A circuit court of appeals has no power under the Judiciary Act
of 1891 to certify the whole case to this Court, but can only
certify distinct points or propositions of law, unmixed with
questions of fact or of mixed law and fact.
The question propounded in this case amounts to no more than an
inquiry whether, in the opinion of this Court, there is an
irreconcilable conflict between two of its previous judgments and a
request, if that is held to be so, that an end be put to that
conflict, and this is not a question or a proposition of law in a
particular case on which this Court is required to give
instructions.
This case coming on to be heard on appeal from the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
that court ordered that a statement of facts and a question be
certified to this Court for its opinion and instruction.
It appears from the statement of facts that William Graver filed
a bill in the Superior Court of the County of Cook, in the State of
Illinois, to impeach for fraud a decree in equity rendered by that
court July 6, 1889, in a certain suit therein depending, wherein
William Graver was complainant and Benjamin C. Faurot and A. O.
Bailey were defendants, by which decree complainant's bill was
dismissed for want of equity, and that the suit was duly and
properly removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Northern District of Illinois.
The bill thus filed was set forth
in haec verba,
together with a demurrer thereto, the decree of the circuit court
sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill, and the opinion
rendered by the circuit court on entering that decree.
The certificate then proceeded thus:
"In view of the decisions
Page 162 U. S. 436
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61,
and
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, this Court is in
doubt touching the case in hand, and desires advice and instruction
upon the following question: whether (assuming the bill of
complaint to be in other respects sufficient) the alleged false
swearing and perjury in the respective answers of defendants in the
original suit in the Superior Court of the County of Cook, State of
Illinois, are in the law available in this suit as ground for a
decree setting aside and declaring void the decree so rendered in
the Superior Court of the County of Cook."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
It appears from the opinion of the circuit court, sent up as
part of the certificate and reported in 64 F. 241, that that court
was impressed with the conviction that the complainant had been
defrauded, but that the court could see no way to accord relief
under the decision in
United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U. S. 61,
although the result might be different if the decision in
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589,
were followed. In other words, the circuit court indicated that it
could have proceeded without difficulty on the principles expounded
in either case if the other were out of the way. Finding it
impossible to reconcile these cases or to make a definitive choice
between them because
United States v. Throckmorton was
cited without disapproval in
Marshall v. Holmes, the
circuit court sustained the demurrer
pro forma, and the
case was transferred to the circuit court of appeals. But when this
had been accomplished, the court of appeals apparently found itself
in a similar quandary, and this resulted in the certificate under
consideration.
Doubtless the determination of contested questions in cases
properly brought before us involves the resolution of doubts,
Page 162 U. S. 437
if any are entertained, in respect of the scope of particular
decisions, but we cannot approve of the mode adopted in this case
of ascertaining the precise bearing of former judgments.
In civil cases, the intention of Congress, as to the
certification provided for in sections five and six of the Act of
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, is to be arrived at in the
light of the rules prevailing prior to that date in relation to
certificates of division of opinion under sections 650, 652 and 693
of the Revised Statutes.
Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U.
S. 324. It was well settled as to them that each
question had to be a distinct point or proposition of law, clearly
stated, so that it could be definitely answered without regard to
other issues of law in the case; that each question must be a
question of law only, and not of fact or of mixed law and fact, and
hence could not involve or imply a conclusion or judgment on the
weight or effect of testimony or facts adduced in the cause, and
could not embrace the whole case, even where its decision turned
upon matter of law only, and even though it were split up in the
form of questions.
Jewell v. Knight, 123 U.
S. 426,
123 U. S. 432;
Fire Ins. Association v. Wickham, 128 U.
S. 426.
By the sixth section of the Judiciary Act, the circuit court of
appeals is not permitted to certify the whole case to us, though we
may require that to be done when questions are certified, or may
bring up by certiorari any case in which the decision of that court
would otherwise be final. But here the entire record is transmitted
as part of the certificate, and the answer to the question
propounded contemplates an examination of the whole case. It is
true that the court of appeals asks us to assume the bill of
complaint to be "in other respects sufficient" -- that is,
sufficient to entitle complainant to relief, if the fraud alleged
were available. But if we should find that the bill was
insufficient, when tested by principled accepted in both the cases
referred to, we should be indisposed to return an answer not
required for the disposition of the case. In any view, we should be
compelled, in answering, to analyze the facts charged in order to
determine whether, in legal effect, they raise the question
involved in
Marshall v. Holmes or that involved in
United States v. Throckmorton, assuming that the
Page 162 U. S. 438
legal effect of the facts in those two cases was not the same,
or, if it were, to determine whether the facts set up here fall
within the same category, and direct which decision should
govern.
This practically requires us to pass upon the whole case as it
stands, and to decide whether the demurrer was properly sustained
or not.
But the whole case is not before us for decision, and the
certificate discloses that the doubt of the courts below is based
on the assumption that this Court has applied well settled general
principles of law differently in two different cases upon the same
state of facts. While some hesitation in decision may temporarily
result until it is finally determined whether that assumption is
justified, and, if justified, the anomaly is corrected, we think
such determination ought not to be attempted, save where the point
must be disposed of on a record after final decree.
In the absence of power to deal with the whole case, the
question amounts to no more than an inquiry as to whether, in our
opinion, there is an irreconcilable conflict between two of our
previous judgments, and a request, if we hold that to be so, that
we put an end to that conflict. We do not regard these as questions
or propositions of law in a particular case on which we are
required to give instruction.
Certificate dismissed.
