In 1883, R. had his legal residence in New Jersey, but actually
lived in New York. His wife resided in New Jersey, and filed a bill
in the Court of Chancery of that state against him for divorce on
the ground of adultery.
The defendant appeared and answered, denying the allegations
in
the bill. In 1886 the plaintiff filed a supplemental bill
charging other
acts of adultery subsequent to the filing of the bill. The court
made an order, reciting the appearance and answer of the defendant
to the original bill, directing him to appear on a day named and
plead to the supplemental bill, and ordering a copy of this order,
with a certified copy of the supplemental bill, to be served on him
personally, which was done in the City of New York. The defendant
did not so appear and answer, and the further proceedings in the
case resulted in a decree finding the defendant guilty of the acts
of adultery charged "in the said bill of complaint and the
supplemental bill thereto," granting the divorce prayed for, and
awarding the plaintiff alimony. The plaintiff commenced an action
in a court of the New York to recover alimony on this decree,
whereupon the defendant, by the solicitor who had appeared for him
and filed his answer to the original bill, applied for and obtained
from the chancellor in New Jersey an amendment to the decree so as
to make it read that the defendant had been guilty of the crime of
adultery charged against him in said supplemental bill. The
complaint in the New York case set forth the proceedings and decree
in the New Jersey case and alleged that the defendant had accepted
the proceedings as valid, and had, after the decree of divorce,
married another wife. The defendant answered, denying that the
Court of Chancery in New Jersey had any jurisdiction to enter the
decree on the supplemental bill, and admitting his second marriage.
On the trial of the New York case, the evidence of an attorney and
counselor of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as an expert, was
offered and received to the effect that in his opinion the
chancellor erred in taking jurisdiction and proceeding to judgment
on the supplemental bill without service of a new subpoena in the
state or the voluntary appearance of defendant after the filing of
the supplemental bill, and that the law of New Jersey did not
warrant him in so doing. The trial resulted in a judgment for
defendant, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals upon the
ground that the law of New Jersey and the practice of its Court of
Chancery had been shown by undisputed evidence to be as stated by
the expert.
Held:
(1) That in the absence of statutory direction or reported
decision to
Page 160 U. S. 532
the contrary, this Court must find the law of New Jersey
applicable to this case in the decree of the chancellor, and that
the remedy of the defendant, if he felt himself aggrieved, was by
appeal; (2) that the opinion of the expert could not control the
judgment of the Court in this respect; (3) that the New York
courts, in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, did not give due
effect to the provisions of Article IV of the Constitution of the
United States, which require that full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other
state.
This was an action brought on August 4, 1887, in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, against Thomas G. Rigney on a final
decree of the Court of Chancery of the State of New Jersey whereby
had been awarded to Ella L. Rigney, now Ella L. Laing, certain
costs, counsel fees, and alimony, as well as a decree of
divorce.
The action was tried at a special term of the supreme court,
before a judge without a jury, and resulted in a judgment
dismissing the complaint. An appeal was taken to the general term
of the supreme court, and there the judgment of the special term
was reversed. From the judgment of the general term, an appeal was
taken to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, which court
reversed the judgment of the general term and affirmed that of the
special term. 127 N.Y. 412. This decision of the Court of Appeals
was duly remitted to the supreme court, and a judgment in
accordance therewith with was entered November 4, 1891, which, by a
writ of error, has been brought to this Court.
It appears that these parties were married in the State of New
York on February 12, 1873, and continued to reside in that state
until January, 1877, when they removed to the City of Elizabeth, in
the State of New Jersey. They had two children, a girl and a boy,
who were fourteen and eleven years old, respectively, at the time
of the trial. In January, 1883, the defendant ceased to support his
family, and subsequently abandoned his family.
On April 23, 1883, she, then being a resident of the State of
New Jersey, filed a bill against the defendant in the Court of
Chancery of that state wherein she alleged that the defendant,
Page 160 U. S. 533
whose legal residence was still in the City of Elizabeth, had
committed adultery with several persons on different occasions in
the City of New York, and prayed for an absolute divorce and for
alimony. On August 4, 1883, the defendant appeared in the suit, by
his solicitors and counsel, and filed an answer denying the
allegations of adultery in the bill.
On May 18, 1886, the plaintiff filed a supplemental bill in the
divorce suit wherein she alleged that the defendant had committed
adultery with a person named, in the City of New York at various
times since the commencement of the suit, and prayed that she might
have the same relief against the defendant "as she might have had
if the facts stated and charged by way of supplement had been
stated in the original bill," and that the marriage be dissolved
and a suitable allowance made to her as alimony.
On April 29, 1887, an order was made by the chancellor of New
Jersey reciting the appearance and answer of the defendant to the
original bill, the filing of the supplemental bill, the issuing of
a subpoena thereon, and that, the defendant residing out of the
State of New Jersey, process could not be served upon him, and
directing that the defendant appear and plead, demur, or answer to
the supplemental bill on or before May 18, 1887, or that, in
default thereof, such decree be made against him as the chancellor
should deem equitable and just, and further directing that a copy
of the order, with a certified copy of the supplemental bill,
should, within five days thereafter, be served upon the defendant
personally, or, in default of such service, that notice of the
order be published as therein directed. On May 4, 1887, a copy of
this order and of the supplemental bill were served on the
defendant personally in the City of New York.
On May 19, 1887, an order was made by the chancellor reciting
that due notice of the order of the court of April 29th directing
the defendant to appear and answer the said bill on or before May
18th had been duly served, with a copy of the supplemental bill,
"as in said order and by the rules of this court directed and
prescribed," and that the defendant had not answered the same
within the time limited by law
Page 160 U. S. 534
and said order, and referring the case to a special master to
ascertain and report, on evidence, as to the truth of the
allegation of the said bill and his opinion thereon.
On June 10, 1887, the special master reported to the court that
all material facts charged in the bill and supplemental bill were
true, and that a decree of divorce should be granted as prayed
for.
On June 11, 1887, a final decree was rendered by the chancellor
confirming the report, granting a divorce, and awarding costs,
counsel fees, and alimony. The decree found "that the said
defendant has been guilty of the crime of adultery charged against
him in the said bill of complaint and the supplemental bill
thereto," and it was
"ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said complainant, Ella
L. Rigney, and the said defendant, Thomas G. Rigney, be divorced
from the bond of matrimony for the cause aforesaid, and the
marriage between them is hereby dissolved accordingly, and the said
parties are hereby freed and discharged from the obligations
thereof."
It was further adjudged and decreed that the custody of the
children be awarded to the plaintiff, and that the defendant pay
alimony
pendente lite at the rate of $100 per month "from
the filing of the bill up to the date of this order," and
thereafter at the rate of $45 per week, together with the costs of
the suit, and the sum of $150 for counsel fees.
It appears by the record that in January, 1888, shortly before
the trial of the present case, which occurred in April, 1888, the
defendant, by the solicitor who had appeared for him and filed his
answer to the original bill in the divorce suit, applied for and
obtained from the chancellor an amendment of the decree of June 11,
1887, by striking out from the recitals thereof the words "bill of
complaint and the," and "thereto," so as to make the recital read,
"and that the said defendant has been guilty of the crime of
adultery charged against him in said supplemental bill." In other
respects, the amended decree was precisely the same as the
original, and, as amended, was enrolled by the procurement and at
the cost of the defendant.
Page 160 U. S. 535
As already stated, on August 4, 1887, Mrs. Rigney brought this
action in the Supreme Court of New York upon the final decree of
the Court of Chancery of New Jersey to recover the amount awarded
by the decree for alimony and costs, no part of which had been
paid. The complaint, served December 3, 1887, set forth the
proceedings and final decree of June 11, 1887, as they are above
stated, and it further alleged that the defendant, accepting the
force of the decree of the New Jersey court, had on September 18,
1887, married one Abbie Ahern. The complaint also alleged that on
or about May 4, 1887, a copy of the said supplemental bill and a
copy of the order for publication thereof were duly served upon the
defendant in the City of New York by the delivery thereof to him
personally.
The defendant in his answer admitted "the making of the order of
May 2, 1887, and the service thereof and of the supplemental bill
upon him," but alleged that, as said service was made in the State
of New York, and not in the State of New Jersey, the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey, by such service, obtained no jurisdiction
to make any personal decree against him on the supplemental bill.
The terms of the answer in this particular were as follows:
"This defendant denies that said Court of Chancery of New Jersey
ever obtained jurisdiction of the person of this defendant under
said supplemental bill, or had any power to enter a personal decree
against him, and he denies that such decree, so far as it is a
personal decree against this defendant, is of any validity or
effect, but he admits that said decree was effectual to dissolve
the marriage status existing between him and the plaintiff."
The answer admitted the truth of the allegations of the
complaint that the defendant, acting on the assumption of the
validity of the decree of divorce, had, on September 18, 1887,
married another woman, and that said marriage had been solemnized
in the State of New Jersey and also in the State of New York.
Page 160 U. S. 539
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal question presented by this record is whether the
judgment of the New York courts, in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, which sought to enforce a final decree of the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey, gave due effect to the provisions of
Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, which require
that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
judicial proceedings of every other state.
The record discloses, and it is conceded, that upon its face the
decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey purports to be a
final decree granting the divorce and adjudging the payment of the
costs and alimony to recover which this suit was brought.
But the defendant seeks to avail himself of the well settled
doctrine that it is competent for a defendant, when sued in the
court of his domicile on a judgment obtained against him in another
state, to show that the court of such other state had not
jurisdiction to render the judgment against him. To sustain this
position in this Court, the defendant relies upon the sixth finding
of the trial court, which was as follows:
"That the above-named defendant was never served with process in
New Jersey under said supplemental bill, and never appeared therein
or answered thereto, and the decree of the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, which was based entirely upon charges of adultery contained
in said supplemental bill, did not, under the laws of that state,
become binding upon said defendant personally."
It is undoubtedly true, as claimed by the defendant in
error,
Page 160 U. S. 540
that if the judgment of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey was
not binding upon the defendant therein personally in that state, no
such force could be given to it in the State of New York, and it is
contended that as, by the sixth finding above recited, it is found
that the decree was not binding personally on the defendant, under
the laws of New Jersey, the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York and this Court must accept and cannot review such finding. And
upon that finding, the Court of Appeals said:
"The trial court found upon undisputed evidence that, under the
law of New Jersey and the practice of its Court of Chancery,
jurisdiction to renders a judgment for alimony and costs on the
supplemental bill, enforceable in that state against the defendant,
could not be acquired without service of a new subpoena in the
state or by his appearance in the action subsequent to the filing
of the supplemental bill. . . . Service within the state was found
to be, under the law and practice of the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, an indispensable prerequisite to the rendition of a
personal judgment."
Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N.Y. 412.
The plaintiff duly excepted to the findings and conclusions, and
it is well settled that exceptions to alleged findings of facts,
because unsupported by evidence, present questions of law
reviewable in courts of error.
The only evidence adduced by the defendant to sustain his side
of the issue as to the law in the State of New Jersey was the
testimony of Daniel M. Dickinson, an attorney and counselor at law
of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, and who had been
employed for some years as chief clerk in the chancellor's office.
This witness testified that under the law and practice of New
Jersey, a supplemental bill was, as to the matter not alleged in
the original bill, an independent proceeding, and that if there
were no service of the subpoena issued under the supplementary bill
and no appearance, the defendant would, as to the new matter
contained in the supplementary bill, not be in court; but the same
witness testified that there was no statute of New Jersey in terms
requiring the issuing of a subpoena on any supplemental bill, nor
was
Page 160 U. S. 541
he able to specify any New Jersey statute which in his opinion
required such process to be issued on a supplemental bill in any
suit in the Court of Chancery of that state, nor could he cite any
judicial decision in that state holding such process to be
necessary. He also testified that,
"by the practice in New Jersey, if the decree contains the fact
that he was served,
prima facie he was; if it does not,
why then there is no decree binding him personally. But so long as
the decree stands against him in our state, why, of course, it is a
good decree."
He also stated that the statute conferring jurisdiction upon the
Court of Chancery is in the revision of the New Jersey laws under
the head of "Chancery Acts."
The plaintiff put in evidence so much of the revision as related
to the Court of Chancery, and which disclosed no provision whatever
requiring a new subpoena to be issued on any supplementary bill
filed in the Court of Chancery, but it does contain provisions with
orders directing absent defendants, whether within or without the
state, to respond to the bill, and on proof of personal service of
such order, the chancellor may proceed to take evidence to
substantiate the bill, and to render such decree as the chancellor
shall think equitable and just, and that any defendant upon whom
such notice is served shall be bound by the decree in such cause as
if he were served with process within the state. New Jersey
Rev.Stat. 1877.
As the defendant's only expert witness testified that the rules
and regulations of the Chancery Court were to be found in the
statutes, it would seem at least questionable whether his opinion
upon the question as to how and when that court acquires
jurisdiction over a defendant in an original or supplemental bill
was competent evidence in the case. At all events, we do not read
his testimony as alleging that where the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over a defendant by personal service within the state,
and then, after appearance by counsel, the defendant absents
himself from the state, and when a supplemental bill is filed in
the suit, service on him of a new subpoena within the state is an
indispensable prerequisite to the rendition of a personal decree on
such supplemental bill.
Page 160 U. S. 542
And when asked directly by defendant's counsel whether such a
decree would be effectual in New Jersey to bind the defendant
personally, he answered, "I have never known any case decided in
New Jersey upon that point."
In the absence of any statutory direction on the subject and of
any reported decision of the Supreme Court of that state, we are
justified in finding the law to be as declared in the very case in
hand, where the chancellor of the Chancery Court of New Jersey has
entered a final decree based upon an original bill, the process
under which was served upon the defendant within the state, and
upon a supplemental bill, a copy of which, with a rule to plead,
was served upon the defendant without the state. So long as this
decree stands, it must be deemed to express the law of the state.
If the defendant deemed himself aggrieved thereby, his remedy was
by an appeal.
In
Cornett v.
Williams, 20 Wall. 226, where, in a circuit court
of the United States, an attempt was made to destroy the effect of
a judgment rendered by a county court by alleging error, this Court
said:
"The power to review and reverse the decision so made is clearly
appellate in its character, and can be exercised only by an
appellate tribunal in a proceeding directly had for that purpose.
It cannot and ought not to be done by another court, in another
case, where the subject is presented incidentally and a reversal
sought in such collateral proceeding. The settled rule of law is
that, jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything
done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally
questioned, is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties
unless impeached for fraud. Every intendment is made to support the
proceeding. It is regarded as if it were regular and irreversible
for error. In the absence of fraud, no question can be collaterally
entertained as to anything lying within the jurisdictional sphere
of the original case. Infinite confusion and mischief would ensue
if the rule were otherwise. These remarks apply to the order of
sale here in question. The county court had power to make it, and
did make it. It is presumed to have been properly made, and the
question of its
Page 160 U. S. 543
propriety was not open to examination upon the trial in the
circuit court. These propositions are sustained by a long and
unbroken line of adjudications in this Court. The last one was the
case of
McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall.
366."
The principle was very clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Baldwin
in
Voorhees v. Bank of United
States, 10 Pet. 474:
"The line which separates error in judgment from the usurpation
of power is very definite, and it is precisely that which denotes
the cases where a judgment or decree is reversible only by an
appellate court, or may be declared a nullity collaterally, when it
is offered in evidence in an action concerning the matter
adjudicated, or purporting to have been so. In the one case, it is
a record importing absolute verity; in the other, mere waste paper.
There can be no middle character assigned to judicial proceedings
which are irreversible for error. Such is their effect between the
parties to the suit, and such are the immunities which the law
affords to a plaintiff who has obtained even an erroneous judgment
or execution."
This rule is recognized in the State of New York. In
Kinnier
v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 542, it was said:
"A judgment of a sister state cannot be impeached by showing
irregularities in the form of proceedings or a noncompliance with
some law of the state relating thereto, or that the decision was
erroneous. Jurisdiction confers power to render the judgment, and
it will be regarded as valid and binding until set aside in the
court in which it was rendered."
Even if, therefore, it was the
opinion of Mr.
Dickinson, the defendant's expert witness, that the chancellor of
New Jersey erred in thinking that jurisdiction over the defendant
personally was conferred by the service on him within the state of
the subpoena under the original bill, and by the service on him,
without the state, of a copy of the supplemental bill and of a rule
to plead, such opinion does not support the finding of the trial
court that, under the laws of the State of New Jersey, the decree
sued on and offered in evidence was not binding upon the defendant
personally. The opinion of the chancellor differed from that of the
witness, and, what is more important,
Page 160 U. S. 544
his
judgment was that, under the laws and practice of
the State of New Jersey, the defendant was in his court, subject to
its jurisdiction, and bound by its decree.
It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error that even if
the defendant could not have been personally bound by a decree
based on the supplemental bill because the subpoena thereunder had
not been served upon him within the State of New Jersey, yet that
as the defendant, after the entry of such a decree against him,
appeared in the New Jersey court by counsel and procured a
modification of the decree, he thereby subjected himself to the
decree as amended.
It is also claimed that, as he admits that he acquiesced in and
ratified the decree by accepting that portion thereof which
relieved him from the contract of marriage, he cannot be heard to
impeach the decree in dealing with the change thus caused in his
marital relations by subjecting him to the payment of costs and
alimony.
The fact that the defendant appeared and procured an amendment
of the decree and its enrollment in its final form took place after
the bringing of the present suit, and, to form the basis for the
contention that he thereby subjected himself to the decree as
amended, such fact ought perhaps to have been made to appear by an
amended or supplemental petition. But as the amended decree was put
in evidence by the defendant himself, and was treated by the New
York courts as the final decree whose effect they were considering,
we shall regard the amended decree as the real ground of the
plaintiff's action.
As the appearance of the defendant was not for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, but was rather in the
nature of an appeal to its jurisdiction, and as the objection
successfully made to the decree as originally enrolled was
restricted to one of its recitals, and did not attack the decree in
the respect that it adjudged that he should pay the costs and
alimony, there is force in the view that he thereby waived any
right to further object to the decree. At all events, he could not
successfully attack the decree collaterally in a court of different
jurisdiction, but his remedy, if any he had, would be by way of
appeal.
Page 160 U. S. 545
It is claimed by the defendant in error that to hold him
personally bound by the decree for the payment of money would, in
the circumstances of the present case, deprive him of his property
without due process of law. This claim is based upon the assumption
that the defendant had no hearing or opportunity to be heard.
As this record discloses that the defendant was served with
process under the original bill, and appeared by counsel, and made
answer, and was personally served with a copy of the supplemental
bill and with an order to plead, and, after permitting himself to
be defaulted, did appear by counsel and procure the vacation of the
original decree and the enrollment of the decree, amended in
accordance with his own motion, it may fairly be said that he both
had an opportunity to be heard and was heard. His appearance by
counsel under the supplementary proceedings was not to object to
the jurisdiction of the court, but to effect a change in the
recitals of the decree on nonjurisdictional grounds. As before
stated, we do not deem it necessary to consider the contention on
behalf of the plaintiff in error that by such appearance the
defendant estopped himself from alleging error in the decree when
thus amended, but we think he certainly precluded himself from now
contending that he has been deprived of his property within the
meaning of the federal Constitution.
As, then, the evidence of the defendant did not avail to show
want of jurisdiction on the part of the Chancery Court of New
Jersey to render the decree in question, and as it was admitted
that the decree remained wholly unpaid, the plaintiff below was
entitled to judgment.
The judgment of the supreme court is hereby reversed, and
the case is remanded to the supreme court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.
