Though questions of negligence and contributory negligence are
ordinarily, questions of fact to be passed upon by a jury, yet,
when the undisputed evidence is so conclusive that the court would
be compelled to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it,
it may withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury and
direct a verdict.
This case was commenced in the District Court of Clay County,
Dakota Territory, on August 31, 1886, by the plaintiff in error,
Biddena Elliott, widow of John Elliott, deceased, against the
railway company, to recover damages on account of the death of John
Elliott, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
defendant and its employees.
The defendant answered, a trial was had at the September term,
1886, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $7,000. Judgment
having been entered thereon, the defendant appealed to the supreme
court of the territory, which reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for a new trial. 5 Dak. 523.
The case was again tried, though apparently in the District
Court of Minnehaha County at the April term, 1889, upon the same
evidence that was presented on the first trial. A verdict was
directed in favor of the defendant, and judgment entered thereon.
Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, which, on May 31, 1889,
affirmed the judgment. Thereupon a writ of error was sued out from
this Court.
Page 150 U. S. 246
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is as to the liability of the company
for the death of John Elliott. The company made three defenses:
one, that it was guilty of no negligence; second, that if there
were any negligence, it was that of a fellow servant, and third
that Elliott was guilty of contributory negligence. The supreme
court of the territory, in its opinion filed when the case was
first in that court, considered the last two defenses as sustained,
and because thereof reversed the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. All of them have been presented and full argued in this
Court, but, as we consider the third sufficient, it is unnecessary
to notice the first two. We are of opinion that the deceased was
guilty of contributory negligence such as to bar any recovery. It
is true that questions of negligence and contributory negligence
are ordinarily questions of fact to be passed upon by a jury; yet,
when the undisputed evidence is so conclusive that the court would
be compelled to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it,
it may withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury, and
direct a verdict.
Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S.
697;
Schofield v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railroad, 114 U. S. 615;
Delaware, Lackawanna &c. Railroad Co. v. Converse,
139 U. S. 469;
Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 418.
What, then, are the facts concerning the accident? It took place
at a station called "Meckling," a hamlet of two or three houses and
of so little importance that at the time, the company had no
station agent there. The main track of the defendant's road ran
eastward and westward in a straight line, and the ground was level.
On the north side of this track was a siding, 728 feet in length
from switch to switch, and distant from the main track at the
maximum 16 feet. This
Page 150 U. S. 247
siding was the only extra track at the place. About 100 feet
east from the west switch was the depot, on the south of the track,
and some 10 feet therefrom. Two hundred feet east of that was a
small car house, 16 feet from the track. These were the only
buildings on the depot grounds. No cars were standing on the track
or siding. The day was clear, and there was nothing to prevent the
deceased from seeing all that was going on. He was foreman of a
section gang, and had been working on this track for 10 or more
years. In expectation of a coming freight train, his men had placed
their hand car on the siding. The train was due at 8:25 A.M., but
was, perhaps, five or ten minutes late. It came from the west, and
at this station made a double flying switch. This was accomplished
by uncoupling the train at two places, thus breaking it into three
sections. The first section, consisting of the engine and 18 cars,
moved along the main track, but before the balance of the train
reached the switch, its speed having been checked by brakes, that
was turned so that two cars, constituting the second section, and
under the control of a brakeman, passed onto the siding. The rear
section having been still further checked by brakes, the switch was
reset so that it passed onto the main track, following the first
section. The rear section consisted of a flat car, a box car, a
caboose, and an empty passenger coach, and was under the care of
the conductor and one brakeman. As the second section was thrown by
the flying switch onto the siding, two of the men started to push
the hand car towards the east, so as not to be struck by the
approaching freight cars. The deceased at the time the first
section passed the car house, was standing some sixteen feet west
thereof, and four or five feet from the track, talking with one of
his men. After a short conversation, the latter started towards the
depot, while the deceased walked eastward along the track until he
had passed a few feet beyond the car house, when he started hastily
towards the siding. His attention had apparently been called by the
approach of the two cars on the siding to the hand car, for he made
some call to the men who were pushing that hand car. He crossed the
main track diagonally, his face turned eastward. The rear
Page 150 U. S. 248
section, coming along from the west, struck and crushed him.
This rear section, when it passed the depot, was moving slowly, not
faster than a walk, as one of the witnesses testified. That it was
moving quite slowly is evident from the fact that it came to a stop
after two cars and the caboose had passed over the body of the
deceased, and this though no special effort was made to check them
after the deceased had been struck, the conductor and brakeman on
that section being unaware of the accident. When he started to
cross the track this approaching section was not to exceed 25 or 30
feet from him.
It thus appears that the deceased, an experienced railroad man,
on a bright morning, and with nothing to obstruct his vision,
started along and across a railroad track, with which he was
entirely familiar, with cars approaching and only 25 or 30 feet
away, and, before he gets across that track, is overtaken by those
cars and killed. But one explanation of his conduct is possible,
and that is that he went upon the track without looking to see
whether any train was coming. Such omission has been again and
again, both as to travelers on the highway and employees on the
road, affirmed to be negligence. The track itself, as it seems
necessary to iterate and reiterate, is itself a warning. It is a
place of danger. It can never be assumed that cars are not
approaching on a track, or that there is no danger therefrom. It
may be, as is urged, that his motive was to assist in getting the
hand car out of the way of the section moving on the siding. But
whatever his motive, the fact remains that he stepped onto the
track in front of an approaching train, without looking or taking
any precautions for his own safety.
This is not a case in which one, placed in a position of danger
through the negligence of the company, confused by his
surroundings, makes perhaps a mistake in choice as to the way of
escape, and is caught in an accident, for here the deceased was in
no danger. He was standing in a place of safety on the sough of the
main track. He went into a place of danger from a place of safety,
and went in without taking the ordinary precautions imperatively
required of all who place themselves in a similar position of
danger.
Page 150 U. S. 249
The trial court was right in holding that he was guilty of
contributory negligence. So, without considering the other
questions presented in the record, the judgment will be
affirmed.
As since the decision of the supreme court of the territory,
that territory has been admitted into the Union as the two states
of North Dakota and South Dakota, and as the counties of the trial
are in the State of South Dakota, the mandate will go to the
Supreme Court of that state.
Affirmed.