Writs of error to circuit courts of appeals in actions for
damages for negligence of railroad corporations are allowed when
the corporations are chartered under the laws of the United
States.
In an action against a railway company to recover for injuries
caused by a collision with a car loaded with coal for a coal
company which had escaped from the side track and run upon the main
track, it is held, in view of the evidence, to be no error to
charge that the railway company is bound to keep its track clear
from obstructions and to see that the cars which it uses on side
tracks are secured in place, so that they will not come upon the
track to overthrow any train that may come along. When in such an
action the defendant sets up a written release of all claims for
damages signed by plaintiff, and the plaintiff, not denying its
execution, sets up that it was signed by him in ignorance of its
contents at a time when he was under great suffering from his
injuries and in a state approaching to unconsciousness caused by
his injuries and by the use of morphine, the question is one for
the jury, under proper instructions from the court, and in this
case, the instructions were proper.
This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Colorado by Robert E. Harris against the
Union Pacific Railway Company to recover for personal injuries
received by him while he was a passenger on defendant's train.
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the circuit court, and the
defendant sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by which the judgment was affirmed.
63 F. 800. A writ of error from this Court was allowed, and, the
cause having been docketed, motions to dismiss or affirm were
submitted.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 158 U. S. 327
The complaint alleged Harris to be "a citizen of the State of
Colorado," and complained of
"the Union Pacific Railway Company, defendant, which was
heretofore and now is duly chartered and organized under and by
virtue of the laws of the United States, and having its principal
place of business in the City of Omaha and State of Nebraska, and
is now, and was at the time and times hereinafter stated, a citizen
of the State of Nebraska."
The motion to dismiss is made upon the ground that the judgment
of the circuit court of appeals was final, inasmuch as the
jurisdiction was dependent upon the opposite parties' being
citizens of different states. As, however, the judgments of the
circuit courts of appeals are final in this class of cases only
when the jurisdiction is dependent "entirely upon the opposite
parties to the suit or controversy being aliens and citizens of the
United States or citizens of different states," plaintiff in error
insists that this judgment was not final, since the jurisdiction
depended not solely on diverse citizenship, but also upon the fact
that plaintiff in error was a federal corporation.
In
Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Amato,
144 U. S. 465, a
suit was brought in the Supreme Court of New York against the
railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, and was removed by the defendant into the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York on
the ground that it arose under an act of Congress, in that the
defendant was a corporation created thereby, and a writ of error to
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was sustained.
In that case, the citizenship of the plaintiff was not mentioned in
the complaint or in the petition for removal, and the petition
stated that the action arose under an act of Congress. It was
accordingly held that the judgment of the circuit court of appeals
was not made final by section 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3,
1891. In the present case, jurisdiction was invoked on the ground
of diverse citizenship, and it is said that that was the sole
ground, and that the reference to the authority under which the
corporation was chartered and organized was merely incidental, and
further
Page 158 U. S. 328
that as the case did not involve the validity or construction of
the charter of plaintiff in error, no federal question arose. It is
not for us to inquire why writs of error to circuit courts of
appeals in actions for damages for negligence of railroad
corporations should be allowed simply because the corporations are
chartered under the laws of the United States, in a statute whose
object was to relieve an overburdened court, since such is the
effect of the statute according to its plain language.
Nevertheless, as plaintiff below appears to have really proceeded
on the ground of diverse citizenship, we think there was color for
the motion to dismiss, although, as the other fact upon which
jurisdiction could be predicated existed, we are obliged to
overrule it. But this brings us to the motion to affirm, which, as
we do not need further argument, we proceed to dispose of.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff, on July 30, 1892, was a
passenger for hire upon one of defendant's coaches in a train with
a locomotive being operated and conducted by defendant between the
City of Georgetown and the City of Denver, defendant being, by the
terms of the contract of passage, bound to deliver plaintiff safely
at Denver, having undertaken to carry and convey him in safety to
that city, and to use due care and diligence thereabout, but that
defendant, in disregard of its undertaking and promise and its duty
in that behalf, carelessly and negligently ran one or more of its
freight cars out on one of its sidings, known as "Silver Age Mill
Siding," and negligently left the same insecure and unsafe, and in
such a position and condition as to interfere with the passage of
the train of cars upon which plaintiff had passage, along the main
line of defendant's track, so that, when the train upon which
plaintiff was a passenger came along, it ran into this freight car
and the injuries complained of were inflicted. This was supported
by the evidence, from which it also appeared that the freight car
in question was loaded for the Silver Age Mill Company with coal,
and was unloaded by that company's men.
The defendant, in its answer, denied all negligence, but
admitted
"that it had standing upon its side track at about the
Page 158 U. S. 329
place mentioned in said complaint, one or more freight cars, but
denies that the said freight cars were left insecure or unsafe or
in such a position as to interfere with the passage of the train of
cars upon which this plaintiff was riding."
The answer contained no allegation or suggestion that any other
company had any control over the side track or the freight cars, or
that any other company was in any manner responsible for the
negligence which resulted in the collision.
The circuit court charged the jury that
"there is no room for controversy, notwithstanding the fact that
this car was delivered to the mining company filled with coal and
for the use of the mining company, and that it would seem from the
evidence that after unloading the car, it was not sufficiently
fastened in respect of the brakes; perhaps it was necessary to
block the wheels also in such a place as that, but that whatever
was necessary to keep it securely in place upon the side track was
not done, and it moved down upon the track so as to overthrow the
cars in the train which came down with the plaintiff. The act of
negligence of the servants of the mining company is to be ascribed
to the defendant. In other words, the railway company, as to its
passengers, is bound to keep its track clear from obstructions of
this kind, to see that the cars which it uses on side tracks are
secured in place, so that they will not come upon the track to
overthrow any train that may come along, and there seems to be no
question but that the car in which plaintiff was riding was
overthrown by the freight car coming down from the switch or side
track and onto the main track in collision with the cars of the
train which carried the plaintiff."
To the giving of these instructions, defendant excepted. But we
agree with the circuit court of appeals that on the evidence and
under the pleadings, there was no reversible error therein, and
that this is so as to the motion at the conclusion of the evidence
by defendant for an instruction that the defendant was not liable,
and that the Silver Age Milling Company was, if there were a
liability at all. Indeed, it is stated by the circuit court of
appeals that it was conceded on argument that defendant's
negligence was sufficiently established.
Page 158 U. S. 330
The stress of the contention of the railroad company is thrown,
however, upon another branch of the case. The complaint was filed
November 26, 1892, and the answer January 11, 1893. On July 8,
1893, the defendant below filed a supplemental answer, setting up a
written release in bar of the action, executed four days after the
accident, to which supplemental answer a replication was filed July
11, 1893, averring as ground of avoidance of such release that
plaintiff's mind at the time of its execution was so enfeebled by
opiates, shock, and pain that he was unable to enter into
contractual relations; that the minds of the parties never met on
the principal subject embraced in the release, namely, the damages
for which the action was brought, and that the release was obtained
through misrepresentation and fraud. The trial commenced July 14,
and was concluded by the rendition of the verdict on July 17, 1893.
Upon the issues joined, the validity of the release was a matter to
be left to the jury, and, although the bill of exceptions does not
purport to contain all the evidence, it appears therefrom that
there was evidence tending to sustain the replication. Certain
exceptions were taken by plaintiff in error in relation to the
admission of evidence over objection, and these were dismissed by
the circuit court of appeals with this observation:
"A separate statement and consideration of these exceptions is
not necessary, as none of them is of any general importance. They
have all been considered carefully, and we are satisfied none of
them has any merit."
We are of the same opinion, but will refer by way of
illustration to two of the rulings complained of. One of the
questions in the case was whether Harris was bound to have read the
release at the time he signed it, and that involved considering
whether he was able to do so. He was asked upon the trial whether
he could read any part of the release without spectacles, it being
contended that he did not have his spectacles at the time the claim
agent of the railroad company interviewed him in his bed just after
the accident. The witness testified that he could not read the fine
print with spectacles, nor the large print without; that his
eyesight was not as good as it was when the release was presented
to him, but that
Page 158 U. S. 331
at that time, he could not have read a word of it without his
glasses. Again, he was asked:
"Were you at the time of signing that, conscious that you were
signing any agreement other than for your expenses of sickness and
loss of time for two weeks?"
And he answered: "That is what he told me; that is just what he
told me," and that the release was not read to him by the claim
agent. We do not think that any ruling in reference to this
testimony can be held as substantially incorrect. The word
"conscious" related to the understanding of the witness at the
time, and the question and answer are to be taken with the other
testimony and the instructions in the case, and we find nothing in
these particulars calculated to mislead the jury or to be so
prejudicial to the defendant as to justify complaint.
The railway company moved that the jury be instructed that, upon
the evidence, the release was a complete bar to the action, which
instruction the court declined to give, and defendant excepted;
but, as there was evidence tending to sustain plaintiff's
contention in relation to the validity of the release, the
instruction was properly refused. The court charged the jury in
this regard, in substance, as follows:
"A release of this kind is of the highest significance in
general when it appears that the situation and circumstances of the
parties show that it has been entered into with an understanding of
the rights of the parties respectively, and with intent to include
all matters of difference between them,"
and
"that when the parties are upon an equal footing and there seems
to be no reason to believe that any mistake has been made in
respect to it, that neither party is at liberty to deny the force
and effect of what it may contain; he is not at liberty to say that
he did not read it or that he did not understand it,"
but that
"when it appears that either party is in a situation as to his
health, physical condition, or as to the state of his mind that
makes it probable that he acted without deliberation, without an
understanding of the act with which he is charged, the instrument
itself may be disregarded;"
that in this instance, plaintiff, having been injured July 30th,
and while he was lying in bed apparently quite ill,
"was approached by an agent of
Page 158 U. S. 332
the defendant company, and was induced to sign the release which
has been put in evidence before you,"
and upon that,
"it becomes a question in the first instance whether he was in a
condition to know precisely what he was doing. He seems to have had
in some degree and to some extent the possession of his faculties.
He had used whisky at the time of the accident, or shortly
afterwards, and morphine had been administered to him on several
occasions. There is a question as to the effect of the accident,
how far he was disabled by it, and as to the effect of the drug and
of the whisky, perhaps, on his mind; whether he was then in a
condition to deal with such a subject as was presented to him. If
he was not, and you can say that his faculties were in such a state
that he could not comprehend what he was doing, and the force and
effect of the paper which he signed, you may say he is not to be
charged with it. . . . And aside from that, if there was a
misunderstanding of the facts, whether the facts were willfully
misstated by the agent of the railway company or not is not a very
material question, but the question is whether the facts were
understood by both parties."
That upon that, the agent of the railroad company said "that he
only spoke in general way of making a settlement," and
"his language was such as to comprehend all matters that were in
difference between them, while plaintiff says that he was not asked
to consider, nor did he consider, the question of the liability of
the railroad company to him for the injury which he had
received."
And
"that, in reckoning up what should be paid to him, they
considered only the question in respect to his illness, his
doctor's bill, and the like, and the loss of time for two
weeks,"
and, if the jury accepted
"plaintiff's account of the negotiation between them as against
that of the agent of the railway company, then it would appear that
the plaintiff at least did not understand the subject matter of the
negotiation, and as to what is expressed in the release, he says
that he did not read it, and could not read it without his
spectacles, and that he did not have them at the time this paper
was given to him."
The court further instructed the jury that
"under some circumstances, a man in full health and accustomed
to the
Page 158 U. S. 333
transaction of business, executing such a paper as that, would
not be at liberty to deny his knowledge of its contents, but with
one in the situation of plaintiff, lying on his bed and somewhat
prostrated by the shock which occurred at the time of the accident,
he may be excused from reading it if he did not in fact read it. .
. . He may be excused because he was in some pain, misery, and
perhaps to some extent under the influence of the morphine which he
had taken."
And further that
"if he understood what he was doing and understood that he was
making a settlement of the whole business, the entire matter
between himself and the railroad company, then he is bound by the
settlement without regard to the amount of money which he received.
. . . If the settlement was made with a full understanding of the
rights of the parties, the plaintiff then being in a state of
health to enable him to transact such business, and upon that you
say that the settlement is binding upon the plaintiff, he is
concluded of this action, and you need make no further inquiry in
respect of it -- that is to say, his action cannot be
maintained."
And the court further charged the jury that if they made an
allowance to the plaintiff, they should deduct from it what he had
received.
To various parts of the charge defendant excepted, but we deem
it unnecessary to go over these exceptions in detail, as the charge
as a whole was in accordance with the great weight of authority
upon the subject, and was correct upon the issues joined and the
evidence thereon.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Railway v.
Lewis, 109 Ill. 120;
Bliss v. New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad, 160 Mass. 447;
Mullen v. Old Colony
Railroad, 127 Mass. 86;
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58;
Lusted v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway, 71 Wis. 391;
Dixon v. Brooklyn City
& Newton Railroad, 100 N.Y. 170;
Illinois Central
Railroad v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183;
Mateer v. Missouri Pacific
Railway, 105 Mo. 320;
Stone v. Chicago & West Mich.
Railroad, 66 Mich. 76;
Smith v. Occidental & Oriental
Steamship Co. 99 Cal. 462.
Judgment affirmed.