Misrepresentations, knowingly made by an applicant for a mineral
patent, as to discovery of mineral or as to the form in which the
mineral appears, whether in placers or in veins, lodes, or ledges,
will justify the government in moving to set aside the patent.
In such cases, the burden of proof is upon the government, and
the presumption that the patent was correctly issued can be
overcome only by clear and convincing proof of the fraud alleged.
The doctrine of the
Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.
S. 325, and of
Colorado Coal & Iron Company v.
United States, 123 U. S. 307, on
this point affirmed.
Exceptions made by the statute cannot be enlarged by the
language of a patent. The statute only excepts from placer patents,
veins, or lodes know to exist at the date of application for
patent.
Page 128 U. S. 674
To establish the statutory exception from a placer patent the
lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained and be of such extent as
to render the land more valuable on that account and justify their
exploitation.
The certificate of the surveyor general is made by statute
evidence of the sufficiency of work performed and improvements made
on a mining claim. In the absence of fraudulent representations
respecting them to him by the patentee, his determination as to
their sufficiency, unless corrected by the Land Department before
patent, must be taken as conclusive. His estimate is open to
examination by the Department before patent, and any alleged error
in it cannot afterwards be made ground for impeaching the validity
of the patent.
In equity. The bill charged that two patents for placer mining
claims had been obtained upon false and fraudulent representations
and prayed for their cancellation. The answer denied all the
allegations of fraud. The bill was dismissed, from which decree the
United States took this appeal.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity brought by the United States against
the Iron Silver Mining Company, a corporation created under the
laws of New York, and James A. Sawyer, a citizen of Colorado, to
cancel two patents for alleged placer mining claims, known
respectively as the "Fanchon Placer Claim" and the "Stinson Placer
Claim," situated in the County of Lake, Colorado. Both patents were
issued to the defendant Sawyer, and the larger part of the claims
was subsequently conveyed by him to the defendant corporation.
The Fanchon claim embraces 113 acres and a fraction of an acre.
The patent for it bears date November 17, 1881, and was issued upon
an entry made April 22, 1880.
The Stinson claim embraces 124 acres and a fraction of an acre.
The patent for it bears date June 15, 1881, and was issued upon an
entry made April 27, 1880.
The bill for the cancellation of these patents alleges that they
were obtained upon false and fraudulent representations
Page 128 U. S. 675
that the land embraced by them was placer mining ground and
contained no veins or lodes of quartz or other rock bearing gold or
silver or other metal, and that the patentee had performed the work
upon each tract required by law to entitle him to enter it as a
placer claim; whereas in fact the land was not placer mining
ground, but land containing sundry veins or lodes of quartz or
other rock bearing gold, silver, and lead of great value, which was
well known to the patentee on his application for the patents, and
that the work required to enter the tracts as placer claims had
never been performed.
The bill also alleges that the defendant Sawyer had previously
made several locations of lode claims on this ground, and that
certificates of these locations had been recorded in the office of
the recorder of Lake County; that he afterwards entered into a
conspiracy with one William H. Stevens and Levi Z. Leiter of
Colorado to defraud the United States of the lode claims and the
timber on the land, of which there was a valuable growth, by
obtaining patents of the land as placer ground for the benefit of
those parties and of the defendant the Iron Silver Mining Company,
in which they were interested; that by its terms, the defendant
Sawyer was to abandon the lode claims and take up the ground as
placer claims, and Stevens and Leiter were to advance the necessary
funds for that purpose; that when the patents were obtained, Sawyer
was to receive in consideration of his services in the matter a
portion of the claims, and that the patents in question were
obtained in execution of this conspiracy.
These allegations are specifically denied by the defendants in
their answer, and the proofs in the case were directed to establish
them, on the one hand, and to refute them on the other. If
established, the government could justly demand a cancellation of
the patents. The statutes providing for the disposition of the
mineral lands of the United States are framed in a most liberal
spirit, and those lands are open to the acquisition of every
citizen upon conditions which can be readily complied with. It is
the policy of the government to favor the development of mines of
gold and silver and other metals, and every facility is afforded
for that purpose, but it
Page 128 U. S. 676
exacts a faithful compliance with the conditions required. There
must be a discovery of the mineral and a sufficient exploration of
the ground to show this fact beyond question. The form, also, in
which the mineral appears, whether in placers or in veins, lodes or
ledges, must be disclosed so far as ascertained. Misrepresentation
knowingly made as to these matters by the applicant for a patent
will afterwards justify the government in proceeding to set it
aside. The government has the same right to demand a cancellation
of the conveyances of the United States, when obtained by false and
fraudulent representations, as a private individual when a
conveyance of his lands is obtained in like manner. In this
respect, the United States, as a landed proprietor, stand upon the
same footing with the private citizen. The burden of proof in such
cases is upon the government. The presumption attending the patent,
even when directly assailed, that it was issued upon sufficient
evidence that the law had been complied with by the officers of the
government charged with the alienation of public lands can only be
overcome by clear and convincing proof. In several cases recently
before this Court, the character and degree of proof required to
set aside a patent for land of the United States, issued in due
form by their officers where they have had jurisdiction over the
subject and have observed the various proceedings preliminary to
its issue required by law, have been discussed and determined, and
rules laid down which must control in future cases of the kind.
In
Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.
S. 325,
121 U. S.
379-381, which was before us at October term, 1886, this
question received careful consideration. The Court there said, by
MR. JUSTICE MILLER:
"The deliberate action of the tribunals to which the law commits
the determination of all preliminary questions, and the control of
the processes by which this evidence of title is issued to the
grantee, demand that to annul such an instrument and destroy the
title claimed under it, the facts on which this action is asked for
must be clearly established by evidence entirely satisfactory to
the court by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court, and that
the case itself must be within the class of causes for which such
an instrument may be avoided."
And again:
"We take the
Page 128 U. S. 677
general doctrine to be that when in a court of equity it is
proposed to set aside, to annul, or to correct a written instrument
for fraud or mistake in the execution of the instrument itself, the
testimony on which this is done must be clear, unequivocal, and
convincing, and that it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of
evidence which leaves the issue in doubt. If the proposition as
thus laid down in the cases cited is sound in regard to the
ordinary contracts of private individuals, how much more should it
be observed where the attempt is to annul the grants, the patents,
and other solemn evidences of title emanating from the government
of the United States under its official seal. In this class of
cases, the respect due to a patent, the presumptions that all the
preceding steps required by the law had been observed before its
issue, the immense importance and necessity of the stability of
titles dependent upon these official instruments, demand that the
effort to set them aside, to annul them, or to correct mistakes in
them should only be successful when the allegations on which this
is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof."
In
Colorado Coal Co. v. United States, 123 U.
S. 307, before us at October term, 1887, the same
subject was considered and a similar conclusion reached as to the
character and degree of proof necessary to invalidate a patent of
the United States. There patents for coal lands were alleged to
have been obtained on false and fraudulent papers made by the
register and receiver of the local land office, combining with
others in a conspiracy for that purpose; but the court, after
referring to the doctrine declared in
Maxwell Land Grant
Case, said, by MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS:
"It thus appears that the title of the defendants rests upon the
strongest presumptions of fact which, although they may be
rebutted, nevertheless can be overthrown only by full proofs to the
contrary, clear, convincing, and unambiguous. The burden of
producing these proofs and establishing the conclusion to which
they are directed rests upon the government. Neither is it relieved
of this obligation by the negative nature of the proposition it is
bound to establish."
Authorities are then cited to show that
Page 128 U. S. 678
in some instances, the burden of proving a negative rests upon
the complaining party, and especially so where the negative
allegation involves a charge of fraud against the party whose
conduct is complained of, for which it is sought to defeat an
estate.
In this connection, a word should be said of a paragraph in the
opinion in
Moffat v. United States, 112 U. S.
24,
112 U. S. 30.
That was a suit to set aside a patent issued to fictitious parties,
and the court, referring to the presumption which is indulged as a
protection against collateral attacks upon a patent by third
parties, said:
"It may be admitted, as stated by counsel, that if upon any
state of facts the patent might have been lawfully issued, the
Court will presume, as against such collateral attacks, that the
facts existed, but that presumption has no place in a suit by the
United States directly assailing the patent and seeking its
cancellation for fraud in the conduct of their officers."
It was not intended by this language to hold that presumptions
in favor of the regularity and lawfulness of patents issued did not
apply in suits by the United States to vacate them for fraud, but
that the presumption mentioned -- that is, that when a patent is
assailed collaterally, if it could be sustained upon any state of
facts, the court will presume that such facts existed -- could not
apply in suits by the United States assailing the patent for fraud
in the conduct of their officers. This is evident from what
immediately follows in the opinion, for the Court adds:
"In such a suit, the burden of proof is undoubtedly, in the
first instance, on the government to show a fatal irregularity or
corrupt conduct on their part; but when a case is established,
which, if unexplained, would warrant a conclusion against them, the
burden of proof is shifted, and they must show such integrity of
conduct, and such a compliance with the law as will sustain the
patent."
If the presumption mentioned could be admitted, no suit of the
kind could be sustained, for facts could be stated which would
overthrow the allegations of fraud.
The patents in controversy were issued under §§ 2329 and 2333 of
the Revised Statutes, which are as follows:
"SEC. 2329. Claims, usually called 'placers,' including all
Page 128 U. S. 679
forms of deposit, excepting veins of quartz or other rock in
place, shall be subject to entry and patent under like
circumstances and conditions and upon similar proceedings as are
provided for vein or lode claims; but where the lands have been
previously surveyed by the United States, the entry in its exterior
limits shall conform to the legal subdivisions of the public
lands."
"SEC. 2333. Where the same person, association, or corporation
is in possession of a placer claim and also a vein or lode included
within the boundaries thereof, application shall be made for a
patent for the placer claim, with the statement that it includes
such vein or lode, and in such case a patent shall issue for the
placer claim, subject to the provisions of this chapter, including
such vein or lode, upon the payment of five dollars per acre for
such vein or lode claim, and twenty-five feet of surface on each
side thereof. The remainder of the placer claim, or any placer
claim not embracing any vein or lode claim, shall be paid for at
the rate of two dollars and fifty cents per acre, together with all
costs of proceedings, and where a vein or lode such as is described
in section twenty-three hundred and twenty is known to exist within
the boundaries of a placer claim, an application for a patent for
such placer claim which does not include an application for the
vein or lode claim shall be construed as a conclusive declaration
that the claimant of the placer claim has no right of possession of
the vein or lode claim; but where the existence of a vein or lode
in a placer claim is not known, a patent for the placer claim shall
convey all valuable mineral and other deposits within the
boundaries thereof."
By the term "placer claim," as here used, is meant ground within
defined boundaries which contains mineral in its earth, sand, or
gravel; ground that includes valuable deposits not in place -- that
is, not fixed in rock -- but which are in a loose state, and may in
most cases be collected by washing or amalgamation without
milling.
By "veins or lodes," as here used, are meant lines or
aggregations of metal embedded in quartz or other rock in place.
The terms are found together in the statutes, and both are
Page 128 U. S. 680
intended to indicate the presence of metal in rock. Yet a lode
may and often does contain more than one vein. In
Iron Silver
Mining Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U. S. 533,
a definition of a lode is given, so far as it is practicable to
define it with accuracy, and it is not necessary to repeat it. What
is important here is that the amount of land which may be taken up
as a placer claim, and the amount as a lode claim, and the price
per acre to be paid to the government in the two cases, when
patents are obtained, are different, and the rights conferred by
the respective patents, and the conditions upon which they are
held, are also different. Rev.Stat. §§ 2320, 2322, 2325, 2333;
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636,
104 U. S. 651;
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, 124 U.
S. 374.
The patent for the Stinson claim contained the following
conditions:
First. That the grant is restricted in its exterior
limits to the boundaries of the tract described, and to any veins
or lodes of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver,
cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits, which may
hereafter be discovered within said limits, and which are not
claimed or known to exist at the date thereof.
Second. That should any vein or lode of quartz or other
rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or
other valuable deposits, be claimed or known to exist within the
described premises at the date thereof, the same is expressly
excepted and excluded therefrom.
The patent for the Fanchon placer claim contains similar
conditions.
The exception from grant in each patent of any vein or lode of
quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, copper, silver,
cinnabar, lead, tin, or other valuable deposit, "claimed or known
to exist" at the date of the patent within the described premises
is in terms broader than the language of the statute under which
the patents were issued. The exception of the statute cannot be
thus enlarged. The statute does not except veins or lodes "claimed
or known to exist," but only such as are known to exist at the time
the application is made for the patent, and not at the date of the
patent. When
Page 128 U. S. 681
such a vein or lode is known to exist within the boundaries of
the placer claim, the application for a patent, which does not
include also an application for the vein or lode, is to be
construed as a conclusive declaration that the claimant has no
right of possession to it; but where the existence of a vein or
lode in a placer claim is not known at the time of the application
for a patent, that instrument will convey all valuable mineral and
other deposits subsequently found within the boundaries of the
claim.
In the present case, the evidence produced establishes
substantially these facts:
That in 1879, the defendant Sawyer prospected the ground which
constitutes the claims in search of mines of gold and silver; that
in this work he was assisted by three or four men whom he employed;
that he made several excavations of ten feet in depth to find lodes
which he was told existed within the premises, and that he made
several lode locations, and filed and recorded certificates
thereof. Subsequently, in October of that year, he found himself
embarrassed by debts owing to his men and for supplies, and he
applied to Mr. Stevens, mentioned above, to purchase an interest in
a claim which he held. It does not appear that any purchase was
made of that interest, but Stevens agreed to look at the lode
claims on the ground subsequently entered as placer claims.
Accordingly, the two (Stevens and Sawyer) went over the ground
together, and examined the excavations made, and also the timber on
the land. After such examination, Stevens stated to Sawyer that it
was a waste of money to excavate for lode claims on that ground;
that its formation was not such as contained lodes; that the rock
was not granite, but gneiss, and advised him to take it up as
placer ground, provided a way could be traced to bring water for
its working from a neighboring stream called "Lake Creek," adding
that the course he thus recommended would accomplish two purposes
-- it would save the timber and enable him to successfully work the
placer. Afterwards, and in pursuance of this advice, Sawyer
concluded to abandon the lode locations he had made, and to file an
application for patents for placer claims, Stevens and Mr. Leiter,
who appears
Page 128 U. S. 682
to have been a friend both of Stevens and Sawyer, agreeing to
advance the money required to make the necessary explorations and
improvements, and the application for the patents, and Sawyer
agreeing to do the necessary work, and when the patents were
obtained to convey the claims to them, reserving a share for
himself. Stevens was examined as a witness in the case, and in his
testimony stated that he had known the ground since June 1, 1879;
that it had a rolling and uneven surface, with gulches, ravines,
and small streams running through it, and was covered with a young
and thrifty growth of timber; that he had crossed and re-crossed it
several times, and carefully examined all the shafts, pit-holes,
and excavations, with reference to their mineral value, and had
come to the conclusion that it contained no lodes, veins, or ledges
of rock in place bearing gold, silver, lead, or other minerals of
value; that the only mineral found was float-gold in deposits of
sand and gravel, and in his opinion it was placer mining ground,
and that he had made an examination with pocket instruments, and
found that the waters of Lake creek could be easily brought in
ditches and flumes to work the placers. He then testified as
follows:
"After deciding it was placer ground and practicable to bring
water on it, Mr. Leiter and myself accepted a proposition from Mr.
Sawyer to furnish the money in order to make the necessary
explorations, improvements, and entry of application for government
patent, he (Sawyer) to do all the work and obtain title for a share
in the property. Our object and purpose in assisting Sawyer was to
obtain an interest in said placer land, being convinced of its
character as such."
The deputy United States surveyor, who made two surveys of the
ground included within the placer claims -- one for the parties
interested in locating the claims and the other the official
survey, on which the application for the patents was based -- by
direction of the surveyor general, was also examined as a witness,
and he testified that in September or October, 1879, he made an
examination of the ground for the purpose of determining whether
any veins, lodes, or ledges of mineral in rock in place, or
gold-bearing rock had been discovered
Page 128 U. S. 683
upon it, and for that purpose had explored every pit, cut, and
shaft on the property, and found that there had not been discovered
in them any mineral-bearing rock in place, and that at the time he
made both surveys, and at the time the applications for the patents
were made, there was not known to exist within the placer claims
any lode or ledge of rock bearing gold, silver, or other valuable
deposit. He further testified that he had resided for several years
in Colorado, and was familiar with placer, lode, and vein
formations.
In pursuance of the arrangement with Stevens and Leiter, Sawyer
performed the labor, and made the improvements necessary to obtain
the placer patents, and applied for the land as placer ground
(other parties who had joined with him in making the locations
having transferred their interests to him), stating that there were
no known lodes or veins upon the tracts, and such proceedings were
then taken as are required by the Revised Statutes in such cases,
and, the only adverse claim made to the applications having been
withdrawn, the patents were issued.
It appears very clearly from the evidence that no lodes or veins
were discovered by the excavations of Sawyer in his prospecting
work, and that his lode locations were made upon an erroneous
opinion, and not upon knowledge that lodes bearing metal were
disclosed by them. It is not enough that there may have been some
indications by outcroppings on the surface of the existence of
lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or other
metal to justify their designation as "known" veins or lodes. To
meet that designation, the lodes or veins must be clearly
ascertained, and be of such extent as to render the land more
valuable on that account and justify their exploitation. Although
pits and shafts had been sunk in various places, and what are
termed in mining cross-cuts had been run, only loose gold and small
nuggets had been found, mingled with earth, sand, and gravel. Lodes
and veins in quartz or other rock in place bearing gold or silver
or other metal were not disclosed when the application for the
patents was made. The subsequent discovery of lodes upon the
ground, and their successful working, does not affect the
Page 128 U. S. 684
good faith of the application. That must be determined by what
was known to exist at the time. It is not, therefore, a fault to be
charged upon Sawyer that he abandoned his original lode locations
after he had discovered that they were worthless, in order to make
locations of placer claims. There was evidence that loose gold
existed in the sand and gravel on the ground in many places, and
had been washed from the earth, and it was the judgment of
experienced miners that if water could be brought from a
neighboring creek the ground could be successfully worked as placer
ground.
It may be, as contended, that Stevens was moved in his advice to
Sawyer as much by the existence of the valuable growth of timber on
the land as by the existence of gold in the ground, and that the
timber could be advantageously used by the Iron Silver Mining
Company. If such were the fact, it would not affect the applicant's
claim to a patent. Probably, in a majority of cases where a placer
claim is located, other matters than the existence of valuable
deposits of mineral enter into the estimate of its worth. Its
accessibility to places where supplies and medical attendance can
be obtained for the men engaged in working upon it and timber
secured to support the drifting or tunneling which may be
necessary; the facility with which water can be brought to wash the
mineral from the earth, sand, or gravel with which it may be
mingled, and the uses to which the land may be subjected when the
claim is exhausted may be proper subjects of consideration. A
prudent miner acting wisely in taking up a claim, whether for a
placer mine or for a lode or vein, would not overlook such
circumstances, and they may in fact control his action in making
the location. If the land contains gold or other valuable deposits
in loose earth, sand, or gravel which can be secured with profit,
that fact will satisfy the demand of the government as to the
character of the land as placer ground, whatever the incidental
advantages it may offer to the applicant for a patent. Nor do we
consider it a suspicious circumstance, or even surprising, that
when Sawyer came to convey to Stevens and Leiter, pursuant to his
arrangement with them, a part of the claims, he should have
retained those
Page 128 U. S. 685
portions which he had originally taken up as lode claims; for
though shown not to be such claims, in fact they constituted ground
which he had examined and believed to be valuable for gold, having
in some instances exhibited traces of it. The question respecting
the whole proceedings taken upon that arrangement is one of good
faith toward the government in securing thereby its patents, and
that we deem to be fully established.
We have gone over with great care all the testimony adduced by
the government in the case, and our conclusion is that it wholly
fails to substantiate the charges of false and fraudulent
representations to obtain the patents, or of a conspiracy by the
patentee and others to defraud the government. We perceive nothing
in what was said or done by him or by those who advised and
assisted him which justifies the imputations of the government upon
his or their conduct.
The sufficiency of the work performed and improvements made upon
each of the claims patented was shown by the certificate of the
surveyor general of the United States for the state in which the
claims are situated. The statute makes his certificate evidence of
that fact. Rev.Stat. § 2325. It declares where publication is made
of the application for a patent that
"the claimant at the time of filing his application, or at any
time thereafter, within the sixty days of publication, shall file
with the register a certificate of the United States surveyor
general that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended
or improvements made upon the claim by himself or grantors."
He was fully informed of the character and value of the labor
performed and improvements made through his deputy, who had
personally examined them and estimated their cost and also secured
affidavits of others on that subject. Their sufficiency, both as to
amount and character, were matters to be determined by him from his
own observation, or from the testimony of parties having knowledge
of the subject, and in such cases, where there are no fraudulent
representations to him respecting them by the patentee, his
determination, unless corrected by the Land Department before
patent, must be taken as conclusive. His
Page 128 U. S. 686
estimate here in both particulars was subject to be examined by
the department before the patents were issued, and any alleged
error in it cannot afterwards be made ground for impeaching their
validity.
Decree affirmed.