Goods and chattels within a state are equally taxable whether
owned by a citizen of the state or a citizen of another state, even
though the latter be taxed in his own state for the value of the
same goods as part of his general personal estate.
Goods, the product of a state, intended for exportation to
another state are liable to taxation as part of the general mass of
property of the their origin until actually started in course of
transportation to the their destination or delivered to a common
carrier for that purpose; the carrying of them to and depositing
them at a depot for the purpose of transportation is no part of
that transportation.
When goods, the product of a state, have begun to be transported
from that state to another state, and not till then, they have
become the subjects of interstate commerce, and, as such, are
subject to national regulation, and cease to be taxable by the
state of their origin.
Goods on their way through a state from a place outside thereof
to another place outside thereof are in course of interstate or
foreign transportation, and are subjects of interstate or foreign
commerce, and not taxable by the state through which they are
passing, even though detained within that state by low water or
other temporary cause.
Logs out at a place in New Hampshire were hauled down to the
Town of Errol, on the Androscoggin River in that state, to be
transported from thence upon the river to Lewiston, Maine, and
waited at Errol for a convenient opportunity for such
transportation.
Held that they were still part of the
general mass of property of the state, liable to taxation if taxed
in the usual way in which such property is taxed in the state.
In September, 1881, Edward S. Coe filed a petition in the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire for the County of Coos against the
Town of Errol for an abatement of taxes, and
Page 116 U. S. 518
therein, among other things, alleged that on the 1st of April,
1880, he and others, residents of Maine and Massachusetts, owned a
large number of spruce logs that had been drawn down the winter
before from Wentworth's location (in New Hampshire), and placed in
Clear Stream and on the banks thereof in the Town of Errol, County
of Coos, New Hampshire, to be from thence floated down the
Androscoggin River to the State of Maine, to be manufactured and
sold, and that the selectmen of said Errol for that year appraised
said logs for taxation at the price of $6,000, and assessed thereon
state, county, town, and school taxes, in the whole to the amount
of $120, and highway taxes to the amount of $60. A further
allegation made the same complaint with regard to a lot of spruce
logs belonging to Coe and another person, which had been cut in the
State of Maine and were on their way of being floated to Lewiston,
Maine, to be manufactured, but were detained in the Town of Errol
by low water. Similar allegations were made with regard to logs cut
the following year, 1880, and drawn from Wentworth's location, and
part of them deposited on lands of John Akers, and part on lands of
George C. Demerit, in said Town of Errol, to be from thence taken
to the State of Maine, and also with regard to other logs cut in
Maine, and floated down to Errol on their passage to Lewiston, in
the State of Maine, and both which classes of logs were taxed by
the selectmen of Errol in the year 1881. The petition also
contained the following allegations, to-wit:
"Said Coe further says that said logs of both years, so in the
Androscoggin River, have each year been taxed as stock in trade in
said Lewiston to said Coe and Pongee, and said Coe claims and
represents that none of said logs was subject to taxation in said
Errol for the reason that they were in transit to market from one
state to another, and also because they had all been in other ways
taxed. That said Androscoggin River, from its source to the outlet
of the Lumbago Lake in the State of New Hampshire, through said
state and through the State of Maine to said Lewiston, is now and
for a long time has been, to-wit, for more than twenty years last
past, a public highway for the
Page 116 U. S. 519
float age of timber from said lakes and rivers in Maine, and
from the upper waters of said Androscoggin River, and its
tributaries in New Hampshire, down said river to said Lewiston, and
has been thus used by the petitioner and his associates in the
lumber business for more than twenty years last past."
Without further pleading, the parties made an agreed case, the
important part of which is as follows, to-wit:
"It is agreed that the facts set forth in the petition are all
true except what is stated as to the taxation of the logs as stock
in trade in Lewiston, Maine, and if that is regarded by the court
as material, the case is to be discharged and stand for trial on
that point. It is agreed that upon this petition the legality of
the taxation is intended to be brought before the court for
adjudication, and all formal objections to the proceedings in the
town meeting, etc., and all other matters of form, are waived, and
we submit the matter to the court for a legal adjudication as to
whether or not any or all of the taxes shall be abated."
"And it is agreed that for many years the petitioner and his
associates in the lumber business have cut large quantities of
timber on their lands in Maine and floated them down the said lakes
and rivers in Maine, and down the Androscoggin River to the mills
at said Lewiston, and timber thus cut has always lain over one
season, being about a year, in the Androscoggin River, in this
state, either in Errol, Dimmer, or Milan, and the timber referred
to in this petition as having been cut in Maine had lain over in
Errol since the spring or summer before the taxation, according to
the above custom."
Upon this case the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in September
term, 1882, adjudged as follows, to-wit:
"Now at this term, the said questions of law having been fully
determined in said law term, and an order made that that portion of
said tax assessed upon the logs cut as aforesaid in said State of
Maine be abated, and that the tax assessed upon all of said logs
cut in the State of New Hampshire be sustained, and said order
having been fully made known to the parties of this case, and
become a part of the record thereof, it is therefore ordered and
decreed by the court that there be judgment in
Page 116 U. S. 520
accordance with said order made at said law term, without costs
to either party."
The petitioner took a bill of exceptions, setting forth the
agreed case, and stating, among other things, the points raised on
the hearing before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the
decision of that court thereon, as follows:
"On said hearing, the petitioner claimed that said taxes named
in the petition, and the statutes of this state under the
provisions of which said taxes were assessed were illegal and void
because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes
of this state are in violation of and repugnant to, the general
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, because said
taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this
state are in violation of and repugnant to, that part of Section 2,
Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States which provides
that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states;'
because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes
of this state are in violation of and repugnant to, those parts of
Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States
which provide that 'the Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,' and
Section 10 of said Article I, which provides that"
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. "
Page 116 U. S. 524
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court. After
stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
The case is now before us for consideration upon writ of error
to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and the same points that
were urged before that court are set up here as grounds of
error.
The question for us to consider, therefore, is whether the
products of a state (in this case timber cut in its forests) are
liable to be taxed like other property within the state, though
intended for exportation to another state, and partially prepared
for that purpose by being deposited at a place of shipment, such
products being owned by persons residing in another state.
We have no difficulty in disposing of the last condition of the
question -- namely the fact (if it be a fact) that the property was
owned by persons residing in another state, for if not exempt from
taxation for other reasons, it cannot be exempt by reason of being
owned by nonresidents of the state. We take it to be a point
settled beyond all contradiction or question that a state has
jurisdiction of all persons and things within its territory which
to not belong to some other jurisdiction, such as the
representatives of foreign governments, with their houses and
effects, and property belonging to or in the use of the government
of the United States. If the owner of personal property within a
state resides in another state, which taxes him for that property
as part of his general estate attached to his person, this action
of the latter state does not in the least affect the right of the
state in which the property is situated to tax it also. It is
hardly necessary to cite authorities on a point so elementary. The
fact, therefore, that the owners of the logs in question were taxed
for their value in Maine as a part of their general stock in trade,
if such fact were proved, could have no influence in the decision
of the case, and may be laid out of view.
We recur, then, to a consideration of the question freed from
this limitation. Are the products of a state, though intended for
exportation to another state and partially prepared for
Page 116 U. S. 525
that purpose by being deposited at a place or port of shipment
within the state, liable to be taxed like other property within the
state? Does the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods --
that is, his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to
do so -- exempt them from taxation? This is the precise question
for solution.
This question does not present the predicament of goods in
course of transportation through a state, though detained for a
time within the state by low water or other causes of delay, as was
the case of the logs cut in the State of Maine the tax on which was
abated by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Such goods are
already in the course of commercial transportation, and are clearly
under the protection of the Constitution. And so, we think, would
the goods in question be when actually started in the course of
transportation to another state or delivered to a carrier for such
transportation. There must be a point of time when they cease to be
governed exclusively by the domestic law and begin to be governed
and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and
that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose in
which they commence their final movement for transportation from
the state of their origin to that of their destination. When the
products of the farm or the forest are collected, and brought in
from the surrounding country to a town or station serving as an
entrepot for that particular region, whether on a river or a line
of railroad, such products are not yet exports; nor are they in
process of exportation; nor is exportation begun until they are
committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the state
to the state of their destination or have started on their ultimate
passage to that state. Until then, it is reasonable to regard them
as not only within the state of their origin, but as a part of the
general mass of property of that state, subject to its jurisdiction
and liable to taxation there if not taxed by reason of their being
intended for exportation, but taxed without any discrimination, in
the usual way and manner in which such property is taxed in the
state.
Of course they cannot be taxed as exports -- that is to say
Page 116 U. S. 526
they cannot be taxed by reason or because of their exportation
or intended exportation -- for that would amount to laying a duty
on exports, and would be a plain infraction of the Constitution,
which prohibits any state, without the consent of Congress, from
laying any imposts of duties on imports or exports, and, although
it has been decided,
Woodruff v.
Parham, 8 Wall. 123, that this clause relates to
imports from and exports to foreign countries, yet when such
imposts or duties are laid on imports or exports from one state to
another, it cannot be doubted that such an imposition would be a
regulation of commerce among the states, and therefore void as an
invasion of the exclusive power of Congress.
See Walling v.
Michigan, ante, 116 U. S. 446,
decided at the present term, and cases cited in the opinion in that
case. But if such goods are not taxed as exports, nor by reason of
their exportation, or intended exportation, but are taxed as part
of the general mass of property in the state at the regular period
of assessment for such property and in the usual manner, they not
being in course of transportation at the time, is there any valid
reason why they should not be taxed? Though intended for
exportation, they may never be exported -- the owner has a perfect
right to change his mind -- and until actually put in motion for
some place out of the state, or committed to the custody of a
carrier for transportation to such place, why may they not be
regarded as still remaining a part of the general mass of property
in the state? If assessed in an exceptional time or manner because
of their anticipated departure, they might well be considered as
taxed by reason of their exportation or intended exportation; but
if assessed in the usual way, when not under motion or shipment, we
do not see why the assessment may not be valid and binding.
The point of time when state jurisdiction over the commodities
of commerce begins and ends is not an easy matter to designate or
define, and yet it is highly important, both to the shipper and to
the state, that it should be clearly defined so as to avoid all
ambiguity or question. In regard to imports from foreign countries,
it was settled in the case of
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, that the state cannot
impose any tax or duty on
Page 116 U. S. 527
such goods so long as they remain the property of the importer
and continue in the original form or packages in which they were
imported, the right to sell without any restriction imposed by the
state being a necessary incident of the right to import without
such restriction. This rule was deemed to be the necessary result
of the prohibitory clause of the Constitution which declares that
no state shall lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports. The
law of Maryland, which was held to be repugnant to this clause,
required the payment of a license tax by all importers before they
were permitted to sell their goods. This law was also considered to
be an infringement of the clause which gives to Congress the power
to regulate commerce. This Court, as before stated, has since held
that goods transported from one state to another are not imports or
exports within the meaning of the prohibitory clause before
referred to, and it has also held that such goods, having arrived
at their place of destination, may be taxed in the state to which
they are carried, if taxed in the same manner as other goods are
taxed, and not by reason of their being brought into the state from
another state nor subjected in any way to unfavorable
discrimination.
Woodruff v.
Parham, 8 Wall. 123;
Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622.
But no definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point
of time at which the taxing power of the state ceases as to goods
exported to a foreign country or to another state. What we have
already said, however, in relation to the products of a state
intended for exportation to another state will indicate the view
which seems to us the sound one on that subject -- namely that such
goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in
the state, subject as such to its jurisdiction and to taxation in
the usual way, until they have been shipped or entered with a
common carrier for transportation to another state or have been
started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.
We think that this must be the true rule on the subject. It seems
to us untenable to hold that a crop or a herd is exempt from
taxation merely because it is by its owner intended for
exportation. If such were the rule, in many states there would be
nothing but the lands and real
Page 116 U. S. 528
estate to bear the taxes. Some of the western states produce
very little except wheat and corn, most of which is intended for
export, and so of cotton in the southern states. Certainly as long
as these products are on the lands which produce them, they are
part of the general property of the state. And so we think they
continue to be until they have entered upon their final journey for
leaving the state and going into another state. It is true, it was
said in the case of
The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 565: "Whenever a commodity has begun
to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce
in that commodity between the states has commenced." But this
movement does not begin until the articles have been shipped or
started for transportation from the one state to the other. The
carrying of them in carts or other vehicles, or even floating them,
to the depot where the journey is to commence is no part of that
journey. That is all preliminary work, performed for the purpose of
putting the property in a state of preparation and readiness for
transportation. Until actually launched on its way to another state
or committed to a common carrier for transportation to such state,
its destination is not fixed and certain. It may be sold or
otherwise disposed of within the state and never put in course of
transportation out of the state. Carrying it from the farm or the
forest to the depot is only an interior movement of the property,
entirely within the state, for the purpose, it is true, but only
for the purpose, of putting it into a course of exportation. It is
no part of the exportation itself. Until shipped or started on its
final journey out of the state, its exportation is a matter
altogether
in fieri, and not at all a fixed and certain
thing.
The application of these principles to the present case is
obvious. The logs which were taxed, and the tax on which was not
abated by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, has not, when so
taxed, been shipped or started on their final voyage or journey to
the State of Maine. They had only been drawn down from Wentworth's
location to Errol, the place from which they were to be transported
to Lewiston, in the State of Maine. There they were to remain until
it should be convenient to send them to their destination. They
come precisely within
Page 116 U. S. 529
the character of property which, according to the principles
herein laid down, is taxable. But granting all this, it may still
be pertinently asked how can property thus situated, to-wit,
deposited or stored at the place of entrepot for future
exportation, be taxed in the regular way as part of the property of
the state? The answer is plain. It can be taxed, as all other
property is taxed, in the place where it is found, if taxed or
assessed for taxation in the usual manner in which such property is
taxed, and not singled out to be assessed by itself in an unusual
and exceptional manner because of its destination. If thus taxed in
the usual way that other similar property is taxed and at the same
rate and subject to like conditions and regulations, the tax is
valid. In other words, the right to tax the property being founded
on the hypothesis that it is still a part of the general mass of
property in the state, it must be treated in all respects as other
property of the same kind is treated.
These conditions we understand to have been complied with in the
present case. At all events, there is no evidence to show that the
taxes were not imposed in the regular and ordinary way. As the
presumption, so far as mode and manner are concerned, is always in
favor of, and not against, official acts, the want of evidence to
the contrary must be regarded as evidence in favor of the
regularity of the assessment in this case.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is
Affirmed.
