It was the duty of the Postmaster General to cause all cheques
or warrants issued under the authority of the Act of March 3, 1883,
c. 119, 22 Stat. 487, and of the Act of August 4, 1886, c. 903, §
8, 24 Stat. 256, 307, 308, to be sent directly to the claimants,
and it was his right to call their attention to the provisions of
the act of 1883, and if the legislation to which attention was thus
invited worked injury to an attorney employed by such claimants to
present their claims, in that it gave his clients an opportunity to
evade, for a time, the payment of what they may have agreed to
allow him, it was an injury from which no cause of action could
arise.
The Postmaster General was directly in the line of duty when, in
order that the will of Congress as expressed in the act of 1883
might be carried out, he informed claimants that they were under no
legal obligation to respect any transfer, assignment or power of
attorney, which section 3477 of the Revised Statutes declared to be
null and void. If the plaintiff had not taken any such transfers,
assignments, or powers of attorney from his clients, he could not
have been injured by the reference made by the Postmaster General
to that section. If he had taken such instruments, he cannot
complain that the Postmaster General called the attention of
claimants to the statute on the subject and correctly interpreted
it.
The act of the head of one of the departments of the government
in calling the attention of any person having business with such
department to a. statute relating in any way to such business
cannot be made the foundation of a cause of action against such
officer.
The same general considerations of public policy and convenience
which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity
from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the
course of the performance of their judicial functions apply to a
large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive
Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon
them by law.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 161 U. S. 484
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in general term, which
affirmed a final order in the same court in special term,
sustaining a demurrer to the declaration filed by the plaintiff in
error, Spalding, against the defendant, Vilas, and dismissing the
plaintiff's action.
The question presented for determination is whether the
plaintiff's declaration stated a valid cause of action against the
defendant.
The plaintiff alleged that he was a citizen of the District of
Columbia, and had been for more than twenty years an attorney at
law, practicing his profession in the City of Washington, and that
the defendant, from March 4, 1885, until January 16, 1888, was the
Postmaster General of the United States.
That
"in or about the year 1871 he, the said plaintiff, was employed
by a considerable number of persons, who were and had been
postmasters at different post offices in the United States to
obtain a review and readjustment of their salaries in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 12, 1866,
relating thereto, and which enacted that when the quarterly returns
of the postmasters of the third, fourth, and fifth classes,
mentioned therein, showed that their salary allowed is ten
percentum less than they would be on the basis of commissions under
the Act of June 22, 1854, fixing their compensation, they were
entitled to have their compensation reviewed and readjusted under
the provisions of said act of 1854, by reason of which a large
number of such postmasters had just and valid claims against the
United States arising from such readjustment, and a large number of
them entered into written contracts with the plaintiff, employing
him and providing a reasonable compensation to him for procuring
the same, and gave to him written powers of attorney to act for
them in the prosecution of said claims and to receive the drafts
which might be issued in payment thereof,"
and that
"upon making and filing applications at the Post
Page 161 U. S. 485
Office Department in behalf of his clients for such readjustment
and review, the same was denied notwithstanding such act of
Congress, whereupon the plaintiff took measures to procure
mandatory legislation by Congress, and appropriations necessary,
pressing such legislation, by all lawful means in his power, in the
different Congresses from 1871 to 1886, giving to such efforts a
great amount of his time, and in the meantime procuring similar
contracts and applications and powers of attorney from several
thousands of postmasters of the said classes throughout different
parts of the United States and filing in the Post Office Department
such applications and powers of attorney and expending a good many
thousands of dollars in building up a business in the collection of
such claims, relying upon the justice thereof, and finally
obtaining the passage of the Acts of Congress of March 3, 1883,
requiring the Postmaster General of the United States, upon proper
presentation of such claims, to compute and pay the same, an Act of
Congress of July 7, 1884, making appropriations for the payment of
such claims, a further Act of Congress of March 3, 1885, making a
like appropriation, and a similar Act of Congress of August 4,
1886, making further appropriations therefor, all of which acts
were brought about in consequence of the continual and persistent
efforts of the plaintiff, under which acts the plaintiff proceeded
to make out papers and proofs for the presentation of such claims
in behalf of his clients, and filed the same, with powers of
attorney to him, as aforesaid, in the said Post Office Department,
and commenced the collection of the same, a large number of said
claims prior to March, 1885, and which were good and valid, being,
however, repudiated by the Post Office Department, and the
prosecution of such claims being made more difficult by great
hostility of the persons managing such department to the collection
of this class of claims."
The declaration also alleged that
"soon after the 3d day of March, 1885, the plaintiff made
application to the defendant, in his capacity of Postmaster General
of the United States, to adjust and pay the said claims which had
been disallowed, and also to review and readjust claims of the same
character
Page 161 U. S. 486
which had not before been presented, which applications were
refused, and an acrimonious controversy arose between the said
defendant and this plaintiff in relation thereto, the said
defendant, among other things, endeavoring to obtain legislation by
Congress to impair and destroy the rights of the plaintiff under
the said contracts, in which, however, he failed; but to further
harass the plaintiff, and to injure him in his good name and in his
business, without any good reason therefor, and with malicious
intent, the said defendant interposed all possible obstacles to the
collection of said claims, and undertook to induce the clients of
the plaintiff to repudiate the contracts they had made, and for
such purpose, and with such malicious intent, caused the drafts for
the payment of such claims to be sent directly to the claimants,
and for the malicious purpose of causing the claimants to disregard
the contracts they had made with the plaintiff for fees, and to
cause them to believe that the same were null and void, and that
plaintiff had rendered them no service, and that he was attempting
falsely to claim for valuable services rendered under said
contracts, falsely claimed to be valid, and using his official
character for such purpose, thus placing the plaintiff before the
country as a common swindler, and to bring him into public scandal,
infamy, and disgrace, and to injure his business, with each letter
of transmittal of drafts to said claimants caused to be issued and
sent to them, between September, 1886, and January 17, 1888, to a
great number, to-wit, four thousand, of the said claimants, clients
of the plaintiff, residing in the states of New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
the territories of Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, the circular of
which the following is a copy, the same being dated and addressed
to each claimant, respectively, stating the sum transmitted, and
the name and post office of such claimant, respectively, and having
added thereto, in print, section 8 of the Act of August 7, 1886,
and section 3477 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
to-wit: "
Page 161 U. S. 487
"
Post-Office Department"
"
Office of the Third Assistant Postmaster General"
"
Division of Finance, Washington, D.C. _____,
188_."
"Sir: Herewith enclosed you will find warrant payable to your
order for $_____, which is in full liquidation of your claim for
the balance unpaid of the readjusted salary of _____, postmaster at
_____, State of _____."
"In transmitting it, I am directed by the Postmaster General to
advise you that in the act of 1883, which provided for
readjustments of salary, the Congress directed that all checks or
warrants should be made payable to the claimants, and transmitted
direct to them, and that in the appropriation and enactment on this
subject by Congress, a copy of which is printed at the foot of this
note, the direction was repeated. This was done because no
attorney's services were necessary to the presentation of the claim
before the department, and the Congress desired all the proceeds to
reach the person really entitled thereto. After a claim of this
character is filed in the department, its examination and the
readjustment of the salary, if found proper, are made directly from
the books and papers in the department by its officers and without
further evidence."
"You are further advised that by section 3477 of the Revised
Statutes, a copy of which is also printed at the foot of this note,
any transfer of this claim or power of attorney for receiving
payment of this warrant is null and void."
"Yours respectfully,"
"J. H. Harris"
"
Third Assistant Postmaster General"
"________ ________"
"________ ________"
"See statutes referred to on next leaf."
It was alleged that the said circular was intended to deceive,
and did deceive, the said claimants, who believed what the
defendant meant and intended, as hereinbefore stated, of and
concerning the plaintiff, and was false in the following respects,
to-wit: (1) That
"in the act of 1883, which provided for readjustments of salary,
the Congress directed that all
Page 161 U. S. 488
checks or warrants should be transmitted direct to the
claimants, and that such direction was repeated in the act of
1886;"
"(2) that 'this was done because no attorney's services were
necessary to the presentation of the claim before the department;'
(3) that 'this was done because the Congress desired all the
proceeds to reach the person really entitled thereto;' (4)
that"
"the statement that claims of this character, after being filed
in the department, were examined and readjusted directly from the
books and papers in the department, without further evidence,
besides being untrue in many cases, was unnecessary to protect the
interests of the government or the claimant, was not required by
law, and was maliciously intended to cause the claimants to believe
that the plaintiff's claim for valuable services was false and
fraudulent, and the same was inserted for no other purpose."
The declaration further alleged that
"the reference to section 3477 in said circular, and the
printing of the whole of said section, was for the malicious
purpose only of causing the claimants to believe that the said
contracts for fees, before suggested in said circular, were null
and void, according to a pretended official ruling of the Post
Office Department, while in truth and in fact the said section had
no reference to any contracts of the kind, nor to contracts of the
character hereinbefore described, as made by the plaintiff with
such claimants;"
that
"all of said false statements or irrelevant references and
printing of said section 3577 of the Revised Statutes were
unnecessary, malicious, and without reasonable or probable cause,
and intended to deceive the claimants, and to thereby induce them
to repudiate the contracts they had made with the plaintiff, and
they understood said circular as meant and intended, as herein
stated, of and concerning the plaintiff, and they were deceived,
and did repudiate their said contracts, by reason thereof, to the
great injury of the good name of the plaintiff and to his business,
and for no other purpose,"
and that
"soon after commencing to issue such circulars the attention of
the defendant was called by the plaintiff to the fact that the
issuing of such circulars produced great injury to his business,
and was unjust towards him, but the said defendant,
Page 161 U. S. 489
notwithstanding, maliciously continued the said issue so long as
he held the position of Postmaster General of the United States, to
all the claimants he could reach, and to the number of four
thousand, as aforesaid, for no other purpose than to continue the
said injury to this plaintiff."
In consequence of the alleged acts of the defendant, the
plaintiff claimed to have been put to great trouble and expense in
enforcing the said contracts, had lost the benefit of many of them
at an expense and loss of $25,000, and, besides, had suffered
injury to his good name and reputation, to the amount of $75,000.
He prayed judgment for $100,000, besides costs and
disbursements.
Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes, referred to in the
circular made part of the declaration, is as follows:
"All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United
States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein,
whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the
consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders or other
authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or of any part
or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void unless they are
freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting
witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment
of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment
thereof. Such transfers, assignments, and powers of attorney must
recite the warrant for payment and must be acknowledged by the
person making them before an officer having authority to take
acknowledgments of deeds, and shall be certified by the officer,
and it must appear by the certificate that the officer at the time
of the acknowledgment, read and fully explained the transfer,
assignment, or warrant of attorney to the person acknowledging the
same."
The thought which underlies the entire argument for the
plaintiff is that the circular issued from the Post Office
Department by direction of the Postmaster General was beyond the
scope of any authority possessed by that officer, and therefore the
sending of the circular to the persons who had presented claims
against the government was not justified
Page 161 U. S. 490
by law, and would not protect the Postmaster General from
responsibility for the injury done to the plaintiff from that
act.
The statute of March 3, 1883, c. 119, 22 Stat. 487, relating to
the readjustment of the salaries of postmasters of certain classes,
provided that every readjustment of salary under that act should be
upon a written application, signed by the postmaster or late
postmaster or legal representative entitled to such readjustment,
and that
"each payment made shall be by warrant or check on the treasurer
or some Assistant Treasurer of the United States, made payable to
the order of said applicant, and forwarded by mail to him at the
post office within whose delivery he resides, and which address
shall be set forth in the application above provided for."
And by the Act of August 4, 1886, c. 903, § 8, 24 Stat. 256,
307, 308, it was declared that the payment of all sums thereby
appropriated
"shall be made by warrants or checks, as provided by the said
Act of March 3, 1883, payable to the order of and transmitted to
the persons entitled respectively thereto."
Whatever may have been the value of any services rendered by the
plaintiff for his clients -- even if the readjustment of their
salaries was wholly due to his efforts "to procure mandatory
legislation by Congress, pressing such legislation, by all lawful
means in his power," through many years -- it was competent for the
legislative branch of the government to provide that any sums
ascertained to be due to claimants should be paid directly to them.
Such a requirement could have had no other object than to make it
certain that the full amount due to those whose salaries were
readjusted was received by them personally, and should not pass
through the hands of agents or attorneys. No one will question the
power of Congress to enact legislation that would effect such an
object.
Ball v. Halsell, ante, 161 U. S. 72. If
such legislation worked injury to the plaintiff in that it gave his
clients an opportunity to evade for a time the payment of what they
may have agreed to allow him, it was an injury from which no cause
of action could arise. This view is so clear that no argument in
its support is necessary.
Page 161 U. S. 491
It results that the Postmaster General not only had the right,
but it was his duty, to cause all checks or warrants issued under
the authority of the above acts of Congress to be sent directly to
the claimants. If not strictly his duty, it was his right, to call
the attention of claimants to the provisions of the act of 1883. Of
the legislation of Congress everyone is presumed to have knowledge,
but all know as matter of fact that the larger part of the people
are not informed as to the provisions of many acts of Congress. No
one could rightfully complain that the Postmaster General called
the attention of those having business with his department to an
act of Congress that related to that business, and which would
explain why checks or warrants in their favor were sent directly to
them, and were not delivered to agents or attorneys.
Nor did the Postmaster General exceed his authority when he
informed claimants that Congress required checks or warrants to be
sent to them
"because no attorney's services are necessary to the
presentation of the claim before the department, and Congress
desired all the proceeds to reach the person really entitled
thereto,"
nor when he stated in his circular that
"after a claim of this character is filed in the department, its
examination, and the readjustment of salary, if found proper, are
made directly from the books and papers in the department, by its
officers, and without further evidence."
Was it not true that any claim under these acts of Congress must
be or could properly be sustained or rejected according to the
evidence furnished by the records of the department? Besides, the
statement that "no attorney's services were necessary to the
presentation of the claim," if not strictly accurate, was at most
only an expression of the opinion of the Postmaster General in the
course of his official duties. As he was charged with the execution
of the will of Congress in relation to the readjustment of those
salaries, he was entitled to express his opinion as to the object
for which the act of 1883 was passed and to indicate what in his
judgment was necessary to be done in order to bring claims under
that act properly before the department. Indeed, the clear
indication in
Page 161 U. S. 492
the act of 1883 of the desire of Congress that the full amount
awarded to claimants should be paid directly to them rendered it
entirely appropriate that he should advise them of the fact that
the records of the department furnished all the evidence necessary
for the readjustment directed by Congress. He did not, by his
circular, advise claimants that they could disregard any valid
contract made by them with attorneys. Claimants could not have
understood him as recommending a violation of the legal rights of
others. He said in substance nothing more than that they (the
claimants) were mistaken if they supposed that the services of
attorneys were required for the presentation and prosecution of
their claims before the department.
Equally without foundation is the suggestion that the Postmaster
General exceeded his authority and duty when he called the
attention of claimants to section 3477 of the Revised Statutes.
That officer might well have apprehended that the salutary
provisions of that section had been overlooked or disregarded by
those interested or connected with the prosecution of these claims.
If any claimant had transferred or assigned his claim, or any part
of it or any interest therein, or had executed any power of
attorney, order, or other instrument for receiving payment of such
claim or any part of it, before the claim was allowed and before
its amount was ascertained and a warrant for its payment issued,
such transfer, assignment, and power of attorney were null and
void. The Postmaster General was directly in the line of duty when,
in order that the will of Congress as expressed in the act of 1883
might be carried out, he informed claimants that they were under no
legal obligation to respect any transfer, assignment, or power of
attorney which section 3477 of the Revised Statutes declared to be
null and void. If the plaintiff had not taken any such transfers,
assignments, or powers of attorney from his clients, he could not
have been injured by the reference made by the Postmaster General
to that section. If he had taken such instruments, he cannot
complain that the Postmaster General called the attention of
claimants to the statute on the subject and correctly interpreted
it.
Page 161 U. S. 493
The act of the head of one of the departments of the government
in calling the attention of any person having business with such
department to a statute relating in any way to such business cannot
be made the foundation of a cause of action against such
officers.
If, as we hold to be the case, the circular issued by the
Postmaster General to claimants under the acts of Congress in
question was not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope of his
official duties, can this action be maintained because of the
allegation that what that officer did was done maliciously?
This precise question has not, so far as we are aware, been the
subject of judicial determination. But there are adjudged cases in
which principles have been announced that have some bearing upon
the present inquiry.
In
Randall v.
Brigham, 7 Wall. 523,
74 U. S. 535,
which was an action against one of the justices of the Superior
Court of Massachusetts for an alleged wrongful removal of the
plaintiff from his office of an attorney and counselor at law, it
was said that whatever might be the rule in respect of judges of
limited and inferior authority, judges of superior or general
authority were not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts
even when such acts were in excess of their jurisdiction, "unless,
perhaps, where the acts in excess of jurisdiction are done
maliciously or corruptly."
But in
Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335,
80 U. S.
350-351, which was an action against a justice of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to recover damages
alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff "by reason of the
willful, malicious, oppressive, and tyrannical acts and conduct" of
the defendant whereby the plaintiff was deprived of his right to
practice as an attorney in that court, it was said that the
qualifying words above quoted were not necessary to a correct
statement of the law, and that judges of courts of superior or
general jurisdiction were not liable to civil suits for their
judicial acts, even when such acts were in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly. A distinction was made between excess of jurisdiction
and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject
matter,
Page 161 U. S. 494
the court observing that where there is clearly no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, any authority exercised is a usurped
authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of
jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. "In
this country," the court said,
"the judges of the superior courts of record are only
responsible to the people, or the authorities constituted by the
people, from whom they receive their commissions for the manner in
which they discharge the great trusts of their office. If, in the
exercise of the powers with which they are clothed as ministers of
justice, they act with partiality, or maliciously or corruptly or
arbitrarily or oppressively, they may be called to an account by
impeachment and suspended or removed from office."
Again:
"The exemption of judges of the superior courts of record from
liability to civil suit for their judicial acts existing when there
is jurisdiction of the subject matter, though irregularity and
error attend the exercise of the jurisdiction, cannot be affected
by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done.
The allegation of malicious or corrupt motives could always be
made, and if the motives could be inquired into, judges would be
subjected to the same vexatious litigation upon such allegations,
whether the motives had or had not any real existence."
In
Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291, Kent, C.J.,
said:
"The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit or
indictment for any act done or omitted to be done by him, sitting
as judge, has a deep root in the common law. It is to be found in
the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily maintained
by an undisputed current of decisions in the English courts amidst
every change of policy, and through every revolution of their
government."
The same principle was announced in England in the case of
Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576, in which Mr. Justice
Rompton said:
"It is the principle of our law that no action will lie against
a judge of one of the superior courts for a judicial act, though it
be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. Therefore
the proposed allegation would not make the declaration good. The
public are deeply interested
Page 161 U. S. 495
in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit and was
established in order to secure the independence of the judges and
prevent their being harassed by vexatious actions."
The principle was applied in one case for the protection of a
county court judge who was sued for slander, the words complained
of having been spoken by him in his capacity as judge while sitting
in court engaged in the trial of a cause in which the plaintiff was
defendant. Chief Baron Kelly observed that a series of decisions,
uniformly to the same effect, extending from the time of Lord Coke
to the present time, established the general proposition that no
action will lie against a judge for any acts done or words spoken
in his judicial capacity in a court of justice, and that the
doctrine had been applied to the court of a coroner, and to a
court-martial, as well as to the superior courts. He said:
"It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed
to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under
the protection of the law, independently and freely, without favor
and without fear. This provision of the law is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the
benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should
be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences. How could a judge so exercise his
office if he were in daily and hourly fear of an action being
brought against him, and of having the question submitted to a jury
whether a matter on which he had commented judicially was or was
not relevant to the case before him?"
Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220.
In
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, which was an
action for libel brought by an officer of the army against his
superior officer to recover damages on account of a report made by
the latter in relation to certain letters of the former, the
defendant claimed that what he did was done in the course of, and
as an act of, military duty. The replication stated that the libel
was written by the defendant of actual malice, without any
reasonable, probable, or justifiable cause, and not
bona
fide, or in the
bona fide discharge of the
defendant's duty as such superior officer. The case was heard
on
Page 161 U. S. 496
demurrer to the replication, and it was held by all the justices
(Cockburn, C.J., only, dissenting) that the action would not lie.
The case was first considered in the light of the pleadings and the
admissions of the demurrer. Mellor, J., said:
"I apprehend that the motives under which a man acts in doing a
duty which it is incumbent upon him to do cannot make the doing of
that duty actionable, however malicious they may be. I think that
the law regards the doing of the duty, and not the motives from
which, or under which, it is done. In short, it appears to me that
the proposition resulting from the admitted statements in this
record amount to this: does an action lie against a man for
maliciously doing his duty? I am of opinion that it does not, and
therefore, upon the pleadings as they stand, we might give judgment
for the defendant."
But according to the report of that case, the Attorney General
did not rest the defense on the effect of the admissions in the
pleadings, but contended broadly that no action would lie against
an officer of the army, charged with duties such as those stated on
the record, for the discharge of them. He likened the case to that
of the judges of courts of law, to grand jurymen, petty jurymen,
and to witnesses, against whom no action lies for what they do in
the course of their duty, however maliciously they may do it, and
claimed immunity for the defendant for the acts done in the course
of his duty on the highest grounds of policy and convenience. No
judge nor juryman, nor witness, he said,
"could discharge his duty freely if not protected by a positive
rule of law from being harassed by actions in respect of the mode
in which he did the duty imposed upon him, and he contended that
the position of the defendant manifestly required the like
protection to be extended to him and to all officers in the same
position."
"There is,' Mellor, J., said, 'little doubt that the reasons
which justify the immunity in the one case do, in great measure,
extend to the other."
An instructive case upon the general subject of the immunity of
public officers from actions for damages on account of what they
may have done in the course of their official duties is
Dawkins
v. Lord Rokeby, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255, 262, the judgment
Page 161 U. S. 497
in which was affirmed by the House of Lords. L.R. 7 H.L. 744,
754. The defendant, a general in the English army, was called
before a court of inquiry, legally assembled to inquire into the
conduct of the plaintiff, also an officer in the army. He made
statements in evidence, and, after the close of the evidence,
handed in a written paper (not called for by the court, but having
reference to the subject of the inquiry) as to the conduct of that
officer. An action was brought in respect of those statements,
which were alleged to be both untrue and malicious. That case came
before the Queen's Bench, in the Exchequer Chamber, upon a bill of
exceptions allowed by Mr. Justice Blackburn, who had instructed the
jury as matter of law that the action would not lie if the verbal
and written statements complained of were made by the defendant,
being a military officer, in the course of a military inquiry, in
relation to the conduct of the plaintiff, he being also a military
officer, and with reference to the subject of that inquiry, and
this even though the plaintiff should prove that the defendant had
acted
mala fide and with actual malice, and without any
reasonable or probable cause, and with the knowledge that the
statements made and handed in by him were false. The court (all the
judges concurring) sustained the correctness of this ruling and
held that the statements were privileged. "The authorities," it was
said,
"are clear, uniform, and conclusive that no action of libel or
slander lies, whether against judges, counsel, witnesses, or
parties, for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any
proceeding before any court or tribunal recognized by law."
Lord Chancellor Cairns, in the House of Lords, said:
"Adopting the expressions of the learned judges with regard to
what I take to be the settled law as to the protection of witnesses
in judicial proceedings, I certainly am of opinion that, upon all
principles, and certainly upon all considerations of convenience
and public policy, the same protection which is extended to a
witness in a judicial proceeding who has been examined on oath
ought to be extended, and must be extended, to a military man who
is called before a court of inquiry of this kind for the purpose of
testifying there upon a matter of
Page 161 U. S. 498
military discipline connected with the army. It is not denied
that the statements which he made -- both those which were made
viva voce and those which were made in writing -- were
relative to the inquiry."
We are of opinion that the same general considerations of public
policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of
superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising
from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their
judicial functions apply to a large extent to official
communications made by heads of executive departments when engaged
in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. The interests
of the people require that due protection be accorded to them in
respect of their official acts. As in the case of a judicial
officer, we recognize a distinction between action taken by the
head of a department in reference to matters which are manifestly
or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less
connection with the general matters committed by law to his control
or supervision. Whatever difficulty may arise in applying these
principles to particular cases in which the rights of the citizen
may have been materially impaired by the inconsiderate or wrongful
action of the head of a department, it is clear -- and the present
case requires nothing more to be determined -- that he cannot be
held liable to a civil suit for damages on account of official
communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in
respect of matters within his authority, by reason of any personal
motive that might be alleged to have prompted his action, for
personal motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized official
conduct. In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
executive department, keeping within the limits of his authority,
should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control
his official conduct may at any time become the subject of inquiry
in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the
executive branch of the government if he were subjected to any such
restraint. He may have legal authority to act, but he may have
such
Page 161 U. S. 499
large discretion in the premises that it will not always be his
absolute duty to exercise the authority with which he is invested.
But if he acts having authority, his conduct cannot be made the
foundation of a suit against him personally for damages, even if
the circumstances show that he is not disagreeably impressed by the
fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular
individuals. In the present case, as we have found, the defendant,
in issuing the circular in question, did not exceed his authority
nor pass the line of his duty as Postmaster General. The motive
that impelled him to do that of which the plaintiff complains is
therefore wholly immaterial. If we were to hold that the demurrer
admitted, for the purposes of the trial, that the defendant acted
maliciously, that could not change the law.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
is
Affirmed.