Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction on habeas
corpus to discharge from custody a person who is restrained of his
liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States but
who, at the time, is held under State process for trial on an
indictment charging him with an offence against the laws of the
State.
When a person is in custody under process from a State court of
original jurisdiction for an alleged offence against the laws of
such State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty
in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit
Court of the United States has a discretion whether it will
discharge him in advance of his trial in the court in which he is
indicted; but this discretion should be subordinated to any special
circumstances requiring immediate action. After conviction of the
accused in the State court, the Circuit Court has still a
discretion whether he shall be put to his writ of error to the
highest court of the State or whether it will proceed by writ of
habeas corpus summarily to determine whether he is restrained of
his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United
States.
On the 29th day of May, 1885, William L. Royall filed two
petitions in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
district of Virginia, each verified by oath, and addressed to the
judges of that court.
In one of them, he represents, in substance, that he is a
citizen of the United States; that, in June, 1884, as a
representative of a citizen of New York -- who was the owner of
certain bonds issued by Virginia under the act approved March 30,
1871, entitled "An act to provide for the funding and payment of
the public debt," -- he sold in the city of Richmond, to Richard W.
Maury, for the sum of $10.50 in current money, a genuine past-due
coupon, cut from one of said bonds in petitioner's presence, and
which he received from the owner, with instructions to sell it in
that city for the best market price; that said coupon bears upon
its face the contract of Virginia that it should be received in
payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due that Commonwealth;
that he acted in said matter without compensation; and,
consequently, the transaction was a sale of the coupon by its
owner. The petition proceeded:
"That on the second day of June, 1884, the grand jury of the
city of Richmond, Virginia, found an indictment against your
petitioner for selling said coupon without a license; that the
before-mentioned coupon is the only one that your petitioner has
sold; that your petitioner was thereupon arrested and committed to
the custody of N. M. Lee, sergeant of the City of Richmond, to be
tried on said indictment, and that he will be prosecuted and tried
on said indictment for selling said coupon without a license, under
the provisions of Section 65 of the Act of March 15, 1884, relating
to licenses generally, and the general provisions of the state law
in respect to doing business without a license; that your
petitioner had no license under the laws of Virginia to sell
coupons; that the act of the General Assembly under which your
petitioner was arrested and is being prosecuted requires any person
who sells one or more of the said tax-receivable coupons issued by
said State of Virginia to pay to said State, before said sale, a
special license tax of $1,000, and, in addition thereto, a tax of
twenty per cent, on the face value of each coupon sold. "
Page 117 U. S. 243
"That said act does not require the seller of any other coupon,
or the seller of anything else, to pay said tax, but it is directed
exclusively against the sellers of such coupons; that your
petitioner is being prosecuted under said act because he sold said
coupon without having first paid to said State said special license
tax, and without paying to her said special tax of twenty per cent.
on the face value thereof; that said act of the General Assembly of
Virginia is repugnant to section ten of article one of the
Constitution of the United States, and is therefore null and void;
that if the said State can refuse to pay the said coupons at
maturity, and then tax the sale of them to taxpayers, she may thus
indirectly repudiate then absolutely, and thus effectually destroy
their value."
"That your petitioner has been on bail from the time he was
arrested until now, but that his bail has now surrendered him, and
he is at this time in the custody of the said N. M. Lee, sergeant
of the City of Richmond, to be prosecuted and tried on said
indictment; that he is held in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, as he is advised."
In the other petition, he represents, in substance, that, under
the provisions of the before-mentioned act of 1871, Virginia issued
her bonds, with interest coupons attached, and bearing upon their
face a contract to receive them in payment of all taxes, debts, and
demands due to that Commonwealth; that another act, approved
January 14, 1882, provides that said coupons shall not be received
in payment of taxes until after judgment rendered in a suit thereon
according to its provisions; that the validity of the latter act
was sustained in
Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.
S. 769, upon the ground that it furnished taxpayers with
a sufficient remedy to enforce said contract; that, by the
provisions of sections 90 and 91 of chapter 450 of the laws of
Virginia for the year 1883-84, it is provided that attorneys at law
who have been licensed to practice law less than five years shall
pay a license tax of $15, and those licensed more than five years
$25, and that such license shall entitle the attorney paying it to
practice law in all the courts of the State; that it is further
provided by said 91st section that no attorney shall bring any suit
on
Page 117 U. S. 244
said coupons under said Act of January 14, 1882, unless he pays,
in addition to the above-mentioned license tax, a further special
license tax of $250; that petitioner had been licensed to practice
law more than five years, and that, in the month of April, 1884, he
paid $25, receiving a revenue license to practice law in all the
courts of the State, but that he had not paid the additional
special license tax provided for in said 91st section; that, under
employment of a client who had tendered coupons, issued by Virginia
under the act of March 30, 1871, to the Treasurer of Richmond City
in payment of his taxes, and thereafter had paid his tax in money
-- the coupons having been received by that officer for
identification and verification, and certified to the Hustings
Court of the City of Richmond -- he brought suit under the Act of
January 14, 1882, to recover the money back after proving the
genuineness of the coupons; that the grand jury of the City of
Richmond thereupon found an indictment against him for bringing the
suit without having paid the special license tax; that he brought
it after he had paid his license tax above mentioned, and while he
had a license to practice law until April, 1885; that he was
thereupon arrested by order of the Hustings Court of Richmond,
committed to the custody of N. M. Lee, sergeant of that City, and
is about to be tried and punished under said indictment; that the
act requiring him to pay a special license tax in addition to his
general license tax is repugnant to Section 10 of Article 1 of the
Constitution of the United States, and is therefore null and void;
and that the act providing for punishing him for not paying the
special license tax is likewise repugnant to the Constitution.
After stating, at some length, the grounds upon which he contends
that the before-mentioned acts are repugnant to the Constitution,
the petitioner avers that he
"is now in the custody of the said N. M. Lee, sergeant of the
City of Richmond, under said indictment, and he is therefore
restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."
Each petition concludes with a prayer that the Circuit Court
award a writ of habeas corpus directed to that officer,
Page 117 U. S. 245
commanding him to produce the body of the petitioner before that
court, together with the cause of his detention, and that he have
judgment discharging him from custody. In each case, the petition
was dismissed upon the ground that the Circuit Court was without
jurisdiction to discharge the prisoner from prosecution.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. After
stating the case as above reported, he continued:
These cases come here under the act of March 3, 1885, c. 353,
which so amends § 764 of the Revised Statutes as to give this Court
jurisdiction, upon appeal, to review the final decision of the
Circuit Courts of the United States in certain specified cases,
including that of a writ of habeas corpus sued out in behalf of a
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution.
The first question to be considered is whether the Circuit
Courts have jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge from custody
one who is restrained of his liberty in violation of the national
Constitution, but who, at the time, is held under state process for
trial on an indictment charging him with an offense against the
laws of the State.
The statutory provisions which control the determination of this
question are found in the following sections of the Revised
Statutes:
"Sec. 751. The Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts
shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus."
"Sec. 752. The several justices and judges of the said courts,
within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause
of restraint of liberty. "
Page 117 U. S. 246
"Sec. 753. The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to
a prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody under or by color
of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial
before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order,
process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or is in custody in
violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United
States; or being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and
domiciled therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted under
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or
exemption claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any
foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect
whereof depend upon the law of nations; or unless it is necessary
to bring the prisoner into court to testify."
"Sec. 754. Application for the writ of habeas corpus shall be
made to the court or justice of judge authorized to issue the same,
by complaint in writing, signed by the person for whose relief it
is intended, setting forth the facts concerning the detention of
the party restrained, in whose custody he is detained, and by
virtue of what claim or authority, if known. The facts set forth in
the complaint shall be verified by the oath of the person making
the application."
"Sec. 755. The court or justice or judge to whom the application
is made shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus, unless it
appear from the petition itself that the party is not entitled
thereto. The writ shall be directed to the person in whose custody
the party is detained."
"Sec. 761. The court or justice or judge shall proceed in a
summary way to determine the facts of the case by hearing the
testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as
law and justice require."
It is further provided that, pending the proceedings on habeas
corpus in cases mentioned in sections 763 and 764 -- which include
an application for the writ by a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States
-- and
"until final judgment therein, and after final judgment of
discharge, any proceeding against the person
Page 117 U. S. 247
so imprisoned or confined or restrained of his liberty, in any
state court, or by or under the authority of any State, for any
matter so heard or determined, or in process of being heard and
determined, under such writ of habeas corpus, shall be deemed null
and void."
§ 766.
The grant to the Circuit Courts in § 751 of jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus is in language as broad as could well
be employed. While it is attended by the general condition,
necessarily implied, that the authority conferred must be exercised
agreeably to the principles and usages of law, the only express
limitation imposed is that the privilege of the writ shall not be
enjoyed by, or, rather, that the courts and the judicial officers
named shall not have power to award the writ to, any prisoner in
jail, except in specified cases, one of them being where he is
alleged to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution. The
latter class of cases was first distinctly provided for by the Act
of February 5, 1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 634, which declares that the
several courts of the United States, and the several justices and
judges thereof, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition
to the authority then conferred by law,
"shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States."
Whether, therefore, the appellant is a prisoner in jail within
the meaning of § 753, or is restrained of his liberty by an officer
of the law executing the process of a court of Virginia, in either
case, it being alleged under oath that he is held in custody in
violation of the Constitution, the Circuit Court has, by the
express words of the statute, jurisdiction on habeas corpus to
inquire into the cause for which he is restrained of his liberty,
and to dispose of him "as law and justice require."
It may be suggested that the state court is competent to decide
whether the petitioner is or is not illegally restrained of his
liberty; that the appropriate time for the determination of that
question is at the trial of the indictment; and that his detention
for the purpose simply of securing his attendance at the trial
ought not to be deemed an improper exercise by that
Page 117 U. S. 248
court of its power to hear and decide the case. The first of
these propositions is undoubtedly sound, for, in
Robb v.
Connolly, 111 U. S. 637,
it was held, upon full consideration, that
"a state court of original jurisdiction, having the parties
before it, may, consistently with existing federal legislation,
determine cases at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, or involving rights dependent upon
such Constitution or laws;"
and that,
"upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union,
rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right
granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, and
the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are
involved in any suit or proceeding before them."
But with respect to the other propositions, it is clear that if
the local statute under which Royall was indicted be repugnant to
the Constitution, the prosecution against him has nothing upon
which to rest, and the entire proceeding against him is a nullity.
As was said in
Ex parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 376:
"An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense
created by it is no crime. A conviction under it is not merely
erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of
imprisonment."
So, in
Ex parte Yarborough, 110
U. S. 654, it was said that if the statute prescribing
the offense for which Yarborough and his associates were convicted
was void, the court which tried them was without jurisdiction, and
they were entitled to be discharged. It would seem, whether
reference be had to the Act of 1867 or to existing statutory
provisions, that it was the purpose of Congress to invest the
courts of the Union, and the justices and judges thereof, with
power, upon writ of habeas corpus, to restore to liberty and
person, within their respective jurisdictions, who is held in
custody, by whatever authority, in violation of the Constitution or
any law or treaty of the United States.
The statute evidently contemplated that cases might arise when
the power thus conferred should be exercised during the progress of
proceedings instituted against the petitioner in a state court or
by or under authority of a State, on account of the very matter
presented for determination by the
Page 117 U. S. 249
writ of habeas corpus; for care is taken to provide that any
such proceedings, pending the hearing of the case upon the writ,
and until final judgment, and after the prisoner is discharged,
shall be null and void. If such were not the clear implication of
the statute, still, as it does not except from its operation cases
in which the applicant for the writ is held in custody by the
authority of a State, acting through its judiciary or by its
officers, the Court could not, against the positive language of
Congress, declare any such exception unless required to do so by
the terms of the Constitution itself. But, as the judicial power of
the nation extends to all cases arising under the Constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States; as the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it; and as
Congress has power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry
into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof -- no doubt can exist as to the power of Congress thus to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union, and of their
justices and judges. That the petitioner is held under the
authority of a State cannot affect the question of the power or
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to inquire into the cause of his
commitment, and to discharge him, if he be restrained of his
liberty in violation of the Constitution. The grand jurors who
found the indictment, the court into which it was returned and by
whose order he was arrested, and the officer who holds him in
custody, are all, equally with individual citizens, under a duty,
from the discharge of which the State could not release them, to
respect and obey the supreme law of the land, "anything in the
Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." And that equal power does not belong to the
courts and judges of the several States; that they cannot, under
any authority conferred by the States, discharge from custody
persons held by authority of the courts of the United States, or of
commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the General
Government acting under its laws -- results from the supremacy of
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Ableman
Page 117 U. S. 250
v. Booth, 21 How. 506;
Tarble's
Case, 13 Wall. 397;
Robb v. Connolly,
111 U. S. 639.
We are therefore of opinion that the Circuit Court has
jurisdiction, upon writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause
of appellant's commitment, and to discharge him if he be held in
custody in violation of the Constitution.
It remains, however, to be considered whether the refusal of
that court to issue the writ, and to take the accused from the
custody of the state officer, can be sustained upon any other
ground than the one upon which it proceeded. If it can be, the
judgment will not be reversed because an insufficient reason may
have been assigned for the dismissal of the petitions. Undoubtedly
the writ should be forthwith awarded, "unless it appears from the
petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto," and the
case summarily heard and determined "as law and justice require."
Such are the express requirements of the State. If, however, it is
apparent upon the petition that the writ, if issued, ought not, on
principles of law and justice, to result in the immediate discharge
of the accused from custody, the court is not bound to award it as
soon as the application is made.
Ex parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193,
28 U. S. 201;
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 3,
71 U. S. 111.
What law and justice may require in a particular case is often an
embarrassing question to the court or to the judicial officer
before whom the petitioner is brought. It is alleged in the
petitions -- neither one of which, however, is accompanied by a
copy of the indictment in the state court, nor by any statement
giving a reason why such a copy was not obtained -- that the
appellant is held in custody under process of a state court in
which he stands indicted for an alleged offense against the laws of
Virginia. It is stated in one case that he gave bail, but was
subsequently surrendered by his sureties. But it is not alleged,
and it does not appear, in either case that he is unable to give
security for his appearance in the state court, or that reasonable
bail is denied him, or that his trial will be unnecessarily
delayed. The question as to the constitutionality of the law under
which he is indicted must necessarily arise at his trial under the
indictment, and it is one upon which, as we have seen, it is
competent for the state court to pass.
Page 117 U. S. 251
Under such circumstances, does the statute imperatively require
the Circuit Court, by writ of habeas corpus, to wrest the
petitioner from the custody of the state officers in advance of his
trial in the state court? We are of opinion that, while the Circuit
Court has the power to do so, and may discharge the accused in
advance of his trial if he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the national Constitution, it is not bound in every
case to exercise such a power immediately upon application being
made for the writ. We cannot suppose that Congress intended to
compel those courts by such means to draw to themselves, in the
first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced
in state courts exercising authority within the same territorial
limits where the accused claims that he is held in custody in
violation of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction
to hear the case summarily, and thereupon "to dispose of the party
as law and justice require," does not deprive the court of
discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the
powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in
the light of the relations existing, under our system of
government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the
States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good
requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary
conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights
secured by the Constitution. When the petitioner is in custody by
state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree
of a court of judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen
of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under
like authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right,
title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under
the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under
color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law
of nations -- in such and like cases of urgency, involving the
authority and operations of the general government, the obligations
of this country to or its relations with foreign nations, the
courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of
habeas corpus, and discharged prisoners who
Page 117 U. S. 252
were held in custody under state authority. So, also, when they
are in the custody of a state officer, it may be necessary, by use
of the writ, to bring them into a court of the United States to
testify as witnesses. The present cases involve no such
considerations. Nor do their circumstances, as detailed in the
petitions, suggest any reason why the state court of original
jurisdiction may not, without interference upon the part of the
courts of the United States, pass upon the question which is raised
as to the constitutionality of the statutes under which the
appellant is indicted. The Circuit Court was not at liberty, under
the circumstances disclosed, to presume that the decision of the
state court would be otherwise than is required by the fundamental
law of the land, or that it would disregard the settled principles
of constitutional law announced by this Court, upon which is
clearly conferred the power to decide ultimately and finally all
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
In
Taylor v.
Carryl, 20 How. 595, it was said to be a recognized
portion of the duty of this Court -- and, we will add, of all other
courts, national and State --
"to give preference to such principles and methods of procedure
as shall seem to conciliate the distinct and independent tribunals
of the States and of the Union, so that they may cooperate as
harmonious members of a judicial system coextensive with the United
States, and submitting to the paramount authority of the same
Constitution, laws, and federal obligations."
And in
Covell v. Heyman, 111
U. S. 182, it was declared
"that the forbearance which courts of coordinate jurisdiction,
administered under a single system, exercise towards each other,
whereby conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the
process of the other, is a principle of comity, with perhaps no
higher sanction than the utility which comes from concord; but
between state courts and those of the United States, it is
something more. It is a principle of right and of law, and
therefore of necessity."
That these salutary principles may have full operation, and in
harmony with what we suppose was the intention of Congress in the
enactments in question, this Court holds that, where a person is in
custody, under process from a state court of
Page 117 U. S. 253
original jurisdiction, for an alleged offense against the laws
of such State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his
liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the
Circuit Court has a discretion whether it will discharge him upon
habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in which he is
indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any
special circumstances requiring immediate action. When the state
court shall have finally acted upon the case, the Circuit Court has
still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then
existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of
error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will
proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether
the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The latter was substantially the
course adopted in
Ex parte Bridges, 2 Woods 428. The
prisoner was indicted and convicted in one of the courts of Georgia
for perjury committed in an examination before a United States
Commissioner under what is known as the "Enforcement Act of
Congress." He was discharged upon habeas corpus, sued out before
Mr. Justice Bradley, upon the ground that the state court had no
jurisdiction of the case; the offense charged being one which,
under the laws of the United States, was exclusively cognizable in
the federal courts. Adverting to the argument that where a
defendant has been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a
state court, his only remedy was to carry the judgment to the state
court of last resort, and thence by writ of error to this Court, he
said:
"This might be so if the proceeding in the state court was
merely erroneous; but where it is void for want of jurisdiction,
habeas corpus will lie, and may be issued by any court or judge
invested with supervisory jurisdiction in such case.
Ex parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163."
It was further observed in the same case that, while it might
appear unseemly that a prisoner, after conviction in a state court,
should be set at liberty by a single judge on habeas corpus, there
was no escape from the act of 1867, which invested such judge with
power to discharge when the prisoner was restrained of his liberty
in violation of a law of the United States.
Page 117 U. S. 254
As it does not appear that the Circuit Court might not, in its
discretion and consistently with law and justice, have denied the
applications for the writ at the time they were made, we are of
opinion that the judgment in each case must be affirmed, but
without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to renew his
application to that court at some future time should the
circumstances render it proper to do so.
Affirmed.
