Hernandez was in command of a revolutionary army in Venezuela
when an engagement took place with the government forces which
resulted in the defeat of the latter, and the occupation of Bolivar
by the former. Underhill was living in Bolivar, where he had
constructed a waterworks system for the city under a contract with
the government, and carried on a machinery repair business. He
applied for a passport to leave the city, which was refused by
Hernandez with a view to coerce him to operate his waterworks and
his repair works for the benefit of the community and the
revolutionary forces. Subsequently a passport was given him. The
revolutionary government under which Hernandez was acting was
recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of
Venezuela. Subsequently Underhill sued Hernandez in .the Circuit
Court for the Second Circuit to recover damages caused by the
refusal to grant the passport, for alleged confinement of him to
his own house, and for alleged assaults and affronts by Hernandez'
soldiers. Judgment being rendered for defendant, the case was taken
to the circuit court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed,
the court holding "that the acts of the defendant were the acts of
Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication
in the courts of another government."
Held that the
circuit court of appeals was justified in that conclusion.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory.
In the early part of 1892, a revolution was initiated in
Venezuela against the administration thereof, which the
revolutionists
Page 168 U. S. 251
claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. The
principal parties to this conflict were those who recognized
Palacio as their head, and those who followed the leadership of
Crespo. General Hernandez belonged to the anti-administration party
and commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar. On the
8th of August, 1892, an engagement took place between the armies of
the two parties at Buena Vista, some seven miles from Bolivar, in
which the troops under Hernandez prevailed, and on the 13th of
August, Hernandez entered Bolivar and assumed command of the city.
All of the local officials had in the meantime left, and the vacant
positions were filled by General Hernandez, who from that date, and
during the period of the transactions complained of, was the civil
and military chief of the city and district. In October, the party
in revolt had achieved success generally, taking possession of the
capital of Venezuela October 6, and on October 23, 1892, the
"Crespo government," so called, was formally recognized as the
legitimate government of Venezuela by the United States.
George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who had
constructed a waterworks system for the City of Bolivar under a
contract with the government, and was engaged in supplying the
place with water, and he also carried on a machinery repair
business. Some time after the entry of General Hernandez, Underhill
applied to him, as the officer in command, for a passport to leave
the city. Hernandez refused this request, and requests made by
others in Underhill's behalf, until October 18, when a passport was
given, and Underhill left the country.
This action was brought to recover damages for the detention
caused by reason of the refusal to grant the passport, for the
alleged confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for certain
alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez'
army.
The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of New York, and on the conclusion of
plaintiff's case, the circuit court ruled that, upon the facts,
plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and directed
Page 168 U. S. 252
a verdict for defendant on the ground that
"because the acts of defendant were those of a military
commander, representing a
de facto government in the
prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible therefor."
Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the case was taken
to the circuit court of appeals, and by that court affirmed upon
the ground
"that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government
of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of
adjudication in the courts of another government."
65 F. 577. Thereupon the cause was brought to this Court on
certiorari.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized
governments, or to cases where redress can manifestly be had
through public channels. The immunity of individuals from suits
brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states
in the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil
officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the
agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact.
Where a civil war prevails (that is, where the people of a country
are divided into two hostile parties, who take up arms and oppose
one another by military
Page 168 U. S. 253
force), generally speaking, foreign nations do not assume to
judge of the merits of the quarrel. If the party seeking to
dislodge the existing government succeeds, and the independence of
the government it has set up is recognized, then the acts of such
government, from the commencement of its existence, are regarded as
those of an independent nation. If the political revolt fails of
success, still, if actual war has been waged, acts of legitimate
warfare cannot be made the basis of individual liability.
United States v.
Rice, 4 Wheat. 246;
Fleming v.
Page, 9 How. 603;
Thorington
v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1;
Williams v. Bruffy,
96 U. S. 176;
Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594;
Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, and
other cases.
Revolutions or insurrections may inconvenience other nations,
but by accommodation to the facts, the application of settled rules
is readily reached. And where the fact of the existence of war is
in issue in the instance of complaint of acts committed within
foreign territory, it is not an absolute prerequisite that that
fact should be made out by an acknowledgment of belligerency, as
other official recognition of its existence may be sufficient proof
thereof.
The Three Friends, 166 U. S.
1.
In this case, the archives of the State Department show that
civil war was flagrant in Venezuela from the spring of 1892, that
the revolution was successful, and that the revolutionary
government was recognized by the United States as the government of
the country, it being, to use the language of the Secretary of
State in a communication to our minister to Venezuela, "accepted by
the people, in the possession of the power of the nation, and fully
established."
That these were facts of which the court is bound to take
judicial notice, and for information as to which it may consult the
Department of State, there can be no doubt.
Jones v. United
States, 137 U. S. 202;
Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore, (1894) 1 Q.B. 149.
It is idle to argue that the proceedings of those who thus
triumphed should be treated as the acts of banditti or mere
mobs.
We entertain no doubt upon the evidence that Hernandez
Page 168 U. S. 254
was carrying on military operations in support of the
revolutionary party. It may be that adherents of that side of the
controversy in the particular locality where Hernandez was the
leader of the movement entertained a preference for him as the
future executive head of the nation, but that is beside the
question. The acts complained of were the acts of a military
commander representing the authority of the revolutionary party as
a government, which afterwards succeeded and was recognized by the
United States. We think the circuit court of appeals was justified
in concluding
"that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government
of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of
adjudication in the courts of another government."
The decisions cited on plaintiff's behalf are not in point.
Cases respecting arrests by military authority in the absence of
the prevalence of war, or the validity of contracts between
individuals entered into in aid of insurrection, or the right or
revolutionary bodies to vex the commerce of the world on its common
highway without incurring the penalties denounced on piracy, and
the like, do not involve the questions presented here.
We agree with the circuit court of appeals that
"the evidence upon the trial indicated that the purpose of the
defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff was to coerce the
plaintiff to operate his waterworks and his repair works for the
benefit of the community and the revolutionary forces,"
and that "it was not sufficient to have warranted a finding by
the jury that the defendant was actuated by malice or any personal
or private motive," and we concur in its disposition of the rulings
below. The decree of the circuit court is
Affirmed.
