A statute of a state which provides that in capital cases in
cities having a population of over 100,000 inhabitants, the state
shall he allowed fifteen peremptory challenges to jurors, while
elsewhere in the state it is allowed in such cases only eight
peremptory challenges, does not deny to a person accused and tried
for murder in a city containing over 100,000 inhabitants the equal
protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, and there was no error in refusing to limit the
state's peremptory challenges to eight.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 120 U. S. 69
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Revised Statutes of Missouri provide that in all capital
cases except in cities having a population of over 100,000
inhabitants, the state shall be allowed eight peremptory challenges
to jurors, and in such cities shall be allowed fifteen.
Rev.Stat.Missouri ยงยง 1900, 1902.
The plaintiff in error, John Hayes, was indicted in the Criminal
Court of St. Louis, a City of over 100,000 inhabitants, by its
grand jury for the crime of murder in shooting and killing one
Mueller in that city on the 26th of August, 1881, and was tried in
April, 1882, and convicted of murder in the first degree. A new
trial having been obtained from the supreme court of the state, he
was again tried in January, 1885, and convicted, as on the first
trial, of murder in the first degree. Judgment of death followed.
On appeal to the supreme court of the state, the judgment was
affirmed and the case is brought before us on error upon the single
ground that, by the law of Missouri providing that, in capital
cases, in cities having a population of over 100,000 inhabitants,
the state shall be allowed fifteen peremptory challenges to jurors,
while elsewhere in Missouri the state is allowed in such cases only
eight peremptory challenges, the accused is denied the equal
protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. When the jurors were summoned
for the trial, and before any peremptory challenges were made by
the state, the accused moved the court to limit the state's
peremptory challenges to eight, objecting to its being allowed more
than that number. But the motion was overruled, and the accused
excepted. And on the trial, against his protest and objection, the
state challenged peremptorily fifteen of the forty-seven qualified
jurors.
The Constitution of Missouri, and indeed of every state of the
union, guarantees to all persons accused of a capital offense or of
a felony of lower grade the right to a trial by an impartial jury,
selected from the county or city where the offense is alleged to
have been committed, and this implies
Page 120 U. S. 70
that the jurors shall be free from all bias for or against the
accused. In providing such a body of jurors, the state affords the
surest means of protecting the accused against an unjust
conviction, and at the same time of enforcing the laws against
offenders meriting punishment. To secure such a body, numerous
legislative directions are necessary prescribing the class from
whom the jurors are to be taken, whether from voters, taxpayers,
and freeholders or from the mass of the population
indiscriminately; the number to be summoned from whom the trial
jurors are to be selected; the manner in which their selection is
to be made; the objections that may be offered to those returned,
and how such objections shall be presented, considered, and
disposed of; the oath to be administered to those selected; the
custody in which they shall be kept during the progress of the
trial; the form and presentation of their verdict, and many other
particulars. All these, it may be said in general, are matters of
legislative discretion. But to prescribe whatever will tend to
secure the impartiality of jurors in criminal cases is not only
within the competency of the legislature, but is among its highest
duties. It is to be remembered that such impartiality requires not
only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any
prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the
scales are to be evenly held.
Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to
free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the
peremptory challenge. The public prosecutor may have the strongest
reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered, from his
habits and associations, and yet find it difficult to formulate and
sustain a legal objection to him. In such cases, the peremptory
challenge is a protection against his being accepted. The number of
such challenges must necessarily depend upon the discretion of the
legislature, and may vary according to the condition of different
communities, and the difficulties in them of securing intelligent
and impartial jurors. The whole matter is under its control.
Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164;
Walter v. People,
32 N.Y. 147, 159;
Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412,
418.
Page 120 U. S. 71
Originally, by the common law, the Crown could challenge
peremptorily without limitation as to number. By act of Parliament
passed in the time of Edward I, the right to challenge was
restricted to challenges for cause. But by a rule of court, the
Crown was not obliged to show cause until the whole panel was
called. Those not accepted on the call were directed to stand
aside. If, when the panel was gone through, a full jury was
obtained, it was taken for the trial. If, however, a full jury was
not obtained, the Crown was required to show cause against the
jurors who had been directed to stand aside, and if no sufficient
cause was shown, the jury was completed from them.
In this country, the power of the legislature of a state to
prescribe the number of peremptory challenges is limited only by
the necessity of having an impartial jury. In our large cities
there is such a mixed population, there is such a tendency of the
criminal classes to resort to them, and such an unfortunate
disposition on the part of businessmen to escape from jury duty,
that it requires special care on the part of the government to
secure there competent and impartial jurors. And to that end it may
be a wise proceeding on the part of the legislature to enlarge the
number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases tried in those
cities. The accused cannot complain if he is still tried by an
impartial jury. He can demand nothing more.
Northern Pacific
Railroad v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642. The
right to challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a juror.
If from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the
constitutional right of the accused is maintained. In this case, it
is not even suggested that the jury by which the accused was tried
was not a competent and impartial one. He was allowed twenty
peremptory challenges, and it does not appear that he exhausted
them.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which
it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to
such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions, both in the privileges conferred
Page 120 U. S. 72
and in the liabilities imposed. As we said in
Barbier v.
Connolly, speaking of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a
public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere
of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated,
is not within the amendment."
113 U.S.
113 U. S. 27,
113 U. S.
32.
In
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, it
was held that the last clause of the amendment as to the equal
protection of the laws was not violated by any diversity in the
jurisdiction of the several courts which the state might establish
as to subject matter, amount, or finality of their decisions, if
all persons within the territorial limits of their respective
jurisdictions have an equal right in like cases and under like
circumstances, to resort to them for redress; that the state has
the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for
municipal purposes and to regulate their local government, and
that, as respects the administration of justice, it may establish
one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts.
And we may add that the systems of procedure in them may be
different without violating any provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Allowing the state fifteen peremptory challenges in capital
cases tried in cities containing a population of over 100,000
inhabitants is simply providing against the difficulty of securing
in such cases an impartial jury in cities of that size which does
not exist in other portions of the state. So far from defeating, it
may furnish the necessary means of giving that equal protection of
its laws to all persons which that amendment declares shall not be
denied to anyone within its jurisdiction.
We see nothing in the legislation of Missouri which is repugnant
to that amendment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of that state therefore is
affirmed.