Admitting that the third article of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that "the judicial power shall extend
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," vests in the
United States exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases, and that a
murder committed in the waters of a state where the tide ebbs and
flows is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, Congress
has not, in the eighth section of the Act of 1790, ch. 9, "for the
punishment of certain offenses against the United States," so
exercised this power as to confer on the courts of the United
States jurisdiction over such murder.
Quaere whether courts of common law have concurrent
jurisdiction with the admiralty over murder committed in bays,
&c., which are enclosed parts of the sea?
Congress having, in the eighth section of the Act of 1790, ch.
9, provided for the punishment of murder, &c., committed "upon
the high seas or in any river, haven, basin, or bay out of the
jurisdiction of any particular state," it is not the offense
committed but the
bay, &c. in which it is committed
that must be out of the jurisdiction of the state.
The grant to the United States in the Constitution of all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction does not extend to a cession
of the waters in which those cases may arise or of general
jurisdiction over the same. Congress may pass all laws which a
necessary for giving the most complete effect to the exercise of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction granted to the government of
the union, but the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to
this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion of territory not
yet given away, and the residuary powers of legislation still
remain in the state.
Congress have power to provide for the, punishment of offenses
committed by perms serving on board a ship of war of the United
States, wherever that ship may lie. But Congress have not exercised
that power in the case of a ship lying in the waters of the United
States; the words "within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or
in any other place or district of country
under the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," in the third
section of the Act of 1790, ch. 9, not extending to a ship of war,
but only to objects in their nature fixed and territorial.
Page 16 U. S. 337
The defendant, William Bevans, was indicted for murder in the
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. The indictment was
founded on the 8th section of the Act of Congress of 30 April,
1790, ch. 9. and was tried upon the plea of not guilty. At the
trial it appeared in evidence that the offense charged in the
indictment, was committed by the prisoner on the sixth day of
November, 1816, on board the United States ship of war
Independence, rated a ship of the line of seventy-four
guns, then in commission, and in the actual service of the United
States, under the command of Commodore Bainbridge. At the same
time, William Bevans was a marine duly enlisted, and in the service
of the United States, and was acting as sentry regularly posted on
board of said ship, and Peter Leinstrum (the deceased, named in the
indictment) was at the same time duly enlisted and in
Page 16 U. S. 338
the service of the United States as cook's mate on board of said
ship. The said ship was at the same time lying at anchor in the
main channel of Boston harbors in waters of a sufficient depth at
all times of tide for ships of the largest class and burden, and to
which there is at all times a free and unobstructed passage to the
open sea or ocean. The nearest land at low water mark to the
position where the ship then lay, on various sides is as follows,
viz., the end of the long wharf so called in the Town of
Boston, bearing southwest by south, half south at the distance of
half a mile; the western point of William's Island, bearing north
by west, at the distance between one quarter and one-third of a
mile; the navy yard of the United States at Charlestown, bearing
northwest half-west, at the distance of three quarters of a mile,
and Dorchester point so called, bearing south southeast, at the
distance of two miles and one quarter, and the nearest point of
governor's Island so called (ceded to the United States), bearing
southeast half-east, at the distance of one mile and three
quarters. To and beyond the position or place thus described, the
civil and criminal processes of the courts of the State of
Massachusetts, have hitherto constantly been served and obeyed. The
prisoner was first apprehended for the offense in the District of
Massachusetts.
The jury found a verdict that the prisoner, William Bevans, was
guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment.
Upon the foregoing statement of facts, which was
Page 16 U. S. 339
stated and made under the direction of the court, the prisoner,
by his counsel, after verdict, moved for a new trial, upon which
motion two questions occurred, which also occurred at the trial of
the prisoner. 1. Whether, upon the foregoing statement of facts,
the offense charged in the indictment, and committed on board the
said ship as aforesaid, was within the jurisdiction of the State of
Massachusetts, or of any court thereof. 2. Whether the offense
charged in the indictment, and committed on board the said ship as
aforesaid, was within the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. Upon
which questions the judges of the said circuit court were at the
trial, and upon the motion for a new trial, opposed in opinion, and
thereupon, upon the request of the district attorney of the United
States, the same questions were ordered by the said court to be
certified under the seal of the court to the Supreme Court to be
finally decided.
Page 16 U. S. 386
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question proposed by the circuit court which will be first
considered is whether the offense charged in this indictment was,
according to the statement of facts which accompanies the question,
"within the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Massachusetts?"
The indictment appears to be founded on the 8th sec. of the "act
for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States."
That section gives the courts of the union cognizance of certain
offenses committed on the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin,
or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.
Whatever may be the constitutional power of Congress, it is
clear that this power has not been so exercised in this section of
the act as to confer on its courts jurisdiction over any offense
committed in a river, haven, basin or bay, which river, haven,
basin, or bay, is within the jurisdiction of any particular
state.
What then is the extent of jurisdiction which a state
possesses?
We answer without hesitation the jurisdiction of
Page 16 U. S. 387
a state is coextensive with its territory; coextensive with its
legislative power.
The place described is unquestionably within the original
territory of Massachusetts. It is then within the jurisdiction of
Massachusetts, unless that jurisdiction has been ceded by the
United States.
It is contended to have been ceded by that article in the
Constitution which declares that "the judicial power shall extend
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The argument
is that the power thus granted is exclusive, and that the murder
committed by the prisoner is a case of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.
Let this be admitted. It proves the power of Congress to
legislate in the case, not that Congress has exercised that power.
It has been argued, and the argument in a favor of as well as that
against the proposition deserves great consideration, that courts
of common law have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of admiralty
over murder committed in bays, which are enclosed parts of the sea,
and that for this reason the offense is within the jurisdiction of
Massachusetts. But in construing the act of Congress, the Court
believes it to be unnecessary to pursue the investigation which has
been so well made at the bar respecting the jurisdiction of these
rival courts.
To bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of
the union, it must have been committed in a river, &c., out of
the jurisdiction of any state. It is not the offense committed, but
the bay in which it is committed, which must be out of the
jurisdiction
Page 16 U. S. 388
of the state. If, then, it should be true that Massachusetts can
take no cognizance of the offense, yet, unless the place itself be
out of her jurisdiction, Congress has not given cognizance of that
offense to its courts. If there be a common jurisdiction, the crime
cannot be punished in the courts of the union.
Can the cession of all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction be construed into a cession of the waters on which
those cases may arise.
This is a question on which the court is incapable of feeling a
doubt. The article which describes the judicial power of the United
States is not intended for the cession of territory or of general
jurisdiction. It is obviously designed for other purposes. It is in
the 8th section of the 2d article, we are to look for cessions of
territory and of exclusive jurisdiction. Congress has power to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this district, and over all
places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in
which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings.
It is observable that the power of exclusive legislation (which
is jurisdiction) is united with cession of territory, which is to
be the free act of the states. It is difficult to compare the two
sections together, without feeling a conviction, not to be
strengthened by any commentary on them, that, in describing the
judicial power, the framers of our Constitution had not in view any
cession of territory, or, which is essentially the same, of general
jurisdiction.
It is not questioned that whatever may be necessary to the full
and unlimited exercise of admiralty
Page 16 U. S. 389
and maritime jurisdiction is in the government of the union.
Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and proper for
giving the most complete effect to this power. Still, the general
jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant of power,
adheres to the territory as a portion of sovereignty not yet given
away. The residuary powers of legislation are still in
Massachusetts. Suppose for example the power of regulating trade
had not been given to the general government. Would this extension
of the judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, have divested Massachusetts of the power to regulate
the trade of her bay? As the powers of the respective governments
now stand, if two citizens of Massachusetts step into shallow water
when the tide flows, and fight a duel, are they not within the
jurisdiction, and punishable by the laws of Massachusetts? If these
questions must be answered in the affirmative, and we believe they
must, then the bay in which this murder was committed, is not out
of the jurisdiction of a state, and the Circuit Court of
Massachusetts is not authorized, by the section under
consideration, to take cognizance of the murder which had been
committed.
It may be deemed within the scope of the question certified to
this Court to inquire whether any other part of the act has given
cognizance of this murder to the Circuit Court of
Massachusetts.
The third section enacts
"That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal,
dockyard, magazine, or in any other place, or district of country,
under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Page 16 U. S. 390
United States, commit the crime of willful murder, such person
or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death."
Although the bay on which this murder was committed might not be
out of the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, the ship of war on the
deck of which it was committed is, it has been said, "a place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,"
whose courts may consequently take cognizance of the offense.
That a government which possesses the broad power of war, which
"may provide and maintain a navy," which "may make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and navel forces," has power
to punish an offense committed by a marine on board a ship of war,
wherever that ship may lie, is a proposition never to be questioned
in this Court. On this section, as on the 8th, the inquiry respects
not the extent of the power of Congress, but the extent to which
that power has been exercised.
The objects with which the word "place" is associated are all,
in their nature, fixed and territorial. A fort, an arsenal, a
dockyard, a magazine, are all of this character. When the sentence
proceeds with the words, "or in any other place or district of
country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States," the construction seems irresistible that, by the words
"other place" was intended another place of a similar character
with those previously enumerated, and with that which follows.
Congress might have omitted in its enumeration some similar place
within its exclusive jurisdiction
Page 16 U. S. 391
which was not comprehended by any of the terms employed to which
some other name might be given, and therefore the words "other
place" or "district of country" were added, but the context shows
the mind of the legislature to have been fixed on territorial
objects of a similar character.
This construction is strengthened by the fact that at the time
of passing this law, the United States did not possess a single
ship of war. It may therefore be reasonably supposed that a
provision for the punishment of crimes in the navy might be
postponed until some provision for a navy should be made. While
taking this view of the subject, it is not entirely unworthy of
remark that afterwards, when a navy was created, and Congress did
not proceed to make rules for its regulation and government, no
jurisdiction is given to the courts of the United States, of any
crime committed in a ship of war, wherever it may be stationed.
Upon these reasons the court is of opinion that a murder committed
on board a ship of war, lying within the harbor of Boston, is not
cognizable in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts;
which opinion is to be certified to that court.
The opinion of the Court on this point is believed to render it
unnecessary co decide the question respecting the jurisdiction of
the state court in the case.
Certificate accordingly.
