The Act of January, 1808, for the relief of Oliver Evans does
not authorize those who erected his machinery between the
expiration of his old patent and the issuing of the new one to use
it after the issuing of the latter.
This was a case certified from the Circuit Court for the
District of Virginia, in which the judges were divided in opinion
upon the question, whether after the expiration of the original
patent granted to Oliver Evans, a general right to use his
discovery was not so vested in the public as to require and justify
such a construction of the act passed in January, 1808, entitled
"An act for the relief of Oliver Evans" as to exempt from either
single or treble damages the use, subsequent to the passage of the
said act, of the machinery therein mentioned, which was erected
subsequent to the expiration of the original patent and previous to
the passage of the said act. The act, vol. 9, 20, authorizes the
Secretary of State to issue letters patent to Oliver Evans in the
manner and form prescribed by the general patent law, granting
to
Page 13 U. S. 200
him for the term of 14 years the exclusive right of making,
using, and vending for use the machinery in question
"provided that no person who may have heretofore paid the said
Oliver Evans for license to use his said improvements, shall be
obliged to renew the said license or be subject to damages for not
renewing the same, and provided also that no person who shall have
used the said improvements or have erected the same for use before
the issuing of the said patent shall be liable to damages therefor.
"
Page 13 U. S. 201
WASHINGTON, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as
follows:
Page 13 U. S. 202
The question certified to this Court by the Circuit Court for
the District of Virginia and upon which the opinion of this Court
is required is whether, after the expiration of the original patent
granted to Oliver Evans, a general right to use his discovery was
not so vested in the public as to require and justify such a
construction of the act passed in January, 1808, entitled "An act
for the relief of Oliver Evans" as to exempt from either treble or
single damages, the use, subsequent to the passage of the said act,
of the machinery therein mentioned, which was erected subsequent to
the expiration of the original patent and previous to the passage
of the said act.
The act upon the construction of which the judges of the circuit
court were opposed in opinion directs a patent to be granted, in
the form prescribed by law, to Oliver Evans for 14 years for the
full and exclusive right of making, constructing, using, and
vending to be used his invention, discovery, and improvements in
the art of manufacturing flour and meal and in the several machines
which he has discovered, invented, improved, and applied to that
purpose.
The proviso upon which the question arises is in the following
words:
"provided that no person who may have heretofore paid the said
Oliver Evans for license to use the said improvements, shall be
obliged to renew said license, or be subject to damages for not
renewing the same, and provided also that no person who shall have
used the said improvements or have erected the same for use before
the issuing of the said patent shall be liable to damages
therefor."
The language of this last proviso is so precise and so entirely
free from all ambiguity that it is difficult for any course of
reasoning to shed light upon its meaning. It protects against any
claim for damages which Evans might make, those who may have used
his improvements or who may have erected them for use prior to the
issuing of his patent under this law. The protection is limited to
acts done prior to another act thereafter to be performed, to-wit,
the issuing of the patent. To extend it by construction to acts
which might be done subsequent to the issuing of the patent, would
be to make, not to interpret, the law.
Page 13 U. S. 203
The injustice of denying to the defendants the use of machinery
which they had erected after the expiration of Evans' first patent
and prior to the passage of this law has been strongly urged as a
reason why the words of this proviso should be so construed as to
have a prospective operation. But it should be recollected that the
right of the plaintiff to recover damages for using his improvement
after the issuing of his patent under this law, although it had
been erected prior thereto, arises not under this law, but under
the general law 21 February, 1793.
* The provisos in
this law profess to protect against the operation of the general
law, three classes of persons; those who had paid Evans for a
license prior to the passage of the law, those who may have used
his improvements, and those who may have erected them for use
before the issuing of the patent.
The legislature might have proceeded still further by providing
a shield for persons standing in the situation of these defendants.
It is believed that the reasonableness of such a provision could
have been questioned by no one. But the legislature has not thought
proper to extend the protection of these provisos beyond the
issuing of the patent under that law, and this Court would
transgress the limits of judicial power by an attempt to supply, by
construction, this supposed omission of the legislature. The
argument, founded upon the hardship of this and similar cases,
would be entitled to great weight if the words of this proviso were
obscure and open to construction. But considerations of this nature
can never sanction a construction at variance with the manifest
meaning of the legislature, expressed in plain and unambiguous
language.
The argument of the defendants counsel that unless the
construction they contend for be adopted, the proviso is senseless
and inoperative, is susceptible of the same answer.
Page 13 U. S. 204
Whether the proviso was introduced from abundant caution, or
from an opinion really entertained by the legislature that those
who might have erected these improvements or might have used them
prior to the issuing of the patent, would be liable to damages for
having done so it is impossible for this Court to say. It is not
difficult, however, to imagine a state of things which might have
afforded some ground for such an opinion.
Although this Court has been informed, and the judge who
delivers this opinion knows that the former patent given to Evans
had been adjudged to be void by the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania,
prior to the passage of this law, yet that fact is not recited in
the law, nor does it appear that it was within the view of the
legislature, and if that patent right had expired by its own
limitation, the legislature might well make it a condition of the
new grant that the patentee should not disturb those who had
violated the former patent. This idea was certainly in the mind of
the legislature which passed the Act of 21 February, 1793, which
after repealing the act of 10 April, 1790, preserves the rights of
patentees under the repealed law only in relation to violations
committed after the passage of the repealing law.
If the decision above mentioned was made known to the
legislature, it is not impossible but that a doubt might have
existed whether the patent was thereby rendered void
ab
initio, or from the time of rendering the judgment, and if the
latter, then the proviso would afford a protection against all
preceding violations. But whatever might be the inducements with
the legislature to limit the proviso, under consideration, as we
find it, this Court cannot introduce a different proviso totally at
variance with it in language and intention.
It is the unanimous opinion of this Court that the act passed in
January, 1808, entitled "an act for the relief of Oliver Evans,"
ought not to be so construed as to exempt from either treble or
single damages the use, subsequent to the passage of the said act,
of the machinery therein mentioned, which was erected subsequent to
the expiration of the original patent and previous to the passage
of the said act. Which opinion is ordered to be certified to the
Circuit Court for the District of Virginia.
* The 5th section of the Act of 21 February, 1793, which is the
only section of that act which gives damages for violation of the
patent right, is repealed by the 4th section of the Act of 17
April, 1800, vol. 5, 90, the 3d section of which act gives treble
damages for the violation of any patent granted pursuant to that
act or the act of 1793.