While a creditor who finds specific property of his debtor in
the hands of the debtor's wife to whom it had been assigned by the
debtor before bankruptcy may follow it and have it appropriated to
the payment of his debt, a judgment
in personam for its
value cannot be taken against her in case the property itself
cannot be found.
Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95 U. S.
3, and
Trust Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S.
304, affirmed.
A bill in equity against husband and wife by the assignees in
bankruptcy of the husband, which alleges that the husband, before
the bankruptcy, transferred a large amount of personal property in
the form bonds, stocks, &c., to the wife for the purpose of
concealing the same from his creditors and delaying, hindering, and
defrauding them and in contemplation of bankruptcy, and which does
not describe the property, but avers inability to do so, and which
waives answer under oath and asks as relief for a transfer to the
assignees of the property in whatever form it may exist, as assets
of the bankrupt, sets forth no case for relief in equity, and
should be dismissed on demurrer.
This was a bill in equity which was dismissed on demurrer. The
case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 120 U. S. 79
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Massachusetts.
It was decided in that court upon a demurrer to the bill of
complaint, the demurrer being sustained and the bill dismissed. The
bill was brought by the present appellants, as assignees in
bankruptcy of William A. Saunders, against said William A. Saunders
and Mary P. Saunders, his wife, and, after alleging that, by due
course of proceeding, William A. Saunders had been adjudged a
bankrupt, and the plaintiffs appointed assignees of his estate, it
proceeds to say that they have discovered, within one year,
"and been first informed of, facts and circumstances upon which
they believe, and therefore aver, that the said bankrupt, without
consideration, transferred to and placed in the hands of his wife,
the said Mary P. Saunders, a large amount of personal property in
the form of money, bonds, stocks and other securities, none of
which can your orators more particularly describe, because all
particular information is refused by the bankrupt and his wife, and
the persons managing the property for them, and because the same
has been invested for income, and often changed in form by
reinvestment, and in pursuance of devices for more effectual
concealment."
Then it is further averred that
"said property is of the value of about forty thousand dollars,
and was so transferred by said bankrupt to his said wife for the
purpose of concealing the same from his creditors and from these
assignees, and to delay, hinder, and defraud his creditors, he
being then deeply indebted, and to an amount wholly beyond his
means and ability to liquidate and pay, so that he was hopelessly
insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy."
The prayer of the bill is "that said Mary P. Saunders, the
respondent, may fully, truly, and particularly answer this bill,
but not under oath, which is hereby waived," and for a decree
that
Page 120 U. S. 80
said property may be held to belong to the assets of said
William A. Saunders in bankruptcy, and the respondent compelled to
transfer and deliver the property, or the proceeds thereof, in
whatever form existing, to the plaintiffs, as assets of the
bankrupt, and for further and other relief.
The imperfections of this bill are very obvious. Counsel for
appellants, conceding the doctrine of
Phipps v. Sedgwick,
95 U. S. 3, and
Trust Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S. 304, that
at wife cannot be held liable to a personal judgment for money
received of her husband during the marital relation, argues that
this bill is an attempt to proceed against a fund in her hands; but
as no particular fund is named, as no particular set of securities
or description of them is given in the bill, as no place is named
where they are deposited, nor any person, even the wife, as holding
them, as no real estate is mentioned as belonging to this fund, as
the nature and character of the conversion made of the fund after
it came to the hands of the wife is not set forth, it seems
impossible to maintain such a bill as seeking to lay hold of and
appropriate a particular fund coming from the bankrupt himself, or
even the proceeds of such a fund. As was very pertinently asked by
the circuit judge in his opinion sustaining the demurrer, what
relief could be given by the court, or what decree could be granted
on this bill, if it were taken
pro confesso, no opposition
being made to it? 14 F. 907. It is not possible to see what decree
could be made or what relief could be given. It is not a bill of
discovery, because the answer under oath of the defendant is
expressly waived. No interrogatories are propounded to either of
the defendants; no effort made to obtain from them, or either of
them, by way of sworn answer, anything which could be used as
evidence in the case. An issue of a general denial of the truth of
the bill would leave nothing on which evidence could be introduced.
It is in fact what is familiarly known as a "fishing bill." The
plaintiffs allege no distinct fact which the defendants, or either
of them, can be called upon to deny. The plaintiffs do not say
positively that any of the allegations of the bill are true, but
the substance of what they say is that they have received certain
information which
Page 120 U. S. 81
excites their suspicion, and this information is so vague, so
uncertain and indefinite as it regards any fund or any particular
sum of money or bonds, or any time or occasion when they were
placed in the control of the female defendant, that unless we are
prepared to establish the proposition that whenever a married woman
is suspected of having received money from her husband to the
prejudice of his creditors, she must be brought up to answer, and
not under oath, as to what she has done with it, this bill must be
held to be insufficient.
In the case of
Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95 U. S.
3, which is a case somewhat analogous to this, this
Court said:
"While the statutes of New York have recognized certain rights
of the wife to deal with and contract in reference to her separate
property, they fall far short of establishing the principle that
out of that separate property she can be made liable for money or
property received at her husband's hands, which in equity ought to
have gone to pay his debts. Equity has been ready, where such
property remains in her hands, to restore it to its proper use, but
not to hold her separate estate liable for what she has received
and probably spent at his dictation. Such a proposition would be a
very unjust one to the wife while under the dominion, control, and
personal influence of the husband. In receiving favors at his
hands, which she supposed to be the offerings of affection or a
proper provision for her comfort, she would be subjecting that
which was her own, or which might afterwards come to her from other
sources, to unknown and unsuspected charges, of the amount and
nature of which she would be wholly ignorant. It answers the
demands of justice in such cases if the creditor, finding the
property itself in her hands or in the hands of one holding it with
notice, appropriates it to pay his debt. But if it is beyond his
reach, the wife should no more be held liable for it then if the
husband himself had spent it in support of his family, or even of
his own extravagance."
To this principle we adhere, and as there is no statement or
description or reference in this bill to any fund now existing
arising out of the bankrupt's gift to his wife, and no call for
discovery in regard to any such fund, but an express waiver
Page 120 U. S. 82
of an answer under oath, we think the bill was properly
dismissed.
Affirmed.