The law of limited liability is part of the maritime law of the
United States, and is in force upon navigable rivers above tide
water, and applies to enrolled and licensed vessels exclusively
engaged in commerce on such a river.
On the second of February, 1891, leave was granted to Mr. Walter
Van Rensselaer Berry to file the petition of Garnett, Stubbs &
Co. and several others for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the
Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
Division of the Southern District of Georgia from proceeding with a
suit in admiralty in that court, in which John Lawton, owner of the
steamer
Katie, had libelled that vessel and summoned the
petitioners as defendants. Leave was granted, and the petition was
filed, to which was attached a copy of the libel.
It appeared that the
Katie was a steamer engaged in the
carrying trade between Augusta on the Savannah River and Savannah,
on the same river, both in the Georgia; that in October, 1887, she
received from the various petitioners,
Page 141 U. S. 2
and from various points along the river, cotton to be
transported for each petitioner, and that while making the voyage,
she took fire and some of the cotton was burned, and other bales
were thrown overboard. The owners or consignees of the cotton which
had been damaged or lost brought suits against Lawton, as a common
carrier, to recover in each case its value. There were ten actions
in all, and their aggregate claims were about sixteen thousand
dollars.
Thereupon Lawton filed the libel in question, alleging, as st
forth in the petition,
"that the amount sued for in said cases, and the loss and damage
happening by means of or by reason of said fire exceeded the value
of said steamboat and her freight on said voyage, and that said
fire was not caused by any negligence of said libellant or of the
master and crew of said steamboat, and that, under the Act of
Congress approved March 3, 1851, as amended by the Act of Congress
approved June 19, 1886, said libellant was not in any wise liable
for said loss or damage; and claiming further, in the event of any
liability, the benefit of the limitation provided in the third and
fourth sections of said Act of March 3, 1851, a copy of said libel
and its 'Exhibits' being hereunto annexed."
The petition further alleged
"That afterwards, to-wit, on the 8th day of March, 1888, an
appraisement of said steamboat and freight was had, said steamboat
being appraised at $3,300 and the freight at $196.75, making a
total of $3,496.75, for which said sum the said John Lawton entered
into the usual stipulation on May 4, 1889."
From the answer of the district judge, it appeared that the
defendants in the admiralty suit had demurred to the libel and had
moved to dismiss the same "because the fourth section of the Act of
Congress approved June 19, 1886, is alleged to be
unconstitutional," and that the court had overruled the demurrer
and dismissed the motion, and ordered the cause to proceed.
This fourth section is as follows:
"Section 4. That section 4289 of the Revised Statutes be amended
so as to read as follows:"
" Section 4289. The provisions of the seven preceding sections
and of section eighteen of an act entitled 'An act to remove
Page 141 U. S. 3
certain burdens on the American merchant marine and to encourage
the American foreign carrying trade, and other purposes,' approved
June twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, relating to
the limitations of the liability of the owners of vessels, shall
apply to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels used on
lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats,
barges, and lighters."
24 Stat. 80, 81.
Page 141 U. S. 8
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to be directed to
the judge of the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern Division of the Southern District of Georgia to prohibit
said judge from taking further cognizance of a certain suit
instituted before him in said court. The suit sought to be
prohibited is a libel filed in said court by John Lawton, owner of
the steamboat
Katie, seeking a decree for limited
liability for the loss and damage which accrued by fire on said
steamboat in the Savannah River on the 12th of October, 1887. 40 F.
480. A copy of this libel is annexed to the petition for
prohibition. It sets out the facts that Lawton was the owner of the
steamboat; that she was an enrolled vessel of the United States,
duly licensed to carry on the coasting trade; that she had for
twenty years been engaged in transporting merchandise, goods, and
commodities from and to the ports of Savannah and Augusta, and
intermediate ports and landings on the Savannah River, in the
States of South Carolina and Georgia, and that some of the said
goods were transported by said steamboat as one of the through
lines of carriers, issuing through bills of lading to and from
ports and places within the State of Georgia and ports and places
in other states of the United States and foreign countries. The
libel then states that on the 8th of October, 1887, the said
steamboat left Augusta for Savannah and intermediate places on the
river in South Carolina and Georgia, intending to load a cargo
chiefly of cotton, being properly manned and
Page 141 U. S. 9
equipped; that on the 10th day of October, having then on board
643 bales of cotton, she left a landing called "Burton's Ferry,"
and shortly after struck on a sandbar, and, notwithstanding the
utmost endeavor of master and crew, remained there till October
12th, when fire was discovered in the cotton near the bow of the
steamboat; that the fire spread with great rapidity, and some of
the bales of cotton had to be thrown overboard to prevent it from
spreading more; and, after three hours of the hardest and most
hazardous work, the master and crew succeeded in clearing the bow
of the burning cotton, and saving the vessel and a portion of the
cargo, but leaving the vessel much burned and damaged. A list of
the cargo was attached to the libel, which proceeded to state that
nearly all of the consignees of the cotton lost or damaged had
brought suits against the libellant, and a list of the suits was
also appended to the libel, in two of which attachments were
issued; that the amount thus sued for, and the loss and damage
happening by means of said fire, exceeded the value of the said
steamboat and her freight on said voyage; that the fire was not
caused by any negligence of the libellant, or of the master and
crew, and that by reason of the exception against fire contained in
the bills of landing and receipts, the libellant was not liable for
the loss and damage caused by said fire; that libellant did not
know the cause of the fire, nor had any information as to the
cause, not being on board of the vessel at the time, and that all
the loss, destruction, and damage to the bales of cotton happened
by means of said fire, and that said fire was not caused by the
design or neglect of the libellant, but was solely caused without
his privity or knowledge. After an allegation that the Savannah
River is a navigable stream lying partly in Georgia and partly in
South Carolina, and that the contracts for carrying the cotton were
maritime contracts, the libellant proceeded to contest his entire
liability under the act of Congress in that behalf and under the
bills of lading, and, if he should be held liable, he claimed the
benefit of limited liability. The libel concluded with the usual
prayer for appraisement of the vessel, and a monition to all
persons claiming damages to appear, etc.
Page 141 U. S. 10
The petitioners, who now come to this Court for a prohibition,
allege that they are cotton factors and commission merchants,
residing and doing business in Savannah, and that they were the
consignees of the cotton constituting the cargo of the said
steamboat, except a few bales. They state that the said steamboat
was engaged exclusively in inland navigation of the Savannah River,
between the ports of Augusta and Savannah and intermediate ports
and places on either side of the said river, and that she was not a
seagoing vessel. They further state the various suits brought by
them, respectively, namely ten different suits, mostly in the City
Court of Savannah, for different sums, amounting in the aggregate
to nearly $16,000, and that in all of said suits, except two
attachments, personal service was made on the said Lawton, the
owner of said steamboat. The petitioners further state the filing
of the said libel, and that an appraisement of the steamboat and
freight had been made, amounting to a total of $3,496.75, for which
sum the said Lawton had entered into the usual stipulation. They
further state that afterwards, on the 9th of April, 1888, they
objected to the said district court's taking further cognizance of
the case, and moved to dismiss the libel on the grounds that the
said court was without jurisdiction in the premises, and that the
fourth section of the Act of Congress approved June 19, 1886, on
which the said action was based, is unconstitutional and void, but
that the said court overruled the said motion, and determined to
proceed with the further cognizance of the cause. The petitioners
further state, and rely upon, the fact that the greater part of the
cotton was shipped by Georgia consignors from divers points or
places within the State of Georgia, to be transported to Savannah,
Georgia, to consignees who were residents and citizens of Savannah,
and was the subject of a commerce strictly internal. The act of
Congress to which the petitioners refer as being the act on which
the libel of Lawton was based, and which they contend is
unconstitutional and void, is the fourth section of the Act
approved June 19, 1886, entitled
"An act to abolish certain fees for official services to
American vessels, and to
Page 141 U. S. 11
amend the laws relating to shipping commissioners, seamen, and
owners of vessels, and for other purposes."
24 Stat. 79. By the section referred to, section 4289 of the
Revised Statutes was amended so as to read as follows:
"SEC. 4289. The provisions of the seven preceding sections, and
of section eighteen of an act entitled"
"An act to remove certain burdens on the American merchant
marine and encourage the American foreign carrying trade, and for
other purposes, approved June 26, 1884, relating to the limitations
of the liability of the owners of vessels, shall apply to all
seagoing vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers
or in inland navigation including canal boats, barges, and
lighters."
The purport and effect of this section is apparent from an
inspection of the original Limited Liability Act passed March 3,
1851. 9 Stat. 635. After exempting ship owners from liability for
loss or damage occasioned by fire on board of their ships happening
without any design or neglect of theirs, and for loss of precious
metals or jewelry of which they or the masters of their vessels
have not received written notice, and declaring that their
liability shall in no case exceed the value of their interest in
the ship and freight then pending, for any loss, damage, or injury
to any property caused by the master, crew, or other persons,
without their privity or knowledge, and making other provisions for
carrying out the design of the act, a final clause is added in the
words following, to-wit:
"This act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal
boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any description
whatever, used in rivers or inland navigation."
The whole act was afterwards carried into the Revised Statutes,
and constitutes sections 4281-4289, inclusive, the section
respecting precious metals and jewelry having been somewhat
enlarged by an amendment made in 1871. The final words of the act
above quoted constitute section 4289 of the Revised Statutes,
which, as before stated, was amended by the act of 1886 so as to
make the limited liability act apply to all kinds of vessels, not
only seagoing vessels, but those used on lakes or rivers, or in
inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters. The
fourth section of the act of 1886 also regulates
Page 141 U. S. 12
the application of the eighteenth section of an Act approved
June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57, which reduced the individual liability
of a ship owner for all debts and liabilities of the ship to the
proportion of his individual share in the vessel. This section
requires no further notice. The only question in the case,
therefore, is whether the fourth section of the act of 1886,
extending the limited liability act to vessels used on a river in
inland navigation, like the steamboat in question, is, as
contended, unconstitutional and void.
It is unnecessary to inquire whether the section is valid as to
all the kinds of vessels named in it; if it is valid as to the kind
to which the steamboat
Katie belongs, it is sufficient for
the purposes of this case. And this question, we think, can be
solved by a reference to two or three propositions which have
become the settled law of this country. It is unnecessary to invoke
the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states in order to find authority to
pass the law in question. The act of Congress which limits the
liability of ship owners was passed in amendment of the maritime
law of the country, and the power to make such amendments is
coextensive with that law. It is not confined to the boundaries or
class of subjects which limit and characterize the power to
regulate commerce, but, in maritime matters, it extends to all
matters and places to which the maritime law extends. The subject
has frequently been up for consideration by this Court for many
years past, and but one view has been expressed. It was gone over
so fully, however, in the late case of
Butler v. Boston
Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527,
that we cannot do better than to quote a single passage from the
opinion of the Court in that case. We there said:
"The law of limited liability, as we have frequently had
occasion to assert, was enacted by Congress as a part of the
maritime law of this country, and therefore it is coextensive in
its operation with the whole territorial domain of that law.
Norwich
Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104,
80 U. S.
127;
The Lottawanna, 21 Wall.
558,
88 U. S. 577;
The
Scotland, 105 U. S. 24,
105 U. S.
29-31;
Providence & New York Steamship Co. v.
Hill Manufacturing Co.,
Page 141 U. S. 13
109 U.
S. 578,
109 U. S. 593. In
The
Lottawanna, we said:"
"It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution
contemplated that the law should forever remain unalterable.
Congress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if
no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be
needed."
Page
88 U. S. 577.
Again, on page
88 U. S. 575,
speaking of the maritime jurisdiction referred to in the
Constitution and the system of law to be administered thereby, it
was said:
"The Constitution must have referred to a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It
certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and
limits of the maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the
several states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a
commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with
each other or with foreign states."
In
The Scotland, this language was used:
"But it is enough to say that the rule of limited responsibility
is now our maritime rule. It is the rule by which, through the act
of Congress, we have announced that we propose to administer
justice in maritime cases."
Page
105 U. S. 31.
Again, in the same case, page
105 U. S. 29, we
said:
"But while the rule adopted by Congress is the same as the rule
of the general maritime law, its efficacy as a rule depends upon
the statute, and not upon any inherent force of the maritime law.
As explained in
The Lottawanna, the maritime law is only
so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws
and usages of that country, and this particular rule of the
maritime law had never been adopted in this country until it was
enacted by statute. Therefore, while it is now a part of our
maritime law, it is nevertheless statute law."
And in
Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill
Manufacturing Co., it was said:
"The rule of limited liability prescribed by the act of 1851 is
nothing more than the old maritime rule, administered in courts of
admiralty in all countries except England from time immemorial, and
if this were not so, the subject matter itself is one that belongs
to the department of maritime law."
Page
109 U. S. 593.
These quotations are believed to express the general, if
Page 141 U. S. 14
not unanimous, views of the members of this Court for nearly
twenty years past, and they leave us in no doubt that while the
general maritime law, with slight modifications, is accepted as law
in this country, it is subject to such amendments as Congress may
see fit to adopt. One of the modifications of the maritime law as
received here was a rejection of the law of limited liability. We
have rectified that. Congress has restored that article to our
maritime code. We cannot doubt its power to do this. As the
Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to
"all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and as this
jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on
the same subject must necessarily be in the national legislature,
and not in the state legislatures. It is true, we have held that
the boundaries and limits of the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction are matters of judicial cognizance, and cannot be
affected or controlled by legislation, whether state or national.
Chief Justice Taney, in
The St.
Lawrence, 1 Black 522,
66 U. S.
526-527;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S.
575-576. But within these boundaries and limits, the law
itself is that which has always been received as maritime law in
this country, with such amendments and modifications as Congress
may from time to time have adopted. It being clear, then, that the
law of limited liability of ship owners is a part of our maritime
code, the extent of its territorial operation (as before intimated)
cannot be doubtful. It is necessarily coextensive with that of the
general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that by the
settled law of this county extends wherever public navigation
extends -- on the sea and the great inland lakes, and the navigable
waters connecting therewith.
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441;
The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443;
Jackson v. The
Magnolia, 20 How. 296;
The
Commerce, 1 Black 574.
Pp.
88 U. S.
575-577.
It being established therefore that the law of limited liability
is part of the maritime law of the United States, it only remains
to determine whether that law may be applied to navigable rivers
above tidewater, such as the Savannah River, and to vessels engaged
in commerce on such a river, like the
Page 141 U. S. 15
steamboat
Katie in this case. Of this there can be no
doubt whatever. The question has been settled by a long course of
decisions, some of which are here referred to:
The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443;
Fretz v. Bull,
12 How. 466;
Jackson v. The
Magnolia, 20 How. 296;
Nelson v.
Leland, 22 How. 48;
The
Commerce, 1 Black 574;
The Hine
v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555;
The
Belfast, 7 Wall. 624;
The
Eagle, 8 Wall. 15;
The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557;
The
Montello, 20 Wall. 430;
Ex Parte Boyer,
109 U. S. 629. In
all of these cases, it was held that the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction granted to the federal government by the Constitution
of the United States is not limited to tidewaters, but extends to
all public navigable lakes and rivers. In some of the cases it was
held distinctly that this jurisdiction does not depend on the
question of foreign or interstate commerce, but also exists where
the voyage or contract, if maritime in character, is made and to be
performed wholly within a single state. Mr. Justice Clifford, in
the opinion of the Court in
The Belfast, said:
"Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime
contracts and maritime torts, including captures
jure
belli and seizures on water for municipal and revenue
forfeitures. (1) Contracts, claims, or service, purely maritime and
touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation,
are cognizable in the admiralty. (2) Torts or injuries committed on
navigable waters, of a civil nature, are also cognizable in the
admiralty courts. Jurisdiction in the former case depends upon the
nature of the contract, but in the latter depends entirely upon
locality. . . . Navigable rivers which empty into the sea or into
the bays and gulfs which form a part of the sea are but arms of the
sea, and are as much within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States as the sea itself. Difficulties attend every
attempt to define the exact limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but
it cannot be made to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate
commerce as conferred in the Constitution. They are entirely
distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another,
and are conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct
grants. Pp.
74 U. S. 637-640. "
Page 141 U. S. 16
Jackson v. The Magnolia was a case of collision between
two steamboats on the Alabama River far above tidewater and within
the jurisdiction of a county. A libel in admiralty was filed by one
of the parties in the district court of the United States, which
was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This Court
reversed the decree and maintained the admiralty jurisdiction. Mr.
Justice Grier, delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"Before the adoption of the present Constitution, each state, in
the exercise of its sovereign power, had its own court of
admiralty, having jurisdiction over the harbors, creeks, inlets,
and public navigable waters connected with the sea. This
jurisdiction was exercised not only over rivers, creeks, and
inlets, which were boundaries to or passed through other states,
but also where they were wholly within the state. Such a
distinction was unknown, nor (as it appears from the decision of
this Court in the case of
Waring v. Clarke, 5 How.
441) had these courts been driven from the exercise of jurisdiction
over torts committed on navigable water within the body of a
county, by the jealousy of the common law courts. When, therefore,
the exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over its public
rivers, ports, and havens was surrendered by each state to the
government of the United States, without an exception as to
subjects or places, this Court cannot interpolate one into the
Constitution, or introduce an arbitrary distinction which has no
foundation in reason or precedent."
In
Nelson v. Leland, the same conclusion was reached,
and the same doctrine maintained. That was also a case of collision
between a steamer and a flatboat on the Yazoo River, which lies
wholly in the State of Mississippi, and empties into the
Mississippi River.
In the case of
The Propeller Commerce, it was held that
in order to bring a case of collision within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is not necessary to show
that either of the vessels was engaged in foreign commerce or
commerce between the states. Maritime torts such as collision,
etc., committed on navigable waters above tidewater, are cognizable
in the admiralty without reference to the voyage or destination of
either vessel.
Page 141 U. S. 17
In the case of
The Belfast, it was decided that, on an
ordinary contract of affreightment, the shipper has a maritime lien
which may be enforced in the admiralty courts, although the
contract be for transportation between ports and places within the
same state, provided it be upon navigable waters to which the
general jurisdiction of the admiralty extends. In the case of
The Montello, it was held that Fox River, in Wisconsin, is
a navigable river, although made such by artificial improvements,
and that a steamer navigating the same is subject to the laws of
the United States with regard to the enrollment and license of
vessels and is liable to be proceeded against in admiralty for
noncompliance with such laws. In
Ex Parte Boyer it was
decided that the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a steam canal
boat in case of collision between her and another canal boat while
the two boats were navigating the Illinois and Lake Michigan Canal,
although the libellant's boat was bound from one place in Illinois
to another place in the same state. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD,
delivering the opinion of the Court in that case, said:
"Within the principles laid down by this Court in the cases of
The
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, and
The
Montello, 20 Wall. 430, which extended the salutary
views of admiralty jurisdiction applied in
The Genesee
Chief, 12 How. 443;
The Hine v.
Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, and
The
Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, we have no doubt of the
jurisdiction of the district court in this case. Navigable water
situated as this canal is, used for the purposes for which it is
used, a highway for commerce between ports and places in different
states, carried on by vessels such as those in question here, is
public water of the United States and within the legitimate scope
of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and
statutes of the United States, even though the canal is wholly
artificial and is wholly within the body of a state, and subject to
its ownership and control, and it makes no difference as to the
jurisdiction of the district court that one or the other of the
vessels was at the time of the collision on a voyage from one place
in the State of Illinois to another place in that state.
The
Belfast, 7 Wall. 624. Pp.
109 U. S.
631-632. "
Page 141 U. S. 18
In view of the principles laid down in the cases now referred
to, we have no hesitation in saying that the Savannah River, from
its mouth to the highest point to which it is navigable, is subject
to the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States. It follows as a matter of course that Congress, having
already, by the act of 1851, amended the maritime law by giving the
benefit of a limited liability to the owners of all vessels
navigating the oceans and great lakes of the country, and
withholding it from the owners of vessels used in rivers or inland
navigation, was perfectly competent to abolish that restriction in
1886 and extend the same beneficent rule to the latter class also.
We think that the act in question -- namely the fourth section of
the act of 1886 -- is a constitutional and valid law. As regards
the steamboat itself and the business in which she was engaged, in
view of the authorities already referred to, there is not the
slightest doubt that the case was one within the admiralty
jurisdiction. The steamboat was a regularly enrolled and licensed
vessel of the United States and was engaged in maritime commerce on
the Savannah River, one of the navigable rivers of the United
States.
The writ of prohibition is denied.