The circuit courts have no power to set aside their decrees in
equity on motion after the term at which they are rendered.
Where McR., a citizen of Kentucky, brought a suit in equity in
the Circuit Court of Kentucky against C.C., stated to be a citizen
of Virginia, and E.J. and S.E., without any designation of
citizenship, all the defendants appeared and answered, and a decree
was pronounced for the plaintiff, it was
held that if a
joint interest vested in C.C. and the other defendants, the court
had no jurisdiction over the cause. But that if a distinct interest
vested in C.C. so that substantial justice, so far as he was
concerned, could be done without affecting the other defendants,
the jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to him
alone.
Page 16 U. S. 592
John McRoberts, stated in the pleadings to be a citizen of the
State of Kentucky, brought his suit in equity, in the District
Court of Kentucky (said court then having by law the jurisdiction
of a circuit court) against Charles Cameron, stated to be a citizen
of Virginia, and Ephraim Jackson, Samuel Emerson, and other parties
named in the bill, without any designation of citizenship. The
defendant Cameron was not served with process, but appeared and
answered the bill, as did the other defendants. The cause was
heard, and at the November term of said court in 1804 a final
decree was pronounced for the plaintiff McRoberts.
In 1805, the defendant Cameron filed a bill of review, which is
now pending, and at the May term of the circuit court of 1811 moved
the court to set aside the decree and to dismiss the suit because
the want of jurisdiction appeared on the record, and upon the
allegation that the said Jackson, Emerson, and the other parties to
the bill, were in fact citizens of the State of Kentucky. On which
motion the following questions arose:
1st. Has the circuit court power and jurisdiction over a
judgment or decree, so as to set the same aside after the term at
which it was pronounced?
2d. If it has, could it be exercised after the lapse of five
years?
3d. Had the district court jurisdiction of the cause as to the
defendant Cameron and the other defendants. If not, had the court
jurisdiction as to the defendant Cameron alone?
Page 16 U. S. 593
Upon which question the judges of the circuit court being
divided in opinion, the same were ordered to be certified to this
Court.
At the present term of this Court it was ordered to be certified
to the circuit court for the District of Kentucky as follows,
viz.,
CERTIFICATE. This cause came on to be heard on the statement of
facts contained in the record, and on the questions on which the
opinions of the judges of the circuit court were opposed, and which
were therefore, at the request of one of the parties, adjourned to
this Court, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof
this Court doth order it to be certified to the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of Kentucky.
1st. That in this case the court had not power over its decree,
so as to set the same aside on motion after the expiration of the
term in which it was rendered.
2d. Consequently, such power cannot be exercised after the lapse
of five years.
3d. If a joint interest vested in Cameron and the other
defendants, the court had no jurisdiction over the cause. If a
distinct interest vested in Cameron, so that substantial justice
(so far as he was interested)
Page 16 U. S. 594
could be done without affecting the other defendants, the
jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to him alone.