The statute requiring the surrender of a fugitive from justice
found in one of the territories to the state in which he stands
charged with treason, felony, or other crime embraces every offense
known to the laws of the demanding state, including
misdemeanors.
Page 114 U. S. 643
Each state has the right to prescribe the forms of pleading and
process to be observed in its courts in both civil and criminal
cases, subject only to those provisions of the national
Constitution designed for the protection of life, liberty and
property in all the states of the Union; consequently, in a case
involving the surrender, under the act of Congress, of a fugitive
from justice, it may not be objected that the indictment is not
framed according to the technical rules of criminal pleading if it
conforms substantially to the laws of the demanding state.
Upon the executive of the state or territory in which the
accused is found rests the responsibility of determining whether he
is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. But the act
of Congress does not direct his surrender unless it is made to
appear that he is in fact a fugitive from justice.
If the determination of that fact, upon proof before the
executive of the state where the alleged fugitive is found, is
subject to judicial review upon habeas corpus, the accused, being
in custody under his warrant, which recites the requisition of the
demanding state, accompanied by an authentic indictment, charging
him substantially as required by its laws with a specific crime
committed within its jurisdiction, should not be discharged
because, in the judgment of the court, the proof showing that he
was a fugitive from justice may not be as full as might properly
have been required.
This is an appeal from the judgment upon habeas corpus of the
Third Judicial District court of Utah remanding the appellant to
the custody of the marshal of the United States, by whom he had
been arrested. The arrest was made under the authority of a warrant
of the Governor of Utah, which recited that it had been represented
by the Governor of Pennsylvania that Louis Reggel stood charged in
that commonwealth with the crime of obtaining goods by false
pretenses from Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman; that he had fled
from the justice of that commonwealth, and had taken refuge in the
Territory of Utah. It then proceeded:
"And whereas said representation and demand are accompanied by
an indictment found against said Reggel by the grand inquest of the
said State of Pennsylvania inquiring for the City and County of
Philadelphia, in and before the Court of Quarter Sessions of the
Peace for the said City and County of Philadelphia, March sessions,
1882, whereby said Louis Reggel is charged with the said crime, and
an affidavit taken before a notary public of said state showing
said Reggel's flight from
Page 114 U. S. 644
said state to and refuge in said territory, and also the statute
laws of said state defining and making said acts of said Reggel a
crime, and which said indictment, affidavit, and laws are certified
by said Governor of Pennsylvania to be duly authenticated: you are
therefore required to arrest the said Louis Reggel,"
etc.
The evidence laid before the Governor of Utah was entirely
documentary, and embraced the following papers:
1. The requisition, in the customary form, of the Governor of
Pennsylvania, requesting the apprehension of Reggel, and his
delivery to the agent of Pennsylvania, and to which was annexed a
copy of the indictment and other papers, certified by him to be
authentic.
2. A duly certified copy of the indictment referred to in the
foregoing requisition, as follows:
"
I
n the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the"
"
City and County of Philadelphis. March Sessions,
1882."
"CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA,
ss.:"
"The grand inquest of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
inquiring for the City and County of Philadelphia, upon their
respective oaths and affirmations, do present Louis Reggel, late of
said county, on the thirteenth day of August, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one at the county
aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, unlawfully
and willfully devising and intending to cheat and defraud Daniel
Myers and Charles Goodman of their goods, moneys, chattels, and
property, unlawfully, did falsely and designedly pretend to the
said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman that he, the said Louis
Reggel, was then and there the owner in his own right of a large
stock of goods in his business as a merchant of Salt Lake City, in
the Territory of Utah, of the value of thirty-five thousand
dollars, and that he did not then and there owe to any person a
single dollar on account of said goods and merchandise, or for
money borrowed, and also then and there unlawfully did falsely and
designedly pretend to the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman
that he was then and there the owner in his own right of a
certain
Page 114 U. S. 645
lot of ground, containing thereon a store building, wherein he
carried on his business at Salt Lake City, in the Territory of
Utah, and that he was also then and there the owner in his own
right of a certain other lot of ground, containing thereon a
certain dwelling house, wherein he then and there resided at Salt
Lake City, in the Territory of Utah, and he, the said Louis Reggel,
then and there unlawfully and falsely pretended to said Daniel
Myers and Charles Goodman that said two houses and two lots were
then and there together of the value of forty thousand dollars, and
that said two lots and their improvements were then and there free
from all encumbrance; whereas in truth and in fact the said Louis
Reggel was not then and there the owner in his own right of goods
and merchandise in his business of the value of thirty-five
thousand dollars at Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah, all
paid for, and free of debt for money borrowed, the said Louis
Reggel being then and there in the possession of and owner of a
stock of goods and merchandise in his business at Salt Lake City,
in the Territory of Utah, of the value of only about six thousand
dollars, instead of the value of thirty-five thousand dollars, as
then and there unlawfully, falsely, and designedly pretended by
him, the said Louis Reggel, and the said Louis Reggel was then and
there indebted in the sum of $3,500 to the banking house of
McCormick & Co. at Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah,
for money drawn from said banking house, and whereas in truth and
in fact the said Louis Reggel was not then and there the owner in
his own right of a certain lot of ground, containing thereon a
store building, wherein he then and there carried on his business
at Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah, and a certain other
lot of ground, containing thereon a dwelling house wherein he then
and there resided at Salt Lake City aforesaid, together of the
value of forty thousand dollars, clear of all encumbrances; that
the said two lots of ground and the improvements and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, were, by the said Louis Reggel, on the
fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and eighty, by deed, duly recorded in the office for
the recording of deeds for Salt Lake county, in the Territory
of
Page 114 U. S. 646
Utah, granted, sold, conveyed, and confirmed unto Robert
Harkness and L. R. Jones, of said Salt Lake City, in the Territory
of Utah, and the title to the said two lots of ground and
improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, was at the time
of the making of said unlawful, false, and fraudulent pretenses by
the said Louis Reggel at the county aforesaid, in the said Robert
Harkness and the said L. R. Jones, and not in the said Louis
Reggel, and the said Louis Reggel then and there well knew the said
pretenses to be unlawful, fraudulent, and false. Whereupon the said
Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, believing the said false
representations and pretenses then and there made by the said Louis
Reggel, sold and delivered to the said Louis Reggel, on a credit of
four months [here follows a description and statement of the value
of said goods, chattels, and property alleged to have been obtained
under false pretenses], which said goods and chattels and property
the said Louis Reggel did then and there unlawfully obtain from the
said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman with intent to cheat and
defraud the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman to the great
damage of the said Daniel Myers and Charles Goodman, contrary to
the form of the act of the General Assembly in such case made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania."
"GEORGE S. GRAHAM"
"
District Attorney"
3. Duly certified copies of certain provisions of the penal laws
of Pennsylvania, as follows:
"Every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and
good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language
of the act of the assembly prohibiting the crime and prescribing
the punishment, if any such there be, or, if at common law, so
plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily
understood by the jury. Every objection to any indictment for any
formal defect apparent on the face thereof shall be taken by
demurrer or on motion to quash such indictment
Page 114 U. S. 647
before the jury shall be sworn, and not afterwards, and every
court before whom any such objection shall be taken for any formal
defect may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indictment to be
forthwith amended in such particular by the clerk or other officer
of the court, and thereupon the trial shall proceed as if no such
defect appeared."
1 Brightly's Purdon's Dig. 347, 348; Act March 31, 1860.
"If any person shall, by any false pretense, obtain the
signature of any person to any written instrument, or shall obtain
from any other person any other chattel, money, or valuable
security, with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same,
every such offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, and undergo an imprisonment not exceeding three years,
provided always that if upon the trial of any person
indicted for such misdemeanor it shall be proved that he obtained
the property in question in such manner as to amount in law to
larceny, he shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted
of such misdemeanor, and no person tried for such misdemeanor shall
be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny upon the same
facts."
Ibid., 347, 348; Act of March 31, 1860.
4. An affidavit by Frederick Gentner, as follows:
"COMMONWEALTH OF PENNA. V. LOUIS REGGEL"
"Frederick Gentner, being duly sworn according to law, deposes
and says: the grand jury of the March sessions of the City and
County of Philadelphia found a true bill of indictment against
Louis Reggel, charging him with the crime of false pretenses, and
that the said Louis Reggel is a fugitive from justice, and now in
Salt Lake City, Utah Territory."
"FREDERICK GENTNER"
"Sworn to and subscribed to this 10th day of April, A.D.
1882."
"Seal of Court Quarter Sessions ALLISON HENNESEY"
"County Philadelphia
Per Clerk"
"Endorsed: @Commonwealth v. Louis Reggel"
Page 114 U. S. 648
The foregoing constituted the evidence submitted to the Governor
of Utah, on which his warrant for the arrest of appellant was
granted.
From the order denying the application of the petitioner to be
discharged and remanding him to the custody of the marshal, an
appeal was allowed and perfected -- the petitioner, pending the
appeal, being placed under bond to surrender himself in execution
of the judgment, if it should be affirmed, modified, or dismissed,
and obey all orders made herein by this Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated
the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
This case arises under §§ 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, which provide:
"SEC. 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any state or
territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of the
executive authority of any state or territory to which such person
has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or affidavit
made before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the
person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate
of the state or territory from whence the person has fled, it shall
be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to
which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured,
and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive
authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority
appointed to secure the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be
delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent
appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner
may be discharged. All costs and expenses incurred in the
apprehending, securing, and transporting such fugitive to the state
or territory making such demand shall be paid by such state or
territory."
"SEC. 5279. Any agent who receives the fugitive
Page 114 U. S. 649
into his custody shall be empowered to transport him to the
state or territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by
force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent
while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than five
hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year."
1 Stat. c. 7, §§ 1, 2.
It is not necessary to consider the question suggested by
counsel as to the right of the governor of the territory to have
withheld the papers upon which he based his warrant for the arrest
of the accused, for the record shows that the requisition and the
accompanying papers from the Governor of Pennsylvania constituted
the evidence upon which he acted, and were submitted to the court
to which the writ of habeas corpus was returned.
Under the act of Congress, it became the duty of the Governor of
Utah to cause the arrest of Reggel, and his delivery to the agent
appointed to receive him, when it appeared:
1. That the demand by the executive authority of Pennsylvania
was accompanied by a copy of an indictment, or affidavit made
before a magistrate, charging Reggel with having committed treason,
felony, or other crime within that state, and certified as
authentic by her governor.
2. That the person demanded was a fugitive from justice.
The first of these conditions was met by the production to the
Governor of Utah of the indictment (duly certified as authentic) of
the grand jury of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace for
the City and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, wherein the
accused was charged with having committed the crime of obtaining,
by false pretenses, certain goods, with the intent to cheat and
defraud the persons therein named, which offense, as was made to
appear from the statutes of that commonwealth (a copy of which,
duly certified as authentic, accompanied the indictment), is a
misdemeanor under the laws of Pennsylvania, punishable by a fine
not exceeding $500, and imprisonment not exceeding three years.
It was objected in the court of original jurisdiction that there
could be no valid requisition based upon an indictment for an
offense less than a felony. This view is erroneous. It
Page 114 U. S. 650
was declared, in
Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 99, that the words "treason,
felony, or other crime," in Section 2 of Article I of the
Constitution, include every offense, from the highest to the
lowest, known to the law of the state from which the accused had
fled, including misdemeanors. It was there said by Chief Justice
Taney, speaking for the whole Court, that, looking to the words of
the Constitution,
"to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to
preserve harmony between the states and order and law within their
respective borders, and to its early adoption by the colonies, and
then by the confederated states whose mutual interest it was to
give each other aid and support whenever it was needed, the
conclusion is irresistible that this compact engrafted in the
Constitution included, and was intended to include, every offense
made punishable by the law of the state in which it was
committed."
It is within the power of each state, except as her authority
may be limited by the Constitution of the United States, to declare
what shall be offenses against her laws, and citizens of other
states, when within her jurisdiction, are subject to those laws. In
recognition of this right, so reserved to the states, the words of
the clause in reference to fugitives from justice were made
sufficiently comprehensive to include every offense against the
laws of the demanding state, without exception as to the nature of
the crime.
Although the constitutional provision in question does not, in
terms, refer to fugitives from the justice of any state who may be
found in one of the territories of the United States, the act of
Congress has equal application in that class of cases, and the
words "treason, felony, or other crime" must receive the same
interpretation when the demand for the fugitive is made, under that
act, upon the governor of a territory, as when made upon the
executive authority of one of the states of the Union.
Another proposition advanced in behalf of the appellant is that
the indictment which accompanied the requisition does not
sufficiently charge the commission of any crime, of which fact it
was the duty of the Governor of Utah to take notice, and which the
court may not ignore in determining whether
Page 114 U. S. 651
the appellant is lawfully in custody. In connection with this
proposition, counsel discusses, in the light of the adjudged cases,
the general question as to the authority of a court of the state or
territory in which the fugitive is found to discharge him from
arrest whenever, in its judgment, the indictment, according to the
technical rules of criminal pleading, is defective in its statement
of the crime charged. It is sufficient for the purposes of the
present case to say that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, every
indictment is to be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law
which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of
assembly prohibiting its commission, and prescribing the punishment
therefor, or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the
offense charged may be easily understood by the jury, and that the
indictment which accompanied the requisition of the Governor of
Pennsylvania does charge the crime substantially in the language of
her statute. That commonwealth has the right to establish the forms
of pleadings and process to be observed in her own courts, in both
civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provisions of the
Constitution of the United States involving the protection of life,
liberty, and property in all the states of the Union.
The only question remaining to be considered, relates to the
alleged want of competent evidence before the governor or of Utah
at the time he issued the warrant of arrest, to prove that the
appellant was a fugitive from the justice of Pennsylvania.
Undoubtedly the act of Congress did not impose upon the executive
authority of the territory the duty of surrendering the appellant,
unless it was made to appear, in some proper way, that he was a
fugitive from justice. In other words, the appellant was entitled,
under the act of Congress, to insist upon proof that he was within
the demanding state at the time he is alleged to have committed the
crime charged, and subsequently withdrew from her jurisdiction, so
that he could not be reached by her criminal process. The statute,
it is to be observed, does not prescribe the character of such
proof, but that the executive authority of the territory was not
required by the act of Congress to cause the arrest of
appellant
Page 114 U. S. 652
and his delivery to the agent appointed by the Governor of
Pennsylvania, without proof of the fact that he was a fugitive from
justice, is, in our judgment, clear from the language of that act.
Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the mere
requisition by the executive of the demanding state, accompanied by
the copy of an indictment or an affidavit before a magistrate,
certified by him to be authentic, charging the accused with crime
committed within her limits, imposes upon the executive of the
state or territory where the accused is found the duty of
surrendering him, although he may be satisfied from incontestable
proof that the accused had in fact never been in the demanding
state, and therefore could not be said to have fled from its
justice. Upon the executive of the state in which the accused is
found, rests the responsibility of determining, in some legal mode,
whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state.
He does not fail in duty if he makes it a condition precedent to
the surrender of the accused that it be shown to him, by competent
proof, that the accused is in fact a fugitive from the justice of
the demanding state.
Did it sufficiently appear that the appellant was, as
represented by the executive authority of Pennsylvania, a fugitive
from the justice of that commonwealth? We are not justified by the
record before us in saying that the Governor of Utah should have
held the evidence inadequate to establish that fact. The warrant of
arrest refers to an affidavit taken before a notary public of
Pennsylvania, showing Reggel's flight from that commonwealth. There
was no such affidavit, but the reference manifestly was to the
affidavit made by Frederick Gentner, which recited the finding by
the grand jury of the City and County of Philadelphia, of a true
bill of indictment charging Reggel with "the crime of false
pretenses," and stating that he "is a fugitive from justice," and
was then in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory. This is sworn to, and
is attested by the seal of the Court of Quarter Sessions -- the
court in which the prosecution is pending. It is not entirely clear
from the record, as presented to us, what is the official character
of the person before whom the affidavit was made. The
reasonable
Page 114 U. S. 653
inference is that the affidavit was made in the court where the
prosecution is pending, and that it is one of the papers
accompanying the requisition of the Governor of Pennsylvania, and
which he certified to be authentic.
It is contended that Gentner's affidavit that Reggel is a
fugitive from justice is the statement of a legal conclusion, and
is materially defective in not setting out the facts upon which
that conclusion rested. Although that statement presents, in some
aspects of it, a question of law, we cannot say that the Governor
of Utah erred in regarding it as the statement of a fact, and as
sufficient evidence that appellant had fled from the state in which
he stood charged with the commission of a particular crime, on a
named day at the City and County of Philadelphia, especially, as no
opposing evidence was brought to his attention. If the
determination of that fact by the Governor of Utah upon evidence
introduced before him is subject to judicial review upon habeas
corpus, the accused, in custody under his warrant -- which recites
the demand of the Governor of Pennsylvania, accompanied by an
authentic indictment charging him, substantially in the language of
her statutes, with a specific crime committed within her limits --
should not be discharged merely because, in the judgment of the
court, the evidence as to his being a fugitive from justice was not
as full as might properly have been required, or because it was so
meager as perhaps to admit of a conclusion different from that
reached by him. In the present case, the proof before the Governor
of Utah may be deemed sufficient to make a
prima facie
case against the appellant as a fugitive from justice within the
meaning of the act of Congress.
Judgment affirmed.
