When, in an action by an employs of a railroad company against
the company to recover damages for a personal injury inflicted upon
him by reason of an engine in motion striking him, it is conceded
that the defendant company was in fault on account of the manner of
running its trains, and the defense is set up that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence, and there is conflicting
evidence on that point, the plaintiff is entitled to have that
question submitted to the jury.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 128 U. S. 444
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought by W. C. Jones against the East
Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railroad Company to recover damages
for a personal injury inflicted upon him by his being struck by an
engine belonging to the defendant company.
The suit was originally brought in the local state court, but
was afterwards removed by the railroad company into the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
On the trial, after considerable testimony had been introduced on
both sides, the court gave the jury the following instruction:
"This case, gentlemen, does not come within the purview of
subsections [3, 4] of section 1166 of the Code of Tennessee. It
must be determined upon the principles of the common law as
interpreted and administered by the Supreme Court of the United
States. It is not necessary for me to explain what would or would
not be negligence on the part of the defendant, for it may be
conceded that the defendant was negligent in running its train,
without its brakes in good condition at a higher rate of speed than
was proper or safe under the circumstances of this case, and still
the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, simply because such
negligence, if it existed, did not cause the injury complained of.
In the judgment of this court, based upon the facts shown in
evidence, and not controverted by the argument, touching the manner
of plaintiff's collision with defendant's engine, the plaintiff was
guilty of such contributory negligence as precludes him from all
right to recover in this action. The court therefore instructs you
to return a verdict for the defendant."
It will be seen from his language that while the court was of
the opinion that the company was guilty of such negligence as would
render it liable in this action, it was relieved from that
liability by contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
It did not, therefore, permit the jury to pass either upon the
negligence of the defendant company or the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff.
The ground upon which the court based this decision is not
Page 128 U. S. 445
shown except so far as appears from the statement, in the
extract above quoted, that,
"upon the facts shown in evidence, and not controverted by the
argument, touching the manner of the plaintiff's collision with
defendant's engine, the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory
negligence as precludes him from all right to recover in this
action."
It is not to be inferred from this statement that counsel for
the plaintiff conceded that he was guilty of contributory
negligence, but the court proceeds upon the idea that the facts,
which in its judgment were shown in evidence, not being
controverted by argument, were sufficient to establish such
negligence.
The evidence is embodied in the bill of exceptions before us,
and we cannot agree with the circuit court that there was such a
clear case of negligence on the part of the plaintiff as to justify
the court in withdrawing the whole subject from the consideration
of the jury. The plaintiff himself states that he was in the depot
of the defendant on business; that the passenger platform was
alongside the tracks which ran between it and the depot; that there
was also a side track that went through the depot; that he passed
out of the depot by the usual way, and was struck between the wall
of the depot and the platform. He further says that the way he was
going, he could not see a train approaching from the east because
there was a car on the side track, and he had no warning of any
approaching train, although he listened as he went out of the
depot. There is also some evidence that there was so much noise
about the place of exit from the depot that the sound of the
advancing train could not be distinguished. On the other hand,
there is some testimony to show that the plaintiff ran carelessly
through the depot; that he knew the train was approaching, and that
he might have guarded himself against it if he had stopped at the
exit of the depot long enough to have looked about him.
But we think these are questions for the jury to determine. We
see no reason, so long as the jury system is the law of the land
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of
fact, why it should not decide such questions as these as well as
others. There is nothing in a case in which
Page 128 U. S. 446
it is conceded, fully and unreservedly, that the defendant
company is in fault on account of the manner of running its trains,
such as the high rate of speed and other careless matters mentioned
by the court in its instructions, which should justify the court in
refusing to submit to the jury the question whether the defendant
company is relieved from the liability incurred by it by reason of
the acts of the plaintiff showing that in some degree he may not
have been as careful as the most cautious and prudent man would
have been.
Instead of the course here pursued, a due regard for the
respective functions of the court and the jury would seem to demand
that these questions should have been submitted to the jury,
accompanied by such instructions from the presiding judge as would
have secured a sound verdict. We think the case is covered by that
of
Kane v. Northern Central Railway Co., ante,
128 U. S. 91, in
which the opinion of this Court was delivered by MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, October 22, 1888.
We forbear to discuss the facts further at this time, as we do
not wish to prejudice the case before the jury in the further
proceedings which must be had.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed with
instructions to grant a new trial.