Since the Act of July 12, 1852, c. 290, took effect, a suit by
or against National Banks cannot be removed from a state court to a
circuit court of the United States unless a similar suit by or
against a state bank in like situation with the National Bank could
be so removed.
A case does not arise under the laws of the United States simply
because this Court has decided in another suit the questions of law
which are involved.
A case is not removable because a colorable assignment has been
made to give a state court exclusive jurisdiction.
Provident
Savings Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, and
Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43, on
this point affirmed.
This writ of error was sued out to review an order of the
circuit court remanding the cause to the state court from which it
had been removed.
Page 120 U. S. 779
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error brought under § 5 of the Act of March 3,
1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, for the review of an order of the
circuit court remanding a suit which had been removed from the
Supreme Court of the County and State of New York. The suit was
begun June 1, 1886, by William B. Cooper, Jr., a citizen of New
York, against the Leather Manufacturers' National Bank, to recover
a balance of account due from the bank to the firm of Ashburner
& Co., which had been assigned to him. The bank was originally
organized under the National Banking Act, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99, on
the 27th of May, 1865, and its corporate existence was extended May
27, 1885, under the Act of July 12, 1882, c. 290, 22 Stat. 162. Its
place of business is in the City of New York, in the State of New
York.
Section 4 of the Act of July 12, 1882, is as follows:
"SEC. 4. That any association so extending the period of its
succession shall continue to enjoy all the rights and privileges
and immunities granted, and shall continue to be subject to all the
duties, liabilities, and restrictions imposed by the Revised
Statutes of the United States, and other acts having reference to
national banking associations, and it shall continue to be in all
respects the identical association it was before the extension of
its period of succession,
provided however that the
jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any
association established under any law providing for national
banking associations, except suits between them and the United
States or its officers and agents, shall be the same as, and not
other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not
organized under any law of the United States which do or might do
banking business where such national banking associations may be
doing business when such suits may be begun, and all laws and parts
of laws of the United States inconsistent with this proviso be, and
the same are hereby, repealed."
On the 23d of September, 1886, the bank presented its petition
to the state court for the removal of the suit to the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Southern District of
Page 120 U. S. 780
New York, under the Act of March 3, 1875, on the ground of its
being a national bank, and consequently the suit was one arising
under the laws of the United States. The cause was duly entered in
the circuit court October 4, 1886, and on the 9th of the same month
Cooper moved that it be remanded. This motion was granted October
22 because § 4 of the Act of July 12, 1882, had taken away from
national banks the right of removing suits under the act of 1875,
on the ground of their being federal corporations. To reverse that
order this writ of error was brought.
The act of 1882 repeals in express terms "all laws and parts of
laws of the United States" inconsistent with its provisions, and
enacts that jurisdiction for suits thereafter brought by or against
national banks, with few exceptions, "shall be the same as, and not
other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not
organized under any law of the United States" doing business where
the national bank "may be doing business when such suits may be
begun." This was evidently intended to put national banks on the
same footing as the banks of the state where they were located for
all the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States. The first National Banking Act, that of February 25, 1863,
c. 58, 12 Stat. 681, provided in § 59 that suits by and against
banks organized thereunder might be brought in any "circuit,
district, or territorial court of the United States held within the
district in which such association may be established." By the Act
of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 116, there was added to
this, "or in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or
city in which such association is located, having jurisdiction in
similar cases." Both these provisions were carried into § 5198 of
the Revised Statutes by the amendatory act of February 18, 1875, c.
80, 18 Stat. 320.
The removal of this class of cases from a state court to a
circuit court was first provided for by the Act of March 3, 1875,
in that clause of § 2 which relates to suits "arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States," as construed in
Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S.
1. Thus, the federal and state courts had concurrent
jurisdiction for suits
Page 120 U. S. 781
brought by or against national banks, and a suit of that
character begun in a state court could be removed by either party
to a circuit court of the United States if the value of the matter
in dispute exceeded $500, because, as a national bank is a federal
corporation, a suit by or against it is necessarily a suit arising
under the laws of the United States. But the act of 1882 provided
in clear and unmistakable terms that the courts of the United
States should not have jurisdiction of such suits thereafter
brought, save in a few classes of cases, unless they would have
jurisdiction under like circumstances of suits by or against a
state bank doing business in the same state with the national bank.
The provision is not that no such suit shall be brought by or
against such a national bank in a federal court, but that a federal
court shall not have jurisdiction. This clearly implies that such a
suit can neither be brought nor removed there, for jurisdiction of
such suits has been taken away unless a similar suit could be
entertained by the same court by or against a state bank in like
situation with the national bank. Consequently, so long as the act
of 1882 was in force, nothing in the way of jurisdiction could be
claimed by a national bank because of the source of its
incorporation. A national bank was by that statute placed before
the law in this respect the same as a bank not organized under the
laws of the United States.
A suggestion was made in argument that the case is one arising
under the laws of the United States for the reason that the cause
of action is identical with that sued on in
Leather
Manufacturers' National Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S.
96, decided by this Court at the last term, and in which
the principles of law which govern the rights of the parties were
determined. Nothing of the kind, however, appears in the record,
and, if it did, it would not authorize a removal. This is not that
suit, and a case does not arise under the laws of the United States
simply because this Court or any other federal court has decided in
another suit the questions of law which are involved.
A case is not removable because a colorable assignment has been
made to give a state court exclusive jurisdiction.
Provident
Page 120 U. S. 782
Savings Society v. Ford, 114 U.
S. 635, followed in
Oakley v. Goodnow,
118 U. S. 43.
Order to remand is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD did not take part in the decision of this
case.