Since the Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, took effect, the
jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States over an action
brought by a citizen of another state against a national bank
established and doing business in a state within the circuit
depends upon citizenship alone, and if that jurisdiction be invoked
on that ground, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the
circuit is final, even though another ground for jurisdiction in
the circuit court be developed in the course of the
proceedings.
This was a petition for an order to show cause why a writ of
mandamus should not issue to the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit to allow an appeal to this Court from a decree of that
court affirming a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts dismissing the bill of
Charles F. Jones against
The Merchants' National Bank of Boston, and also for a
citation to such bank to appear and show cause why such decree
should not be corrected.
The petition set forth, in substance, that petitioner recovered
a judgment in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
against one Swift for the sum of $18,876.82 upon an action for
contract; that Swift paid the amount of the judgment to the clerk
of the court, who entered satisfaction of the same; that the money
so received by the clerk was deposited with the Merchants' National
Bank for the benefit of petitioner, as he claims; that the clerk
declined to instruct the bank to pay the money over, whereupon
petitioner brought
Page 164 U. S. 692
his bill against the bank for an account of such money, to which
bill the bank demurred; that the court sustained the demurrer and
dismissed his bill, whereupon petitioner appealed to the circuit
court of appeals, which affirmed the decree of the circuit
court.
Petitioner then claimed an appeal to this Court, and presented
an application for the allowance of such appeal to the court of
appeals, which was denied, and he thereupon made this application
for a mandamus to allow the appeal.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The circuit court of appeals refused to allow an appeal in this
case upon the ground that its jurisdiction of the case was
"dependent entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or
controversy being . . . citizens of different states," and
therefore, under ยง 6 of the court of appeals Act of March, 1891,
its decree was final, and not the subject of an appeal to this
Court.
Prior to the Act of July 12, 1882, 290, 22 Stat. 162, and the
jurisdictional Act of March 3, 1887, as revised by the Act of
August 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433. 436, it had always been held
that suits against corporations organized under acts of Congress
were suits arising under the laws of the United States, and
therefore cognizable by the circuit courts, regardless of the
citizenship of the parties. This doctrine was applied to the United
States Bank more than 79 years ago in
Osborne v.
United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738,
22 U. S. 819,
and more recently to railways chartered under acts of Congress,
Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S.
1, even since the court of appeals act was passed,
Northern Pacific Railroad v. Amato, 144 U.
S. 465;
Pacific Railway Co. v. Harris,
158 U. S. 326.
But by the act of 1882, and more recently by section 4 of the
Acts of March 3, 1887, and August 13, 1888, the privilege
Page 164 U. S. 693
of suing and being sued under this clause was taken away from
national banks by the following language:
"SEC. 4. That all national banking' associations established
under the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of all
actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and all suits
in equity, be deemed citizens of the states in which they are
respectively located, and in such cases the circuit and district
courts shall not have jurisdiction, other than such as they would
have in cases between individual citizens of the same states."
In
Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.
S. 778, it was held by this Court that, under the act of
1882, which was similar in its terms, an action against a national
bank could not be removed to the federal court
"unless a similar suit could be entertained by the same court by
or against a state bank in like situation with the national bank.
Consequently, so long as the act of 1882 was in force, nothing in
the way of jurisdiction could be claimed by a national bank because
of the source of its incorporation. A national bank was by that
statute placed before the law in this respect the same as a bank
not organized under the laws of the United States."
See, also Whittemore v. Amoskeag Nat. Bank,
134 U. S. 524;
Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U.
S. 644. The section above cited from the act of 1888
undoubtedly deprives these banks of the privilege of suing or being
sued except in cases where diversity of citizenship would authorize
an action to be brought, and in such cases the decree of the court
of appeals is final.
In this case, the original bill averred the complainant to be a
citizen of Pennsylvania and the defendant to be a national bank,
duly established under the laws of the United States, having its
place of business at Boston, and a citizen of the State of
Massachusetts. As the bill was filed after the act of 1888 took
effect, it must be deemed to be a suit dependent upon citizenship
alone. But even if another ground were developed in the course of
the proceedings, the judgment of the court of appeals would be
final if the jurisdiction of the circuit court were originally
invoked solely upon the ground of
Page 164 U. S. 694
citizenship.
Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck,
150 U. S. 138;
Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 408.
The petition for mandamus must be
Denied.
