When there is a general finding in favor of the plaintiff on the
issues of fact raised by the pleadings in an action for the
recovery of duties illegally
Page 130 U. S. 40
exacted, the facts must be taken to be as alleged by him in the
pleadings.
Since the enactment of § 7 of the Act of March 3, 1882, c. 121,
22 Stat. 488, 523, the value of an importation of goods is to be
ascertained for the purpose of customs duties by their actual
market value, without reference to the "charges" specified in §§
2907, Rev.Stat., and it appearing in this case that under an
appraisement of imported oranges, the invoiced value of such
"charges" was reduced, and the amount of such reduction added to
the invoiced value of the fruit, although such invoice value
represented its true market value,
held that such addition
to the true invoice value was illegal, and that the power of the
collector to make it was apart from any question of fraud in the
appraisement, and could be raised in an action at law when the
importer had taken such steps as entitled him to bring suit for the
recovery of the duties so illegally extracted.
The case is stated by the Court in its opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action for the recovery of the sum of $1,440.07, with
interest, being the amount of certain duties which, it is alleged,
were illegally exacted from the defendants in error. The case was
tried by the court pursuant to a stipulation between the parties
waiving the intervention of a jury.
The court found "the issues of fact raised by the pleadings in
favor of the plaintiffs." We must assume, therefore, that the facts
were as alleged by the plaintiffs in their pleadings.
It is alleged in the petition and amended petition that the
plaintiffs were importers of and dealers in foreign fruits at New
Orleans; that, in December, 1883, and January, 1884, they imported
several cargoes of Valencia oranges on the steamships
Pontiac,
Norfolk, North Anglia, Vindolano, and
Ehrenfels,
aggregating 21,165 cases, each case being over two and one-half
cubic feet; that the invoice value of the oranges was 177,310
pesetas, while the invoice value of the charges (composed of value
of cases, nails, packing, bands, cost of
Page 130 U. S. 41
transportation, etc.) was 120,990 pesetas, making the total
invoice value of fruit and charges 298,300 pesetas; that the fruit
as it arrived was duly entered in the customs department at New
Orleans, the fruit at its true invoice value, which was its true
market value at the date of the respective importations, and the
charges at their true invoice value; that nevertheless the
collector, without pretending that there was any mistake or fraud
in the invoice value of the fruit, caused an appraisement of each
importation to be made, despite the protest and remonstrance of
petitioners, and thereby increased the invoice value of the fruit,
and reduced the invoice value of the charges in each, increasing
the value of the fruit by just so many pesetas as the invoice value
of the charges was reduced, and making a total increase of
36,271.15 pesetas in the value of the fruit, equal to $7,000.33 in
American coin, upon which petitioners were obliged to pay 20
percent duty, or $1,400.07; that as soon as the liquidations of
each and all of the entries were made by the customs department,
and within thirty days thereafter, the petitioners appealed from
the decision of the collector to the Secretary of the Treasury;
that the Secretary, on the 18th of February, 1885, decided that it
appeared that the
"fruit in question was invoiced at a value which properly
represented its market value, but that the value of the boxes,
packing, etc., was excessive, and was reduced by the appraiser, and
the value of the fruit advanced to the same extent,"
and affirmed the decision of the collector; that one of the
merchant appraisers appointed by the collector knew nothing of the
value of Valencia oranges or of the charges thereon, and so
admitted; that none of the oranges, nor any samples thereof, were
submitted to or examined by the merchant appraisers, which facts
were specifically set forth in plaintiff's protest, filed with the
collector, against the appraisement; and that all the subsequent
appraisements of shipments, other than the shipment by the Pontiac,
were based upon the above merchant appraisement, and an appeal to
the Secretary of the Treasury was refused on the ground that such
appraisement was binding.
The effect of § 7 of the Act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat.
488, 523, was to exclude from the estimate of the
Page 130 U. S. 42
amount of duties collectible upon goods imported from other
countries the value of the "charges" specified in §§ 2907 and 2908
of the Revised Statutes, including the value of the usual and
necessary sacks, crates, boxes, of covering of any kind, not
composed of materials or made in any form designed to evade duties
thereon, but used in the
bona fide transportation of such
goods to the United States. The duties therefore for which the
plaintiffs were liable in respect to the oranges they imported were
to be ascertained with reference only to their true and actual
market value.
Oberteuffer v. Robertson, 116 U.
S. 499,
116 U. S.
509-510. That the collector made a reduction of the
invoice value of the charges is of no consequence, because such
charges were not dutiable items. He did what the law did not
authorize him to do -- namely increased the dutiable value of the
oranges, although they were invoiced and entered at their true
market value. The additional duties exacted from the plaintiffs on
this increased value amounted to the sum for which the judgment was
rendered. It is insisted, however, that this question cannot arise
upon the present writ of error. The only bill of exceptions taken
in the case states
"that on the trial of the cause the plaintiffs offered evidence
tending to show that the value fixed on goods imported by them was
excessive, and that the appraisement of said goods was erroneous,
to the reception of which evidence defendant objected on the ground
that said goods were duly appraised, and that the appraisement is
final and conclusive in the absence of fraud, which is not alleged,
and on the further ground that such evidence is not admissible
under the allegations of plaintiffs' petition, which objections
were overruled by the court, and said evidence received, to-wit, on
ground because, in the opinion of the court, it is not necessary to
allege fraud."
The contention of the government is that, as fraud was not
specifically alleged in respect to the appraisement, the court
erred in admitting and considering evidence to impeach it. This
position is supposed to be sustained by the case of
Hilton v.
Merritt, 110 U. S. 97,
110 U. S. 106.
In that case, it was said:
"Considering the acts of Congress as establishing a system
and
Page 130 U. S. 43
giving force to all the sections, its plain and obvious meaning
is that the appraisement of the customs officers shall be final,
but all other questions relating to the rate and amount of duties
may, after the importer has taken the prescribed steps be reviewed
in an action at law to recover duties unlawfully exacted."
Again:
"The valuation made by the customs officers was not open to
question in an action at law as long as the officers acted without
fraud and within the power conferred on them by the statute."
In the case before us, there is no impeachment of the
appraisement, so far as it states the value of the charges or the
value of the goods as increased by the amount of the reduction made
from the value of the charges. The only inquiry is whether the
collector acted within the power conferred upon him by statute when
he required the importers to pay duties not only upon the actual
market value of the goods, but upon such additional value as was
equal to the reduction made from the value of the cases covering
the goods. These are questions of law simply, involving the power
of the collector under the statute. They are entirely apart from
any inquiry as to fraud in the appraisement or as to the values set
forth in it, and may be raised by the importer in an action at law,
when he has taken such steps as entitle him to bring suit for the
recovery of duties illegally exacted from him. This ruling is
entirely consistent with the decision in
Hilton v.
Merritt.
Judgment affirmed.