
transportation, which of the two shall prevail? How can the former
make void the latter? In view of this necessary operation of the
law of Iowa, if it be valid, the language of this Court in the case
of
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485,
95 U. S.
488, is exactly in point. It was there said:"
"But we think it may safely be said that state legislation,
which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or
to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration,
in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon
the
Page 170 U. S. 425
business through the local instruments to be employed after
coming within the state, but directly upon the business as it comes
into the state from without or goes out from within. While it
purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the state,
it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the
management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His
disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state,
or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a
greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within,
and sometimes those taken up within and put down without. A
passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the
state must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of
that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board
afterwards if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case
that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The
River Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten
different states, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce
upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter
of national concern. If each state was at liberty to regulate the
conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion
likely to allow could not but be productive of great inconvenience
and unnecessary hardship. Each state could provide for its own
passengers, and regulate the transportation of its own freight,
regardless of the interests of others. Nay, more, it could
prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the
state in respect to passengers and property brought from without.
On one side of the river or its tributaries, he might be required
to observe one set of rules, and on the other, another. Commerce
cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of
passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself,
or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line
his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy
the same cabin, and on the other, be kept separate. Uniformity in
the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the
other of his route is a necessity in his business, and, to secure
it, Congress, which is
Page 170 U. S. 426
untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive
legislative power of determining what such regulations shall
be."
And it was doubtless this construction which caused the Court to
observe, in the opinion in
Wilkerson v. Rahrer,
140 U. S. 545,
149 U. S. 552,
that the act of Congress "divests them [objects of interstate
commerce shipment] of that character at an earlier period of time
than would otherwise be the case." We think that, interpreting the
statute by the light of all its provisions, it was not intended to
and did not cause the power of the state to attach to an interstate
commerce shipment while the merchandise was in transit under such
shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination and
delivery there to the consignee, and, of course, this conclusion
renders it entirely unnecessary to consider whether, if the act of
Congress had submitted the right to make interstate commerce
shipments to state control, it would be repugnant to the
Constitution.
It follows from this conclusion that as the act for which the
plaintiff in error was convicted, and which consisted in moving the
goods from the platform to the freight warehouse, was a part of the
interstate commerce transportation, and was done before the law of
Iowa could constitutionally attach to the goods, the conviction was
erroneous, and the judgment below is therefore
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR.
JUSTICE BROWN, dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BROWN, and myself are
constrained to dissent from this judgment, which appears to us to
deny due effect to the police power reserved to each state by the
Constitution of the United States, and recognized by Congress in
the Act of August 8, 1890, c. 728, commonly known as the Wilson
Act, 26 Stat. 313.
The purpose and effect of this act may be best understood by
recalling the history of the law upon the subject.
In order to keep this opinion within reasonable compass,
Page 170 U. S. 427
we shall, in referring to the previous decisions of this Court,
confine ourselves, as far as possible, to those decisions which
directly relate to the traffic in intoxicating liquors.
The regulation of the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating
liquors has always been recognized as a subject peculiarly
appertaining to the police power of the several states
respectively.
License Cases,
5 How. 504;
Bartemeyer v.
Iowa, 18 Wall. 129;
Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25;
Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201;
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623;
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1;
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U. S.
31.
Upon the question how far the police power reserved to each
state over this subject is affected by the grant to Congress of the
power to regulate commerce among the several states there have been
conflicting opinions, and even varying decisions at different
periods.
The earliest cases which came before this Court concerning the
extent of the police power of each state over intoxicating liquors
within its borders were
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, Fletcher v.
Rhode Island, and
Peirce v. New Hampshire, decided in
1847, and reported under the name of
The
License Cases, 5 How. 504.
In
Peirce v. New Hampshire, a statute of New Hampshire,
prohibiting sales of intoxicating liquors by any person without a
license from municipal authorities and authorizing licenses to be
granted only to persons residing within the state, was held by all
the Justices to be constitutional and valid as applied to a barrel
of intoxicating liquors brought into New Hampshire from another
state and sold in New Hampshire by the importer in the same barrel,
unbroken and in the same condition in which it had been brought in,
there having been no legislation of Congress upon the subject.
That decision was afterwards repeatedly cited with approval.
Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,
70 U. S. 730;
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S.
25,
97 U. S. 33;
Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.
S. 691,
102 U. S. 701;
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
123 U. S.
657-658. And in several cases, the validity of statutes
of a state taxing the sale of intoxicating liquors brought from
another state was
Page 170 U. S. 428
treated as depending upon the question whether the statutes made
any discrimination in favor of liquors manufactured within the
state.
Hinson v.
Lott, 8 Wall. 148;
Tiernan v. Rinker,
102 U. S. 123;
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446,
116 U. S.
460.
The question whether the power of Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states is exclusive or
only paramount was a subject of much diversity of opinion from an
early period until 1851, when this Court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Curtis, in
Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299, laid down this principle:
when the nature of the particular subject in question is such as to
demand a single uniform rule operating equally throughout the
United States, the power of Congress is exclusive, but when the
subject is of such a nature as to require different systems of
regulation, drawn from local knowledge or experience and conformed
to local wants, it may be the subject of state legislation so long
as Congress has not legislated. 12 How.
53 U. S.
319-320. The principle there laid down has become fully
recognized and established in our jurisprudence.
Transportation
Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691,
107 U. S. 704;
Crandall v.
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35,
73 U. S. 42;
Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.
S. 691,
102 U. S.
701.
Wherever, from the nature of the subject, the power of Congress
to regulate commerce is exclusive, the several states, of course,
cannot legislate, even if there has been no legislation by
Congress; or, as the proposition has been stated in another
form:
"Where the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive, the
failure of Congress to make express regulations indicates its will
that the subject shall be left free from any restrictions or
impositions, and any regulation of the subject by the states,
except in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such
freedom."
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U.
S. 489,
120 U. S.
493.
The theory that the bringing of intoxicating liquors from one
state into another, and the selling of them there in the packages
in which they had been introduced, are subjects requiring to be
regulated by a national and uniform rule, and therefore within the
exclusive power of Congress, and wholly
Page 170 U. S. 429
free from state legislation, was not broached by any member of
the Court before the cases of
Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway, 125 U. S. 465, and
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100.
In
Bowman's case, Chief Justice Waite and two other
Justices dissented, and in
Leisy's case three Justices
dissented, and the reasons for and against the decisions were
stated at length in the opinions delivered in those cases. It will
be sufficient for our present purpose to state the points there
decided.
Each of those cases arose under the statutes of the State of
Iowa regulating the manufacture, the sale, and the transportation
of intoxicating liquors within the state.
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, decided
by this Court March 19, 1888, involved the validity of a provision
of those statutes (substantially similar to the provision now
before us, as construed by the highest court of the state) imposing
a penalty upon any railroad company or other common carrier, or any
agent of either, or any other person, that should knowingly bring
within the state, or knowingly transport or convey between points
or from one place to another within the state for any other person
or corporation any intoxicating liquors without first having
obtained a certificate from the auditor of the county to which it
was consigned or within which it was to be conveyed from place to
place certifying that the consignee was authorized by the laws of
Iowa to sell such liquors. The majority of this Court, upon a
consideration of the whole statute, frankly recognized that
"the provision in question has been adopted by the State of Iowa
not expressly for the purpose of regulating commerce between its
citizens and those of other states, but as subservient to the
general design of protecting the health an morals of its people and
the peace and good order of the state against the physical and
moral evils resulting from the unrestricted manufacture and sale
within the state of intoxicating liquors."
125 U.S.
125 U. S.
475-476. Nevertheless, the provision was held to be
unconstitutional and void, as applied to a railroad company
transporting intoxicating liquors into the state from another
Page 170 U. S. 430
state, upon the ground that the state
"cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied,
regulate commerce between its people and those of the other states
of the Union in order to effect its end, however desirable such a
regulation might be."
125 U.S.
125 U. S. 493.
The Court took pains to distinguish the case from
Peirce v. New
Hampshire, above cited, and distinctly reserved the expression
of any opinion upon the question whether the state had the right to
regulate or prohibit the sale of the liquor by the importer in
unbroken packages after it had been brought within the state. 125
U.S.
125 U. S. 479,
125 U. S.
499-500.
But in
Leisy v. Hardin, two years later, that question
was distinctly presented for decision, and it was decided that the
provision of the statutes of Iowa prohibiting the sale of any
intoxicating liquors otherwise than for pharmaceutical, medicinal,
chemical, or sacramental purposes, and under a druggist's license
from a county court of the state, was, as applied to a sale by the
importer, and in the original packages, unbroken and unopened, of
such liquors manufactured in and brought from another state,
unconstitutional and void as repugnant to the grant by the
Constitution to Congress of the power to regulate interstate
commerce. The majority of the Court, in its opinion, delivered by
the present CHIEF JUSTICE, April 28, 1890, treated
Peirce v.
New Hampshire as overruled, and stated its own conclusions as
follows:
"The plaintiffs in error are citizens of Illinois, are not
pharmacists, and have no permit, but import into Iowa beer, which
they sell in original packages, as described. Under our decision in
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, they had the
right to import this beer into that state, and, in the view which
we have expressed, they had the right to sell it, by which act
alone it would become mingled in the common mass of property within
the state. Up to that point of time, we hold that, in the absence
of congressional permission to do so, the state had no power to
interfere by seizure, or any other action, in prohibition of
importation and sale by the foreign or nonresident importer."
And it was said in that opinion that
"the responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the
regulation
Page 170 U. S. 431
of interstate commerce is concerned, to remove the restriction
upon the state in dealing with imported articles of trade within
its limits, which have not been mingled with the common mass of
property therein, if, in its judgment, the end to be secured
justifies and requires such action."
135 U.S.
135 U. S.
123-124.
Thereupon Congress immediately interposed, and by explicit
legislation unequivocally manifested its purpose that no silence on
its part should give rise to the presumption that it intended that
either the transportation of intoxicating liquors from one state
into another or their sale in the latter state, even in the
packages in which they had been brought, should be free and beyond
the reach of the police power of the state.
On May 14, 1890, Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, reported to the Senate,
from the committee on the judiciary, a bill which, as amended upon
his motion on May 29, was passed August 8, 1890, enacting that
"all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or
liquids, transported into any state or territory or remaining
therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon
arrival in such state or territory be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted in the
exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same
manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such
state or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of
being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."
Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, p. 4642;
Id., pt. 6, p. 5430; Act Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat.
313.
Soon after the passage of this act of Congress, the question of
its constitutionality and effect was brought before this Court in
Rahrer's Case, 140 U. S. 545.
Intoxicating liquors, which had been sent, before the passage of
this act, by their owners in Missouri to Rahrer in Kansas, to be
sold by him on their account, were, after the passage of the act,
sold by him in Kansas as the agent of the consignors, and in the
original packages. This Court unanimously held that Rahrer was
liable to be prosecuted for such a sale under statutes of the State
of Kansas, passed in 1889, which made no distinction between
imported and domestic liquors.
Page 170 U. S. 432
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in delivering the opinion of the majority of
the Court, said:
"Congress has now spoken, and declared that imported liquors or
liquids shall, upon arrival in a state, fall within the category of
domestic articles of a similar nature."
140 U.S.
140 U. S. 560.
The grant by the Constitution to Congress of the power to regulate
interstate commerce, said THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
"furnishes no support to the position that Congress could not,
in the exercise of the discretion reposed in it, concluding that
the common interest did not require entire freedom in the traffic
in ardent spirits, enact the law in question. In so doing, Congress
has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate commerce, or to
exercise any power reserved to the states, or to grant a power not
possessed by the states, or to adopt state laws. . . . No reason is
perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain
designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a
rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of
time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its
competency to do so."
140 U.S.
140 U. S.
561-562.
"Congress did not use terms of permission to the state to act,
but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state
laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition,
created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part. It
imparted no power to the state not then possessed, but allowed
imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the local
jurisdiction. . . . This is not the case of a law enacted in the
unauthorized exercise of a power exclusively confided to Congress,
but of a law which it was competent for the state to pass, but
which could not operate upon articles occupying a certain situation
until the passage of the act of Congress. That act, in terms,
removed the obstacle, and we perceive no adequate ground for
adjudging that a reenactment of the state law was required before
it could have the effect upon imported which it had always had upon
domestic property. Jurisdiction attached not in virtue of the law
of Congress, but because the effect of the latter was to place the
property where jurisdiction could attach."
140 U.S.
140 U. S.
564-565.
Page 170 U. S. 433
The necessary effect of that decision is that the police power
of each state includes the police power of each state includes the
regulation of the transportation, as well as the sale, of all
intoxicating liquors within its territory, except so par as
affected by the grant by the Constitution to Congress of the power
over interstate and foreign commerce, and that, so far as Congress
manifests its intention that the interests of such commerce do not
require its exemption from the exercise of the police power of the
state, this power is unrestricted.
The opinions heretofore delivered in this Court upon the effect
of the act of Congress of 1890, although they do not decide,
clearly imply, that the "arrival in such state" contemplated and
intended by the act is an arrival within the territorial limits and
jurisdiction of the state. In
Rahrer's case, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, in the passages already quoted, said that Congress by this
act has declared that "imported liquors shall, upon arrival in a
state, fall within the category of domestic articles of a similar
nature," and has allowed "imported property to fall at once upon
arrival within the local jurisdiction." 140 U.S.
140 U. S. 560,
140 U. S. 564.
The natural meaning of these expressions is that imported liquors,
upon arrival within the jurisdiction of the state, become at once
subject to its jurisdiction. And in
Scott v. Donald,
165 U. S. 58, the
phrase used in the opinion of the majority of the Court was, "upon
arrival in a state," and, in the dissenting opinion, "upon their
arrival within the state," without a suggestion in either opinion
that the two phrases were not exactly synonymous or that any
"arrival within the state" was not an "arrival in the state." 165
U.S.
165 U. S. 99,
165 U. S.
102.
The case at bar directly presents the question of the meaning of
the words "upon arrival in such state," as used by Congress in this
act.
Chief Justice Marshall, when discussing the general meaning of
the words "arrival" and "to arrive," said:
"'To arrive' is a neuter verb, which, when applied to an object
moving from place to place, designates the fact of 'coming to' or
'reaching' one place from another, or of coming to or reaching a
place by traveling or moving towards it. If the place
Page 170 U. S. 434
be designated, then the object which reaches that place has
arrived at it. A person who is coming to Richmond has arrived when
he enters the city. But it is not necessary, to the correctness of
this term, that the place at which the traveler arrives should be
his ultimate destination, or the end of his journey. A person going
from Richmond to Norfolk by water arrives within Hampton Roads when
he reaches that place; or, if he diverges from the direct course,
he arrives in Petersburg when he enters that town. This is, I
believe, the universal understanding of the term."
The Patriot, 1 Brock. 407, 411-412.
If, as Chief Justice Marshall declared, it is the universal
understanding of the term that it designates the fact of "coming
to" or "reaching" a place by traveling or moving towards it, and
does not require that the place at which the traveler arrives
should be his ultimate destination, and, consequently, that a
traveler arrives in a city or town when he enters that city or
town, it would seem to follow that "arrival in the state" is
complete when the person or the merchandise in question enters the
state.
That such is the meaning of the word "arrival," as used in the
act of Congress now in question, appears to us to be confirmed by
the whole scope and by the obvious purpose of the act.
The act declares and enacts that all intoxicating liquors
"transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein
for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival
in such state or territory,"
be subject to the effect and operation of its laws enacted in
the exercise of its police powers to the same extent and in the
same manner as though they had been produced in it, "and shall not
be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in
original packages or otherwise."
The act, in terms, includes all intoxicating liquors
"transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for
use, consumption, sale or storage therein," if it be assumed that
the words "for use, consumption, sale or storage therein" are not
restricted to the next preceding clause, "or remaining therein,"
but also extend back to the earlier clause,
Page 170 U. S. 435
"transported into any state or territory," still the effect of
the words is to cover all intoxicating liquors transported into or
remaining in the state for any possible purpose, except that of
being transported though the state to another state or country. All
such liquors are, "upon arrival in such state," to be subject to
the operation and effect of the laws enacted by the state "in the
exercise of its police powers" to the same extent and in the same
manner as if the liquors had been produced within its limits. And
it is expressly provided that intoxicating liquors shall not be
exempt from the exercise of the police powers of the state "by
reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise." The phrases "transported into any state," "upon arrival
in such state," and "introduced therein" would seem to have been
used as substantially equivalent.
The act makes no mention of arrival at a specific destination or
place in the state. Its whole object, as appears upon its face as
well as from the circumstances which led to its enactment, is not
to define when a particular voyage or transit shall be considered
at an end, but to assure to the state, throughout its territorial
jurisdiction, the full exercise of its police powers over the
subject of intoxicating liquors. And we find nothing in the act to
indicate an intention on the part of Congress that the mere fact
that intoxicating liquors, brought by a common carrier into the
state, have not reached their ultimate destination in the state or
been delivered to the consignee shall exempt them, after coming
within the territorial limits of the state, from the exercise of
its police powers.
By the statute of the State of Iowa under which Rhodes was
prosecuted,
"if any express company, railway company, or any agent or person
in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or
any person in the employ of any common carrier, or if any other
person shall transport or convey between points or from one place
to another within this state, for any other person or persons or
corporation, any intoxicating liquors without first having been
furnished with a certificate from and under the seal of the county
auditor of
Page 170 U. S. 436
the county to which said liquor is to be transported or is
consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be conveyed
from place to place, certifying that the consignee or person to
whom said liquor is to be transported, conveyed or delivered, is
authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in such county,"
the company, agent, or person so offending shall, upon
conviction, be fined in the sum of $100 for each offense, and
"the offense herein defined shall be held to be complete and
shall be held to have been committed in any county of the state
through or to which said intoxicating liquors are transported, or
in which the same is unloaded for transportation, or in which said
liquors are conveyed from place to place or delivered."
But it is provided that
"the defendant may show as a defense hereunder, by preponderance
of evidence, that the character and circumstances of the shipment
and its content were unknown to him."
McClain's Code of Iowa, ยง 2410. And it was held by the supreme
court of the state that in order to support the conviction of
Rhodes, it must appear that when doing the act complained of, he
knew that the box in question contained intoxicating liquor.
The material facts, as appearing by the record and stated in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa, reported in 90 Ia. 496, were
as follows:
The intoxicating liquor which Rhodes has been adjudged guilty of
transporting or conveying from one place to another within the
State of Iowa in violation of the statute of the state was a jug of
whisky contained and hidden in a wooden box about a cubic foot in
size, marked "W. H.," represented to contain groceries, delivered
at Dallas, in the State of Illinois, by a company doing business at
that place, to the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway
Company, and consigned to one William Hown at Brighton, in the
State of Iowa, and was carried, under a through waybill, by that
railway company, over its road to Burlington, in the State of Iowa,
and was there transferred to the Burlington & Western Railway
Company, whose road was wholly within the State of Iowa, and was
carried by this company to Brighton. Upon its arrival at Brighton,
it was delivered by the trainmen
Page 170 U. S. 437
upon the platform of this company's depot, and immediately
afterwards Rhodes, the company's station agent at Brighton,
complying with the directions of his employer, carried the box from
the platform into the freight room of the depot building, where, on
the same day, it was seized by a constable on a search warrant,
being then held by the company for payment of the unpaid freight
and for delivery to the consignee. Neither Rhodes nor the company
held a permit for the transportation or sale of intoxicating
liquors or a certificate from the county auditor that the consignee
was authorized to sell such liquors.
Rhodes testified that before the arrival of the box, a mail
carrier told him he was looking for a box from Dallas for William
Hown, and said it was likely to be marked "W. H.," and would
contain alcohol or whisky; that he told the mail carrier he had not
received a box of that description; that the box arrived the next
day, and that he supposed, perhaps, this was the box the mall
carrier told him would come. The Supreme Court of Iowa was of
opinion that this testimony clearly showed that Rhodes knew that
the box contained intoxicating liquors, and its reviewable by this
Court.
Dower v. Richards, 151 U.
S. 658;
Egan v. Hart, 165 U.
S. 188;
Turner v. New York, 168 U. S.
90,
168 U. S. 95.
Nor does the conclusion of that court that Rhodes, by moving the
box from the depot platform to the freight house, only a few feet
off, transported or conveyed the box from one place to another
within the state within the meaning of the statute of Iowa present
any question of law which this Court is authorized to review,
except so far as the statute, thus construed, may deprive him of a
right under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The intoxicating liquor in question was brought by rail under a
through waybill from Dallas, in the State of Illinois, to
Burlington and Brighton, in the State of Iowa. It was carried by
the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company (whose road
ran from Illinois into Iowa) to Burlington, and was there delivered
to the Burlington and Western Railway
Page 170 U. S. 438
(whose road was wholly in the State of Iowa), and was carried by
this company to Brighton, and was there delivered by its servants
upon the platform of its freight station. Taking into consideration
that so much of the transportation as was performed by an
interstate railroad company had been accomplished, and that the
remainder of the transportation was by an Iowa corporation, and
wholly within the State of Iowa, and had been so far completed as
to land the intoxicating liquor upon the soil of Iowa, we are of
opinion that there had been an "arrival in such state," so as to
subject the liquor to the exercise of the police powers of the
State of Iowa within the letter and the spirit of the act of
Congress.