The Act of the Legislature of Michigan of June 28, 1589, Public
Laws of 1589, pp. 282, 283, fixing the amount per mile to be
charged by railways for the transportation of a passenger, violates
no provision in the Constitution of the United States so far as
disclosed by the facts in this case. A legislature has power to fix
rates for the transportation of passengers by railways, and the
extent of judicial interference is protection against unreasonable
rates.
Whenever in the pursuance of an honest antagonistic assertion of
rights there is presented a question involving the validity of any
act of any legislature, state or federal, and the decision
necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature to so enact,
the Court must determine whether the act be constitutional or not;
but it never was the thought that by means of a friendly suit, a
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.
Courts should be careful not to declare legislative acts
unconstitutional upon agreed and general statements, and without
the fullest disclosure of all material facts.
In 1889, the Legislature of the State of Michigan passed an act,
No. 202 of the Public Acts of that year, pages 282 and 283, by
which, among other things, section 3323 of Howell's Statutes, being
a part of the railroad law of that state, was amended. So far as
affects the matters in controversy here, it is enough to quote from
the ninth paragraph, referring to the powers and liabilities of
railroad companies. That is as follows:
"Ninth. To regulate the time and manner in which passengers and
property shall be transported, and the tolls and compensation to be
paid therefor, but such compensation for transporting any
passenger, and his or her ordinary baggage, not exceeding in weight
one hundred and fifty pounds, shall not exceed the following
prices,
viz., for a distance not exceeding five miles,
three cents per mile; for all other distances, for all companies
the gross earnings of whose passenger
Page 143 U. S. 340
trains, as reported to the commissioner of railroads for the
year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, equaled or exceed
the sum of three thousand dollars per mile of road operated by said
company, two cents per mile, and for all companies the earnings of
whose passenger trains, reported as aforesaid, were over two
thousand dollars and less than three thousand dollars per mile of
road operated by said company, two and a half cents per mile, and
for all companies whose earnings, reported as aforesaid, were less
than two thousand dollars per mile of road operated by said
company, three cents per mile."
Prior thereto, the regular fare charged on plaintiff in error's
road from Port Huron to Battle Creek was $4.80, the distance being
159 3/4 miles. On the very day on which the law took affect,
to-wit, October 2, 1889, the defendant in error, plaintiff below,
went to the defendant's office in Port Huron and tendered $3.20 for
a ticket from that place to Battle Creek, which was refused.
Thereupon he brought this action in damages, to which the railroad
company promptly answered and on November 22, 1889, less than two
months from the time the law went into effect, the case was tried,
and a verdict and a judgment entered in favor of the defendant in
error for the sum of $101, an amount sufficient to take the case to
the higher court. On the trial, it was agreed that the railroad
company's earnings on its passenger trains for the year 1888
exceeded three thousand dollars per mile; that its capital stock
was $6,600,000, and had been fully paid in; that its bonded debt
was $12,000,000, one-half bearing six percent and the other half
five percent interest, payable semiannually; that the capital stock
and mortgage debt represented an actual amount paid into the
corporation; that the railroad property was at the time worth more
than the capital stock and mortgage debt, and that, in addition to
the mortgage debt, there was a floating debt of the amount of
$896,906.40. Further, the following tabulated statement of the
earnings and expenses for the year 1888 was admitted to be
correct:
"7th. That the total earnings and income of the defendant from
all sources for the year 1888 was $3,228,338.17. "
Page 143 U. S. 341
Of this amount there was received
from passenger traffic the sum of . . . $1,065,502.94
And from freight traffic the sum of . . . 2,160,180.23
From miscellaneous sources. . . . . . . . 2,655.00
-------------
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$3,228,338.17
8th. That defendant's operating
expenses for the year 1888 were . . . . $2,404,516.54
The interest paid on its bonds was. . . . 661,335.36
Other necessary expenses, including
interest on part of the unfunded
debt, rental of cars, tracks, etc. . . 150,305.61
------------- $3,216,157.51
9th. That, in addition to the foregoing
expenses, defendant paid during the
year 1888 from its earnings, on account
of interest on bonds not paid in pre-
vious years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,257.94
-------------
$3,228,415.45
In addition to this agreed statement of facts, two witnesses
were called, one the traffic manager and the other the treasurer of
the plaintiff in error. Their testimony was substantially that, in
view of the competition prevailing at Chicago for through business,
it was impossible to increase the freight rates then charged by the
company, because it would throw the volume of business into the
hands of competing roads. Upon such agreed statement and testimony,
and that alone, the railroad company asked an instruction that the
act of 1889, referred to, was unconstitutional. The court refused
this instruction, and an exception to the refusal to give this
Page 143 U. S. 342
instruction was the solitary one taken on the trial. The court
proceeded to charge the jury that the act in question was valid and
that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict and judgment by reason
of the failure of the defendant to comply with its provisions. To
this charge no exceptions were taken, and the case went to the
supreme court of the state on the single exception above stated.
That court sustained the ruling of the trial court and affirmed its
judgment, 83 Mich. 592, to revise which judgment the railroad
company sued out a writ of error from this Court.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question presented on the record is whether the trial
court, on the facts presented, erred in refusing to instruct as a
matter of law that the act of 1889 was unconstitutional. It will be
noticed that that act does not interfere with the rates of freight;
it simply regulates passenger fares; also that there was no
agreement that the freight states could not be so changed as to
increase the revenues therefrom. There was in evidence the opinion
of two gentlemen, doubtless well informed and worthy of credit,
that an increase of freight rates was inexpedient and futile, and
would tend to diminish, rather than increase, the income from
freight. But the question was not submitted to the jury as to
whether they believed that an increase of freight rates would work
a reduction of the income from freight, nor even whether they
believed that a reduction of the passenger tariff between Battle
Creek and Port Huron would not so increase the travel as to
increase the earnings therefrom; but the court was asked
Page 143 U. S. 343
to peremptorily charge the jury that the law fixing the
passenger rate was unconstitutional. In other words, the
instruction asked amounted to this: that as matter of law, the
opinion of these two witnesses as to the effect of raising the
freight tariff upon the earnings was conclusive; that as like
matter of law, the reduction of passenger tariffs would not so
increase the amount of passenger business as to increase the
revenues, but would, on the contrary, diminish the earnings
therefrom; that such reduction would operate to so far diminish the
earnings of the road as to prevent the payment of operating
expenses and fixed charges, and therefore that the act was
unconstitutional in its application to this company; or else that
the legislature had no power in respect to the matter and that an
act prescribing maximum rates was necessarily unconstitutional,
although the rates authorized might be so high as to enable every
company to pay therefrom all expenses and large dividends to
stockholders.
In this connection it is worthy of note that while, by the
agreed statement, the previous passenger rate between Port Huron
and Battle Creek was $4.80, which was the same rate pre mile that
defendant uniformly charged all other persons for transportation
upon its road, yet from the report of the defendant, made to the
state of its business for the year 1888, and which we are invited
by its counsel to examine, it appears that the average rate of fare
per mile for all passengers was $.0162, being .0038 less than the
maximum rate fixed by the act in question.
Can it be, under these circumstances, that the court erred in
peremptorily refusing to instruct the jury that an act fixing a
maximum rate at two cents per mile is unconstitutional? Is the
validity of a law of this nature dependent upon the opinion of two
witnesses, however well qualified to testify? Must court and jury
accept their opinions as a finality? Must it be declared as matter
of law that a reduction of rates necessarily diminishes income? May
it not be possible -- indeed, does not all experience suggest the
probability -- that a reduction of rates will increase the amount
of business, and therefore the earnings? At any rate, must the
court assume
Page 143 U. S. 344
that it has no such effect, and, ignoring all other
considerations, hold as matter of law that a reduction of rates
necessarily diminishes the earnings? If the validity of such a law
in its application to a particular company depends upon a question
of fact as to its effect upon the earnings, may not the court
properly leave that question to the jury, and decline to assume
that the effect is as claimed? There can be but one answer to these
questions. If the contention be that the legislature has no power
in the matter and that an act fixing rates, however high they may
be, is necessarily unconstitutional, it is enough to refer to the
long series of cases in this Court in which the contrary has been
decided. The legislature has power to fix rates, and the extent of
judicial interference is protection against unreasonable rates.
Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 116 U.
S. 307;
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway v.
Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in passing upon the present case,
felt constrained to make this observation:
"It being evident from the record that this was a friendly suit
between the plaintiff and the defendant to test the
constitutionality of this legislation, the Attorney General, when
it was brought into this Court upon writ of error, very properly
interposed and secured counsel to represent the public interest. In
the stipulation of facts or in the taking of testimony in the court
below, neither the Attorney General nor any other person interested
for or employed in behalf of the people of the state took any part.
What difference there might have been in the record had the people
been represented in the court below, however, under our view of the
case, is not of material inquiry."
Counsel for plaintiff in error, referring to this, does not
question or deny, but says:
"The Attorney General speaks of the case as evidently a friendly
case, and Justice Morse, in his opinion, also so speaks of it. This
may be conceded; but what of it? There is no ground for the claim
that any fraud or trickery has been practiced in presenting the
testimony."
We think there is much in the suggestion. The theory upon which,
apparently, this suit was brought is that parties
Page 143 U. S. 345
have an appeal from the legislature to the courts, and that the
latter are given an immediate and general supervision of the
constitutionality of the acts of the former. Such is not true.
Whenever, in pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic
assertion of rights by one individual against another, there is
presented a question involving the validity of any act of any
legislature, state or federal, and the decision necessarily rests
on the competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must,
in the exercise of its solemn duties, determine whether the act be
constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the
ultimate and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. It never was
the thought that by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.
These observations are pertinent here. On the very day the act
went into force, the application for a ticket is made, a suit
commenced, and within two months a judgment obtained in the trial
court -- a judgment rendered not upon the presentation of all the
facts from the lips of witnesses and a full inquiry into them, but
upon an agreed statement which precludes inquiry into many things
which necessarily largely enter into the determination of the
matter in controversy. A single suggestion in this direction: it is
agreed that the defendant's operating expenses for 1888 were
$2,404,516.54. Of what do these operating expenses consist? Are
they made up partially of extravagant salaries -- fifty to one
hundred thousand dollars to the President, and in like proportions
to subordinate officers? Surely before the courts are called upon
to adjudge an act of the legislature fixing the maximum passenger
rates for railroad companies to be unconstitutional on the ground
that its enforcement would prevent the stockholders from receiving
any dividends on their investments or the bondholders any interest
on their loans, they should be fully advised as to what is done
with the receipts and earnings of the company; for, if so advised,
it might clearly appear that a
Page 143 U. S. 346
prudent and honest management would, within the rates
prescribed, secure to the bondholders their interest and to the
stockholders reasonable dividends. While the protection of vested
rights of property is a supreme duty of the courts, it has not come
to this -- that the legislative power rests subservient to the
discretion of any railroad corporation which may, by exorbitant and
unreasonable salaries or in some other improper way, transfer its
earnings into what it is pleased to call "operating expenses."
We do not mean to insinuate aught against the actual management
of the affairs of this company. The silence of the record gives us
no information, and we have no knowledge outside thereof, and no
suspicion of wrong. Our suggestion is only to indicate how easily
courts may be misled into doing grievous wrong to the public, and
how careful they should be to not declare legislative acts
unconstitutional upon agreed and general statements, and without
the fullest disclosure of all material facts.
Judgment affirmed.