The Act of February 26, 1880, "to prohibit the importation and
migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to
perform labor in the United States, its Territories, and the
District of Columbia," 23 Stat. 332, c. 164, does not apply to a
contract between an alien, residing out of the United States, and a
religious society incorporated under the laws of a state, whereby
he engages to remove to the United States and to enter into the
service of the society as its rector or minister.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error is a corporation duly organized and
incorporated as a religious society under the laws of the State of
New York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September,
Page 143 U. S. 458
1887, an alien residing in England. In that month the plaintiff
in error made a contract with him by which he was to remove to the
City of New York and enter into its service as rector and pastor,
and in pursuance of such contract, Warren did so remove and enter
upon such service. It is claimed by the United States that this
contract on the part of the plaintiff in error was forbidden by 23
Stat. 332, c. 164, and an action was commenced to recover the
penalty prescribed by that act. The circuit court held that the
contract was within the prohibition of the statute, and rendered
judgment accordingly, 36 F. 303, and the single question presented
for our determination is whether it erred in that conclusion.
The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in these
words:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that from
and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any
person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner
whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its territories,
or the District of Columbia under contract or agreement, parol or
special, express or implied, made previous to the importation or
migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to
perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its
territories, or the District of Columbia."
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within
the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his
church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with
compensation on the other. Not only are the general words "labor"
and "service" both used, but also, as it were to guard against any
narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning, to them
is added "of any kind," and further, as noticed by the circuit
judge in his opinion, the fifth section, which makes specific
exceptions, among them professional actors, artists, lecturers,
singers, and domestic
Page 143 U. S. 459
servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor
and service was intended to be reached by the first section. While
there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think Congress
intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the
present case. It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has
been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating
its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the
judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general
meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act
in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or
of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd
results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act. As said in Plowden 205:
"From which cases it appears that the sages of the law
heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in
some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in
the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and
those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act
they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those
which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to
reach to some persons only, which expositions have always been
founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have
collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of
making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with
another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances."
In
Margate Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 B. & Ald. 266,
270, Abbott, C.J., quotes from Lord Coke as follows: "Acts of
Parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or
free from injury or wrong be, by a literal construction, punished
or endangered." In the case of
State v. Clark, 29 N.J.Law
96, 98-99, it appeared that an act had been passed making it a
misdemeanor to willfully break down a fence in the possession of
another person. Clark was indicted
Page 143 U. S. 460
under that statute. The defense was that the act of breaking
down the fence, though willful, was in the exercise of a legal
right to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected the
testimony offered to sustain the defense, and the supreme court
held that this ruling was error. In its opinion, the court used
this language:
"The act of 1855, in terms, makes the willful opening, breaking
down, or injuring of any fences belonging to or in the possession
of any other person a misdemeanor. In what sense is the term
'willful' used? In common parlance, 'willful' is used in the sense
of 'intentional,' as distinguished from 'accidental' or
'involuntary.' Whatever one does intentionally, he does willfully.
Is it used in that sense in this act? Did the legislature intend to
make the intentional opening of a fence for the purpose of going
upon the land of another indictable if done by permission or for a
lawful purpose? . . . We cannot suppose such to have been the
actual intent. To adopt such a construction would put a stop to the
ordinary business of life. The language of the act, if construed
literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If a literal
construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be
so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the
words. The object designed to be reached by the act must limit and
control the literal import of the terms and phrases employed."
In
United States v.
Kirby, 7 Wall. 482,
74 U. S. 486,
the defendants were indicted for the violation of an act of
Congress providing
"that if any person shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or
retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of
any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction,
for every such offense, pay a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars."
The specific charge was that the defendants knowingly and
willfully retarded the passage of one Farris, a carrier of the
mail, while engaged in the performance of his duty, and also in
like manner retarded the steamboat
General Buell, at that
time engaged in carrying the mail. To this indictment the
defendants pleaded specially that Farris had been indicted for
murder by a court of competent authority in Kentucky; that a
bench-warrant had been issued and
Page 143 U. S. 461
placed in the hands of the defendant Kirby, the sheriff of the
county, commanding him to arrest Farris and bring him before the
court to answer to the indictment, and that, in obedience to this
warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse, entered upon
the steamboat
General Buell and arrested Farris, and used
only such force as was necessary to accomplish that arrest. The
question as to the sufficiency of this plea was certified to this
Court, and it was held that the arrest of Farris upon the warrant
from the state court was not an obstruction of the mail or the
retarding of the passage of a carrier of the mail within the
meaning of the act. In its opinion, the Court says:
"All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always
therefore be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to
its language which would avoid results of this character. The
reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The
common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf,
that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in
the streets should be punished with the utmost severity' did not
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell
down in the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the
ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edw. II which
enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony,
does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on
fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be
burnt.' And we think that a like common sense will sanction the
ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the
obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its
carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the
mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for
murder."
The following cases may also be cited:
Henry v. Tilson,
17 Vt. 479;
Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 743;
Ex Parte
Ellis, 11 Cal. 220;
Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410;
Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cowen 89;
People v. Insurance
Company 15 Johns. 358;
Burch v. Newbury, 10 N.Y. 374;
People v.
Page 143 U. S. 462
Commissioners of Taxes, 95 N.Y. 554, 558;
People v.
Lacombe, 99 N.Y. 43, 49;
Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4
G. & J. 152;
Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 530;
Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284;
Oates v. National
Bank, 100 U. S. 239.
Among other things which may be considered in determining the
intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We do not mean
that it may be used to add to or take from the body of the statute,
Hadden v.
Collector, 5 Wall. 107, but it may help to
interpret its meaning. In the case of
United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358,
6 U. S. 386,
Chief Justice Marshall said:
"On the influence which the title ought to have in construing
the enacting clauses much has been said, and yet it is not easy to
discern the point of difference between the opposing counsel in
this respect. Neither party contends that the title of an act can
control plain words in the body of the statute, and neither denies
that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing
ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to
construction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived,
and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have
its due share of consideration."
And in the case of
United States v.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610,
16 U. S. 631,
the same judge applied the doctrine in this way:
"The words of the section are in terms of unlimited extent. The
words 'any person or persons' are broad enough to comprehend every
human being. But general words must not only be limited to cases
within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to
which the legislature intended to apply them. Did the legislature
intend to apply these words to the subjects of a foreign power, who
in a foreign ship may commit murder or robbery on the high seas?
The title of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish some
aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature. The title
of this act is 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against
the United States.' It would seem that offenses against the United
States, not offenses against the human race, were the crimes which
the legislature intended by this law to punish. "
Page 143 U. S. 463
It will be seen that words as general as those used in the first
section of this act were by that decision limited, and the intent
of Congress with respect to the act was gathered partially at
least, from its title. Now the title of this act is
"An act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners
and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the
United States, its territories, and the District of Columbia."
Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches only to the work
of the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the
professional man. No one reading such a title would suppose that
Congress had in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into
this country of ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class
whose toil is that of the brain. The common understanding of the
terms "labor" and "laborers" does not include preaching and
preachers, and it is to be assumed that words and phrases are used
in their ordinary meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the
statute by the language of the title indicates an exclusion from
its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of
ministers, rectors, and pastors.
Again, another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the
evil which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court
properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it
existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the
legislative body.
United States v. Union Pacific Railroad,
91 U. S. 72,
91 U. S. 79. The
situation which called for this statute was briefly but fully
stated by MR. JUSTICE BROWN when, as district judge, he decided the
case of
United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798:
"The motives and history of the act are matters of common
knowledge. It had become the practice for large capitalists in this
country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of
great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers,
under contracts by which the employer agreed, upon the one hand, to
prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers
agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate
of wages. The effect of this was to break down the labor market and
to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the
level
Page 143 U. S. 464
of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant
that an appeal was made to Congress for relief by the passage of
the act in question, the design of which was to raise the standard
of foreign immigrants and to discountenance the migration of those
who had not sufficient means in their own hands, or those of their
friends, to pay their passage."
It appears also from the petitions and in the testimony
presented before the committees of Congress that it was this cheap,
unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the influx of
which Congress sought to prevent. It was never suggested that we
had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and least of all
that the market for the services of Christian ministers was
depressed by foreign competition. Those were matters to which the
attention of Congress or of the people was not directed. So far,
then, as the evil which was sought to be remedied interprets the
statute, it also guides to an exclusion of this contract from the
penalties of the act.
A singular circumstance throwing light upon the intent of
Congress is found in this extract from the report of the Senate
committee on education and labor recommending the passage of the
bill:
"The general facts and considerations which induce the committee
to recommend the passage of this bill are set forth in the report
of the committee of the house. The committee report the bill back
without amendment, although there are certain features thereof
which might well be changed or modified in the hope that the bill
may not fail of passage during the present session. Especially
would the committee have otherwise recommended amendments,
substituting for the expression, 'labor and service,' whenever it
occurs in the body of the bill, the words 'manual labor' or 'manual
service,' as sufficiently broad to accomplish the purposes of the
bill, and that such amendments would remove objections which a
sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticism may urge to the proposed
legislation. The committee, however, believing that the bill in its
present form will be construed as including only those whose labor
or service is manual in character, and being very desirous that the
bill become a law before the adjournment, have reported the bill
without
Page 143 U. S. 465
change."
P. 6059, Congressional Record, 48th Cong. And referring back to
the report of the committee of the house, there appears this
language:
"It seeks to restrain and prohibit the immigration or
importation of laborers who would have never seen our shores but
for the inducements and allurements of men whose only object is to
obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the social
and material wellbeing of our own citizens, and regardless of the
evil consequences which result to American laborers from such
immigration. This class of immigrants care nothing about our
institutions, and in many instances never even heard of them. They
are men whose passage is paid by the importers. They come here
under contract to labor for a certain number of years. They are
ignorant of our social condition, and, that they may remain so,
they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact with
Americans. They are generally from the lowest social stratum, and
live upon the coarsest food, and in hovels of a character before
unknown to American workmen. They, as a rule, do not become
citizens, and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body
politic. The inevitable tendency of their presence among us is to
degrade American labor and to reduce it to the level of the
imported pauper labor."
Page 5359, Congressional Record, 48th Congress.
We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which
was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the
appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of each house, all
concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was simply to stay
the influx of this cheap unskilled labor.
But, beyond all these matters, no purpose of action against
religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national,
because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From
the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a
single voice making this affirmation. The commission to Christopher
Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from "Ferdinand and
Isabella, by the grace of God, King and Queen of Castile," etc.,
and recites that "it is hoped that by God's assistance some of the
continents and islands in the
Page 143 U. S. 466
ocean will be discovered," etc. The first colonial grant, that
made to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was from "Elizabeth, by the
grace of God, of England, Fraunce and Ireland, Queene, defender of
the faith," etc., and the grant authorizing him to enact statutes
of the government of the proposed colony provided that "they be not
against the true Christian faith nowe professed in the Church of
England." The first charter of Virginia, granted by King James I in
1606, after reciting the application of certain parties for a
charter, commenced the grant in these words:
"We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their
Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a Work, which may, by the
Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his
Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian Religion to such
People, as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true
Knowledge and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels
and Savages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to a
settled and quiet government; DO, by these our Letters-Patents,
graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble and well intended
Desires."
Language of similar import may be found in the subsequent
charters of that colony, from the same king, in 1609 and 1611, and
the same is true of the various charters granted to the other
colonies. In language more or less emphatic is the establishment of
the Christian religion declared to be one of the purposes of the
grant. The celebrated compact made by the pilgrims in the
Mayflower, 1620, recites:
"Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the
Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage
to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by
these Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence of God and
one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil
Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and
Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid."
The fundamental orders of Connecticut, under which a provisional
government was instituted in 1638-39, commence with this
declaration:
"Forasmuch as it hath pleased the Allmighty God by the wise
disposition of his diuyne pruidence
Page 143 U. S. 467
so to Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants and
Residents of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield are now cohabiting
and dwelling in and vppon the River of Conectecotte and the Lands
thereunto adioyneing; And well knowing where a people are gathered
togather the word of God requires that to mayntayne the peace and
vnion of such a people there should be an orderly and decent
Gouerment established according to God, to order and dispose of the
affayres of the people at all seasons as occation shall require;
doe therefore assotiate and conioyne our selues to be as one
Publike state or Comonwelth, and doe, for our selues and our
Successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att any tyme
hereafter, enter into Combination and Confederation togather, to
mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity of the gospell of
our Lord Jesus weh we now prfesse, as also the disciplyne of the
Churches, weh according to the truth of the said gospell is now
practiced amongst vs."
In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the
province of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is recited:
"Because no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest
Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their
Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship; And
Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights
and Spirits, and the Author as well as Object of all divine
Knowledge, Faith, and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds,
and persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby
grant and declare,"
etc.
Coming nearer to the present time, the declaration of
independence recognizes the presence of the Divine in human affairs
in these words:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that thet are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness. . . . We therefore the Representatives of the
united states of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing
to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions, do, in the Name and by Authority of the good these
Colonies, solemnly publish and declare,"
etc.;
"And for the
Page 143 U. S. 468
support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the
Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other
our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."
If we examine the constitutions of the various states, we find
in them a constant recognition of religious obligations. Every
Constitution of every one of the forty-four states contains
language which, either directly or by clear implication, recognizes
a profound reverence for religion, and an assumption that its
influence in all human affairs is essential to the wellbeing of the
community. This recognition may be in the preamble, such as is
found in the Constitution of Illinois, 1870:
"We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful to Almighty
God for the civil, political, and religious liberty which He hath
so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing
upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the same unimpaired to
succeeding generations,"
etc.
It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers
shall take an oath closing with the declaration, "so help me God."
It may be in clauses like that of the Constitution of Indiana,
1816, Art. XI, section 4: "The manner of administering an oath or
affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience
of the deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to
God." Or in provisions such as are found in Articles 36 and 37 of
the declaration of rights of the Constitution of Maryland,
1867:
"That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally
entitled to protection in their religious liberty, wherefore no
person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall
disturb the good order, peace, or safety of the state, or shall
infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural,
civil, or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to
frequent or maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain
any place of worship or any ministry; nor shall any person,
otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness or juror on
account of his religious belief,
provided he
Page 143 U. S. 469
believes in the existence of God, and that, under his
dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his
acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or
the world to come. That no religious test ought ever to be required
as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this state,
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor
shall the legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the
oath prescribed by this constitution."
Or like that in Articles 2 and 3 of part 1st of the Constitution
of Massachusetts, 1780:
"It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society
publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the
great Creator and Preserver of the universe. . . . As the happiness
of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government
essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality, and as these
cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the
institution of the public worship of God and of public instructions
in piety, religion, and morality, therefore, to promote their
happiness, and to secure the good order and preservation of their
government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest
their legislature with power to authorize and require, and the
legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the
several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic or
religious societies to make suitable provision at their own
expense, for the institution of the public worship of God and for
the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety,
religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not
be made voluntarily."
Or, as in sections 5 and 14 of Article 7 of the Constitution of
Mississippi, 1832:
"No person who denies the being of a God, or a future state of
rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil
department of this state. . . . Religion morality, and knowledge
being necessary to good government, the preservation of liberty,
and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education,
shall forever be encouraged in this state."
Or by Article 22 of the Constitution of Delaware, (1776), which
required all officers, besides an oath of allegiance, to make and
subscribe the following declaration:
"I, A. B., do profess
Page 143 U. S. 470
faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and
in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore, and I do
acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be
given by divine inspiration."
Even the Constitution of the United States, which is supposed to
have little touch upon the private life of the individual, contains
in the First Amendment a declaration common to the constitutions of
all the states, as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," etc., and also provides in Article I, Section 7, a
provision common to many constitutions, that the executive shall
have ten days (Sundays excepted) within which to determine whether
he will approve or veto a bill.
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a
universal language pervading them all, having one meaning. They
affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not
individual sayings, declarations of private persons. They are
organic utterances. They speak the voice of the entire people.
While, because of a general recognition of this truth, the question
has seldom been presented to the courts, yet we find that in
Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, 400, it was
decided that
"Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a
part of the common law of Pennsylvania; . . . not Christianity with
an established church and tithes and spiritual courts, but
Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."
And in
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294-295,
Chancellor Kent, the great commentator on American law, speaking as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, said:
"The people of this state, in common with the people of this
country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule
of their faith and practice, and to scandalize the author of these
doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely
impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is
a gross violation of decency and good order. . . . The free, equal,
and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever it may be,
and free and decent discussions on any religious
Page 143 U. S. 471
subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious
and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the
whole community is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound by any
expressions in the Constitution, as some have strangely supposed,
either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like
attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama, and for
this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian
people, and the morality of the country is deeply engrafted upon
Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those
impostors."
And in the famous case of
Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 2 How. 127,
43 U. S. 198,
this Court, while sustaining the will of Mr. Girard, with its
provision for the creation of a college into which no minister
should be permitted to enter, observed: "It is also said, and
truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of
Pennsylvania."
If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life, as
expressed by its laws, its business, its customs, and its society,
we find every where a clear recognition of the same truth. Among
other matters, note the following: the form of oath universally
prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom
of opening sessions of all deliberative bodies and most conventions
with prayer; the prefatory words of all wills, "In the name of God,
amen;" the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath, with the
general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of
courts, legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on that
day; the churches and church organizations which abound in every
city, town, and hamlet; the multitude of charitable organizations
existing every where under Christian auspices; the gigantic
missionary associations, with general support, and aiming to
establish Christian missions in every quarter of the globe. These,
and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of
unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this
is a Christian nation. In the face of all these, shall it be
believed that a Congress of the United States intended to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the
services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?
Page 143 U. S. 472
Suppose, in the Congress that passed this act, some member had
offered a bill which in terms declared that if any Roman Catholic
church in this country should contract with Cardinal Manning to
come to this country and enter into its service as pastor and
priest, or any Episcopal church should enter into a like contract
with Canon Farrar, or any Baptist church should make similar
arrangements with Rev. Mr. Spurgeon, or any Jewish synagogue with
some eminent rabbi, such contract should be adjudged unlawful and
void, and the church making it be subject to prosecution and
punishment. Can it be believed that it would have received a minute
of approving thought or a single vote? Yet it is contended that
such was, in effect, the meaning of this statute. The construction
invoked cannot be accepted as correct. It is a case where there was
presented a definite evil, in view of which the legislature used
general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil,
and thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed that the general
language thus employed is broad enough to reach cases and acts
which the whole history and life of the country affirm could not
have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of the
courts under those circumstances to say that, however broad the
language of the statute may be, the act, although within the
letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and
therefore cannot be within the statute.
The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.