While the motion to dismiss must therefore be overruled, yet, as
there was color for it, we must inquire whether the questions on
which jurisdiction depends are such as, in the language of our
rule, (6), not to need further argument. We are of opinion that
they are of that class. When Charles W. Colehour was adjudged a
bankrupt, he does not appear to have held any interest in the lands
now in controversy. The answer of Roby distinctly states that he,
Charles W. Colehour, in 1876, for a sufficient and valuable
consideration, conveyed all his interest to W. H. Colehour, and had
no interest in said lands at the date of his petition in
bankruptcy, filed in 1878. The decree is evidently based, so far as
Charles W. Colehour is concerned, upon the deed to him by William
H. Colehour, executed in 1879, although the respective interests of
the parties were established with reference to the declaration of
trust made in October, 1873. There is consequently no ground upon
which to rest the contention that Charles W. Colehour had any
interest or right in the lands that passed to his assignee in
bankruptcy.
Equally without force is the contention that the adjudication of
Roby to be a bankrupt, followed by his conveyance to his assignee
in bankruptcy and his purchase from such assignee, had any effect
upon the rights of William H. Colehour or Charles W. Colehour. The
respective interests of
Page 146 U. S. 161
Roby and the Colehours in the lands at the date of Roby's
bankruptcy could have been determined in a suit or proceeding to
which they and Roby's assignee in bankruptcy were parties, so that
the purchaser at the assignee's sale would have acquired a title
discharged from any claim upon them by either of the Colehours. But
it does not appear that any such was brought, or that the
conflicting interests of the parties were determined as between
them, or either of them, and Roby's assignee in bankruptcy. Roby's
claim is that his purchase of the lands from his assignee in
bankruptcy, the legal title to which was in him, of record,
discharged him from all obligation to recognize any claim, upon the
part of either of the Colehours, arising out of the relations
existing between them and him prior to his bankruptcy. If at the
time of filing his petition in bankruptcy, he was bound by his
relations to the Colehours, although holding the legal title, to
account to them for their portions of the lands, as defined in any
previous declaration of trust to which he was a party, or to which
he assented, or by which he was bound, he was not discharged from
that obligation by merely purchasing the lands from his assignee in
bankruptcy. It does not appear that any issue was framed and
determined in the bankruptcy court as between him or his assignee
and the Colehours. The conveyance to his assignee passed to the
latter only such interest as he in fact had, and when he bought
from the assignee, he purchased only such as he could rightfully
have conveyed originally to his assignee. If, before he went into
bankruptcy, the Colehours had any interest in the lands which they
could assert as between themselves and him, he could not, by simply
purchasing it from his assignee, acquire an absolute title, freed
from their claim. We are of opinion that the proceedings in
bankruptcy against Roby, and the purchase from his assignee did not
defeat the claims now asserted by the Colehours in these lands, and
which were recognized by the decree below.
Whether such relations in fact existed between the Colehours and
Roby as prevented him, consistently with those relations, from
purchasing the lands for himself -- in other
Page 146 U. S. 162
words, whether he was the attorney of the Colehours when he
acquired the legal title -- or whether, upon principles of equity,
Roby should be deemed to have acquired the title for them and
himself, subject to the declaration of trust referred to in the
pleadings and decree, are not questions of a federal nature. The
decree below in respect to those matters is not subject to
reexamination by this Court. The federal questions having been
decided correctly, and those questions being such as not to need
any further argument beyond that presented in the briefs of
counsel, the decree in each of the cases must be
Affirmed.