By section 6 of the Act of March 3, 1891, establishing circuit
courts of appeals, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, the appellate jurisdiction
not vested in this Court was vested in the court created by that
act, and the entire jurisdiction was distributed.
The words "unless otherwise provided by law" in the clause in
that section which provides that the circuit courts shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction "in all cases other than those provided for
in the preceding section of this act, unless otherwise provided by
law" were inserted in order to guard against implied repeals, and
are not to be construed as referring to prior laws only.
It is competent for this Court by certiorari to direct any case
to be certified by the circuit courts of appeals, whether its
advice is requested or not, except those which may be brought here
by appeal or writ of error.
Section 6 of the Chinese Restriction Act of May 6, 1882, 22
Stat. 58, c. 126, as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat.
115, c. 220, does not apply to Chinese merchants, already domiciled
in the United States, who, having left the country for temporary
purposes,
animo revertendi, seek to reenter it on their
return to their business and their homes.
This is a writ of certiorari for the review of a judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Page 144 U. S. 48
Northern District of California in a case of habeas corpus which
determined that Lau Ow Bew, the appellant, is a Chinese person
forbidden by law to land within the United States, and has no right
to be or remain therein, and ordered that he be deported out of the
country, and transported to the port in China whence he came.
The proceedings in the circuit court are set out in the
application for the certiorari, as reported in
141 U. S. 141 U.S.
583. The case was heard and determined in that court upon an agreed
statement of facts, as follows:
"It is hereby stipulated and agreed that the following are the
facts herein:"
"1st. That the said Lau Ow Bew is now on board the S.S.
Oceanic, which arrived in the port of San Francisco, State
of California, on the 11th day of August, A.D. 1891, from Hong
Kong, and is detained and confined thereon by Captain Smith, the
master thereof."
"2d. That the said passenger is now and for seventeen years last
past has been a resident of the United States, and domiciled
therein."
"3d. That during all of said time, the said passenger has been
engaged in the wholesale and importing mercantile business in the
City of Portland, State of Oregon, under the firm name and style of
Hop Chong & Co."
"4th. That said firm is worth $40,000, and said passenger has a
one-fourth interest therein, in addition to other properties."
"5th. That said firm does a business annually of $100,000, and
pays annually to the United States government large sums of money,
amounting to many thousands of dollars, as duties upon
imports."
"6th. That on the 30th day of September, A.D. 1890, the said
passenger departed from this country temporarily on a visit to his
relatives in China, with the intention of returning as soon as
possible to this country, and returned to this country by the
steam-ship
Oceanic on the 11th day of August, A.D.
1891."
"7th. That at the time of his departure, he procured
satisfactory
Page 144 U. S. 49
evidence of his status in this country as a merchant, and on his
return hereto he presented said proofs to the collector of the port
of San Francisco, but said collector, while acknowledging the
sufficiency of said proofs, and admitting that the said passenger
was a merchant domiciled herein, refused to permit the said
passenger to land on the sole ground that the said passenger failed
and neglected to produce the certificate of the Chinese government
mentioned in section 6 of the Chinese Restriction Act of May 6,
1882, as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884."
The circuit court rendered judgment September 14, 1891, 47 F.
578, which, the case having been carried by appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was on the 7th day of
October, 1891, affirmed, 47 F. 641.
On November 16, 1891, this Court, upon the application of
appellant, ordered that a writ of certiorari issue to the circuit
court of appeals, requiring it to certify the case up for review
and determination, under section 6 of the act to establish circuit
courts of appeals, approved March 3, 1891. 26 Stat. 826, 828, c,
517.
The fifth article of the treaty concluded July 28, 1868, between
the United States and China, known as the "Burlingame Treaty," 16
Stat. 739, declares that:
"The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially
recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his
home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free
migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects,
respectively, from the one country to the other, for purposes of
curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents."
Article VI of that treaty is as follows:
"Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China
shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in
respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the
citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and, reciprocally,
Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall
enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions
Page 144 U. S. 50
in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the
citizens or subjects or the most favored nation. But nothing herein
contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of
the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the
United States."
A supplementary treaty was concluded November 17, 1880, 22 Stat.
826, which recites, among other things, in its preamble, that
"whereas the government of the United States, because of the
constantly increasing immigration of Chinese laborers to the
territory of the United States and the embarrassments consequent
upon such immigration, now desires to negotiate a modification of
the existing treaties which shall not be in direct contravention of
their spirit,"
and articles I and II of which are as follows:
"Whenever, in the opinion of the government of the United
States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or
their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the
interests of that country, or to endanger the good order of the
said country, or of any locality within the territory thereof, the
government of China agrees that the government of the United States
may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may
not absolutely prohibit it. The limitation or suspension shall be
reasonable, and shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the
United States as laborers, other classes not being included in the
limitations. Legislation taken in regard to Chinese laborers will
be of such a character only as is necessary to enforce the
regulation, limitation, or suspension of immigration, and
immigrants shall not be subject to personal maltreatment or
abuse."
"Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as
teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with
their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now
in the United States, shall be allowed to go and come of their own
free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights,
privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the
citizens and subjects of the most favored nation."
The sixth section of the Act of May 6, 1882, entitled "An
Page 144 U. S. 51
act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,"
22 Stat. 58, c. 126, as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884, 23
Stat. 115, c. 220, the matter inserted in amendment being
italicized, and the matter stricken out being in brackets, reads as
follows:
"SEC. 6. That in order to the faithful execution of [articles
one and two of the treaty in]
the provisions of this act,
[before mentioned,] every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who
may be entitled by said treaty [and]
or this act to come
within the United States, and who shall be about to come to the
United States, shall
obtain the permission of and be
identified as so entitled by the Chinese government,
or of such
other foreign government of which at the time such Chinese person
shall be a subject, in each case [such identity] to be
evidenced by a certificate issued [under the authority of said] by
such government, which certificate shall be in the English
language, [or (if not in the English language) accompanied by a
translation into English, stating such right to come,]
and
shall show such permission, with the name of the permitted person
in his or her proper signature, and which certificate shall
state the
individual, family, and tribal name
in
full, title or official rank, if any, the age, height, and all
physical peculiarities, former and present occupation or
profession,
when and where and how long pursued, and place
of residence [in China] of the person to whom the certificate is
issued, and that such person is entitled [conformably to the treaty
in]
by this act [mentioned] to come within the United
States.
If the person so applying for a certificate shall be a
merchant, said certificate shall, in addition to above
requirements, state the nature, character, and estimated value of
the business carried on by him prior to and at the time of his
application as aforesaid, provided that nothing in this act nor in
said treaty shall be construed as embracing within the meaning of
the word 'merchant' hucksters, peddlers, or those engaged in
taking, drying, or otherwise preserving shell or other fish for
home consumption or exportation. If the certificate sought for the
purpose of travel for curiosity, it shall also state whether the
applicant intends to pass through or travel within the
Page 144 U. S. 52
United States, together with his financial standing in the
country from which such certificate is desired. The certificate
provided for in this act, and the identity of the person named
therein, shall, before such person goes on board any vessel to
proceed to the United States, be vised by the endorsement of the
diplomatic representatives of the United States in the foreign
country from which said certificate issues, or of the consular
representative of the United States at the port or place from which
the person named in the certificate is about to depart, and such
diplomatic representative or consular representative whose
endorsement is so required is hereby empowered, and it shall be his
duty, before endorsing such certificate as aforesaid, to examine
into the truth of the statements set forth in said certificate, and
if he shall find upon examination that said or any of the
statements therein contained are untrue, it shall be his duty to
refuse to endorse the same. Such certificate,
vised as
aforesaid, shall be
prima facie evidence of the fact
set forth therein, and shall be produced to the collector of
customs [or his deputy] of the port in the district in the United
States at which the person named therein shall arrive,
and
afterwards produced to the proper authorities of the United States
whenever lawfully demanded, and shall be the sole evidence
permissible on the part of the person so producing the same to
establish a right of entry into the United States; but said
certificate may be controverted, and the facts therein stated
disproved, by the United States authorities."
On the 3d of July, 1890, the Treasury Department issued certain
instructions regarding the reentry into the United States of
Chinese persons after a visit to China, one of which is as
follows:
"Chinamen who are not laborers and who may have heretofore
resided in the United States are not prevented by existing law or
treaty from returning to the United States after visiting China or
elsewhere. No certificates or other papers, however, are issued by
the department, or by any of its subordinate officers, to show that
they are entitled to land in the United States; but it is suggested
that such persons should, before leaving the United States, provide
themselves
Page 144 U. S. 53
with such proofs of identity as may be deemed proper, showing
that they have been residents of the United States, and that they
are not laborers, so that they can present the same to and be
identified by, the collector of customs at the port where they may
return."
Syn.Treas.Dec. 1890, pp. 253, 254.
Page 144 U. S. 55
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before proceeding to dispose of this case upon the merits, the
question of jurisdiction, although not argued by counsel, must
receive attention.
The Act of Congress of March 3, 1891, establishing circuit
courts of appeals and defining and regulating the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, was passed
to facilitate the prompt disposition of cases in this Court, and to
relieve it from the oppressive burden of general litigation, which
impeded the examination of cases of public concern and operated to
the delay of suitors.
In re Woods, 143 U.
S. 202.
Page 144 U. S. 56
By section 4,
"The review by appeal, by writ of error, or otherwise, from the
existing circuit courts, shall be had only in the Supreme Court of
the United States, or in the circuit courts of appeals hereby
established, according to the provisions of this act regulating the
same."
By section 14, section 691, of the Revised Statutes, and section
3 of the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, 18 Stat. 316, and
"all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of
error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or
writs of error in the preceding sections five and six of this
act"
were repealed.
Under section 5, appeals or writs of error may be taken from the
circuit courts directly to this Court in six specified classes of
cases, namely:
"[1] In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in
issue. In such cases, the question of jurisdiction alone shall be
certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision.
[2] From the final sentences and decrees in prize causes. [3] In
cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime. [4]
In any case that involves the construction of application of the
Constitution of the United States. [5] In any case in which the
constitutionality of any law of the United States, or the validity
or construction of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn in
question. [6] In any case in which the Constitution or law of a
state is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the
United States."
By section 6, the circuit courts of appeals "shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal or by writ of error,"
final decisions of the circuit courts, "in all cases other than
those provided for in the preceding section of this act, unless
otherwise provided by law." The appellate jurisdiction not vested
in this Court was thus vested in the court created by the act, and
the entire jurisdiction distributed.
McLish v. Roff,
141 U. S. 661,
141 U. S.
666.
The words "unless otherwise provided by law" were manifestly
inserted out of abundant caution, in order that any qualification
of the jurisdiction by contemporaneous or subsequent
Page 144 U. S. 57
acts should not be construed as taking it away except when
expressly so provided. Implied repeals were intended to be thereby
guarded against. To hold that the words referred to prior laws
would defeat the purpose of the act and be inconsistent with its
context and its repealing clause.
The section then provides that
"the judgments or decrees of the circuit courts of appeals shall
be final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent
entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being
aliens and citizens of the United States or citizens of different
states; also in all cases arising under the patent laws, under the
revenue laws, and under the criminal laws, and in admiralty cases,
excepting that in every such subject within its appellate
jurisdiction the circuit court of appeals at any time may certify
to the Supreme Court of the United States any questions or
propositions of law concerning which it desires the instruction of
that court for its proper decision. And thereupon the Supreme Court
may either give its instructions on the questions and propositions
certified to it, which shall be binding upon the circuit courts of
appeals in such case, or it may require that the whole record and
cause may be sent up to it for its consideration, and thereupon
shall decide the whole matter in controversy in the same manner as
if it had been brought there for review by writ of error or appeal.
And excepting also that in any such case as is hereinbefore made
final in the circuit court of appeals, it shall be competent for
the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such
case to be certified"
for its determination as if brought up by appeal or writ of
error.
"In all cases not hereinbefore, in this section, made final,
there shall be of right an appeal or writ of error or review of the
case by the Supreme Court of the United States where the matter in
controversy shall exceed one thousand dollars besides costs."
By this section, judgments or decrees in the enumerated classes
of cases are made final in terms by way of the exclusion of any
review by writ of error or appeal, while as to cases not expressly
made final by the section, appeal or writ of error may be had of
right where the money value of the matter in controversy exceeds
one thousand dollars besides costs.
Page 144 U. S. 58
The case before us is one of habeas corpus. The jurisdiction of
the circuit court was not in issue, nor was the construction or
application of the Constitution of the United States involved, nor
the constitutionality of any law of the United States, or the
validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority,
drawn in question. It did not fall within either of the classes of
cases which may be brought directly to this Court under the act,
and was therefore properly carried to the circuit court of appeals,
and as a case of habeas corpus is not one in which the matter in
controversy involves a money value, no appeal lies from that court
under section 6.
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.
S. 487. But as the decree is "made final" by the effect
of the section in giving the circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction
over that class of cases, we are of opinion that it is reviewable
upon certiorari, and that this writ was providently issued.
In every case within its appellate jurisdiction, the circuit
court of appeals may certify to this Court any questions or
propositions of law in respect of which it desires instruction, and
this Court may then require the whole record and cause to be sent
up, and so it is competent for this Court by certiorari to direct
any case to be certified, whether its advice is requested or not,
except those which may be brought here by appeal or writ of error,
and the latter are specified as those where the money value exceeds
a certain amount, and which have not been made final "in this
section" -- that is, made final in terms. And as certiorari will
only be issued where questions of gravity and importance are
involved or in the interest of uniformity of decision, the object
of the act is thereby attained.
We are brought, therefore, to the consideration of the questions
arising upon the record. Lau Ow Bew came to the United States in
1874, and has been for seventeen years a resident thereof and
domiciled therein, and during that period has carried on a
wholesale and importing mercantile business in the City of
Portland, Oregon. On September 30, 1890, he went to China for the
purpose of visiting his relatives and with the intention of
returning as soon as possible, having previously
Page 144 U. S. 59
procured the proper evidence of his status in this country as a
merchant in accordance with the regulations of the Treasury
Department of July 3, 1890. He took passage for home at Hong Kong
on the
Oceanic, which reached San Francisco on August 11,
1891. Although it was admitted by the collector that appellant was
a merchant domiciled in the United States, and the sufficiency of
his proofs of identity was acknowledged, yet the collector refused
to permit him to land on the sole ground that he failed and
neglected to produce the certificate of the Chinese government
mentioned in section 6 of the Chinese Restriction Act of May 6,
1882, as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884.
Does the section apply to Chinese merchants, already domiciled
in the United States, who, having left the country for temporary
purposes,
animo revertendi, seek to reenter it on their
return to their business and their homes?
Nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U. S. 457;
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S.
259;
United States v.
Kirby, 7 Wall. 482;
Oates v. National
Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
In the case of
Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605, it was held by
the Circuit Court for the District of California, September 5,
1882, that Chinese merchants who resided at the time of the passage
of the Act of Congress of May 6, 1882, in other countries than
China, on arriving in a port of the United States, were not
required by that act to produce certificates of the Chinese
government establishing their character as merchants, as a
condition of their being allowed to land, but that their character
as such merchants could be established by parol evidence. And MR.
JUSTICE FIELD, delivering the opinion of the Court, referring to
the sixth section of the act, said:
"The certificate mentioned in this section is evidently designed
to facilitate proof by Chinese, other than laborers, coming from
China and desiring to enter the United States, that they are not
within the prohibited class. It is not required
Page 144 U. S. 60
as a means of restricting their coming. To hold that such was
its object would be to impute to Congress a purpose to disregard
the stipulation of the second article of the new treaty, that they
should be 'allowed to go and come of their own free will and
accord.'"
And Judge Deady, in the District Court for the district of
Oregon, held, January 15, 1883, that the certificate provided for
in section 6 was not the only competent evidence that a Chinese
person is not a laborer and therefore entitled to come to and
reside within the United States, but that the fact might be shown
by any other pertinent and convincing testimony.
In re Ho
King, 14 F. 724.
The Amendatory Act of July 5, 1884, enlarged the terms of the
certificate, and provided that it should be the sole evidence
permissible on the part of the person producing the same to
establish a right of entry into the United States. This rule of
evidence was evidently prescribed by the amendment as a means of
effectually preventing the violation or evasion of the prohibition
against the coming of Chinese laborers. It was designed as a
safeguard to prevent the unlawful entry of such laborers under the
pretense that they belonged to the merchant class or to some other
of the admitted classes. But the phraseology of the section, in
requiring that the certificate of identification should state not
only the holder's family and tribal name in full, his title or
official rank, if any, his age, height, and all physical
peculiarities, but also his former and present occupation or
profession, when and where and how long pursued, and his place of
residence, and, if a merchant, the nature, character, and estimated
value of the business carried on by him prior to and at the time of
his application for such certificate, involves the exaction of the
unreasonable and absurd condition of a foreign government
certifying to the United States facts in regard to the place of
abode and the business of persons residing in this country, which
the foreign government cannot be assumed to know, and the means of
information in regard to which exist here, unless it be construed
to mean that Congress intended that the certificate should be
procured only by Chinese residing in China or
Page 144 U. S. 61
some other foreign country, and about to come for the first time
into the United States for travel or business or to take up their
residence.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, in the case already cited, referring to the
Chinese government, said:
"That government could not be expected to give, in its
certificate, the particulars mentioned of persons resident -- some,
perhaps, for many years -- out of its jurisdiction. Neither the
letter nor the spirit of the act calls for a construction imputing
to Congress the exaction of a condition so unreasonable. . . . We
repeat what we said in the case of Ah Tie and other Chinese
laborers -- that all laws are to be so construed as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion, and general terms are to be so
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence."
The section, by its terms, declares that
"Every Chinese person, other than a laborer who may be entitled
by said treaty or this act to come within the United States and who
shall be about to come to the United States shall obtain the
permission of, and be identified as so entitled by, the Chinese
government, or of such other foreign government of which at the
time such Chinese person shall be a subject,"
the permission and identification in each case to be evidenced
by the certificate described.
But Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States, and in
China only for temporary purposes,
animo revertendi, do
not appear to us to occupy the predicament of persons "who shall be
about to come to the United States," when they start on their
return to the country of their residence and business. The general
terms used should be limited to those persons to whom Congress
manifestly intended to apply them, and they would evidently be
those who are about to come to the United States for the first
time, and therefore might properly be required to apply to their
own government for permission to do so, as also to so identify them
as to distinguish them as belonging to the classes who could
properly avail themselves of such leave.
By general international law, foreigners who have become
Page 144 U. S. 62
domiciled in a country other than their own acquire rights and
must discharge duties in many respects the same as possessed by and
imposed upon the citizens of that country, and no restriction on
the footing upon which such person stand by reason of their
domicile of choice, or commercial domicile, is to be presumed,
while, by our treaty with China, Chinese merchants domiciled in the
United States have, and are entitled to exercise, the right of free
egress and ingress, and all other rights, privileges, and
immunities enjoyed in this country by the citizens or subjects of
the "most favored nation."
There can be no doubt, as was said by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
speaking for the Court in
Chew Heong v. United States,
112 U. S. 536,
112 U. S. 549,
that
"since the purpose avowed in the act was to faithfully execute
the treaty, any interpretation of its provisions would be rejected
which imputed to Congress an intention to disregard the plighted
faith of the government, and consequently the court ought, if
possible, to adopt that construction which recognized and saved
rights secured by the treaty."
Tested by this rule, it is impossible to hold that this section
was intended to prohibit or prevent Chinese merchants, having a
commercial domicile here, from leaving the country for temporary
purposes and then returning to and reentering it, and yet such
would be its effect if construed as contended for on behalf of
appellee.
In the case of
Ah Ping, 23 F. 329, it was held that the
section did not apply to Chinese subjects, residents of the United
States, departing for temporary purposes of business or pleasure,
and the late Judge Sawyer, delivering the opinion of the court,
said:
"As to those domiciled in foreign countries, there is no ready
means in this country for their identification. In the countries
whence they propose to come, the means of ascertaining the facts
are at hand; hence the provision. As to those resident or domiciled
in this country, we have ourselves the best means of
identification, while as to many of them, even in their native
country, and much less when they are temporarily in other foreign
countries, there is no practicable means of either identification
or for procuring
Page 144 U. S. 63
the certificate prescribed. The United States statutes do not
now nor have they ever required or provided for the issue of any
certificate in this country to resident Chinese, other than
laborers, who are about to depart temporarily, for business or
pleasure, either to China or other foreign countries. There are
many Chinese merchants in California who have been domiciled in the
state from twenty to thirty-five years. Our own means of
identification of such persons are greatly superior to those of any
other country -- even that of their nativity. To require such
parties, every time they go to another country, to perform the
required acts abroad would be utterly impracticable, and
practically tantamount to an absolute refusal to permit their
return."
The question has been ruled in the same way by the Treasury
Department on many occasions; by Secretary Folger, March 14, 1884,
Syn. Treas.Dec. 1884, 128; by Secretary Gresham, September 25,
1884,
id., 400; by Secretary McCulloch, January 14, 1885,
id., 1885, 26; by Assistant Secretary French, December 2,
1884; by Assistant Secretary Maynard, November 7, 1888, and by
Acting Secretary Batcheller in the instructions of July 3, 1890,
already given.
No other rule in this respect was laid down by Congress in the
Act of September 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 476, c. 1015, nor in that of
October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064, when the absolute exclusion
of Chinese laborers was prescribed.
Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U. S. 581.
We are of opinion that it was not intended that commercial
domicile should be forfeited by temporary absence at the domicile
of origin, nor that resident merchants should be subjected to loss
of rights guarantied by treaty if they failed to produce from the
domicile of origin that evidence which residence in the domicile of
choice may have rendered it difficult if not impossible to obtain,
and as we said in considering the application of this petitioner
for the writ of certiorari,
141 U. S. 141 U.S.
583,
141 U. S. 588,
we do not think that the decision of this Court in
Wan Shing v.
United States, 140 U. S. 424,
ruled anything to the contrary of the conclusions herein expressed.
As there pointed out, Wan Shing was not a merchant, but a laborer.
He had
Page 144 U. S. 64
acquired no commercial domicile in this country, and whatever
domicile he had acquired, if any, he had forfeited by departure and
absence for seven years with no apparent intention of returning.
All the circumstances rendered it possible for him to procure and
produce the specified certificate and required him to do so. We
have no doubt of the correctness of the judgment then rendered, and
the reasons given in its support.
As Lau Ow Bew is, in our opinion, unlawfully restrained of
his liberty, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and, as required by section 10 of
the Act of March 3, 1891, remand the cause to the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District of California, with
directions to reverse its judgment and discharge the
petitioner.
